Liati, Angela v Fitzsimons, Christopher Ronald
[1996] FCA 447
•13 JUNE 1996
CATCHWORDS
BANKRUPTCY ACT - Sequestration Orders - order made by Registrar - "review" of order hearing de novo.
Re Brindle; Ex p F B & F A McMahon Pty Ltd (1992) 35 FCR 506
Re Kwiatek; Ex p Big J Ltd v Pattison (1989) 21 FCR 374
BANKRUPTCY ACT - Sequestration Order - debt based on solicitor's bill of costs - dispute as to service of bill - bankruptcy notice - whether bankruptcy notice personally served - insolvency - debts subject to further dispute in litigation - whether insolvent.
Bankruptcy Rules, r 15
Corney v Brien (1951) 84 CLR 343
Re Ditfort; Ex p Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 19 FCR 347
Re Hudson; Ex p G E Crane & Sons Ltd (1990) 25 FCR 318
Trojan v Corporation of Hindmarsh (1987) 16 FCR 37
Wren v Mahoney (1972) 126 CLR 212
ANGELA LIATI v CHRISTOPHER RONALD FITZSIMONS
No NB 460/96
FINN J
SYDNEY
13 JUNE 1996
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
)
GENERAL DIVISION ) No. NB 460 of 1996
)
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE STATE )
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
BETWEEN: ANGELA LIATI
Applicant
AND: CHRISTOPHER RONALD FITZSIMONS
Respondent
CORAM: FINN J
DATE: 13 JUNE 1996
PLACE: SYDNEY
MINUTES OF ORDERS
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The orders made by the Registrar on 23 February 1996 be affirmed with costs.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
)
GENERAL DIVISION ) No. NB 460 of 1996
)
BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE STATE )
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
BETWEEN: ANGELA LIATI
Applicant
AND: CHRISTOPHER RONALD FITZSIMONS
Respondent
CORAM: FINN J
DATE: 13 JUNE 1996
PLACE: SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
On 23 February 1996 a Registrar in Bankruptcy made a sequestration order against the estate of Ms Liati. The petitioning creditor was Mr C R Fitzsimons, a solicitor. The act of bankruptcy relied upon was the failure on or before 4 July 1995 to comply with a bankruptcy notice served on 20 June 1995. The indebtedness claimed was the amount due on a judgment obtained by default in the Local Court at North Sydney on 27 January, 1995, the judgment itself being in respect of unsatisfied bills of costs said to have been given by Mr Fitzsimons to Ms Liati for professional services rendered.
The Registrar's power to make this order derived from the Bankruptcy Act 1966, s31A ("the Act"). Notwithstanding that
the initial application filed by Ms Liati in this matter on 26 February 1996 sought to have the bankruptcy annulled -presumably under the Act, s153B - her application has been conducted, properly in my view, as a review of the exercise of the Registrar's delegated power under the Act, s31A(7). As such, this "review" takes the form of a hearing de novo: see Re Kwiatek; Ex p Big J Ltd v Pattison (1989) 21 FCR 374; see also Re Brindle; Ex p F B & F A McMahon Pty Ltd (1992) 35 FCR 506; Re Millar; Ex p Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia, unreported decision of Burchett J, 27 April 1993. I should add that counsel for Mr Fitzsimons has not objected to the matter being dealt with in this way - the more so given that when making her original application Ms Liati acted without legal representation as she has thereafter in this matter.
Background
As it will be necessary to describe in some detail the particular circumstances said to support the specific grounds of objection Ms Liati has to the making of a sequestration order, my comments here can be brief.
Ms Liati retained Mr Fitzsimons in May 1993 to advise her concerning a property settlement with her de facto spouse under the De Facto Relationships Act 1984 (NSW). The original retainer was, on Mr Fitzsimons' evidence, an oral one on terms that payment would only be made on finalisation of the property matter. This arrangement was later changed - I have no clear evidence as to Ms Liati's part in agreeing the change - to a situation which resulted in the preparation of bills of costs from time to time. Again it is Mr Fitzsimons' evidence that he indicated that his charges would be only on the appropriate Supreme Court scale. Three bills were prepared on this basis. It is Mr Fitzsimons' evidence that these bills were sent to Ms Liati. It is her evidence that she received only one. I will need to return to this matter. The retainer was terminated sometime in mid-1994. Mr Fitzsimons then instituted proceedings against Ms Liati in the Local Court at North Sydney in respect of the three bills of costs. On 27 January 1995 judgment by default was given in the sum of $4,015.67, this sum being made up of the debt claimed ($3,296.00), legal costs and disbursements ($503.00) and interest ($216.67). I should note that Ms Liati had legal representation at this time. The bankruptcy notice issued on 16 February 1995 was founded on this judgment debt. As will be seen, Ms Liati denies personal service of the bankruptcy notice although she does not deny that it came into her possession sometime after it was sworn to have been served by the person engaged by Mr Fitzsimons for the purpose. The creditor's petition now before me was served on 20 December 1995.
There is one matter to which reference needs be made as it has significant bearing on the issue of Ms Liati's solvency. The proceedings under the De Facto Relationships Act in which Mr Fitzsimons was originally retained were subsequently litigated in the Supreme Court of New South Wales on Ms Liati's behalf by another firm of solicitors, Thorntons. Though a judgment was given in her favour in the sum of $125,000.00 on 15 December 1995, the defendant was ordered to pay only one quarter of her costs. An appeal and, I was informed, a cross-appeal have been lodged against that judgment.
On 15 February 1996, Thorntons billed Ms Liati for their costs in the sum of $188,147.10. Orders have been made in the Supreme Court in favour of Thorntons "freezing" the $125,000 to be paid under the judgment.
I should, perhaps, add for the sake of completeness that neither Mr Fitzsimons' retainer nor the bills said to have been rendered under it were affected by the 1993 amendments to the Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW).
The Bases of Opposition to the Creditor's Petition
Following directions given by Hill J, Ms Liati filed several affidavits in which she particularised her objections. In the hearing before me these were refined to the following:
that there was not personal service of the bankruptcy notice as required by the Bankruptcy Rules, r 15;
that two of the bills of costs were not delivered to Ms Liati and costs included in the third are contested by her with the consequence that she disputes the debt relied upon and she has instituted proceedings in the Local Court at North Sydney to have the default judgment of 27 January 1995 set aside;
that Mr Fitzsimons agreed or undertook not to proceed with the creditors petition, at least on 23 February 1996 which was the date on which the sequestration order was made; and
that Ms Liati was not insolvent.
While some attempt was made by Ms Liati in her affidavits and in cross-examination of Mr Fitzsimons to impugn his motives for persisting with these bankruptcy proceedings, I would have to say that there is no credible evidence at all before me to suggest that the proceedings constitute an abuse of process or are otherwise being used either to obtain a collateral advantage or to prosecute some conspiracy between Mr Fitzsimons and Ms Liati's former de facto spouse.
The four matters referred to above seem in the event to have been accepted by Ms Liati as encapsulating the essence of her opposition. I will refer to each in turn. Before so doing I should make the following observations.
These proceedings are merely part of a series of events extending over some years now which, doubtless, have been stressful for Ms Liati. It would appear her well-being has been affected and she has required medication in consequence. It equally would appear that she considers herself to be the object of the oppressive conduct of others. I express no opinion on the reasonableness or otherwise of that view. I mention these matters as they may well provide some explanation for her evidence in this matter - evidence which, in some crucial respects, I have rejected. As will become apparent, she appears to have constructed or perceived some events in ways favourable to the protection of her own interests. Equally she denies or else has forgotten events which I have found to have occurred.
Personal Service of the Bankruptcy Notice
The issue here is not whether the manner in which the service was effected should be taken as constituting personal service: cf Re Ditfort; Ex p Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 19 FCR 347; Re Hudson; Ex p G E Crane & Sons Ltd (1990) 25 FCR 318. Rather it is whether Ms Liati was physically present at all when the alleged personal service occurred.
Mr Emanuel Spinola, a licensed commercial agent whose services are utilised by Mr Fitzsimons for process serving, has sworn that he effected personal service on Ms Liati on Tuesday 20 June 1995, at approximately 7.50pm. The manner in which he said he did so is set out in paragraph 2 of his affidavit of service of 17 October 1995.
"2.There was some difficulty affecting [sic] service. Initially I spoke to Angela Liati through the intercom that connects the front door to the unit she occupies, I rang the intercom. A female person greeted me and I asked, "Hi Angela." She replied, "Hi, who's that?" I advised, "I have this Federal Court Bankruptcy Notice from Chris Fitzsimons for service on you." She replied, "My solicitor has already spoken to Fitzsimons twice. I don't have any money to pay him yet. When my claim is finalised I will pay him. He will have to wait till then. I'm not coming down to get it. I'm going to call the police if you don't leave me alone." She then hung up. I managed to gain access to the block and knocked on her door. She opened the door and said, "Is that you again, I'm going to call the police." I replied, "Angela, that won't be necessary. This is the Federal Court Bankruptcy Notice for you from Chris Fitzsimons as I mentioned earlier on the intercom. I am at liberty to drop it at your feet if your [sic] refuse to accept it." She replied, "I'm not accepting anything from you. I already told you that I can't pay Chris anything yet, he'll have to wait until I get my claim finalised." I then placed the Bankruptcy Notice at her feet."
In cross-examination he described how he obtained access to the building: he entered when the occupant of unit 5 opened the front door and he assisted her entrance. While he said he could not remember the details of the interior of the building he, nonetheless, said he could identify Ms Liati. He had seen her on television and at her mother's. He indicated that before effecting service he had spoken to Ms Liati on the phone on a number of occasions and had tried to serve her "dozens of times".
Though his affidavit of service is dated 17 October 1995, four months after the event, it seems clear on the evidence before me - I refer to the deleted notations on the annexure stamp to that affidavit - that he prepared a draft affidavit on 23 June 1995, three days after the alleged service and that he telephoned Mr Fitzsimons concerning service on 22 June. The reason given by Mr Spinola for the non-use of that draft was that Mr Fitzsimons later said that it did not describe the circumstances of the service in sufficient detail.
It should be said that in his affidavit evidence referring to the telephone call noted above, Mr Fitzsimons indicated that he was told by Mr Spinola that personal service was effected "the previous night". That would have been on 21 June the day after the date sworn to by Mr Spinola.
In contrast, it is Ms Liati's evidence that she was not at home on the evening of 20 June; that over the relevant period she had a friend staying with her - the friend resides in Brisbane but, at the time of this hearing was in England; and that, according to her affidavit of 18 April 1996:
"On Saturday 8 July 1995 my friend Jillian was packing prior to me driving her to the airport to board a plane back to Brisbane. She handed me a copy of the Bankruptcy Notice and said 'I found this under the door the other day. I did not want to upset you while your hearing was on'."
The hearing to which reference is made was the litigation in the Supreme Court against her de facto spouse. That part of it of present relevance began on 3 July and finished on 6 July 1995.
Ms Liati has not given evidence as to her whereabouts on the night of 20 June. Neither has affidavit evidence been prepared by her friend.
It should be said that, at no stage up to the hearing before the Registrar, did Ms Liati raise any objection to the service effected. Her explanation of this is that it was only after the preliminary hearing before Hill J on 2 April 1996 that, on reading the Act, she discovered the requirement of personal service on her.
I am then confronted with two, quite inconsistent accounts of the manner in which the bankruptcy notice was brought to Ms Liati's notice: the one, alleging personal service; the other, alleging that the documents were merely placed under the door of her unit on some date prior to 8 July when they were handed to Ms Liati by her friend.
Ms Liati invited me to reject Mr Spinola's account for a number of reasons. First she relied upon the inconsistency between the date he has sworn he effected service (20 June) and the date which Mr Fitzsimons says he was told by Mr Spinola in their telephone conversation was the date of service (21 June). Secondly she asked rhetorically of Mr Spinola's evidence concerning his knowledge of her identity, that if he saw her at her mother's why did he not serve her there? And thirdly referring to his evidence that he tried "dozens of times" to serve her, Ms Liati invites me to conclude that his failures induced him simply to push the documents under the door of her unit.
Counsel for Mr Fitzsimons, for his part, invited me to accept Mr Spinola's version of events. He drew attention to Ms Liati's failure either to indicate where she was on the night in question or to have evidence brought forward from her friend. He pointed to the fact that the documents whose proper receipt she happens to dispute in these proceedings are in fact the key ones - two of the three bills of costs, as will be seen, and the bankruptcy notice - and he suggested that her evidence should be treated with suspicion for this reason. Finally, counsel suggested that there may be some elements of truth in Ms Liati's version in that Mr Spinola on his own evidence left the documents on the floor at Ms Liati's feet. They may well have been picked up by her friend. They may well not have been handed over to her until a later date.
While Ms Liati may have a satisfactory explanation for her late raising of the service issue, I nonetheless consider that on the evidence before me I should accept Mr Spinola's evidence as to service. I do not regard the apparent inconsistencies in date of service as being of particular moment given other available evidence. Mr Fitzsimons, in any event, in recounting his telephone conversation in his affidavit did not seek to give a verbatim description of it. Neither was Mr Spinola questioned about his version.
Whatsoever the manner of service, the evidence before me does support of finding that it was effected on 20 June. It is in my view improbable that Mr Spinola would have prepared a draft affidavit on 23 July and have communicated its contents to Mr Fitzsimons if he had not at that time effected service. Likewise Ms Liati's evidence in cross-examination is that it was her friend who spoke to Mr Spinola on the intercom. It was not suggested by her that this occurred on any day other than on 20 June. If such was the time of service then the version of events given by Ms Liati, considered in the light of her own cross-examination has sufficient of the implausible about it as positively to require explanation and substantiation.
She said in cross-examination that her friend was staying with her for about a week on the 20th; that she (the friend) then returned to Brisbane; and that she came back for the de facto relationship case which began on 3 July 1996. I am, in effect, being asked on her version of events to find either that the friend found the bankruptcy notice on or about 20 June, retained it, returned to Brisbane (presumably with it), and only at the end of her later return to Sydney gave it to Ms Liati, or else that the notice lay on the floor until her friend's second visit. Equally I am being asked to find that, though found about two weeks before the Supreme Court case commenced, the friend concealed the existence of the notice until 8 July as she did not want to upset Ms Liati while the "hearing was on". Any of the above findings would, in my view, be unsafe ones to make on the state of the evidence before me.
Likewise I would regard a finding that Ms Liati was not at the unit at the time service was effected as unsafe in the absence of any evidence at all that would tend to support her own statement on this matter.
As I have indicated above, I am prepared in the circumstances to accept that service was effected at the time and in the manner described by Mr Spinola. I reject Ms Liati's version of how the bankruptcy notice was brought to her attention.
The Judgment Debt
It is Mr Fitzsimons evidence that he sent Ms Liati three itemised bills of cost. The first, of 21 December 1993, was for $2,598.00. The letter accompanying this bill indicated that:
"The account has been calculated in accordance with the Supreme Court scale of fees and consequently the hourly rate and itemised costs can be varified [sic] by reference to the Supreme Court scale."
The second, of 18 May 1994, was for $2,948.00 (this sum including the unpaid first bill). The third, of 3 June 1994, took the bills in aggregate to $3296.00. The last bill stated that Mr Fitzsimons would do no further work without the account being paid. File copies of all three bills and, in the case of the first two, their accompanying letters - the third bill stood alone and had no such letter - were put in evidence.
Ms Liati, while acknowledging she received the first bill, denies receipt of the latter two bills: she claims the first time she saw them was in the proceedings before Hill J to which I have already referred. Mr Fitzsimons gave evidence before me of their preparation and signing by him and of his secretary's responsibility in their preparation and posting. I am prepared to infer in the circumstances that they were posted to Ms Liati although the secretary who was said to have effected the postage was not called.
I have considered it necessary to make this finding on this matter. These bankruptcy proceedings are founded on a default judgment. There is no doubt as to the power of this court to go behind such a judgment in the present proceedings where it is appropriate so to do: Corney v Brien (1951) 84 CLR 343 at 347; Wren v Mahoney (1972) 126 CLR 212. Given that Ms Liati is a litigant in person, given my obligation in consequence - see Neil v Nott (1994) 121 ALR 148 at 150 - and given her denial of receipt of the latter two bills, the matter required some examination on my part. It clearly is the case that the integrity of Mr Fitzsimons' judgment depends first and foremost on satisfaction of the statutory and common law conditions precedent to the bringing of an action for the recovery of costs. For present purposes, I refer specifically to the Legal Profession Act 1987, s198(1) (which precludes action for recovery unless (inter alia) the bill has been "given" to the person against whom the claim is made) and s198(6) (which allows a bill to be given by sending it by post to the person's residence last known to the solicitor). I have in effect found that on the evidence before me Ms Liati's objection does not lead to the conclusion that action for recovery of the costs of all three bills was precluded by s198.
I would further add that at the time she was served with the statement of claim in the Local Court proceedings and until after the default judgment, Ms Liati had her own solicitors. They were aware of the proceedings; they sought information from her about them; but they were apparently given no instructions by her in relation to them other than to intimate to Mr Fitzsimons that Ms Liati did not admit the quantum of the claim. This Thorntons did by letter of 19 January 1995. Whatever Ms Liati's present recollection of receiving the two bills, she was not, apparently, prepared to dispute in legal proceedings her liability at that stage.
Quite unrelated to the above is the allegation of Ms Liati that the first bill was loaded with an unearned component of $400.00. That component which, on Ms Liati's evidence, was to be represented in disbursements for filing fees etc had apparently a "gratuity" element to it. Ms Liati at the time was seeking, in the event unsuccessfully, to get her de facto spouse to pay Mr Fitzsimons' bill. This unearned sum was apparently to be a benefit given Mr Fitzsimons for his services on her behalf.
Mr Fitzsimons does not deny that Ms Liati suggested to him that he so load his bill. What he denies vehemently is that he acted on the suggestion. His costs, as he explained both in these proceedings and to the de facto spouse's solicitors, were calculated on the Supreme Court scale for work done.
I am impressed by, and accept, Mr Fitzsimons' evidence in this matter. I would add that the bills, in their provisions for disbursements, are wholly consistent with his evidence.
The final matter which I should here mention is the proceedings Ms Liati instituted seemingly in early 1996 (I have no precise evidence of the actual date) to have the default judgment of 27 January 1995 set aside. Given that (i) she was legally represented at the time of that judgment; (ii) the matters raised in the two affidavits supporting the motion are substantially, though not precisely, the same as the objections raised before me to the making of a sequestration order; (iii) considerable time has passed and opportunity has been had in which to challenge the judgment; and (iv) it has been necessary in these proceedings to go behind the judgment in any event - I do not consider that the bringing of that motion provides, in the circumstances, adequate reason for my adjourning the petition pending the hearing of the motion: cf Adamopoulos v Olympic Airways SA (1990) 95 ALR 525.
Ms Liati's Solvency
If I am satisfied that Ms Liati is able to pay her debts, the petition should be dismissed: Bankruptcy Act, s52(2). The onus of proving that such is the case lies with Ms Liati. In her affidavit of 27 March 1996 she states her assets to be (i) jewellery worth "$6,000 approx"; (ii) clothes worth "$10,000 approx"; and (iii) the "frozen" $125,000 judgment which is subject to appeal.
An annexure to that affidavit lists her creditors as follows:
"LIST OF CREDITORS
PERSONAL LOAN - approx.
(SECURED BY GUARANTEE FROM MOTHER
WITH MORTGAGE ON HOME AND SUBJECT
TO LITIGATION) $ 70,000.00
LYONSWOOD INVESTIGATIONS $ 1,362.50
HENRY, DAVIES, YORK $ 601.20
NATIONAL BANK
(IN DISPUTE - SUBJECT TO LITIGATION) $ 5,688.63
C.R. FITZIMONS [sic]
(IN DISPUTE - SUBJECT TO LITIGATION) $ 6,008.24
THORNTONS
(IN DISPUTE - SUBJECT TO LITIGATION) $136,569.6
PETER WARREN
(1) WARREN'S MOTOR VILLAGE )
(IN DISPUTE - SUBJECT )
TO LITIGATION $3,450.61 )
)
(2) COSTS WAVERLEY COURT )
(SUBJECT TO APPEAL ) $ 8,150.6
BEING CONSIDERED) $4,700.00 )
)
(3) AMOUNT TO BE PAID AS A )
RESULT OF JUDGEMENT OF )
15/12/95 - CORRECT FIGURE )
UNAVAILABLE UNTIL COSTS TAXED ) ??
COURT FILLING [sic] FEES -
POSTPONED ??
BRIGGS PAUL DOWDING $ 1,020.00
10. THERE IS AN AMOUNT DUE TO RAINE &
HORNE, DOUBLE BAY FOR OVERDUE RENT
BUT THERE WAS A SUPREME COURT ORDER
MADE BY JUSTICE COHEN ON 23 FEB. 1996
THAT PETER WARREN GIVE ME A CHEQUE
FOR $3912.83 PAYABLE TO RAINE & HORNE
AND THIS WILL CANCEL THE DEBT"
I was furnished with no additional evidence as to her creditors. However, in her submissions she did acknowledge both bank debts though asserting that, in relation to the personal loan, the true sum was in the order of $60,000. I was not provided with any information about the appeal and cross-appeal in the De Facto Relationships Act proceedings (other than the grounds of appeal) or of their respective prospects.
Ms Liati's submissions on this matter proceeded from the premise that it is not possible to establish whether or not she is solvent until the outcome of her appeal is known. Additionally she says that the majority of her debts are disputed or are subject to litigation. What, though, she has conceded is that if she is bankrupted on this petition Mr Fitzsimons stands to gain almost nothing. Indeed she expressed apparent incredulity at his persisting with the petition given the knowledge she says he has of her financial affairs.
She is presently unemployed. She asserted under cross-examination that she would be able to pay Mr Fitzsimons' debt by selling a ring she possessed which, on purchase, was said to be valued at $14,000. I was provided with no evidence as to value or saleability of the ring. I would note, though, that in her affidavit evidence referred to above she placed a value of "$6,000 approx" on all of her jewellery. I attach little weight to her assertion as to her present capacity to pay Mr Fitzsimons' debt.
It is clear that in her own view her fortunes hang on a single thread - her appeal. Notwithstanding that she disputes in some way most of her debts - I would note that the Thorntons' debt is understated by over $50,000 in her list - I do not consider it at all probable that, even with some measure of success in that appeal, she is likely to find her salvation in it. The weight of debt upon her, even allowing for some variation upwards of the judgment and downwards of her debts, is such as to leave considerable doubt as to her future ability to pay her debts. On her own evidence those debts are not made up simply of unpaid legal costs. Her present inability to pay her debts is, in effect, conceded by Ms Liati in her questioning of why Mr Fitzsimons is persisting with his petition.
I do not in the circumstances consider it to be at all demonstrated that, if Mr Fitzsimons was to be compelled to abide the outcome of the appeal and cross appeal, the situation likely to emerge is one "which will probably bear fruit in payment" in the near future: cf Trojan v Corporation of Hindmarsh (1987) 16 FCR 37 at 48. It clearly has not been demonstrated that the present situation is one in which payment is at all likely.
Despite the uncertainties created by Ms Liati's appeal and her other disputes involving her debts, I do not consider that she has made out a case for my dismissing the petition on the ground that she is able to pay her debt. Furthermore I do not regard the fact of her appeal as providing "other sufficient cause" in the circumstances of this case for the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act, s52(2).
The Undertaking/Agreement not to Prosecute his Petition
This matter can be disposed of shortly. No evidence has been placed before me suggesting that there was a contract of some form between the parties under which Mr Fitzsimons agreed not to pursue his creditor's petition. It is Ms Liati's evidence that Mr Fitzsimons nonetheless represented to her that he would not do so. It is unnecessary for me to make a finding as to whether such in fact occurred. Even if there was such a representation that was relied upon in relation to the hearing before the Registrar on 23 February 1996 - the evidence of Ms Liati's failure to attend that hearing was in fact based on forgetfulness not reliance - and even if an estoppel could thus be raised against Mr Fitzsimons relating to that hearing, there is no evidence at all to suggest that that estoppel could have any effect in relation to the hearing before me.
There is no basis at all for suggesting that on this hearing Mr Fitzsimons is disentitled, because of representation made and relied upon or otherwise, from prosecuting his petition. Accordingly I reject this objection.
In the event Ms Liati has failed to make out any of her grounds of objection to the making of the sequestration order.
Likewise I am satisfied both that she committed the act of bankruptcy alleged in the creditor's petition and that the other matters required by s52(1) of the Act to be proved have been made out.
Accordingly, I order that the orders made by the Registrar on 23 February 1996 be affirmed with costs.
I certify that this and the preceding 15 pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Finn.
Associate
Dated 7 June 1996
Counsel for the applicant : B Skinner
Solicitors for the applicant : Brown & Partners
: A Liati appeared in person
Date of hearing : 27 May 1996
Date of judgment : 13 June 1996
2
11
0