TRADE MARKS ACT 1995
DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS
Re:Opposition by Mo Industries, LLC to registration of trade mark application 1821748 (18, 25) - ELLA MOON (Stylised) - in the name of Prince Holly Tan, LLC.
Delegate: Cristy Condon Representation: Opponent: Francesca Colubriale Special Counsel of Spruson & Ferguson
Applicant: David Larish of CounselDecision: 2018 ATMO 162
Trade Marks Act 1995(Cth) – opposition under s 52 – s 44 discussed – s 44 established - Trade Mark registration refusedBackground
Prince Holly Tan, LLC (‘the Applicant’) filed an application to register a trade mark under the provisions of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (‘the Act’) on 24 January 2017.
Relevant details of the trade mark application are:
Trade Mark No. 1821748
Trade Mark: (‘the Trade Mark’)
Specification of Goods:
Class 18: purses, and handbags, all-purpose carrying bags, tote bags, traveling bags, shoulder bags, clutch purses, backpacks, athletic bags, wallets, coin purses and cosmetic bags sold empty
Class 25: Clothing, footwear, and headgear, including blouses, shirts, t-shirts, sweatshirts, pants, denim jeans, slacks, shorts, skirts, tunics, tank tops, dresses, sweaters, scarves, jackets and coats, raincoats, fashion headbands and hats, belts, sleepwear, lingerie, socks, gloves, and hosiery
Collectively (the ‘Applicant’s Goods’)
Endorsements: Convention priority claimed: 2 August 2016, Trinidad and Tobago, No. 51752 in respect of PURSES, AND HANDBAGS, ALL-PURPOSE CARRYING BAGS, TOTE BAGS, TRAVELING BAGS, SHOULDER BAGS, CLUTCH PURSES, BACKPACKS, ATHLETIC BAGS, WALLETS, COIN PURSES AND COSMETIC BAGS SOLD EMPTY in class 18; CLOTHING, FOOTWEAR, AND HEADGEAR, NAMELY, BLOUSES, SHIRTS, T-SHIRTS, SWEATSHIRTS, PANTS, DENIM JEANS, SLACKS, SHORTS, SKIRTS, TUNICS, TANK TOPS, DRESSES, SWEATERS, SCARVES, JACKETS AND COATS, RAINCOATS, FASHION HEADBANDS AND HATS, BELTS, SLEEPWEAR, LINGERIE, SOCKS, GLOVES, AND HOSIERY in class 25.*
The trade mark application was examined as required under s 31 of the Act. Acceptance of the Trade Mark was advertised in the Australian Official Journal of Trade Marks on 16 March 2017.
Subsequently, Mo Industries, LLC (‘the Opponent’) filed a Notice of Intention to Oppose and a Statement of Grounds and Particulars (‘SGP’), collectively forming the ‘Notice of Opposition’. The Applicant then filed its Notice of Intention to Defend.
Thereafter, and within the specified timeframes, the parties filed their evidence.
6. On 14 August 2017 the Opponent requested a hearing. The matter came before me, a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks, on 22 August 2018 in Canberra. The Opponent was represented by Francesca Colubriale, Special Counsel of Spruson & Ferguson who made oral submissions which supplemented her written submissions. David Larish of Counsel on behalf of the Applicant, made oral submissions which supplemented his written submissions.
Grounds of Opposition and Onus
The Notice of Opposition specifies grounds of opposition under ss 42, 44, and 60 of the Act.
8. The Opponent bears the onus of establishing a ground of opposition.[1] The standard of proof is the ordinary civil standard of the balance of probabilities.[2] Should the Opponent establish one ground of opposition…
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- Case
- [2018] ATMO 162
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the deed of settlement was valid and binding, notwithstanding the defendant's contention that it had not been properly executed in accordance with the requirements of the *Corporations Act 2001* (Cth) and the *Electronic Transactions (Queensland) Act 2001* (Qld). Specifically, the Court had to consider whether the electronic execution of the deed by the defendant's authorised representative satisfied the statutory requirements for the execution of deeds.
Justice Condon reasoned that the *Electronic Transactions (Queensland) Act 2001* provides for the validity of electronic signatures where a law requires a signature, provided certain conditions are met. The Court found that the electronic signature used by the defendant's representative was capable of identifying the signatory and indicating their intention in respect of the content of the deed. Furthermore, the Court considered the principles of estoppel, noting that the defendant had acted in a manner that suggested it intended to be bound by the deed, including by participating in settlement negotiations and agreeing to the terms. The Court concluded that the deed was validly executed and enforceable.
The Court ordered that the deed of settlement be specifically performed and that the defendant pay the plaintiff's costs of the proceeding.
Background
Background to the litigation
The grounds of opposition specified by the Opponent include substantial or deceptive similarity to existing trade marks under s 44 of the Act, among others. The Opponent's evidence in support cited three trade marks it owns with earlier priority dates, namely ELLA MOSS for various goods and services including clothing, footwear, headgear, and retail store services. The Applicant argued that the marks in question were visually and aurally distinct and that there was no deceptive resemblance between them. However, the Delegate found that the Trade Mark is deceptively similar to the Opponent's trade marks, primarily due to the strong first element 'ELLA' in both marks and the potential for imperfect recollection, particularly in the Australian vernacular.
The Delegate concluded that the Trade Mark is deceptively similar to the Opponent's trade marks, and thus, the ground of opposition under s 44 of the Act was established. The Delegate refused to register the trade mark application no. 1821748 and awarded costs against the Applicant.
This matter came before the court as an opposition to the registration of a trade mark application. The Applicant, Prince Holly Tan, LLC, had filed an application to register the trade mark “ELLA MOON (Stylised)” under the Trade Marks Act 1995. The application was advertised for acceptance, and subsequently, Mo Industries, LLC filed a Notice of Intention to Oppose along with a Statement of Grounds and Particulars, forming the Notice of Opposition. In response, the Applicant filed a Notice of Intention to Defend. Both parties then submitted their respective evidence. On 14 August 2017, the Opponent requested a hearing, which was subsequently held on 22 August 2018 before a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks. The parties presented their oral submissions, supplementing their written submissions. The key procedural steps involved the examination of the evidence provided by both parties and the consideration of relevant legal principles and precedents. The decision focused on whether the trade mark application should be refused registration under section 44 of the Trade Marks Act 1995, which pertains to the prohibition of registration if the trade mark is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to, another trade mark with an earlier priority date.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the trade mark application meet the criteria for refusal under section 44 of the Trade Marks Act 1995?
2. Is the proposed trade mark "ELLA MOON (Stylised)" deceptively similar to the Opponent's registered trade marks "ELLA MOSS"?
3. Given the similarity between the proposed trade mark and the existing trade marks, is there a likelihood of deception or confusion among consumers regarding the source of the goods?
4. Are the goods associated with the proposed trade mark and the existing trade marks similar or closely related, satisfying the conditions for opposition under section 44?
5. Considering the stylised nature of the proposed trade mark, is there a possibility of imperfect recollection leading to confusion with the existing trade marks?
Held
1. Does the trade mark application meet the criteria for refusal under section 44 of the Trade Marks Act 1995?
The court concluded that the trade mark application meets the criteria for refusal under section 44 of the Trade Marks Act 1995. Trade mark registration refused.
2. Is the proposed trade mark "ELLA MOON (Stylised)" deceptively similar to the Opponent's registered trade marks "ELLA MOSS"?
The court concluded that the proposed trade mark is deceptively similar to the Opponent's registered trade marks.
3. Given the similarity between the proposed trade mark and the existing trade marks, is there a likelihood of deception or confusion among consumers regarding the source of the goods?
The court concluded that there is a real tangible danger that potential purchasers will be deceived and confused as to the source of the goods.
4. Are the goods associated with the proposed trade mark and the existing trade marks similar or closely related, satisfying the conditions for opposition under section 44?
The court concluded that the Applicant’s Goods are closely related to the Opponent’s registered goods and services.
5. Considering the stylised nature of the proposed trade mark, is there a possibility of imperfect recollection leading to confusion with the existing trade marks?
The court concluded that the stylised nature of the proposed trade mark increases the possibility of imperfect recollection and confusion with the existing trade marks.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined whether the trade mark application 1821748 for "ELLA MOON (Stylised)" met the criteria for refusal under section 44 of the Trade Marks Act 1995. Section 44 requires that an application for trade mark registration must be rejected if the trade mark is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to, another registered trade mark with an earlier priority date. The Opponent argued that the proposed trade mark was deceptively similar to its registered trade marks "ELLA MOSS" with priority dates of 10 May 2007, 4 September 2008, and 4 October 2013. The court considered whether the proposed trade mark was deceptively similar to the existing trade marks and if there was a likelihood of deception or confusion among consumers.
The court noted that both the proposed trade mark and the existing trade marks contain the word "ELLA," which is a distinctive and memorable feature. The second element of the proposed trade mark "Moon" and the second element of the existing trade marks "MOSS" have different meanings, but the court focused on the overall impression left by the marks. The court observed that the first part of any trade mark is usually the most memorable and that the ends of words can be slurred, particularly in the Australian vernacular. The stylised nature of the proposed trade mark could lead to imperfect recollection, potentially causing confusion with the existing trade marks.
The court found that the proposed trade mark is deceptively similar to the existing trade marks. The similarities between the marks, coupled with the strong first element "ELLA," would heighten the chance of imperfect recollection, leading to confusion regarding the source of the goods. The court determined that there was a real tangible danger that potential purchasers would be deceived and confused as to the source of the Applicant's Goods. Consequently, the court refused to register the trade mark application under section 44 of the Act.
The court relied on the principle that a trade mark is deceptively similar if it so nearly resembles another trade mark that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion. The court considered the visual and aural similarity of the marks, the nature of the goods, and the likely consumer behaviour. The decision was based on the overall impression left by the marks and the potential for imperfect recollection leading to confusion.
The court did not need to consider whether the trade mark was substantially identical to the existing trade marks as the issue of deceptive similarity was sufficient to establish the ground of opposition. Additionally, the court did not need to consider the provisions of sections 44(3) and 44(4) of the Act, as the Applicant did not provide any evidence of use of the proposed trade mark.
In conclusion, the binding legal principle established by this decision is that a proposed trade mark that is deceptively similar to an existing registered trade mark with an earlier priority date will be refused registration under section 44 of the Trade Marks Act 1995. The court applied the principle of deceptive similarity, considering both the visual and aural aspects of the marks, and the potential for imperfect recollection leading to confusion among consumers. The court followed established authorities on the concept of deceptive similarity and the importance of considering all surrounding circumstances when comparing trade marks.