Melisavon Pty Ltd v Springfield Land Development Corporation Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Melisavon Pty Ltd v Springfield Land Development Corporation Pty Limited [2014] QCA 233

PARTIES:

MELISAVON PTY LTD
ACN 010 635 837
(appellant)
v
SPRINGFIELD LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION PTY LIMITED ACN 055 714 531 AS
TRUSTEE FOR SPRINGFIELD DEVELOPMENT TRUST
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 9105 of 2013
SC No 5108 of 2011

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

16 September 2014

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

3 April 2014

JUDGES:

Margaret McMurdo P and Holmes JA and Ann Lyons J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, Margaret McMurdo P and Ann Lyons J agreeing as to the order made, Holmes JA dissenting

ORDER:

The appeal is dismissed with costs.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE – QUEENSLAND – PROCEDURE UNDER UNIFORM CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES AND PREDECESSORS – SUMMARY JUDGMENT– where the appellant appealed the decision of the learned primary judge dismissing an application for summary judgment – where the appellant made an application for summary judgment pursuant to r 293 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) – where the respondent made a claim for damages for negligence – where by operation of s 10 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) the claim will be statute barred if the cause of action arose prior to 16 June 2005 – where the respondent argued that there were real issues of fact to be tried in the proceeding – whether the appeal ought to be allowed

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – LIMITATION OF PARTICULAR ACTIONS – SIMPLE CONTRACTS, QUASI-CONTRACTS AND TORTS – ACCRUAL OF CAUSE OF ACTION AND WHEN TIME BEGINS TO RUN – TORTS – ACTIONS AGAINST ARCHITECTS, ENGINEERS, BUILDERS AND RELATED PROFESSIONALS – where the cause of action is founded on tort – where the latent defect at the centre of the claim was the appellant's negligently engineered design of the clubhouse – when does time accrue – whether the learned primary judge erred in finding that the limitation period did not commence until the respondent "first became aware, or ought to have become aware, that it had sustained loss because of the alleged defective design" – whether the respondent's claim in this proceeding is statute barred

Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), s 10
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 293

Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609; [1995] HCA 17, cited
Cartledge v E Jopling & Sons Ltd [1963] AC 758, cited
Central Trust Co v Rafuse [1986] 2 SCR 147, cited
City of Kamloops v Nielsen [1984] 2 SCR 2, cited
Council of the Shire of Noosa v Farr & Ors [2001] QSC 60, cited
Cyril Smith & Associates Pty Ltd v The Owners – Strata Plan No 64970 [2011] NSWCA 181, cited
Di Sante v Camando Nominees Pty Ltd [2000] VSC 211, cited
Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539; [1988] HCA 15, followed

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Details
Case
[2014] QCA 233
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Melisavon Pty Ltd, appealed against the decision of the primary judge dismissing their application for summary judgment. The respondent, Springfield Land Development Corporation Pty Ltd, had brought a claim for damages for negligence against the appellant, relating to a latent defect in the design of a clubhouse. The dispute hinged on whether the respondent's claim was statute-barred under section 10 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), which would apply if the cause of action arose before 16 June 2005. The appellant argued that the limitation period began to run when the latent defect was caused by the appellant's negligently engineered design, while the respondent contended that the limitation period did not begin until they became aware, or ought to have become aware, of the loss due to the defect.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the primary judge correctly found that the limitation period did not commence until the respondent became aware, or ought to have become aware, of the loss due to the defective design. The appellant submitted that the limitation period began to run when the defect was caused, while the respondent argued that it only began when they were aware, or should have been aware, of the loss. The court had to determine whether the primary judge's interpretation of when the limitation period commenced was correct and whether the respondent's claim was, therefore, statute-barred.

The court found that the primary judge did not err in determining that the limitation period did not commence until the respondent became aware, or ought to have become aware, of the loss due to the alleged defective design. The court held that the primary judge correctly interpreted the law on when the limitation period begins to run in cases of negligence involving latent defects. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal and ruled that the respondent's claim was not statute-barred. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

The appeal is dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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