Miles v R

[2017] NSWCCA 266

Court of Criminal Appeal

Supreme Court

New South Wales

• Summary available

Medium Neutral Citation:

Miles v R [2017] NSWCCA 266

Hearing dates:

6 November 2017

Date of orders:

16 November 2017

Decision date:

16 November 2017

Before:

Leeming JA at [1]; Rothman J at [11]; Hamill J at [67]

Decision:

(1)   Leave to appeal be granted;

 

(2)   Appeal be upheld;

 

(3)   The sentence imposed on the Applicant, Benjamin Adam Miles, by the District Court on 10 June 2016, be quashed and in lieu thereof the following sentence be imposed:

 

(a)   An aggregate sentence, being a sentence of a non-parole period of 3 years and 9 months commencing 27 August 2015 and expiring 26 May 2019 and a balance of term of 3 years and 3 months, concluding 26 August 2022.

 (b)   The Applicant is first eligible for parole on 26 May 2019.

Catchwords:

CRIMINAL LAW – appeal – conceded error in taking Form 1 offences into account on each charge instead of specifying the count – principles of parity discussed in re-sentencing – appeal allowed – sentence reduced.

Legislation Cited:

Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW)
Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW)

Cases Cited:

Barnden v State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 161
Cameron v R [2017] NSWCCA 229
Doumit v R [2011] NSWCCA 134
DS v R [2014] NSWCCA 267
England v R; Phanith v R [2009] NSWCCA 274
Green v R; Quinn v R (2011) 244 CLR 463; [2011] HCA 49
Hi v The Queen [2017] VSCA 315
Hilli v The Queen; Jones v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520; [2010] HCA 45
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40
Lowe v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 606; [1984] HCA 46
Postiglione v The Queen (1997) 189 CLR 295; [1997] HCA 26
R v McGuire [2017] QCA 250
R v Phuong; R v Lewan [2015] SASCFC 70
Sparos v R (2013) 235 A Crim R 462; [2013] NSWCCA 223
Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461; [1989] HCA 53;
Tan v R [2014] NSWCCA 96
Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465; [1988] HCA 14
Wan v R [2017] NSWCCA 261
Woodward v R [2017] NSWCCA 44

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

Benjamin Adam Miles (Applicant)
Regina (Respondent Crown)

Representation:

Counsel:
P Skinner (Applicant)
T Smith (Respondent Crown)

  Solicitors:
Armstrong Felton (Applicant)
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Respondent)

File Number(s):

2015/251814

 Decision under appeal 

Court or tribunal:

District Court

Jurisdiction:

Criminal

Date of Decision:

10 June 2016

Before:

Mahony SC DCJ

File Number(s):

2015/251814

Judgment

1. LEEMING JA: In this application for leave to appeal against sentence, the Crown properly conceded material error. The facts are set out in Rothman J’s judgment, which I have had the advantage of reading in draft, and to which I wish to add the following.

2. The conceded error came about because the “Form 1” which had been drafted (it may be presumed) by the Crown, which was signed by a person authorised under s 32(5) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) and which listed five charges of supply and possession of prohibited drugs, failed to identify the “principal offence” in relation to which Mr Miles had indicated that he wished the court to take account when imposing sentence. Instead, it listed all five offences to which Mr Miles had pleaded guilty and for which he was to be sentenced. The error was not detected by senior counsel briefed for Mr Miles, nor by the advocate appearing for the Crown, as a consequence of which the sentencing judge did not receive the assistance to which he was entitled.

3. A similarly defective Form 1 was the subject of comment in Woodward v R [2017] NSWCCA 44 at [23]-[24].

4. The Form 1 offences included selling 28.19 grams of cocaine to a female undercover operative for $7,500 and giving her 0.64 grams of methylamphetamine as a sample in order (according to the agreed facts) that “she could assess how much of the drug she wished to purchase in the future”. The indictable quantity for cocaine is 5 grams.

5. The Form 1 offences were plainly far from trivial. It was open to the primary judge to exercise the power in s 53A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act to impose an aggregate sentence, but it remained necessary to identify an offence as the principal offence, in respect of which the Form 1 offences would be taken into account, in the indicative sentence specified under s 53A(2)(b). This was one of the errors identified in Doumit v R [2011] NSWCCA 134.

6. The Crown also maintained that it was wrong for the sentencing judge to state that “I have taken into account the five matters on the Form 1, which also has to be reflected in some accumulation of the sentences”. The Crown pointed to what a majority of this Court held in Sparos v R (2013) 235 A Crim R 462; [2013] NSWCCA 223 at [1] and [7]; cf at [59]-[60]. I agree that it was wrong to proceed on the basis that the Form 1 offences were required to affect the accumulation inherent in the aggregate sentence. In the absence of submissions on a point in an appeal where error is conceded, I do not think it is necessary to express a view on the point on which this Court divided in Sparos, namely, whether it was open to do so.

7. However, and with respect, I struggle to understand how the accumulation to which the sentencing judge referred was effected. The primary judge imposed an aggregate sentence of 4.5 years, with a non-parole period of 2.5 years, on the applicant’s co-offender. The co-offender had been charged with no other offences, and yet the indicative sentences for the three offences – all of which were committed on the same day and in a transaction with the same operative – were 2 years and 3 months, 2 years and 12 months. It will be seen that the co-offender received relatively little reduction by way of concurrency. In contrast, the indicative sentences for the five offences for which the applicant was sentenced were 2.5 years, 3 years, 4 years, 3 years and 2 years. Those offences were committed over an 8 week period. It will be seen that the applicant obtained the benefit of a deal of concurrency, significantly more than did his co-offender, and both in absolute terms (6.5 years) and proportionately. I acknowledge that that might, at least in theory, be a consequence of considerations of totality, but if so, it is not explained in the reasons. Further, the reasons of the primary judge do not explain how such a different approach to accumulation – and one which was highly favourable to the applicant – was applied to both men, sentenced on the same day, when it was said that it was the applicant whose sentence was adversely affected by the Form 1 offences, while his co-offender had no other offences to which account was to be taken.

8. I can deal with the other grounds concisely. I would reject ground 3, which asserts an error in the nature of double jeopardy in relation to counts 1 and 2. There is no such error. The three offences comprising the ongoing supply count which was count 1 took place on 3 days in July 2015. The supply comprising count 2 took place in August.

9. The gravamen of ground 1 is addressed in resentencing. It is not possible to deal with it in respect of the sentence which was imposed, because all of the indicative sentences must be taken to have been infected by the error in relation to the defective Form 1. For that reason, there were only limited submissions on the test to be satisfied to establish disparity sufficient of itself to give rise to appealable error. That said, having now read what Hamill J wrote in Cameron v R [2017] NSWCCA 229 at [79]-[90], I think I was wrong, in Tan v R [2014] NSWCCA 96, to adhere to the proposition that it is necessary for the disparity to be “gross, marked or glaring”. In Cameron at [86], Hamill J said that:

“I am not convinced that the application of epithets such as ‘gross’ or ‘glaring’ to the asserted disparity is a necessary part of the process of reasoning when an intermediate appellant court is called upon to determine a ground of appeal where disparity (or, more usually, a lack of due proportion between sentences imposed on associated offenders) is asserted.”

I now share his Honour’s scepticism. Each of the three adjectives bears a different meaning: what might fairly be regarded as “marked” might fall short of being “gross” or “glaring”, yet the collocation of the three is apt to heighten the test and may distract from the underlying principle. The formulation “gross, marked or glaring” appears not to be found in appellate decisions in other States: see for example R v Phuong; R v Lewan [2015] SASCFC 70 at [39]-[51], R v McGuire [2017] QCA 250 at [46]-[47] and [100]-[101]; Hi v The Queen [2017] VSCA 315 at [71]-[72] and Barnden v State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 161 at [55]-[59]. That said, there will always be differences in the objective and subjective elements in any case involving multiple offenders, such that mere difference in sentence alone cannot give rise to appellable error. The question is whether the sentence imposed on a co-offender is reasonably justified in light of those differences, bearing in mind the qualitative and discretionary judgments required of the sentencing judge.

10. I agree with the sentence proposed by Rothman J, and with the reasons his Honour gives for that sentence. In particular, I agree that the sentence imposed on the applicant’s co-offender was at the very bottom of the range. Yet it was not said to be manifestly inadequate, and the applicant is entitled to the application of the principles of parity in respect of the sentence imposed upon his co-offender. The result is that the sentence which this Court will impose is one which is lower than it would otherwise be.

11. ROTHMAN J: Benjamin Adam Miles (the Applicant) seeks leave to appeal and appeals the sentence imposed upon him in the District Court on 10 June 2016. After a 25% discount for a plea of guilty at the earliest opportunity and consequent upon a finding of special circumstances, the sentencing judge imposed an aggregate sentence of 8 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years and 6 months.

12. A Form 1 was lodged which indicated that further offences listed therein should be taken into account in relation to each of the offences for which the Applicant was to be sentenced. It is correctly conceded by the Crown, in this proceeding, that such a course was an error of law and the Form 1 was required to relate to one only offence.

13. His Honour sentenced on the basis of the Form 1 as filed and, thereby, was led into error. As a consequence, error is disclosed and the Court is required to re-sentence. I will expand on the foregoing.

Offences

14. The Applicant was charged with five offences being:

Count 1: Ongoing Supply of prohibited drug, contrary to s 25A(1) of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (“the Drug Act”), for which the maximum sentence is 20 years imprisonment and/or a fine of $385,000 and for which there is no standard non-parole period;

Count 2: Supply prohibited drug (large commercial quantity) (3, 4 MDMA), contrary to s 25(2) of the Drug Act, for which the maximum sentence is life imprisonment and/or a fine of $550,000 and for which the legislature has set a standard non-parole period of 15 years imprisonment.

Count 3: Supply prohibited drug (large commercial quantity) (3, 4 MDMA), contrary to s 25(2) of the Drug Act, and for which the maximum sentence and standard non-parole period are set out in count 2 above.

Count 4: Supply prohibited drug (commercial quantity) (Cocaine), contrary to s 25(2) of the Drug Act, for which the legislature has set a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment and/or a fine of $385,000 and a standard non-parole period of 10 years imprisonment.

Count 5: Supply prohibited drug (methylamphetamine), contrary to s 25(1) of the Drug Act, for which the maximum sentence is 15 years imprisonment and/or a fine of $220,000 and for which there is no standard non-parole period.

15. In the course of the application for leave and appeal, the Applicant and the Respondent (Crown) jointly sought to amend the Form 1 so that it applied only to count 3 above, being sequence 11 in the records relating to the sentencing proceedings.

16. The Applicant’s proceedings on sentence were conducted at the same time as the proceedings of his co-offender, who was charged with three offences being the offences referred to above of counts 3, 4 and 5.

17. Given the centrality of the parity issue in these proceedings, it is appropriate to set out the indicative sentences for the Applicant and his co-offender, which are as follows:

INDICATIVE SENTENCES	The Applicant, Miles	The Co-Offender, Abraham
Count 1 Miles	2 years & 6 months	Not charged
Count 2 Miles	3 years, NPP 18 months	Not charged
Count 3 Miles/ Count 1 Abraham	4 years, NPP 2 years	2 years & 3 months, NPP 18 months
Count 4 Miles/ Count 2 Abraham	3 years, NPP 18 months	2 years, NPP 12 months
Count 5 Miles/ Count 3 Abraham	2 years	1 years
AGGREGATE SENTENCE FOR APPLICANT 8 years with a non-parole period of 4 years & 6 months	AGGREGATE SENTENCE FOR ABRAHAM 4 years & 6 months with a non-parole period of 2 years & 6 months

Facts

18. There were agreed facts upon which basis the Applicant was sentenced, which were in the following terms:

“The accused is a single male with no dependants. At the time of charging he was 25 years, unemployed, and had no form of income other than welfare benefits.

In June 2015 the Monaro Drug Unit formed Strike Force Hiems to investigate the supply of prohibited drugs in Jindabyne and the NSW snow fields during the 2015 snow season.

On 23 June 2015 Assistant Commissioner WORBOYS authorised the conduct of the cross-border controlled operation authority referenced CBCO15/189 in relation to the supply of prohibited drugs involving the accused, Benjamin Adam Miles.

Sequence four: S25A(1) DMTA Ongoing supply (incorporating Seq 1, 2, 3)

Between 2 July 2015 and 29 July 2015, a period of not more than 30 consecutive days, the accused supplied a prohibited drug, namely 3,4- methyl enedioxymethylamphetamine, on three occasions for financial reward.

Supply one (seq 1):

About 3:28pm 2 July 2015 the accused, Benjamin Miles, was recorded at the Lake Jindabyne Hotel, Kosciuszko Road, Jindabyne while he negotiated the sale of 3,4-methylenedioxymethylamphetamine (hereinafter referred to as MDMA) to a female known to police in exchange for $2990. In conversations with the accused he was recorded saying that he had a large customer base and encouraged the female to purchase larger quantities of the drug. The accused stated he was capable of supplying multiple ounce weights for $4,800 each. The accused further stated that the female should put the drug in gel caps to sell them to maximise her profit.

In further conversations with the accused he was recorded saying he did not want the money and drugs in the one place so the female gave him $2,990 and he left the keys to his 2007 Subaru Forester with the female as collateral. The accused walked to unit 10 Gippsland Street, Jindabyne, with the money and returned a short time later and was recorded while he supplied the female with 13.70grams of MDMA.

The substance supplied by the accused was analysed by the NSW Forensic & Analytical Science Service and found to be 3,4-methyIenedioxymethylamphetamine with a purity of 67.0%. The indictable quantity is 1.25grams. The commercial quantity is 125grams. The large commercial quantity is 500grams.

Supply two (seq 2):

About 4:29pm, 23 July 2015 the accused was recorded at the Lake Jindabyne Hotel, Kosciuszko Road, Jindabyne while he supplied 51.72grams of MDMA to a female known to police in exchange for $9,000. The accused stated that he was a sponsored snowboarder who picked up work occasionally as a labourer or dish washer and that he travelled internationally with regularity.

The substance supplied by the accused was analysed by the NSW Forensic & Analytical Science Service and found to be 3,4-methylenedioxymethylamphetamine with a purity of 72.0%. The indictable quantity is 1.25grams. The commercial quantity is 125grams. The large commercial quantity is 500grams.

Supply three (seq 3):

About 3:06pm, 29 July 2015 the accused was recorded at the Jindabyne Bowling Club, Bay Street, Jindabyne while meeting a female known to police. At 3:47pm, the same day in Park Road, Jindabyne the accused was recorded while he supplied 56.80grams of MDMA to the female in exchange for $9,000.

During the meeting the accused encouraged the female to purchase larger quantities of drug and quoted $4,300 per ounce if she purchased more than four ounces at a time. The accused reassured the female that he would still be making money on the deal. The accused explained that he would like for the female to refer to the drug as ‘cheeseburgers’ when she rang to place an order. He further explained that one cheeseburger would be an ounce (28.4grams) of MDMA.

The substance supplied by the accused was analysed by the NSW Forensic & Analytical Science Service and found to be 3,4- methylenedioxymethylamphetamine. The indictable quantity is 1,25grams. The commercial quantity is 125grams. The large commercial quantity is 500grams.

Sequence ten: S25(2) supply large commercial quantity prohibited drug (incorporating Seq 5, 6, 9)

Between 2 July 2015 and 20 August 2015 the accused supplied the female with a total of 646.86grams of 3,4- methylenedioxymethylamphetarnine. It should be noted that theaccused, at every meeting with the female, encouraged her to purchase more of the drug for on supply. The accused consistently offered price reductions as an incentive for the female to make larger purchases.

The purity of the MDMA sold by the accused to this point was of very high potency and as such would pose a significantly higher risk of injury to the end user if not diluted or taken in minute quantities. The amount of drug supplied by the accused has the potential to make 40,000 street deals of the drug.

Sequence five

About 2:08pm, 5 August 2015 the accused was recorded while he met a female known to police at the Jindabyne Bowling Club, Kosciuszko Road, Jindabyne and negotiated the purchase of MDMA. During this conversation the accused reiterated that he was making money on the transaction and that he travelled to Canada and the United States for their snow seasons, planning to return there again in January. The accused was recorded while he encouraged the female to purchase larger quantities of MDMA and quoted her $4,000 per ounce when she purchased in quantities of greater than ten ounces (284 grams).

About 2:36pm the female handed the accused $17,200 for an agreed four ounces of MDMA. The accused gave the female his car keys and directed her to go to the car park of the Lake Jindabyne Hotel. The accused was observed to enter 1/10 Gippsland Street, Jindabyne for a short period before walking to the car park of the car park of the Lake Jindabyne Hotel, Kosciuszko Road, Jindabyne. The accused was recorded while he supplied 111.38grams of MDMA to the female.

The substance supplied by the accused was analysed by the NSW Forensic & Analytical Science Service and confirmed to be 3,4- methylenedioxymethylamphetamine. The indictable quantity is 1.25grams. The commercial quantity is 125grams. The large commercial quantity is 500grams.

Sequence six

About 3:18pm, 12 August 2015 the accused was recorded while he met a female known to police at the Jindabyne Bowling Club, Kosciuszko Road, Jindabyne and negotiated the purchase of MDMA. The accused told the female that, aside from MDMA, he could source cocaine and methylamphetamine (‘ice’). The accused quoted the female $7,500 per ounce of cocaine and stated that it was of high quality. The accused asked the female to refer to the cocaine as ‘drinks’ when ordering the drug over the phone and that one drink would be an ounce of cocaine. He asked the female to refer to the methylamphetamine as ‘fries’ and again one fries would be an ounce. He joked that if you want all three it would be a ‘meal deal’.

The accused asked that the female order the MDMA in half pound (227gram) amounts where she could, as it would save repackaging of the drug. The accused told the female if she was purchasing the MDMA in quantities greater than half pound then he would charge her $3,800 but reassured her that he was still making money on the deal.

About 4:07pm, the female handed the accused $19,350 for an agreed four and a half ounces of MDMA. The accused gave the female his car keys and directed her to go to on-street parking in Park Road, Jindabyne. The accused was observed to walk to and enter 1/10 Gippsland Street, Jindabyne for a short period before walking to where the female had parked as directed. The accused was recorded while he supplied 125.80grams of MDMA to the female.

The substance supplied by the accused was analysed by the NSW Forensic & Analytical Science Service and found to be 3,4- methyl enedioxymethylamphetamine with a purity of 78%. The indictable quantity is 1.25grams. The commercial quantity is 125grams. The large commercial quantity is 500grams.

Sequence nine

Also during this meeting the accused was recorded while he supplied the female with ten ounces (278.64grams) of MDMA in exchange for $38,000.

The substance supplied by the accused was analysed by the NSW Forensic & Analytical Science Service and found to be 3,4- methylenedioxymethylamphetamine with a purity of 65%. The indictable quantity is 1.25grams. The commercial quantity is 125grams. The large commercial quantity is 500grams.

Sequence seven: S25m DMTA (Form 1)

About 3:30pm, 20 August 2015 the accused was at the Bullocks Flat Ski Tube Station car park, Alpine Way, Jindabyne when he was recorded while he supplied 28.19grams of cocaine to a female known to police in exchange for $7,500. The accused told the female that if she purchased the cocaine in pound quantities (454grams) he would be able to bring the price down to $7,300 yet still make money.

The substance supplied by the accused was analysed by the NSW Forensic & Analytical Science Service and found to be cocaine with a purity of 28.5%. The indictable quantity is 5grams. The commercial quantity is 250grams. The large commercial quantity is 1000grams.

Sequence eight: S25(l) DMTA (Form 1)

Also during this meeting the accused supplied the female with 0.64grams of methylamphetamine (‘ice’) as a sample at no cost so she could assess how much of the drug she wished to purchase in future. The accused told the female that he did not do much of the methylamphetamine and would source only a couple of ounces (56.8grams) with a purity of 81%.

The substance supplied by the accused was analysed by the NSW Forensic & Analytical Science Service and found to be methylamphetamine.

Sequence eleven: S25(2) DMTA: Supply large commercial quantity prohibited drug

About 2.00pm, 27 August 2015 the accused was at the Bullocks Flat Ski Tube Station car park, Alpine Way, Jindabyne when he was recorded while he supplied 681.6grams of 3,4-methylenedioxymethylamphetamine to a female known to police in exchange for $91,200. The commercial quantity is 125grams. The large commercial quantity is 500grams.

Sequence twelve: S25(2) DMTA: Supply commercial quantity prohibited drug About 2.00pm, 27 August 2015 the accused was at the Bullocks Flat Ski Tube Station car park, Alpine Way, Jindabyne when he was recorded while he supplied 284.0grams of cocaine to a female known to police in exchange for $75,000. The indictable quantity is 5grams. The commercial quantity is 250grams. The large commercial quantity is 1000grams.

Sequence thirteen: S25(1)DMTA: Supply prohibited drug

About 2.00pm, 27 August 2015 the accused was at the Bullocks Flat Ski Tube Station car park, Alpine Way, Jindabyne when he was recorded while he supplied 56.8grams of methylamphetamine to a female known to police in exchange for $23,800. The indictable quantity is 1.25grams. The commercial quantity is 125grams. The large commercial quantity is 500grams.

Arrest

About 2.06pm, 27 August 2015 the accused was arrested at the Bullocks Flat Ski Tube Station car park, Alpine Way, Jindabyne. The accused was cautioned and all safeguards adhered to.

Sequence fifteen- S10(l) DMTA Possess prohibited drug (Form 1)

During the search of the accused investigators located in the top breast pocket of his shirt a clear plastic vial with a black screw-on lid containing a white powder. The accused stated the contents of the vial was cocaine.

The accused was informed of investigators intent to execute a search warrant on his residence at 2/10 Gippsland Street, Jindabyne. At that time the accused stated a wooden chest and its contents located in the living room of that unit was his.

A short time later the accused was conveyed to 2/10 Gippsland Street, Jindabyne. The accused was introduced onto the video recording and was asked to nominate his bedroom which he did. The accused also nominated the wooden chest.

Sequence sixteen: SlO(l) DMTA Possess prohibited drug (Form 1)

Located within the wooden chest was a small plastic re-sealable bag containing a white powder. The accused stated the powder was MDMA powder.

Sequence seventeen: S10(l) DMTA Possess prohibited drug (Form 1)

Also located within the wooden chest were a total of 77 oxycontin tablets. The accused stated the tablets were oxycontin tablets and he did not possess a prescription for them.

Also located within the wooden chest was $120 in Australian currency, a number of re-sealable plastic bags, a large re-sealable bag containing empty clear gell caps and two sets of digital scales.

The accused was taken to Cooma Police Station where he was introduced to the custody manager. The accused was explained his rights under Part 9. The accused participated in an electronically recorded interview and was informed of the allegations and declined to answer any questions put to him.

Electronic and physical surveillance was used extensively during operations and forms a significant portion of brief of evidence. Listening device recordings made during operations were done so under section 7(4) of the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW). Telephone intercept and surveillance warrants authorised other covertly obtained evidence by the Strike Force.

3,4- methylenedioxymethylamphetamine, cocaine, methylamphetamine and oxycodone are prohibited drugs listed on Schedule One of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW).

On conviction, a Drug Proceeds Order is sought under section 29 Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime Act 1989 (NSW) for the sum of $103,040, being the total amount of money from which the accused received benefit as a result of supply prohibited drugs to known persons during this operation.

On conviction an Order is sought for the destruction of prohibited drugs retained by the New South Wales Police in relation to this matter.”

19. Material was adduced on behalf of the Applicant going to his subjective circumstances. The Applicant gave evidence on sentence and was cross-examined by the Crown.

20. In addition to the oral testimony of the Applicant, the Court had before it a pre-sentence report of 16 February 2016 and a record disclosing that the Applicant was a first offender (as was his co-offender).

21. The Applicant tendered a letter over his own signature (Exhibit 1 in the sentence proceedings) and a statement by his mother, which included a reference from his school; a record of his having obtained a Bachelor of Industrial Design from University; a letter from a potential employer; material going to his snowboarding expertise and registration of a business name relating to that.

22. Further, a psychiatric report from Professor James Ogloff AM, Clinical and Forensic Psychologist, was tendered (Exhibit 3 in the sentence proceedings). Professor Ogloff also compiled a report in relation to the co-offender that was tendered in the proceedings in relation to the co-offender’s sentence.

23. It is unnecessary to recite large extracts from the report of Professor Ogloff in relation to the Applicant, but it is clear that the Applicant exhibited “low mood” and “was particularly anxious during the assessment”. His expressed emotion was blunted and he displayed low-concept and was largely dependent on the perception that others have of him (Exhibit 3 [44]).

24. Apart from the presentation of very low self-esteem to which Professor Ogloff referred, the Professor also referred to the Applicant’s feelings of inadequacy and shame, the latter being particularly about his offending and the effect it has had on his family. Part of the feelings of inadequacy was the Applicant’s perception of the comparison between him and his older brother.

25. Despite a history of serious clinical depression in the Applicant’s family and the Applicant’s reluctance to discuss this history (particularly his mother’s and uncle’s experiences with depression), the Applicant did not have a formal history of depressive illness or anxiety sufficient to enable Professor Ogloff to diagnose a pre-existing depressive illness. This is because, notwithstanding treatment by counselling and medication, the Professor found it “difficult to determine to what extent his depressed mood and anxiety have persisted over time or are the result of his negative life circumstances including his poor adjustment to incarceration”.

26. The report suggests that the diagnosis “that most closely captures his presentation is Adjustment Disorder, with mixed anxiety and depressed mood, persistent (symptoms lasting greater than 6 months)”. The Professor however was unable to determine definitively the prognosis of his disorder without a good understanding of his mental health history and outcome.

27. The Applicant’s co-offender, on the other hand, gave a more complete psychological history to Professor Ogloff, which included a prior report of a clinical psychologist (15 February 2016, i.e. after incarceration for the offences) from which the Professor could conclude that the co-offender met the criteria for Dysthymia, co-morbid with cannabis addiction. Dysthymia is now (DSM-5) known as Persistent Depressive Disorder.

28. It is necessary to recite that the Applicant was arrested and charged on 27 August 2015 and bail was refused. The Applicant has remained in custody since that date. The Applicant entered a plea of guilty at the Local Court on 10 December 2015 (the earliest reasonable opportunity); and the sentence hearing and sentencing occurred on 25 May 2016 and 10 June 2016.

Grounds of Appeal

29. The Applicant raises three grounds of appeal:

“1.    Ground 1:

The Applicant has a justifiable sense of grievance as to the disparity in the sentence imposed upon him for the three offences committed jointly with his co-offender and that disparity is such as to justify the intervention of this Honourable Court.

2.    Ground 2:

His Honour erred in his process of taking into account the outstanding charges admitted by the Applicant.

3.    Ground 3:

The indicative sentences that his Honour imposed for counts 1 and 2 are infected with an error in the nature of double jeopardy, and as a result the aggregate sentence imposed for all counts including these two is similarly so infected.”

30. As stated at the outset, the Crown concedes that the matter raised in Ground 2 was an error of law that fulfils the standard expressed by the High Court in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40, but does not concede Grounds 1 or 3. Given the concession as to Ground 2, it is necessary for the Court, as presently constituted, to re-sentence. Part of that re-sentencing function involves a consideration of whether a lesser sentence is warranted in law.

31. Because other error has already been conceded, it is technically unnecessary to deal with disparity in the sentence appeal. Nevertheless, it is necessary to deal with the appropriate parity between the Applicant and his co-offender in re-sentencing afresh and, in so doing, deal with the principles applicable thereto.

Parity Principle

32. The principles of equal justice embody the norm expressed in the term “equality before the law” and are an aspect of the rule of law: Green v R; Quinn v R (2011) 244 CLR 463; [2011] HCA 49 at [28]. The principle, as has been stated a number of times, is a fundamental element in a rational and fair system of criminal justice (and beyond criminal justice).

33. Inconsistency in punishment undermines the public perception in the fairness of the criminal justice system and the integrity of the administration of justice. Similarly, equality of treatment enhances the integrity of the justice system and is a matter of continuing importance to the administration of justice and to the community: Lowe v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 606; [1984] HCA 46 at CLR 610 – 611.

34. The principle requires identity of outcome in cases that are relevantly identical and requires different outcomes in cases that are different in a relevant respect. The difference in outcome must reflect differences in the circumstances of the offenders or differences in the cases of the offenders whose sentences are under comparison: Postiglione v The Queen (1997) 189 CLR 295; [1997] HCA 26; Hilli v The Queen; Jones v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520; [2010] HCA 45.

35. The principle was and continues to be a reflection of the application of the norm of equality before the law and involves this Court intervening only when there is a justifiable sense of grievance arising from the sentence imposed on another. In imposing a sentence at first instance or in resentencing on appeal, the parity principle must be applied to ensure that a difference in the sentence of co-offenders must reflect, rationally, the differences in the relevant respects of each offender.

36. In the submissions of the Crown, the Court was urged to adopt a principle that, in order to give rise to a ground of appeal on disparity, the difference must be “gross, marked or glaring”: Tan v R [2014] NSWCCA 96 at [39], by reference to the discussion by Howie J in England v R; Phanith v R [2009] NSWCCA 274.

37. Recently, Hamill J, in dissent (but not, it seems on this question of principle), said in Cameron v R [2017] NSWCCA 229 at [79] and following:

“[79]    The High Court has emphasised that the issue of parity is an application of the fundamental principle of equal justice. In his frequently cited dissenting judgment in Lowe v The Queen, Mason J said at 610-611:

‘Just as consistency in punishment – a reflection of the notion of equal justice – is a fundamental element in any rational and fair system of criminal justice, so inconsistency in punishment, because it is regarded as a badge of unfairness and unequal treatment under the law, is calculated to lead to an erosion of public confidence in the integrity of the administration of justice. It is for this reason that the avoidance and elimination of unjustifiable discrepancy in sentencing is a matter of abiding importance to the administration of justice and to the community.’

…

[81]    In Postiglione v The Queen, the High Court considered a case where ‘other things were not equal’, but the judgments established that the principle requires that there be a ‘due proportion’ between sentences in such cases. Dawson and Gaudron JJ said at 301-302:

‘The parity principle upon which the argument in this Court was mainly based is an aspect of equal justice. Equal justice requires that like should be treated alike but that, if there are relevant differences, due allowance should be made for them. In the case of co-offenders, different sentences may reflect different degrees of culpability or their different circumstances. If so, the notion of equal justice is not violated. On some occasions, different sentences may indicate that one or other of them is infected with error. Ordinarily, correction of the error will result in there being a due proportion between the sentences and there will then be equal justice. However, the parity principle, as identified and expounded in Lowe v The Queen, recognises that equal justice requires that, as between co-offenders, there should not be a marked disparity which gives rise to “a justifiable sense of grievance”. If there is, the sentence in issue should be reduced, notwithstanding that it is otherwise appropriate and within the permissible range of sentencing options.’

…

[82]    This passage shows that the parity principle is not to be applied in an unduly technical way and that an appeal court must consider the practical impact of the sentences imposed on two offenders in determining whether the disparity between the sentences is justified. Similar sentiments emerge from the High Court’s decision and judgments in Green & Quinn v The Queen.

…

[85]    In Tuivaga, Hoeben CJ at CL went on to cite with approval the following passage from the judgment of Latham J (Button J and Grove AJ agreeing) in Mammone v R:

‘45    ... The imposition of different sentences does not, without more, raise “equal justice” considerations. Moreover, a sense of grievance is only “justifiable” or legitimate if the application of objective criteria compels the court to that conclusion. The age, background, criminal history and role in the offence of various offenders may justify some disparity: Green v The Queen ; Quinn v The Queen [2011] HCA 49 at [31].

46    In particular, as the majority in Green & Quinn make clear,

“A court of criminal appeal deciding an appeal against the severity of a sentence on the ground of unjustified disparity will have regard to the qualitative and discretionary judgments required of the primary judge in drawing distinctions between co-offenders.”‘“ [Footnotes omitted.]

38. With respect to Hamill J, I adopt that analysis. In the same judgment, Basten JA referred to international law principles relating to non-discrimination in the law and cited, with approval, Gaudron J in Street v Queensland Bar Association [1989] HCA 53; (1989) 168 CLR 461 at 571 with which comments I, with respect, also agree. As Hamill J pointed out at [86] – [90], the addition of an epithet relating to the disparity being gross or glaring does not reflect the test. The test remains whether the principles of equal justice have been misapplied.

39. Of course, most cases involve differences between co-offenders. No two offenders are identical. A difference in sentence between one co-offender and another that is intended to reflect a difference in the circumstances of each offender is another example of the exercise of a sentencing judgment. Such a judgment should be the subject of interference only where the difference can be said not to reflect the difference between the relevant offenders.

40. In other words, without using epithets or placing a gloss on the principle, different judges may arrive at different conclusions to reflect differences, each of which conclusion may be rational, reasonable and appropriate: see Wan v R [2017] NSWCCA 261 at [42] citing the judgment of the Court in DS v R [2014] NSWCCA 267 at [39], which makes clear that such descriptors are intended to ensure that the principle applies “where the discrepancy between the sentences is not reasonably explained by the degree of difference between co-offenders and their offending”.

Consideration

41. It is necessary for the Court to reiterate that the purposes of sentencing described both in s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 and by the common law include punishment, general deterrence, specific deterrence, protection of the community, retribution and reform: Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465; [1988] HCA 14. Each of these purposes must be considered together and none can be considered in isolation.

42. The process, often described as intuitive synthesis, is one in which the sentencing judge synthesises the objective seriousness of the offence with the subjective circumstances of the offender, bearing in mind each of the purposes of sentencing, and arrives at a result that best achieves a balance in those purposes. All of those purposes are guideposts and often they point in different directions.

41. The principle of equal justice, which gives rise to the principle of parity, deals with the concept, as stated, that like should be treated alike and those that are relevantly different should be treated differently in a way that rationally reflects the differences between them.

42. In my view, the sentence imposed upon the co-offender is at the very bottom of the range that could have been imposed. Nevertheless, the Crown does not suggest that the sentence imposed is impermissibly lenient. Nor has the Crown appealed the sentence imposed upon the co-offender.

43. As a consequence, it is appropriate that the Applicant’s sentence rationally reflect the difference in offending between the Applicant and his co-offender. Were it not for parity, I would not impose a sentence lower than was imposed below.

44. The comment that the sentence imposed upon the co-offender was at the bottom of the range or below it takes into account the guidepost that one of the offences carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment (together with a fine) and a standard non-parole period of 15 years imprisonment.

45. The indicative sentence set for count 3 in relation to the Applicant is 4 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 2 years imprisonment. For the co-offender, for the same offence, which the sentencing judge wrongly describes as a “large quantity”, as distinct from “a large commercial quantity”, the indicative sentence set was 2 years and 3 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months. His Honour described the offence, in relation to the co-offender, as “below the mid-range of offending” (AB 205, ROS, co-offender at [47]).

46. Each offender received the maximum discount for the plea of guilty at the earliest reasonable opportunity, being 25%. The five offences on the Form 1 are to be given effect in fixing a sentence in relation to count 3 in the Applicant’s charges.

47. The Crown submits that there are significant differences in the Applicant’s conduct and that of his co-offender. In part, those significant differences relate to what is said to be the relative objective seriousness of the two offenders and the difference in moral culpability. Further, any sentence to be imposed on the Applicant must take account of the charges in counts 1 and 2, with which the co-offender was not charged.

48. As already stated, I do not consider the subjective circumstances of the two offenders to be substantially different: see [23] – [27], supra. Nor do they require significantly different sentences to be imposed.

49. Taking into account the Form 1 offences in relation to count 3 and bearing in mind the time of the offences in counts 1 and 2, adds significantly to the totality of the offending with which the Applicant is charged. The Form 1 offences can only be taken into account in fixing a sentence for count 3, but, in so doing, greater regard should be had for the need for specific deterrence and punishment and the greater culpability in relation to the charge in count 3.

50. Moreover, the range of offences with which the Applicant is charged discloses offending over a period of approximately two months commencing 2 July 2015 and concluding 27 August 2015, whereas the co-offender’s charges all occurred on one day being 27 August 2015. Further, there are no Form 1 offences attached to any of the co-offender’s charges.

51. Further, the two additional charges for which the Applicant was sentenced are each serious, involving, as they do, maximum sentences of 20 years imprisonment and life imprisonment respectively and in relation to the latter charge a standard non-parole period of 15 years imprisonment.

52. These additional offences require an appropriately longer aggregate sentence on the Applicant than on his co-offender.

53. The indicative sentences set for counts 1 and 2 were 2 years and 6 months imprisonment for count 1 and, for count 2, 3 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months. Given the existence of a standard non-parole period in relation to the offence charged in count 2, it was necessary for the learned sentencing judge to set a non-parole period in his indicative sentence.

54. At the same time, the indicative sentence set in relation to count 3 of the Applicant, which must take account of the Form 1 offences and the need for a sentence to be imposed in the context of the ongoing nature of the offending, was 4 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 2 years. For the co-offender, the indicative sentence set for the equivalent charge was a head sentence of 2 years and 3 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months imprisonment.

55. For count 4, the sentencing judge set an indicative sentence for the Applicant of 3 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months imprisonment and, for his co-offender, a head sentence of 2 years imprisonment and a non-parole period of 12 months imprisonment. For count 5, the sentencing judge set an indicative sentence for the Applicant of 2 years imprisonment and, for his co-offender, 12 months imprisonment.

56. The Crown submits that the Applicant and his co-offender had significantly different subjective circumstances and significantly different roles in the relevant offences. The difference in subjective circumstances seems to be more a result of the reluctance of the Applicant to discuss his and his family’s mental history than a significant difference in their mental state. Further, they were described as “partners” in the criminal offending and the objective evidence seems to suggest that neither obtained a profit from the offending, but each used the offending to support their own drug habit and such living expenses as they may have otherwise incurred.

57. Each offender seems, on the objective material available, to be involved to a similar or like extent in the criminal offending for which they were both charged and any difference in the description of their offending seems to relate more to their use of language than it does to any significant difference in the offending for those three offences with which they were both charged.

58. In light of the foregoing comments, the indicative sentence set for the Applicant in relation to counts 3, 4 and 5 does not reflect a rational differentiation between the offending of each of the offenders. The appeal, however, is against the aggregate sentence imposed; not the indicative sentences. Nevertheless, the difference in the indicative sentences discloses a disparity that is unwarranted and, in relation to the sentence to be imposed in this appeal, ought not be reflected in the orders proposed.

59. The seriousness of the offences charged in counts 1 and 2, as already stated, requires the imposition of a significant sentence over and above that which would have been imposed were they not to have been committed. The effect of those counts, as already stated, relates to the seriousness of those offences, themselves, and the impact that this kind of offending, over a longer period of time, had on factors relating to specific deterrence, punishment and culpability in the offences charged and may lead to a significant penalty over and above that imposed on the co-offender.

60. I propose that the Court set indicative sentences for the offences in the following way:

1. Count 1 – between 2 July and 29 July 2015 Ongoing Supply of prohibited drug, contrary to s 25A(1) of the Drug Act – 2 years and 6 months imprisonment;

2. Count 2 – between 2 July 2015 and 20 August 2015 Supply prohibited drug (large commercial quantity) (3, 4 MDMA), contrary to s 25(2) of the Drug Act – 3 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 18 months imprisonment;

3. Count 3 – on 27 August 2015 Supply prohibited drug (large commercial quantity) (3, 4 MDMA), contrary to s 25(2) of the Drug Act (taking into account the five offences on the Form 1) 3 years and 6 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 2 years and 6 months;

4. Count 4 – on 27 August 2015, Supply prohibited drug (commercial quantity) (Cocaine), contrary to s 25(2) of the Drug Act – 2 years and 6 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 15 months;

5. Count 5 – on 27 August 2015, Supply prohibited drug (methylamphetamine), contrary to s 25(1) of the Drug Act – 18 months imprisonment.

63. The foregoing continues the discount of 25% for the Applicant’s early plea of guilty and the finding of special circumstances. It is appropriate, for the reasons explained by the sentencing judge, that the Applicant receive a shorter non-parole period and a longer period during which the Applicant is eligible for parole.

64. I propose that the Court impose an aggregate sentence, being a sentence of a non-parole period of 3 years and 9 months, commencing 27 August 2015 and expiring 26 May 2019 and a balance of term of 3 years and 3 months concluding 26 August 2022.

65. The Applicant would be first eligible for parole on 26 May 2019.

66. I propose the following orders:

1. Leave to appeal be granted;

2. Appeal be upheld;

3. The sentence imposed on the Applicant, Benjamin Adam Miles, by the District Court on 10 June 2016, be quashed and in lieu thereof the following sentence be imposed:

1. An aggregate sentence, being a sentence of a non-parole period of 3 years and 9 months commencing 27 August 2015 and expiring 26 May 2019 and a balance of term of 3 years and 3 months, concluding 26 August 2022.

2. The Applicant is first eligible for parole on 26 May 2019.

67. HAMILL J:  I have had the very great benefit of reading the draft judgments of both Leeming JA and Rothman J.  I agree with the orders proposed by Rothman J and with the reasons his Honour articulates for those orders.  I also agree with the judgment of Leeming JA. 

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Decision last updated: 16 November 2017