FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Mohammad v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1249
Citation: Mohammad v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1249 Appeal from: Application for extension of time and leave to appeal: Ali v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 1630 Parties: SHABBIR ALI MOHAMMAD v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL File number: VID 462 of 2014 Judge: MORTIMER J Date of judgment: 18 November 2014 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for extension of time and leave to appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court affirming decision of Migration Review Tribunal refusing to grant applicant a student visa – no satisfactory explanation for delay – no reasonable prospects of success on appeal – application refused. Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 44.12
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 35.13, 36.72Cases cited: Cement Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2010) 187 FCR 261; [2010] FCAFC 101
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Gallo v Dawson (1990) 93 ALR 479
Gurung v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCCA 2009
Hatcher v Cohn (2004) 139 FCR 425; [2004] FCA 1548
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344
Mehmood v Attorney-General (Cth) (2013) 141 ALD 339; [2013] FCA 406
Nguyen v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCAFC 38Date of hearing: 18 November 2014 Date of last submissions: 18 November 2014 Place: Melbourne Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 33 Counsel for the Appellant: The Applicant appeared in person Solicitor for the Respondents: Mr JC Hutton of Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submits to any order the Court may make save as to costs. Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 462 of 2014
BETWEEN: SHABBIR ALI MOHAMMAD
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MORTIMER J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 NOVEMBER 2014
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for an extension of time in which to seek leave to appeal is refused.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 462 of 2014
BETWEEN: SHABBIR ALI MOHAMMAD
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MORTIMER J
DATE:
18 NOVEMBER 2014
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered Ex Tempore and Revised)
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The applicant applied for a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) (Subclass 572) visa on 6 June 2013, while in Australia on a Business Entry (Class UC) visa. The application was refused by a…
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 1249
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the applicant's reasons for the delay in lodging the appeal, which were lack of knowledge and financial hardship. The court was not satisfied with the applicant's explanation for the delay, noting that there was no evidence of misunderstanding the time limits or receiving wrong advice. The court found that the applicant was capable of asking for the information he needed and acting upon it. Even if the court had been persuaded to grant an extension of time, it would have refused the applicant leave to appeal. The court found that the orders and judgment of the Federal Circuit Court were not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave to appeal. The court found that the Federal Circuit Court was correct to identify the Tribunal's decision as one primarily concerned with the credibility of the applicant. The Tribunal's reasons made it plain it did not believe what the applicant said to it, and the reasons of the Tribunal set out a rational basis for the Tribunal's disbelief of the applicant.
The court concluded that the application for an extension of time in which to seek leave to appeal was refused, and the applicant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs of and incidental to the application. The court found that there was no evidence that the Federal Circuit Court had proceeded in a procedurally unfair way, as the applicant contended. The hearing may have been shorter than the applicant anticipated, but there was no evidence he was not given a reasonable opportunity to put the arguments he wanted to put on judicial review. Most of what the applicant wished to say was not, in a legal sense, directed at establishing jurisdictional error. Since he is not a lawyer, and is unfamiliar with the Australian legal system, that is hardly surprising.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for an extension of time in which to seek leave to appeal is refused.
2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Also broadly expressed is the discretion to grant leave to appeal conferred by s 24(1A) of the Federal Court Act: see generally Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 399. As the Full Court observed in Cement Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2010) 187 FCR 261; [2010] FCAFC 101 (at [20]):Leave to appeal against an interlocutory order will usually be granted only where the applicant is able to show that the order occasions substantial prejudice to the applicant and there is a reasonable argument that the order should be set aside: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397.CONSIDERATION The applicant’s explanation for the delay in filing what should have been an application for leave to appeal but was in fact a notice of appeal are “lack of knowledge” and “financial hardship”. He states that “finally I came to Federal Circuit Court in this regard [that is, being dissatisfied with the Federal Circuit Court decision]” and was told by an “officer” that he could “lodge the Federal Court review by requesting a fee waiver”. Even giving the applicant the benefit of treating the document he lodged as what it needed to be under the Rules, there is no explanation about the timing of his approach to the Federal Circuit Court for information about where he might go from there. He does not, for example, give evidence that he misunderstood the time limits. There is no evidence of attempted but failed filing of documents. There is no evidence he received the wrong advice from anyone. To the contrary, what evidence he gives demonstrates he is capable of asking for the information he needs and acting upon it. Notwithstanding, the delay is short — only six days — I am not satisfied on the evidence that the applicant’s explanation is acceptable. There are many unrepresented applicants in this jurisdiction who manage to comply with the time limits imposed by the Rules. No extension of time should be granted. Even if I had been persuaded to grant an extension of time in which to seek leave to appeal, I would have refused the applicant leave to appeal. The orders and judgment of the Federal Circuit Court is not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave to appeal. The Federal Circuit Court was correct to identify the Tribunal’s decision as one primarily concerned with the credibility of the applicant. The Tribunal’s reasons make it plain it did not believe what the applicant said to it. The reasons of the Tribunal set out a rational basis for the Tribunal’s disbelief of the applicant. The Federal Circuit Court was correct to find that none of the grounds of review expressed by the applicant could be made out. There is no evidence that the Court proceeded in a procedurally unfair way, as the applicant contends. Although the hearing may have been shorter than the applicant anticipated, there is no evidence he was not given a reasonable opportunity to put the arguments he wanted to put on judicial review. It is apparent most of what the applicant wished to say was not, in a legal sense, directed at establishing jurisdictional error. Since he is not a lawyer, and is unfamiliar with the Australian legal system, that is hardly surprising.