of an lnqulry as tor2] THE CIRCCUiUISTAECES OF THE FIRE
which nnqu~ry
m.dc
ON THE MOTOR TAWER "CELLANA", OFFICIAL NUMBER 317787
WHEN BERTIIED AT N0.2 WHARF, GORE
COVE, NEW SOUTH WALES
ON 29 JUNE 1976.
The Court, having carefully lnqulred as to(*) the clrcumstances of the
fire on the motor tanker
"CELLANA", Offlcial number
317787 when berthed
at No.2 wharf, GORE COVE, New
South Wales
on 29 June 1976.
Finds that *a flre occurred on board the Motor Tanker
"Cellana" at about
0020 on Tuesday, 29 June 1976
whilst berthed at No.2 w)larf at the tanker termlr.al
owned and operated by Shell Refinlng (Australia)
Pty. Limlted at Gore Cove
13 the port of Sydney
In New South Wales and that shortly thereafter
s
a consequence of such
f l re two members of t he crew
of the vessel namely Bosun Alan Talbot and A/B Seaman
Arnold Higglns dled
as a result of asphyxlatlon.
M.T.
"Cellana" 1 s owned by Shell Internatlonal Marluc
Limlted of London and was at the relevant tune under
charter to Shell Company of
Australia Llmlted. Associated
Steamshlps Llrnlted 1 s the Hanager
of the vessel pnslxirlt
to an agreement dated 29 February 1969 between that
company and Shell Company of Australla Llmlted. The
agent for and
In the port of Sydney 1 s Union Bulkshlps
Pty. Llmlted.
- 2 -
The vessel was bullt at Whyalla
In South Australla in
1968 by Whyalla Shipbullding and Englneerlng
Works, a divlsion
of The Broken H111 Proprletory Llmited. It has
a registcred
tonnage of 9021.83 a gross tonnage
of 16004.57 and a dead
weight of 25,632 tons.
Its port of reglstratlon 1s Geelong
in the State of Victorla.
The vessel has seven sets of cargo
tanks, each set
consisting of a centre, a starboard and a port tank. Each
set 1s known by Its respective number followed by the word
"across".
In addition there IS, as far as 1 s relevant to
the inquiry, a tank known
as the slop tank which
1s used In
closed-circuit tank-washlng operations. Each set
of tanks
can be opened
to various main lines by means
of valves some
of whlch are hand-operated whilst others are operated
by
means of compressed air. There are four maln llnes running
fore and aft numbered
1 to 4,
1 and 2 belng
on the port slde
and 3 and 4 on the starboard slde
of the flying deck. Each
set of tanks has its
own interconnecting cross-over line,
I
which in the case of No.5 across is dlrectly connected to No.2 and No.3 malnline by means of valves known as No.5 port cross-over valve and No.5 starboard cross-over valve
respectlvely. All such cross-over valves are manually
operated and requlre some 30 turns from the shut to the
open positlon.
In order
had been adopted whereby the dlfferent valves were palnted a
dlstinguishlng colour. This system…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Re Tyndall; Ex parte Official Receiver [1977] FCA 15
Case
[1977] FCA 15
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
This case involved an inquiry into the circumstances surrounding a fire that occurred on the motor tanker "CELLANA" while it was berthed at No.2 Wharf, Gore Cove, New South Wales, on 29 June 1976. The fire resulted in the deaths of two crew members, Bosun Alan Talbot and A/B Seaman Arnold Higgins, who succumbed to asphyxiation due to smoke inhalation. The Court was required to determine the cause of the fire and whether any negligence or defects contributed to the tragic incident. The legal issues included the adequacy of the crew's training and the effectiveness of safety procedures and equipment on board the vessel. The Court found that the fire was caused by the opening of a cross-over valve by A/B Seaman Barry James Hourigan, who was instructed to do so by Bosun's Mate Eric George Wakeling, without proper oversight or understanding of the valve's function. Additionally, the spread of the fire was exacerbated by the open window of cabin No.4, which allowed smoke and heat to penetrate the crew's accommodation area. The Court recommended improvements in crew training, particularly in fire-fighting and tank-washing operations, and the implementation of more rigorous monitoring and record-keeping practices during such operations. The final orders included the implementation of these recommendations to prevent similar incidents in the future.