Hyacinth Developments Pty Ltd v Scenic Rim Regional Council

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Hyacinth Developments Pty Ltd v Scenic Rim Regional Council & Ors [2018] QSC 230

PARTIES:

HYACINTH DEVELOPMENTS PTY LTD
(ACN 100 627 709)

(plaintiff)

v
SCENIC RIM REGIONAL COUNCIL
(first defendant)
ONESOURCE PTY LTD (ACN 010 859 408)
(second defendant)
MUS PTY LTD (ACN 116 375 065)
(third defendant)
WARREN KEITH MORTON

(fourth defendant)

FILE NO/S:

BS No 10423 of 2015

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

8 October 2018

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

1 December 2017

JUDGE:

Douglas J

ORDER:

1.    The plaintiff be granted leave to file a pleading in the form of the proposed second further amended statement of claim.

2.    The application for summary judgment is dismissed.

3.    The application to strike out the proposed second further amended statement of claim is dismissed.

4.    The parties shall be heard as to costs.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – ENDING PROCEEDINGS EARLY – SUMMARY DISPOSAL – SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF OR APPLICANT – OTHER CASES AND MATTERS – where the plaintiff obtained approvals from the first defendant to develop land – where the plaintiff purchased the land and commenced the development – where the approvals were declared invalid by the Planning and Environment Court – where the invalidity of the approvals caused the plaintiff to cease development and enter into liquidation – where the plaintiff commenced proceedings almost ten years after the land was originally purchased and almost six years after the approvals were declared invalid – where the defendants brought a summary judgment application on the basis that the proceedings were commenced out of time – whether the limitation issue ought to be decided at an interlocutory stage

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – PLEADINGS – STRIKING OUT – OTHER CASES AND MATTERS – where the defendants brought a strike out application on the basis that the proceedings were commenced out of time – whether the limitation issue ought to be decided at an interlocutory stage

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – GENERAL MATTERS – AMENDMENT OF ORIGINATING PROCESSES AND PLEADINGS OUTSIDE LIMITATION PERIOD – AMENDMENTS INTRODUCING NEW CAUSE OF ACTION OR PARTICULARISING CAUSE OF ACTION – where it was unclear whether the proceedings were commenced outside the limitation period – where the plaintiff sought to amend the pleadings three years after the proceedings were commenced – where the purported amendments were outside the limitation period – whether the amendments introduced a new cause of action – whether the amendments caused prejudice to the defendants – whether the plaintiff ought to be granted leave to amend

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – PLEADINGS – PARTICULAR PLEADINGS – ORIGINATING PROCESS – where the plaintiff sought to amend the pleadings three years after the proceedings were commenced – where the defendants argued that there had been delay – whether the plaintiff ought to be granted leave to amend

Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld), s…

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Details
Case
[2018] QSC 230
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Hyacinth Developments Pty Ltd sought damages from Scenic Rim Regional Council and three former town planners for alleged negligence and breaches of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). The plaintiff had purchased land with the expectation of developing it, relying on approvals from the Council. However, these approvals were later declared invalid by the Planning and Environment Court, leading to the plaintiff's financial ruin and eventual liquidation. After exiting liquidation, the plaintiff initiated proceedings nearly six years after the invalidity of the approvals was declared and almost ten years after purchasing the land. The defendants argued the proceedings were statute-barred and sought summary judgment and to strike out the plaintiff's claims. The court had to decide whether the limitation issue could be resolved at the interlocutory stage and whether the plaintiff should be allowed to amend its pleadings to introduce a new cause of action outside the limitation period.

The court held that it was generally undesirable to decide limitation issues at the interlocutory stage unless it was in the clearest of cases, as insufficient was known about the damage sustained by the plaintiff and the circumstances in which it was sustained. The court found it arguable that the plaintiff's loss did not crystallise until the invalidity of the approvals was declared, making it a reasonable contention that the plaintiff's cause of action did not accrue until that date. The court also considered the plaintiff's application to amend its pleadings to introduce a new cause of action, which arose before the proceedings commenced but was not statute-barred when the proceedings began. The court found that the plaintiff could be granted leave to amend the pleadings under the Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld), even if the limitation period had expired by the time of the amendment. The court dismissed the defendants' applications for summary judgment and to strike out the plaintiff's claims, allowing the plaintiff to proceed with its amended pleadings.

The court's orders included granting the plaintiff leave to file a proposed second further amended statement of claim, dismissing the defendants' application for summary judgment, dismissing the application to strike out the proposed second further amended statement of claim, and directing the parties to be heard on the issue of costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The plaintiff be granted leave to file a pleading in the form of the proposed second further amended statement of claim.

2. The application for summary judgment is dismissed.

3. The application to strike out the proposed second further amended statement of claim is dismissed.

4. The parties shall be heard as to costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

It is convenient to address the summary judgment application first and to recognise that the defendants’ application, based as it is on an argument that the plaintiff’s action is brought out of time, faces the significant hurdle of the decision in Wardley Australia Ltd v Western Australia[1] that it is undesirable that limitation questions of this kind should be decided in interlocutory proceedings except in the clearest of cases as, generally speaking, insufficient is known of the damage sustained by the plaintiff and of the circumstances in which it was sustained to justify a confident answer to the question. [1] (1992) 175 CLR 514, 533; see also Melisavon Pty Ltd v Springfield Land Development Corporation Pty Ltd [2015] 1 Qd R 476, 494 at [26], 509 at [69].Background In this case the cause of action pleaded is principally one in negligence against the first defendant, the Scenic Rim Regional Council, and in negligence and breach of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) against the second, third and fourth defendants who, at relevant times, operated as a town planner giving advice to the plaintiff. The plaintiff wished to develop land at North Tamborine and, on the pleading, entered into a contract to purchase the land on the strength of representations by the Council that its development proposal was acceptable to it and could be progressed as a minor change without the necessity for advertising it or publicly notifying it. That was in a context, which the plaintiff then says it did not know, where there had been active public opposition to earlier proposals to develop the land on behalf of a community group styled the “Tamborine Mountain Progress Association Incorporated”. The Council approved a number of so-called minor change applications after an initial meeting on 12 April 2005 between it and the plaintiff. The second minor change application was approved on 7 July 2005 and on 26 August 2005 the plaintiff exercised a call option to purchase the land, having previously entered into a contract for its purchase which was rescinded by mutual agreement on 18 May 2005 and replaced by a put and call option deed. The plaintiff settled its purchase of the land on 1 November 2005. Then, on 12 December 2006, the Council approved a further so-called minor change application, the third such application made by the plaintiff with the assistance of the second, third and fourth defendants. As things transpired the Tamborine Mountain Progress Association Inc became aware of the proposal to develop the land and objected successfully in the Planning and Environment Court. In those proceedings the Council conceded that the minor change applications approved by it were beyond its power as they should have been subject to impact assessable procedures which required public notification.[2][2] Tamborine Mountain Progress Association Inc v Scenic Rim Regional Council [2010] QPELR 195. The consequence was that Judge Wilson SC, as his Honour then was, declared that the approvals were beyond power and had no lawful effect and that a further plan of development which the Council purported to approve was not generally in accordance with the plan of development approved as part of the original rezoning of the site. His Honour described the Council’s decision as “inexplicable and incomprehensible”.[3] Notably, however, his Honour recognised that he had a discretion whether to grant or refuse relief based on arguments for the plaintiff in this matter that it had no reason to believe that the approvals were anything but lawful, that it had always acted in accordance with them, had undertaken substantial works and very large borrowings and was incurring interest at the rate of over $100,000 per month while the proceedings delayed its development. The argument also was that the Tamborine Mountain Progress Association had been guilty of undue delay in bringing its application before that Court.[3] Tamborine Mountain Progress Association Inc v Scenic Rim Regional Council [2010] QPELR 195, 198 at [18].

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

As things transpired a consequence of the making of the declarations was that the plaintiff lost its financial support for the development, went into liquidation, sold the land and did not have access to funds to pursue development approvals of the type that should have been sought earlier. It has now come out of external administration and its original director now has control of the company again. Summary judgment It was against that background that the plaintiff commenced these proceedings on 19 October 2015, just before the sixth anniversary of Judge Wilson SC’s decision in the Planning and Environment Court made on 20 October 2009. The plaintiff’s argument to resist the summary judgment is, essentially, that its loss did not crystallise until the making of that decision, particularly because of the existence of the discretion in his Honour whether or not to grant declaratory relief, but also because of an argument that the approvals provided a lawful basis for the plaintiff to act which continued until the approvals were declared to be beyond power or were set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction. In that context, the plaintiff relied upon the decision of the Court of Appeal in Stevenson Group Investments Pty Ltd v Nunn.[4] There, McMurdo P, with whom Fraser JA and Mullins J agreed, expressed the view that , even if any of the alleged non-compliances in that case amounted to jurisdictional error, her Honour remained unpersuaded that the intention of the Integrated Planning Act was that the permit was necessarily void and of no legal effect in those circumstances where such a declaration was not sought until long after the relevant building was completed and sold. Such an approach seems to me to be also consistent with the decision in Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority.[5] Accordingly, the plaintiff argued that it did not suffer actual damage until those declarations were made. [4] [2013] QPELR 1, 11 at [39].[5] (1998) 194 CLR 355, 388-391 at [91]-[93]. The defendants’ argument is that the plaintiff suffered the loss as soon as it became bound to purchase the land as the “package of rights” acquired by the plaintiff when it purchased the land was less valuable than the price which it paid. As a consequence, its cause of action occurred on that date and the loss occurred then. The 2FASOC sets up three categories of loss claimed by the plaintiff at paras 127A to 127J dealing with causation and loss. They were characterised by Mr Andreatidis for the Council as the “different transaction case”, the “no transaction case” and the “lost opportunity case”. In my view it is arguable that each of those formulations of the possible losses suffered by the plaintiff is affected by the issue whether the development approvals continued to be valid until his Honour Judge Wilson’s decision. It was not until then that the package of rights lost its value. The argument that the plaintiff suffered the loss as soon as it became bound to purchase the land depends on my being satisfied that the development approval was a nullity at that stage. There is a reasonable argument that the development approvals did continue to be valid until his Honour Judge Wilson’s declarations with the consequence that the value of the land acquired by the plaintiff was only diminished when those declarations were made.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The plaintiff accepts that this allegation involves the introduction of a new cause of action but argues it should be given leave to introduce it because it is closely connected with the plaintiff’s existing case about alleged misrepresentations made at the April 2005 meeting. The connection is sufficiently close, it submits, because the new facts alleged can properly be said to arise out of the same, or substantially the same facts already alleged. It submitted that no prejudice should be occasioned to the defendants by reason of the amendments, and that it is otherwise appropriate to give leave to introduce them.Consideration Mr O’Sullivan QC’s submissions also raised an issue of some potential general interest. This can be characterised as an application to amend the pleading by introducing a cause of action that arose before the proceeding itself had commenced, that would arguably have been statute barred at the date of the amendment but not statute barred when the proceedings began. He pointed out that, on one construction of rr 375 to 380 and r 387 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, if no request for trial date has been filed, leave is not required and the appropriate course is for the defendants to apply within eight days to disallow the amendments pursuant to r 379 of the UCPR. Such an application would then be governed by the principles set out in r 376(4) permitting the court to give leave to amend to include a new cause of action if the court considers it appropriate and that the new cause of action arises out of the same facts or substantially the same facts as a cause of action for which relief has already been claimed.[10] [10] Compare Edwards v State of Queensland [2012] QSC 248 at [30] and Mokrzecki v Popham [2013] QSC 123 at [25]-[26]. He submitted that, on another construction of the rules, while r 376(4) is expressed in permissive terms, it also implicitly prohibits an amendment of the kind identified in r 376(1). That rule only applies “if a relevant period of limitation, current at the date the proceeding was started, has ended”. The plaintiff brought the application out of an abundance of caution in the event that leave were required but submits that, if it cannot currently be determined whether the period of limitation was current at the date the proceeding was started, so that it was unclear whether r 376(4) could apply, one could find a solution to the practical difficulty that arises where there is a question of whether a limitation period has expired and that cannot be fairly determined ahead of trial.[11][11] Mokrzecki v Popham [2013] QSC 123 at [12] and see [16]-[21] also. He submitted that I could solve the problem by applying s 16(1) of the Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld), which provides a separate source of jurisdiction to the court to grant leave to amend a pleading introducing a new cause of action statute barred when the amendment is made. That power is not confined to cases falling within the language of r 376(1). That seems to me to be a sensible approach to the potential problem. I should also point out that Mr O’Sullivan’s submissions included the argument that the court’s inherent jurisdiction would extend to permit such an amendment.[12][12] Edwards v State of Queensland [2012] QSC 248 at [31]-[32].