FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Duckworth v Field [2023] FCA 801
File number: WAD 60 of 2023 Judgment of: BANKS-SMITH J Date of judgment: 14 July 2023 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY - notice of objection to automatic discharge from bankruptcy - power to make such order as court thinks just and equitable - no evidence provided by trustee - open to infer on evidence tendered by bankrupt that subsequent substantial compliance with request for financial information - other discretionary factors - order that notice of objection be withdrawn Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 5, 6A, 30, 73, 139U, 139W, 139WA, 149, 149A, 149B, 149C, 149D, 149J, 149K, 149N, Schedule 2 (Insolvency Practice Schedule (Bankruptcy)) ss 5‑30, 90-15, 90-20 Cases cited: Booth v Offerman as trustee of the bankrupt estate of Geoffrey David Booth [2019] FCA 5
Frigger v Trenfield [2019] FCA 1746
Frost v Sheahan [2005] FCA 1014
Frost v Sheahan (Trustee) [2009] FCAFC 20
Macchia v Nilant [2001] FCA 7; (2001) 110 FCR 101
Mango Boulevard Pty Ltd v Whitton [2015] FCA 1169; (2015) 242 FCR 331
Nguyen v Pattison [2005] FCA 650
Re Tyndall; Ex parte Official Receiver (1977) 30 FLR 6
Smith v Trustee of the Property of Richard John Smith (a bankrupt) [2023] FCA 300
Division: General Division Registry: Western Australia National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency Number of paragraphs: 66 Date of hearing: Determined on the papers Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant was self-represented Counsel for the Respondent: The respondent did not appear ORDERS
WAD 60 of 2023 BETWEEN: NEIL JAMES DUCKWORTH
Applicant
AND: MALCOLM FIELD
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
BANKS-SMITH J
DATE OF ORDER:
14 JULY 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The respondent withdraw the objection to discharge dated 6 February 2020 forthwith.
2.The originating application dated 17 March 2023 and the interlocutory application dated 17 March 2023 are otherwise dismissed.
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
A.Pursuant to s 149A(3) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) the applicant is taken to be discharged from bankruptcy upon the objection being withdrawn.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BANKS-SMITH J:
Mr Neil Duckworth was made bankrupt on 29 September 2017 by a sequestration order made by the (then) Federal Circuit Court: Water Corporation v Duckworth [2017] FCCA 2216. The Official Trustee was appointed his trustee in bankruptcy at that time. In the ordinary course, pursuant to s 149 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (automatic discharge), Mr Duckworth would have been discharged from bankruptcy on about 14 October 2020, being three years from when he provided his completed statement of affairs to the Official Receiver.
However, on 6 February 2020 the respondent, who by then was the Trustee, filed an objection to Mr Duckworth's discharge from bankruptcy on the grounds that Mr Duckworth failed to comply with his statutory obligation to disclose particulars of income or…
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues were whether the notice of objection was validly issued and if the Official Trustee's refusal to withdraw the objection was just and equitable. The court considered the obligations under s 139U of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) that required Mr Duckworth to provide financial information. The court also evaluated the discretionary powers of the court under s 149D(1)(e) to make an order as it thinks just and equitable.
The court found that the notice of objection was validly issued, as it was based on Mr Duckworth's failure to provide the requested financial information as required by s 139U. The court observed that the Official Trustee's refusal to withdraw the objection was within her discretion. However, the court considered other factors, such as Mr Duckworth's subsequent substantial compliance with the request for financial information. The court concluded that it was just and equitable to order the withdrawal of the notice of objection. The court noted that Mr Duckworth would be deemed discharged from bankruptcy upon the objection being withdrawn.
In conclusion, the court ordered the respondent to withdraw the objection to discharge forthwith and dismissed the other applications. The court's decision recognised the importance of compliance with the Bankruptcy Act while also considering the broader context of the case.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The respondent withdraw the objection to discharge dated 6 February 2020 forthwith.
2. The originating application dated 17 March 2023 and the interlocutory application dated 17 March 2023 are otherwise dismissed.
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
A. Pursuant to s 149A(3) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) the applicant is taken to be discharged from bankruptcy upon the objection being withdrawn.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Although I informed Mr Duckworth that such applications are generally dealt with by oral hearing, he requested that I deal with it on the papers, saying that he had nothing further to add.Consideration The patchy nature of the evidence before me from Mr Duckworth, and the absence of any evidence from the Trustee, has left me in a position where it has been necessary to make assumptions and draw a number of inferences, as is apparent in the following reasons. Mr Duckworth makes no complaint about the form of the notice of objection itself. Because the Trustee relied on s 149D(1)(e) by way of the ground of objection, there was no obligation to provide reasons for issuing the notice: s 149C(1A). As Rangiah J observed in Mango Boulevard (at [134]), s149C(1A) does not remove the necessity for a trustee to have reasons to issue a notice of objection, but there is no obligation to state them in the notice. Section 149C(1)(b) also required the Trustee to refer to the evidence or other material that in the opinion of the Trustee establishes the ground relied upon. As explained in Smith v Trustee of the Property of Richard John Smith (a bankrupt) [2023] FCA 300 at [44] (Collier J), the notice must put the bankrupt in a position where they can identify, and if necessary search out, the evidence relied upon for the objection. In this case, the two letters referred to in the notice of objection were in the possession of Mr Duckworth and they explained in clear terms that the failure to provide the requested information founded the issue of the notice. The 1 August 2019 letter expressly asked for the ICQs and supporting documents, including bank statements, to be provided. The 15 January 2020 letter noted the lack of reply to the 1 August 2019 letter and again expressly sought the completion of the ICQs and supporting documents, including bank statements. There is no question that Mr Gamble and the Trustee were entitled to ask Mr Duckworth to provide the requested information, and he was obliged to comply: s 139U of the Bankruptcy Act. Bank statements fall within the 'books' that might evidence income ('books' is defined broadly in s 5 of the Bankruptcy Act, and includes accounts). Mr Duckworth appears to rely on the initial letter from the Official Trustee's office of 15 December 2017 to assert that he was not obliged to make income contributions, and so was not obliged to provide further information. Such a submission ignores the information provided by Ms Hale to the effect that he would continue to be required to provide information about his income during the course of his bankruptcy. More importantly, it ignores the operation of s 139WA (see [13] above). The provision of the 1 August 2019 letter and non-compliance with that letter are sufficient in the present circumstances for me to proceed on the basis that the notice of objection was validly issued. It follows, and I infer, that Mr Duckworth's real complaint is that the trustee has more recently refused to withdraw the objection. Whilst one could consider the refusal to withdraw the objection to be a continuing act over a period of time, I proceed on the basis that the decision reflected in the email to Mr Duckworth of 6 October 2022 is the relevant action of the Trustee for the purpose of this application. The Court considered such an application in Frost v Sheahan [2005] FCA 1014 (affirmed on appeal - Frost v Sheahan (Trustee) [2009] FCAFC 20 (Frost FCAFC)). It was accepted that the trustee's refusal to withdraw the notices in that case constituted an act, omission or decision of the trustee within the meaning of (then) s 178, such that it could be reviewed having regard to the supervisory jurisdiction over the conduct of a trustee contemplated by that provision.