Krug v National Australia Bank Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Krug v National Australia Bank Ltd [2025] QSC 183

PARTIES:

WAYNE RICHARD KRUG

(plaintiff)

v
NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED

(defendant)

FILE NO:

16552 of 2024

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

8 August 2025

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

29 July 2025

JUDGE:

Johnstone J

ORDER:

1.   The defendant’s application is dismissed.

2.   The plaintiff has leave to file and read the application dated 29 July 2025 and the affidavit of Ms Stokes affirmed on 29 July 2025 in support.

3.   The plaintiff is relieved of the Harman Undertaking such that he is permitted to use the documents identified at sub-paragraphs (a) to (i) of the application dated 29 July 2025 filed in this proceeding in the manner he has.

4.   I will hear the parties on costs.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – ENDING PROCEEDINGS EARLY – SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT OR RESPONDENT – LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – where the defendant provided financial advice to the plaintiff concerning certain insurance policies – where the plaintiff commenced proceedings against the defendant alleging a failure to warn of the risks associated with changing insurance policies – where the pleaded causes of action were subject to a six year limitation period – where the defendant applies for summary judgment on grounds that the claim is made out of time and is statute barred – where the plaintiff asserts that time did not start to run until the earliest date upon which the entitlement arose to be paid a benefit under the relevant insurance policies – whether the claim is made out of time – whether the claim should be summarily dismissed

PROCEDURE – DISCOVERY AND INTERROGATORIES – DISCOVERY OF DOCUMENTS – UNDERTAKINGS AND USE OF DOCUMENTS – HARMAN UNDERTAKING – where the plaintiff used certain documents disclosed in a separate and related proceeding to commence this proceeding – where the plaintiff admits that his use of the documents breached the implied Harman undertaking – where the plaintiff seeks leave retroactively to regularise his use of the documents in this proceeding – where the defendant seeks summary dismissal owing to the breach of undertaking – whether the plaintiff has demonstrated “special circumstances” – whether the documents have been used for a collateral purpose – whether the plaintiff should be relieved from the implied undertaking

Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth), s 12DA, s 12DB, s 12GF(2), s 12GM(5)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 953A, s 953B(5)
Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth), s 27A, s 29(2)
Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), s 10(1)(a)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 293

Ambridge Investments Pty Ltd (No. 3) v Baker [2010] VSC 545, considered
Aslami v Board of Trustees of the State Public Sector Superannuation Scheme [2019] FCA 1560, cited
Cheney v Duncan [2001] NSWCA 197, cited
Commonwealth v Cornwell [2007] HCA 16; (2007) 229 CLR 519, cited
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo [2005] QCA 227;…

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Details
Case
[2025] QSC 183
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Krug v National Australia Bank Ltd, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant, alleging that the defendant failed to warn of the risks associated with changing certain insurance policies. The dispute was heard in the Supreme Court of Queensland. The plaintiff contended that the defendant’s failure to warn constituted misleading or deceptive conduct, while the defendant argued that the plaintiff’s claims were statute-barred. The defendant applied for summary judgment, contending that the plaintiff’s claims were time-barred by the six-year limitation period applicable to the pleaded causes of action.

The court considered the legal issues of whether the plaintiff’s claims were statute-barred and whether the plaintiff's use of certain documents disclosed in a separate proceeding breached the implied Harman undertaking. The defendant argued that the claims were made out of time, relying on the six-year limitation period. The plaintiff, however, argued that the limitation period did not start to run until the earliest date upon which the entitlement to be paid a benefit under the relevant insurance policies arose. Additionally, the plaintiff sought relief from the breach of the Harman undertaking, claiming that the documents had not been used for a collateral purpose.

The court determined that the question of whether the claims were statute-barred was not suitable for summary judgment as insufficient information was known to determine the matter confidently. The court also found that the plaintiff had demonstrated special circumstances that warranted relief from the breach of the Harman undertaking. The court held that the plaintiff could use the documents in the manner he had, allowing the proceeding to continue. Consequently, the defendant's application for summary judgment was dismissed.

ORDERS:
1. The defendant's application is dismissed.
2. The plaintiff has leave to file and read the application dated 29 July 2025 and the affidavit of Ms Stokes affirmed on 29 July 2025 in support.
3. The plaintiff is relieved of the Harman Undertaking such that he is permitted to use the documents identified at sub-paragraphs (a) to (i) of the application dated 29 July 2025 filed in this proceeding in the manner he has.
4. I will hear the parties on costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The defendant’s application is dismissed.

2. The plaintiff has leave to file and read the application dated 29 July 2025 and the affidavit of Ms Stokes affirmed on 29 July 2025 in support.

3. The plaintiff is relieved of the Harman Undertaking such that he is permitted to use the documents identified at sub-paragraphs (a) to (i) of the application dated 29 July 2025 filed in this proceeding in the manner he has.

4. I will hear the parties on costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Krug v National Australia Bank Ltd involves a dispute between the plaintiff, Mr Krug, and the defendant, National Australia Bank Ltd (NAB). NAB provided financial advice to Mr Krug concerning certain insurance policies. Mr Krug commenced proceedings against NAB alleging that the bank failed to warn him of the risks associated with changing his insurance policies. The pleaded causes of action were subject to a six-year limitation period. NAB applied for summary judgment, arguing that the claim was made out of time and was statute-barred. Mr Krug asserted that the limitation period did not start to run until the earliest date upon which the entitlement arose to be paid a benefit under the relevant insurance policies.

The proceedings were also affected by an issue concerning the use of documents. Mr Krug used certain documents disclosed in a separate and related proceeding to commence this proceeding. He admitted that his use of the documents breached the implied Harman undertaking. Mr Krug sought leave retroactively to regularise his use of the documents in this proceeding. NAB sought summary dismissal due to the breach of the undertaking. The court had to determine whether Mr Krug had demonstrated "special circumstances" and whether the documents had been used for a collateral purpose.

The matter was heard in the Queensland District Court. NAB applied for summary judgment on the grounds that Mr Krug's claim was made out of time and was statute-barred. Mr Krug opposed the application. In addition, Mr Krug sought leave to regularise his use of certain documents that he had admitted to using in breach of an implied Harman undertaking. The court considered the arguments from both parties on these issues and delivered its judgment accordingly.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Rule 293 of the UCPR provides: “293 Summary judgment for defendant(1)A defendant may, at any time after filing a notice of intention to defend, apply to the court under this part for judgment against a plaintiff.(2) If the court is satisfied—(a) the plaintiff has no real prospect of succeeding on all or a part of the plaintiff’s claim; and(b) there is no need for a trial of the claim or the part of the claim;the court may give judgment for the defendant against the plaintiff for all or the part of the plaintiff’s claim and may make any other order the court considers appropriate.” The rule was considered by the Court of Appeal in Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo,[2] in which Williams JA considered the significance of the changes brought out about by the introduction of that rule. At [17] his Honour said: “Summary judgment will not be obtained as a matter of course and the judge determining such an application is essentially called upon to determine whether the respondent to the application has established some real prospect of succeeding at a trial; if that is established then the matter must go to trial.” [2][2005] 2 Qd R 232. In Shaw v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation; Rablin v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation,[3] Gotterson JA said at [31]: “[31] The content of the test of “no real prospect of successfully defending” set by r 292(2)(a) was considered by this Court in Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo. Williams JA (with whom McMurdo P and Atkinson J agreed) quoted with approval the following observations of Lord Woolf MR in Swain v Hillman concerning the English analogue of r 292. His Lordship said: “The words ‘no real prospect of succeeding’ do not need any amplification, they speak for themselves. The word ‘real’ distinguishes fanciful prospects of success or… they direct the court to the need to see whether there is a ‘realistic’ as opposed to a ‘fanciful’ prospect of success.”[32] Williams JA recalled that in Queensland University of Technology v Project Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd (in liq), this Court had cautioned that great care must be exercised to ensure that under the guise of achieving expeditious finality, a party is not deprived of an opportunity for the trial of their case. His Honour also noted that, with particular reference to r 292(2)(b), P D McMurdo J had observed in Gray v Morris that in considering that matter, a court must keep in mind why the interests of justice usually require the issues to be investigated at a trial.” (citations omitted)[3][2016] QCA 275. See also Greenhill One Pty Ltd v Dreamtech Designs Pty Ltd [2019] QSC 20 at [41]. In circumstances where summary judgment is sought on the basis of an allegation that a proceeding has been commenced after the expiration of a limitation period it is as well to refer to the observations of the majority of the High Court in Wardley Australia Ltd v State of Western Australia (1992) 175 CLR 514 at 533:“We should, however, state in the plainest of terms that we regard it as undesirable that limitation questions of the kind under consideration should be decided in interlocutory proceedings in advance of the hearing of the action, except in the clearest of cases. Generally speaking, in such proceedings, insufficient is known of the damage sustained by the plaintiff and of the circumstances in which it was sustained to justify a confident answer to the question.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court considered the application for summary judgment under Rule 293 of the UCPR, which allows a defendant to apply for judgment if there is no real prospect of the plaintiff succeeding and no need for a trial. In Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo, Williams JA emphasised that summary judgment is not to be granted as a matter of course, and the judge must determine if the respondent has established a real prospect of success. The court also noted that it is generally undesirable to decide limitation questions in interlocutory proceedings unless the case is very clear. The High Court in Wardley Australia Ltd v State of Western Australia reinforced the point that generally, insufficient is known about the damage and circumstances to justify a confident answer to the limitation question in such proceedings.

In this case, the court found that there was a real prospect that the plaintiff's claim would succeed, and therefore the application for summary judgment was dismissed. The court considered the plaintiff's argument that the limitation period did not start to run until the earliest date upon which the entitlement arose to be paid a benefit under the insurance policies, and found that the plaintiff's case had merit.

Regarding the implied Harman undertaking, the court found that the plaintiff had demonstrated "special circumstances" warranting relief from the breach of the undertaking. The court relied on the plaintiff's affidavit and the fact that the documents were not used for a collateral purpose. The plaintiff was thus relieved from the implied undertaking, permitting the use of the documents as they had been used in the proceeding. The court also noted that it would hear the parties on costs.