Moss v Gunns Finance Pty Ltd (Receivers & Managers Appointed) (In liquidation)

Link copied
Case Copied 51 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Moss v Gunns Finance Pty Ltd (Receivers & Managers Appointed) (In liquidation) [2018] FCAFC 185

Appeal from: Gunns Finance Pty Ltd (Receivers And Managers Appointed) (in Liquidation) v Moss & Anor [2017] FCCA 1773
File number: VID 978 of 2017
Judges: GLEESON, LEE, AND BANKS-SMITH JJ
Date of judgment: 29 October 2018
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – appeal – application for orders reversing trustees’ decision not to admit a proof of debt in full and for a personal insolvency agreement to be set aside – personal insolvency agreement set aside by primary judge – whether primary judge should have set aside personal insolvency agreement – whether personal insolvency agreement calculated to benefit creditors generally – where debtor has a cross-claim – no error established in primary judge determining issues raised by cross-claim necessary to form a view as to whether proof of debt should have been admitted in full – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth)
Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 79, 1022B, 1013D, 1013E, 1022A, 1022B, 1041H
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 104, 178, 188, 221, 222
Insolvency Law Reform Act 2016 (Cth)

Federal Circuit Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2016 (Cth) Rule 10.04

Cases cited:

Augustyn v Putnin (1988) 83 ALR 514

Beard v Prestige Banking Industries (1981) 52 FLR 384

Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd v Clout [2016] FCA 119; (2016) 14 ABC(NS) 46

Cummings v Claremont Petroleum NL (1996) 185 CLR 124

Forshaw v Thompson (1992) 35 FCR 329

Hingston v Westpac Banking Corporation [2012] FCAFC 41; (2012) 200 FCR 493

McGoldrick v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1993) 47 FCR 547

Musolino v Sidiropoulos (1991) 101 ALR 235

New Age Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd v Etlis [2013] FCA 884; (2013) 11 ABC (NS) 542

Osborne v Gangemi [2011] FCA 1252; (2011) 9 ABC (NS) 257

Quikfund (Australia) Pty Ltd v Prosperity Group International Pty Ltd (in liq) [2013] FCAFC 5; (2013) 209 FCR 368

Re Brindle; Ex parte FB & FA McMahon Pty Limited (1992) 35 FCR 506

Re Dingle; Ex parte Westpac Banking Corporation v Worrell (1993) 47 FCR 478

Re Rogers; Ex parte CMV Parts Distributors Pty Ltd (1989) 20 FCR 561

Re Tyndall; Ex parte Official Receiver (1977) 30 FLR 6; 17 ALR 182

Scott v Davis [2000] HCA 52; 204 CLR 333

Westpac Banking Corporation v Hingston (No 2) [2010] FCA 1116; (2010) 117 ALD 552

Zantiotis v Andrew (1987) 80 ALR 23

Clarke v Great Southern Finance Pty Ltd(in liq) [2010] VSC 473 (2010) 243 FLR 451

Clarke v Great Southern Finance Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) (in liq) [2014] VSC 516

Woodcroft-Brown v Timbercorp Securities Ltd (No 2) [2011] VSC 526

Morgans v Launchbury [1973] AC 127

Date of hearing: 22, 23 August 2018
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 109
Counsel for the Appellant:
CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Moss v Gunns Finance Pty Ltd (Receivers & Managers Appointed... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2018] FCAFC 185
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Moss v Gunns Finance Pty Ltd (Receivers & Managers Appointed) (In liquidation) involved a dispute regarding the admission of a proof of debt and the setting aside of a personal insolvency agreement (PIA) in the context of bankruptcy proceedings. The primary judge had set aside the PIA and determined that the Gunns Woodlot debt should have been admitted for its full claimed value rather than the admitted amount of $1. The bankrupt, Moss, appealed against these decisions. The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge should have set aside the PIA and whether the PIA was calculated to benefit creditors generally. The court also considered whether the primary judge should have admitted the Gunns Woodlot debt in full.

The court examined the primary judge's reasoning and found no error in the determination that the Gunns Woodlot debt should not have been admitted in full. The primary judge concluded that the return to creditors under the PIA was negligible, there was little risk to creditors if the PIA was set aside, and further investigation was required into the debtor's affairs. The court held that the primary judge's conclusion on the PIA was based on these findings and the trustees' failure to properly consider the debt claim. The court also found that the primary judge did not err in determining the issues raised by the cross-claim necessary to form a view on whether the proof of debt should have been admitted in full. The appeal was dismissed, and the costs of the respondent were paid out of the bankrupt estate of the appellant.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The costs of the respondent of the appeal be paid out of the bankrupt estate of the appellant.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Having identified the relevant statutory tasks and the principles to be applied, it is appropriate to turn to how the primary judge determined the applications.C HOW THE PRIMARY JUDGE APPROACHED HIS DECISION At [8], the primary judge summarised his conclusions as to why “an order should be made setting aside the PIA”. The reasons were fourfold:(1)the Gunns Woodlot debt was wrongly admitted for only $1 and should have been admitted for its full claimed value; (2)the return to creditors under the PIA is negligible and there was little risk to creditors if it was set aside;(3)the trustees ought to have been circumspect in relation to debts owed to friendly creditors who voted for the PIA but did not stand to benefit under it; and(4)further investigation was required in relation to the affairs of the debtor in particular in relation to the property owned by his wife. In relation to the Proof of Debt Application, as noted above, although no order was made by the primary judge, his Honour made three findings relevant to its determination:(1)despite being required to do so, the trustees failed to decide for themselves the true value of the Gunns Woodlot debt: at [168]; (2)Mr Moss did not establish that Gunns Finance was acting as an agent for GPL or that Gunns Finance is fixed with a liability in respect of any alleged misrepresentation contained in any product disclosure statement and accordingly, for this reason, “the cross-claim fails”: at [187]; (3)the calculation of interest and indemnity costs which form a substantial part of the Gunns Woodlot debt was not successfully impugned: at [193]. It will be necessary to return to these aspects of the primary judge’s reasons below, but two important preliminary comments should be made. First, although a Points of Claim document was before the Court, it did not specify, with any particularity, how Gunns Finance put the PIA Application case under s 222(1)(d) or s 222(1)(e) of the Act. This lack of precision did not assist the primary judge delineating between matters relied upon under each subsection of s 222(1) and the interrelationship between the individual findings summarised at [17] above. The reasoning of the primary judge as to the PIA Application is best viewed as comprising two parts. At [70]-[105], the primary judge considered what his Honour identified were the grounds for setting aside the PIA pursuant to s 222(1)(d) of the Act; and at [106]-[163], the primary judge considered what his Honour identified as being the s 222(1)(e) ground. Accordingly, it seems to us that the better view of his Honour’s reasons insofar as a s 221(1)(d) conclusion was reached, is that his conclusion is based on the findings that: (a) the return to creditors under the PIA was negligible and there was little risk to creditors if set aside; (b) the trustees ought to have been circumspect in relation to debts owed to friendly creditors who voted for the PIA but did not stand to benefit under it; and (c) further investigation was required.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Both Ground 1 and Ground 2 of the notice of contention were not opposed and leave to raise these grounds was granted. Proposed Ground 3 fell into a separate category, and the question of leave was reserved. Mr Wells submitted that it raised a new matter which had not been addressed in the submissions on appeal and was not dealt with in detail in either the primary judgment or the hearing below. There is no reason why Ground 3, which does raise a discrete issue, could not have been advanced at an earlier time during the course of the appeal. It would require attention to be given to detailed matters not addressed in the written submissions. In the circumstances, we consider that the objection of Mr Moss to a grant of leave to raise it belatedly is well founded. Accordingly, leave to raise Ground 3 is refused. E CONSIDERATION OF THE APPEAL GROUNDSE.1 Admission of Gunns Woodlot Debt Grounds (Ground 2 ANOA) The primary judge’s conclusion that Gunns Finance’s proof was wrongly admitted for only $1 and should have been admitted in full (at [8(a)], [134]) had two aspects: first, the controlling trustees had not properly considered Gunns Finance’s claim (see [106]-[147]); and secondly, a conclusion that the underlying merits were such as to require that the proof be admitted in the full amount (see [164]-[187]). The latter conclusion was expressed, as explained above, in the finding that Gunns Finance established its claim, and Mr Moss’ “cross-claim failed” (at [187]). Mr Moss challenges both these findings. The first aspect can be dealt with shortly. Although the primary judge reasoned that the trustees failed in their duty to make their own judgment about the prospects of the litigation between Gunns Finance and Mr Moss (see [141]-[147]), this has no enduring consequence. The controlling trustees may determine any question as to the entitlement of a person to vote, but the Court has power to determine whether or not persons were in actual fact entitled to vote: see Forshaw v Thompson (1992) 35 FCR 329 at 339-340 (Lockhart J with whom Black CJ and Sweeney J agreed); Zantiotis v Andrew (1987) 80 ALR 23, 26-27 (Beaumont J); Re Dingle; Westpac Banking Corporation v Worrell (1993) 47 FCR 478, 485 (Full Court). As the Full Court noted in Re Dingle; Westpac v Worrell at 90, “once the matter came to Court, the course taken by the trustee became irrelevant”, as did the conduct or opinion of the trustees. Another matter which on a proper analysis is of no enduring significance, is the assertion of Mr Moss that the recovery proceeding itself could not be “properly determined in the absence of a trial of the District Court proceeding”. Mr Moss contends the cross-claim (including the issue of the authority of Mr Uittenbogaard, an employee of GPL) could not be determined “in the absence of a trial” and the “usual pre-trial steps” (such as discovery, subpoenas, notices to produce). It follows, it is said, that the primary judge erred in finding that his Honour was determining the cross-claim. For reasons that have already been remarked upon, this submission of Mr Moss may be accepted so far as it goes. The problem for Mr Moss is that it does not go very far at all.