FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Moss v Gunns Finance Pty Ltd (Receivers & Managers Appointed) (In liquidation) [2018] FCAFC 185
Appeal from: Gunns Finance Pty Ltd (Receivers And Managers Appointed) (in Liquidation) v Moss & Anor [2017] FCCA 1773 File number: VID 978 of 2017 Judges: GLEESON, LEE, AND BANKS-SMITH JJ Date of judgment: 29 October 2018 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – appeal – application for orders reversing trustees’ decision not to admit a proof of debt in full and for a personal insolvency agreement to be set aside – personal insolvency agreement set aside by primary judge – whether primary judge should have set aside personal insolvency agreement – whether personal insolvency agreement calculated to benefit creditors generally – where debtor has a cross-claim – no error established in primary judge determining issues raised by cross-claim necessary to form a view as to whether proof of debt should have been admitted in full – appeal dismissed Legislation: Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth)
Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 79, 1022B, 1013D, 1013E, 1022A, 1022B, 1041H
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 104, 178, 188, 221, 222
Insolvency Law Reform Act 2016 (Cth)Federal Circuit Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2016 (Cth) Rule 10.04
Cases cited: Augustyn v Putnin (1988) 83 ALR 514
Beard v Prestige Banking Industries (1981) 52 FLR 384
Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd v Clout [2016] FCA 119; (2016) 14 ABC(NS) 46
Cummings v Claremont Petroleum NL (1996) 185 CLR 124
Forshaw v Thompson (1992) 35 FCR 329
Hingston v Westpac Banking Corporation [2012] FCAFC 41; (2012) 200 FCR 493
McGoldrick v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1993) 47 FCR 547
Musolino v Sidiropoulos (1991) 101 ALR 235
New Age Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd v Etlis [2013] FCA 884; (2013) 11 ABC (NS) 542
Osborne v Gangemi [2011] FCA 1252; (2011) 9 ABC (NS) 257
Quikfund (Australia) Pty Ltd v Prosperity Group International Pty Ltd (in liq) [2013] FCAFC 5; (2013) 209 FCR 368
Re Brindle; Ex parte FB & FA McMahon Pty Limited (1992) 35 FCR 506
Re Dingle; Ex parte Westpac Banking Corporation v Worrell (1993) 47 FCR 478
Re Rogers; Ex parte CMV Parts Distributors Pty Ltd (1989) 20 FCR 561
Re Tyndall; Ex parte Official Receiver (1977) 30 FLR 6; 17 ALR 182
Scott v Davis [2000] HCA 52; 204 CLR 333
Westpac Banking Corporation v Hingston (No 2) [2010] FCA 1116; (2010) 117 ALD 552
Zantiotis v Andrew (1987) 80 ALR 23
Clarke v Great Southern Finance Pty Ltd(in liq) [2010] VSC 473 (2010) 243 FLR 451
Clarke v Great Southern Finance Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) (in liq) [2014] VSC 516
Woodcroft-Brown v Timbercorp Securities Ltd (No 2) [2011] VSC 526
Date of hearing: 22, 23 August 2018 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 109 Counsel for the Appellant:
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- Case
- [2018] FCAFC 185
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the primary judge's reasoning and found no error in the determination that the Gunns Woodlot debt should not have been admitted in full. The primary judge concluded that the return to creditors under the PIA was negligible, there was little risk to creditors if the PIA was set aside, and further investigation was required into the debtor's affairs. The court held that the primary judge's conclusion on the PIA was based on these findings and the trustees' failure to properly consider the debt claim. The court also found that the primary judge did not err in determining the issues raised by the cross-claim necessary to form a view on whether the proof of debt should have been admitted in full. The appeal was dismissed, and the costs of the respondent were paid out of the bankrupt estate of the appellant.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The costs of the respondent of the appeal be paid out of the bankrupt estate of the appellant.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Both Ground 1 and Ground 2 of the notice of contention were not opposed and leave to raise these grounds was granted. Proposed Ground 3 fell into a separate category, and the question of leave was reserved. Mr Wells submitted that it raised a new matter which had not been addressed in the submissions on appeal and was not dealt with in detail in either the primary judgment or the hearing below. There is no reason why Ground 3, which does raise a discrete issue, could not have been advanced at an earlier time during the course of the appeal. It would require attention to be given to detailed matters not addressed in the written submissions. In the circumstances, we consider that the objection of Mr Moss to a grant of leave to raise it belatedly is well founded. Accordingly, leave to raise Ground 3 is refused. E CONSIDERATION OF THE APPEAL GROUNDSE.1 Admission of Gunns Woodlot Debt Grounds (Ground 2 ANOA) The primary judge’s conclusion that Gunns Finance’s proof was wrongly admitted for only $1 and should have been admitted in full (at [8(a)], [134]) had two aspects: first, the controlling trustees had not properly considered Gunns Finance’s claim (see [106]-[147]); and secondly, a conclusion that the underlying merits were such as to require that the proof be admitted in the full amount (see [164]-[187]). The latter conclusion was expressed, as explained above, in the finding that Gunns Finance established its claim, and Mr Moss’ “cross-claim failed” (at [187]). Mr Moss challenges both these findings. The first aspect can be dealt with shortly. Although the primary judge reasoned that the trustees failed in their duty to make their own judgment about the prospects of the litigation between Gunns Finance and Mr Moss (see [141]-[147]), this has no enduring consequence. The controlling trustees may determine any question as to the entitlement of a person to vote, but the Court has power to determine whether or not persons were in actual fact entitled to vote: see Forshaw v Thompson (1992) 35 FCR 329 at 339-340 (Lockhart J with whom Black CJ and Sweeney J agreed); Zantiotis v Andrew (1987) 80 ALR 23, 26-27 (Beaumont J); Re Dingle; Westpac Banking Corporation v Worrell (1993) 47 FCR 478, 485 (Full Court). As the Full Court noted in Re Dingle; Westpac v Worrell at 90, “once the matter came to Court, the course taken by the trustee became irrelevant”, as did the conduct or opinion of the trustees. Another matter which on a proper analysis is of no enduring significance, is the assertion of Mr Moss that the recovery proceeding itself could not be “properly determined in the absence of a trial of the District Court proceeding”. Mr Moss contends the cross-claim (including the issue of the authority of Mr Uittenbogaard, an employee of GPL) could not be determined “in the absence of a trial” and the “usual pre-trial steps” (such as discovery, subpoenas, notices to produce). It follows, it is said, that the primary judge erred in finding that his Honour was determining the cross-claim. For reasons that have already been remarked upon, this submission of Mr Moss may be accepted so far as it goes. The problem for Mr Moss is that it does not go very far at all.