FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Mohammed v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 687
ORDERS
SYG 904 of 2018 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: ALTAF AHMED KHAN MOHAMMED
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE KENDALL
DATE OF ORDER:
25 AUGUST 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the second respondent dated 12 March 2018.
2.A writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent requiring it to reconsider and determine the applicant’s application for review according to law.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE KENDALL:
BACKGROUND
The applicant is a citizen of India (Court Book (“CB”) 2). He first arrived in Australia…
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- Case
- [2022] FedCFamC2G 687
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that there was no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision to refuse the first adjournment request. The Tribunal had been advised that the applicant and his family were overseas, and in response, the Tribunal offered the applicant the option of appearing at the hearing by telephone. The court noted that s 366 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) expressly allows for the giving of evidence before the Tribunal by telephone, and there was no evidence to suggest that the applicant (or his representative) objected to a telephone hearing or that such a hearing would have been in any way inadequate. The court further found that the Tribunal's handling of the evidence provided by the applicant was also not unreasonable. The applicant had not provided any information prior to the hearing and SMS hearing reminder messages had failed, and the Tribunal had regard to Departmental movement records and the applicant’s own evidence that he was offshore at the time of the hearing. The court concluded that the Tribunal's decision did not involve jurisdictional error.
As a result, the court dismissed the applicant's application for judicial review and affirmed the decision of the Tribunal. The court's decision was final and binding, and the applicant's application for a visa was refused.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
These issues, to the extent that they give rise to a question of jurisdictional error, will be considered by the Court below.CONSIDERATIONThe Adjournment Requests As outlined above, in oral submissions to the Court, the applicant stressed that his main concern was that the Tribunal had refused to grant him an adjournment (which, he says, he requested during the hearing) despite the fact that he had only been back in Australia for two days prior when he hearing occurred. The Court will consider whether the Tribunal acted unreasonably in the circumstances. For the sake of clarity, the Court considers that the applicant made two adjournment requests in this matter (which the applicant confirmed in oral submissions before the Court) – one prior to the Tribunal hearing (made on the applicant’s behalf by his representative) and one at the hearing itself. The two adjournment requests will be considered below.The first adjournment request As detailed above, on 19 February 2018, the applicant’s representative requested an adjournment of the hearing (the “first adjournment request”) on the basis that the applicant was overseas visiting his father who was “seriously unwell”. A medical certificate in that regard was provided to the Tribunal (CB 148-151). On 20 February 2018, the Tribunal refused to grant the first adjournment request and notified the applicant (through his representative) that the hearing would instead be conducted by telephone (CB 151-165). On 5 March 2018, the applicant’s representative advised the Tribunal (by email) that the applicant had “decided to return to Australia before the scheduled hearing date and attend the hearing in person” (CB 159). The Court does not consider there to be any error in the Tribunal’s response to this adjournment request. The Tribunal was advised that the applicant and his family were out of the country and, in response, the Tribunal offered the applicant the option of appearing at that hearing by telephone. Section 366 of the Act expressly allows for the giving of evidence before the Tribunal by telephone. At the time of the Tribunal’s decision, s 366 of the Act provided as follows:366 Oral evidence by telephone etc.(1)For the purposes of the review of a decision, the Tribunal may allow an appearance by the applicant before the Tribunal, or the giving of evidence by the applicant or any other person, to be by:(a) telephone; or (b) closed‑circuit television; or (c) any other means of communication.… There is nothing that prohibits the Tribunal from conducting hearings by telephone: s 366 of the Act; Brar v Minister for Immigration & Anor (No 2) (2017) 322 FLR 81 at [16]; Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Dhillon (2014) 227 FCR 525 at [28]; SZJTK v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1712 at [24]-[25]; MZAHK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 87 at [30]; SZNNE v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2010] FCA 194 at [49]. Further, there is no evidence before the Court to suggest that the applicant (or his representative) objected at that stage to a telephone hearing or that a telephone hearing would have been in any way inadequate.