SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Hyacinth Developments Pty Ltd v Scenic Rim Regional Council & Ors [2018] QSC 230
PARTIES:
HYACINTH DEVELOPMENTS PTY LTD
(ACN 100 627 709)(plaintiff)
v
SCENIC RIM REGIONAL COUNCIL
(first defendant)
ONESOURCE PTY LTD (ACN 010 859 408)
(second defendant)
MUS PTY LTD (ACN 116 375 065)
(third defendant)
WARREN KEITH MORTON(fourth defendant)
FILE NO/S:
BS No 10423 of 2015
DIVISION:
Trial Division
PROCEEDING:
Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
8 October 2018
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
1 December 2017
JUDGE:
Douglas J
ORDER:
1. The plaintiff be granted leave to file a pleading in the form of the proposed second further amended statement of claim.
2. The application for summary judgment is dismissed.
3. The application to strike out the proposed second further amended statement of claim is dismissed.
4. The parties shall be heard as to costs.
CATCHWORDS:
PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – ENDING PROCEEDINGS EARLY – SUMMARY DISPOSAL – SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF OR APPLICANT – OTHER CASES AND MATTERS – where the plaintiff obtained approvals from the first defendant to develop land – where the plaintiff purchased the land and commenced the development – where the approvals were declared invalid by the Planning and Environment Court – where the invalidity of the approvals caused the plaintiff to cease development and enter into liquidation – where the plaintiff commenced proceedings almost ten years after the land was originally purchased and almost six years after the approvals were declared invalid – where the defendants brought a summary judgment application on the basis that the proceedings were commenced out of time – whether the limitation issue ought to be decided at an interlocutory stage
PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – PLEADINGS – STRIKING OUT – OTHER CASES AND MATTERS – where the defendants brought a strike out application on the basis that the proceedings were commenced out of time – whether the limitation issue ought to be decided at an interlocutory stage
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – GENERAL MATTERS – AMENDMENT OF ORIGINATING PROCESSES AND PLEADINGS OUTSIDE LIMITATION PERIOD – AMENDMENTS INTRODUCING NEW CAUSE OF ACTION OR PARTICULARISING CAUSE OF ACTION – where it was unclear whether the proceedings were commenced outside the limitation period – where the plaintiff sought to amend the pleadings three years after the proceedings were commenced – where the purported amendments were outside the limitation period – whether the amendments introduced a new cause of action – whether the amendments caused prejudice to the defendants – whether the plaintiff ought to be granted leave to amend
PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – PLEADINGS – PARTICULAR PLEADINGS – ORIGINATING PROCESS – where the plaintiff sought to amend the pleadings three years after the proceedings were commenced – where the defendants argued that there had been delay – whether the plaintiff ought to be granted leave to amend
Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld), s…
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- Case
- [2018] QSC 230
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that it was generally undesirable to decide limitation issues at the interlocutory stage unless it was in the clearest of cases, as insufficient was known about the damage sustained by the plaintiff and the circumstances in which it was sustained. The court found it arguable that the plaintiff's loss did not crystallise until the invalidity of the approvals was declared, making it a reasonable contention that the plaintiff's cause of action did not accrue until that date. The court also considered the plaintiff's application to amend its pleadings to introduce a new cause of action, which arose before the proceedings commenced but was not statute-barred when the proceedings began. The court found that the plaintiff could be granted leave to amend the pleadings under the Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld), even if the limitation period had expired by the time of the amendment. The court dismissed the defendants' applications for summary judgment and to strike out the plaintiff's claims, allowing the plaintiff to proceed with its amended pleadings.
The court's orders included granting the plaintiff leave to file a proposed second further amended statement of claim, dismissing the defendants' application for summary judgment, dismissing the application to strike out the proposed second further amended statement of claim, and directing the parties to be heard on the issue of costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The plaintiff be granted leave to file a pleading in the form of the proposed second further amended statement of claim.
2. The application for summary judgment is dismissed.
3. The application to strike out the proposed second further amended statement of claim is dismissed.
4. The parties shall be heard as to costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The plaintiff accepts that this allegation involves the introduction of a new cause of action but argues it should be given leave to introduce it because it is closely connected with the plaintiff’s existing case about alleged misrepresentations made at the April 2005 meeting. The connection is sufficiently close, it submits, because the new facts alleged can properly be said to arise out of the same, or substantially the same facts already alleged. It submitted that no prejudice should be occasioned to the defendants by reason of the amendments, and that it is otherwise appropriate to give leave to introduce them.Consideration Mr O’Sullivan QC’s submissions also raised an issue of some potential general interest. This can be characterised as an application to amend the pleading by introducing a cause of action that arose before the proceeding itself had commenced, that would arguably have been statute barred at the date of the amendment but not statute barred when the proceedings began. He pointed out that, on one construction of rr 375 to 380 and r 387 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, if no request for trial date has been filed, leave is not required and the appropriate course is for the defendants to apply within eight days to disallow the amendments pursuant to r 379 of the UCPR. Such an application would then be governed by the principles set out in r 376(4) permitting the court to give leave to amend to include a new cause of action if the court considers it appropriate and that the new cause of action arises out of the same facts or substantially the same facts as a cause of action for which relief has already been claimed.[10] [10] Compare Edwards v State of Queensland [2012] QSC 248 at [30] and Mokrzecki v Popham [2013] QSC 123 at [25]-[26]. He submitted that, on another construction of the rules, while r 376(4) is expressed in permissive terms, it also implicitly prohibits an amendment of the kind identified in r 376(1). That rule only applies “if a relevant period of limitation, current at the date the proceeding was started, has ended”. The plaintiff brought the application out of an abundance of caution in the event that leave were required but submits that, if it cannot currently be determined whether the period of limitation was current at the date the proceeding was started, so that it was unclear whether r 376(4) could apply, one could find a solution to the practical difficulty that arises where there is a question of whether a limitation period has expired and that cannot be fairly determined ahead of trial.[11][11] Mokrzecki v Popham [2013] QSC 123 at [12] and see [16]-[21] also. He submitted that I could solve the problem by applying s 16(1) of the Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld), which provides a separate source of jurisdiction to the court to grant leave to amend a pleading introducing a new cause of action statute barred when the amendment is made. That power is not confined to cases falling within the language of r 376(1). That seems to me to be a sensible approach to the potential problem. I should also point out that Mr O’Sullivan’s submissions included the argument that the court’s inherent jurisdiction would extend to permit such an amendment.[12][12] Edwards v State of Queensland [2012] QSC 248 at [31]-[32].