Inspector-General in Bankruptcy v Hartnett

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Inspector-General in Bankruptcy v Hartnett [2025] FCA 111

File number(s): QUD 507 of 2024
Judgment of: DOWNES J
Date of judgment: 24 February 2025
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – application pursuant to section 222(1) Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) to set aside personal insolvency agreement entered pursuant to Part X of that Act – meaning of “in force” in section 222(1) – whether the terms of the agreement are unreasonable or are not calculated to benefit the creditors generally – whether any other reason to set aside the agreement – sequestration order sought by creditor pursuant to section 222(10) Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – where first respondent arranged for invoices to be issued in his name and arranged for those purported creditors to vote in favour of personal insolvency agreement – where major creditor which voted in favour of personal insolvency agreement was a related party controlled by the first respondent’s spouse – where controlling trustees were not provided with complete information – finding of abuse of process by first respondent – personal insolvency agreement set aside and sequestration order made
Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 222, 222(1), 222(2), 222(8), 222(10), 222(11)

Bankruptcy Legislation Amendment Act 2004 (Cth) s 142

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 56(2), 78, 136

Insolvency Practice Rules (Bankruptcy) 2016 (Cth) r 75-132(1)

Cases cited:

Alexiou v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (Application to Amend Pleading) [2025] FCA 7

Beau Timothy John Hartnett trading as Hartnett Lawyers v Anthony Robert Bell as Executor of the Estate of the late Mabel Dawn Deakin-Bell (No 2) (2023) 113 NSWLR 381; [2023] NSWCA 311

Bell v Hartnett Lawyers (No 3) (2022) 112 NSWLR 463; [2022] NSWSC 1204

Hingston v Westpac Banking Corporation (2012) 200 FCR 493; [2012] FCAFC 41

Moss v Gunns Finance Pty Ltd (2018) 131 ACSR 462; [2018] FCAFC 185

Mouglalis v Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd (2017) 250 FCR 92; [2017] FCAFC 47

New Age Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd v Etlis (2013) 11 ABC (NS) 542; [2013] FCA 884

Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355

Ritson v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2021] FCAFC 208

Tamaya Resources Ltd (in liq) v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu [2015] FCA 1098

Division: General Division
Registry: Queensland
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency
Number of paragraphs: 158
Date of hearing: 28–30 January 2025
Counsel for the Applicant: Dr J Jaques KC and Mr M Maynard
Solicitor for the Applicant: Australian Government Solicitor 
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr R Cowen of Cowen Schwarz Marschke Lawyers
Counsel for the Second and Third Respondents: Mr M Jones KC and Mr M Downes
Solicitor for the Second and Third Respondents: Davidson Ryan Lawyers
Counsel for the Fourth Respondent: Mr S Sykes
Solicitor for the Fourth Respondent: McVittie Legal

ORDERS

QUD 507 of 2024
BETWEEN:

INSPECTOR-GENERAL IN BANKRUPTCY

Applicant

AND:

BEAU TIMOTHY JOHN HARTNETT

First Respondent

ANNE MEAGHER IN HER CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE OF THE…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCA 111
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Inspector-General in Bankruptcy v Hartnett involved a dispute over a personal insolvency agreement (PIA) entered into by Beau Timothy John Hartnett. The Inspector-General sought to set aside the PIA on the grounds that it was unreasonable and not calculated to benefit creditors generally, and because there were other reasons to set aside the agreement. The case also involved a sequestration order sought by a creditor based on alleged abuse of process. The dispute centred on whether the terms of the PIA were unreasonable, the extent of the first respondent's involvement in arranging the PIA, and the information provided to the controlling trustees.

The court had to decide whether the PIA was unreasonable and not calculated to benefit creditors generally, and if there were other reasons to set it aside. This involved examining the conduct of the first respondent in arranging the PIA and whether he had acted in a way that constituted an abuse of process. The court also considered the evidence provided to the controlling trustees and whether there were sufficient grounds to set aside the PIA.

The court found that the PIA was unreasonable and not calculated to benefit creditors generally, as the first respondent had significant control over the PIA and had acted in a manner that constituted an abuse of process. The court also found that the controlling trustees were not provided with complete information, which further supported setting aside the PIA. Based on these findings, the court set aside the PIA and made a sequestration order. The court also made an order regarding costs, with the applicant paying the costs of the second and third respondents from a specific date.

The final orders of the court included setting aside the PIA, sequestrating the estate of Beau Timothy John Hartnett, appointing a trustee over the estate, and making orders for costs. The effective date of bankruptcy was set as 19 December 2024. The court also noted that Mr Gavin King had signed a consent to act as trustee under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to section 222(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), the personal insolvency agreement of the First Respondent dated 23 April 2024 is set aside.

2. Pursuant to section 222(10) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), the estate of Beau Timothy John Hartnett is sequestrated, with the effective date of bankruptcy being 19 December 2024.

3. Mr Gavin King, registered trustee in bankruptcy, is appointed trustee over the estate of Beau Timothy John Hartnett.

4. The Applicant pay the Second and Third Respondents’ costs after 16 January 2025 which were thrown away by the claim for costs made against the Second and Third Respondents as contained in the Application filed on 29 August 2024.

5. The Applicant/First Cross-Respondent’s and Fourth Respondent/Cross-Claimant’s costs are to be paid from the estate of Beau Timothy John Hartnett in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).

6. This order is taken to be entered once it has been authenticated in accordance with rule 39.35 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

1. A consent to act as trustee under section 156A of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) has been signed by Mr Gavin King.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

During the hearing, certain rulings were made, with reasons to be provided in this judgment. These are my reasons for those rulings.Objections to evidenceAffidavit of Beau Timothy John Hartnett affirmed 2 December 2024 The Inspector-General raised objections to two paragraphs of the affidavit of Beau Timothy John Hartnett affirmed on 2 December 2024 (Hartnett affidavit). The Inspector-General objected to [104] of the Harnett affidavit on the basis that it was a conclusory statement. That paragraph refers to an order made in the Supreme Court of Queensland conditioned on Mr Hartnett and a company of which he was a director paying the sum of $65,074.22 into a trust account. It states: The total of $65,074.22 included $51,749.22 as partial costs of the Supreme Court trial. The Inspector-General submitted that [104] asserts that the total amount of $65,074.22 included partial costs of $51,749.22 of the Supreme Court trial, but that the basis of that fact is not made apparent in the Hartnett affidavit. However, as submitted by Mr Hartnett, the facts stated in this paragraph are within Mr Hartnett’s personal knowledge. To the extent that it could be said that it was conclusory (that is, an opinion), it was admissible by reason of s 78 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). For these reasons, I did not exclude this evidence. An objection was also taken to [120] of the Hartnett affidavit. That paragraph states: I believe that King Tide Company Pty Ltd and I do not have any liability to Arawak Holdings Pty Ltd (in liquidation), because of the application of the indemnity principle. Mr Hartnett submitted that [120] is a summary of other paragraphs of his affidavit and that it should be allowed. However, as submitted by the Inspector-General, Mr Hartnett’s subjective belief as to his indebtedness is irrelevant to any issue in this proceeding. That had the consequence that it was not admissible: see s 56(2) of the Evidence Act. That paragraph was excluded for this reason.Affidavit of Anthony Robert Bell affirmed 8 November 2024 Mr Hartnett objected to [19] of the affidavit of Mr Bell affirmed on 8 November 2024 (Bell affidavit) on the ground that it makes a positive assertion that Mr Hartnett had significant assets not held in his name which was legally and factually inaccurate. That paragraph stated:The third reason was that Mr Hartnett had significant assets not held in his name that I thought might be used to pay the total debt. Although I did not regard this as a proper objection, I made an order pursuant to s 136 of the Evidence Act limiting [19] of the Bell affidavit to being evidence of the reasons that Mr Bell voted the way that he did. In my view, this met the complaint raised by Mr Hartnett. Mr Hartnett objected to [22] of the Bell affidavit on the same grounds as [19]. That paragraph stated:The meeting was adjourned to 22 April 2024. My instructions were still to vote against the proposed personal insolvency agreement because I did not think I was getting enough money out of the proposed agreement, particularly when considered against what I saw to be considerable assets to which, and over which, Mr Hartnett had access or control.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Finally, while I accept that the fact that the transactions contemplated by the PIA have been completed is a factor against setting it aside, this fact does not overcome the more compelling factors which are in favour of setting the PIA aside, as identified above.Conclusion For those reasons, the PIA will be set aside on the ground that it is unreasonable and not calculated to benefit creditors generally within the meaning of s 222(1)(d) and on the ground that, in all of the circumstances of this case, there is another reason that it should be set aside within the meaning of s 222(1)(e). A sequestration order will also be made along with the ancillary orders sought by Mr Bell, with minor variations. As Mr Bell’s application is brought under s 222(10), ss 43(1), 44, 47, 52(1) and 52(2) and Part XIA do not apply: see s 222(11) of the Bankruptcy Act. In particular, although the making of the application for the sequestration order under s 222(10) is taken to be equivalent to the presentation of a creditor’s petition against Mr Hartnett, it is not necessary for the act of bankruptcy on which the petition is founded to have been committed within six months before the presentation of the petition (or, in this case, the application under s 222(10) is brought). Mr Hartnett was served with a bankruptcy notice on 22 December 2023 and no payment was received. Accordingly, Mr Hartnett committed an act of bankruptcy on 12 January 2024: see s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act. Mr Hartnett did not dispute this. Further acts of bankruptcy occurred on 1 March 2024 and 23 April 2024: see ss 40(1)(i) and 40(1)(j) of the Bankruptcy Act. A further act of bankruptcy will occur when an order is made in this proceeding setting aside the PIA: see s 40(1)(m) of the Bankruptcy Act. Mr Bell seeks an order that the date of bankruptcy be the earliest of these dates, namely 12 January 2024. Mr Hartnett appeared to accept that this date could be nominated, but submits that the nomination of this date will result in prejudice to him, being a date “far earlier than would normally be the case under the Act”. This submission has some force. However, Mr Hartnett did not nominate an alternative date of bankruptcy. None of the dates on which any of the acts of bankruptcy occurred in this case could be said to be within the period of six months immediately before the date on which the application for the sequestration order was made within s 115(1B) of the Bankruptcy Act. In this situation, it is appropriate to nominate 19 December 2024 as the date of bankruptcy, being the date on which the application for the sequestration order was filed by Mr Bell. Such an order was made by White J in a similar situation, which order was upheld in Mouglalis v Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd (2017) 250 FCR 92; [2017] FCAFC 47 per Besanko J at [8], per Logan J at [44] and per Charlesworth J at [64]–[65].Costs order and findings sought by Controlling Trustees By the Statement of Claim, the Inspector-General made allegations concerning the sufficiency of the work performed by the Controlling Trustees, and included in the prayer for relief an order that (inter alia) the Controlling Trustees pay costs. While it was a necessary part of the Inspector-General’s case that the investigations by the Controlling Trustees were not sufficient (because if they were, this would tell against the relief being granted) and although I have made findings that aspects of the investigations by the Controlling Trustees were inadequate, it was not necessary to seek costs against the Controlling Trustees as part of the prayer for relief.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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