MDE v MLG & Queensland Police Service

Link copied
Case Copied 30 min read

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

MDE  v MLG & Queensland Police Service  [2015] QDC 151

PARTIES:

MDE

(Appellant)

v
MLG

(First Respondent)

&
COMMISSIONER OF THE QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE

(Second Respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No. 25 of 2015

DIVISION:

Appellate

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Magistrates Court at Cairns

DELIVERED ON:

2 June 2015

DELIVERED AT:

District Court at Cairns

HEARING DATE:

25 May 2015

JUDGES:

Morzone QC DCJ

ORDER:

1.   Appeal allowed

2.   The orders made in the Magistrates Court on 21 January 2015 are set aside

3.   The application for a domestic violence order is dismissed.

4.   I give liberty to apply for any other orders and directions by first giving at least 5 business days’ written notice to the other parties.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – domestic violence protection – mode of hearing of appeal – error of law – witness credit – whether ‘couple relationship’ – whether order ‘desirable to protect the aggrieved from domestic violence’

Legislation

Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) ss 4, 18, 37, 84, 164, 168, 169

Weapons Act 190 (Qld) s 10B

Cases

Coultin v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1

Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472

GKE v EUT [2014] QDC 248

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

SCJ v ELT [2011] QDC 100

Suttor v Gundowda Pty Limited (1950) 81 CLR 418

Whisprun Pty ltd v Dixon (2003) 200 ALR 47

COUNSEL:

P McCafferty for the Second Respondent

SOLICITORS:

Dr J Hackett for the Appellant pro bono
No appearance for the First Respondent
The Legal Services Division of the Public Safety Business Agency for the Second Respondent.

Introduction

  1. The appellant appeals against the decision of the Magistrates Court made on 21 January 2015 that a domestic violence protection order be issued against him under s 37 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (‘the Act’)

  2. The first respondent has been served with a notice of the appeal and hearing, but has not shown any interest or participated in the proceeding. The appellant filed an affidavit proving service of the appeal, which I have considered.

  3. The active parties provided outlines of argument and made further submissions on the hearing of the appeal, which I have considered.

    Background

  4. On 17 October 2014, a police officer made an application against the appellant for a protection order made under s 25 of the Act in respect of the aggrieved, the first respondent.

  5. The applicant alleged the following conduct of the appellant:

    (a)The first respondent’s apartment locks were ‘superglued’ on three occasions and that on several occasions the appellant had been to her apartment and left notes to the effect that he was “sorry I have missed you”.

    (b)On 16 October 2014 the first respondent returned home and found the appellant sitting on the staircase leading up to her apartment. When the first respondent saw the appellant, the appellant ran to her front door and leant against it. The first respondent’s evidence was that the appellant said…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read MDE v MLG & Queensland Police Service and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2015] QDC 151
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of MDE v MLG & Queensland Police Service involved an appeal against a decision made by a magistrate to issue a domestic violence protection order under s 25 of the Act. The appellant contested the issuance of the order, arguing that the magistrate erred in her decision-making process. The court had to determine whether the magistrate had exercised her discretion correctly and if the order was indeed necessary or desirable to protect the aggrieved party from domestic violence. The appeal also raised issues regarding the mode of hearing, witness credibility, and the impact of the order on the appellant’s ability to obtain a weapons license.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the magistrate had exercised her discretion correctly, whether she had considered all relevant factors, and if the order was necessary or desirable for the protection of the aggrieved party. The court also had to assess if the magistrate erred in her consideration of the appellant’s loss of his weapons license and whether the procedural steps taken were appropriate. Additionally, the court examined the magistrate’s findings of fact based on the appellant's evidence, given that the witnesses were not cross-examined.

The court found that the magistrate had exercised her discretion based on an incorrect principle and had allowed irrelevant matters to influence her decision. The magistrate’s consideration of the appellant's loss of his weapons license was not a relevant factor required by the Act. Furthermore, the court noted that the appellant's written statement, which was not sworn, did not need to be sworn at the hearing, as the magistrate was not bound by strict evidentiary rules. The court also found that the majority of the magistrate’s findings were based on her assessment of the appellant’s evidence and did not involve cross-examination of witnesses.

The appeal was allowed, and the orders made by the magistrate on 21 January 2015 were set aside. The application for a domestic violence order was dismissed. The court granted liberty to apply for any other orders and directions, provided that at least five business days’ written notice was given to the other parties.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed

2. The orders made in the Magistrates Court on 21 January 2015 are set aside

3. The application for a domestic violence order is dismissed.

4. I give liberty to apply for any other orders and directions by first giving at least 5 business days’ written notice to the other parties.

Background

Background to the litigation

The active parties provided outlines of argument and made further submissions on the hearing of the appeal, which I have considered. Background On 17 October 2014, a police officer made an application against the appellant for a protection order made under s 25 of the Act in respect of the aggrieved, the first respondent. The applicant alleged the following conduct of the appellant:(a)The first respondent’s apartment locks were ‘superglued’ on three occasions and that on several occasions the appellant had been to her apartment and left notes to the effect that he was “sorry I have missed you”.(b)On 16 October 2014 the first respondent returned home and found the appellant sitting on the staircase leading up to her apartment. When the first respondent saw the appellant, the appellant ran to her front door and leant against it. The first respondent’s evidence was that the appellant said to her words which included a complaint that the first respondent had treated him as invisible. The appellant called her a “fucking slut”. The appellant accepts that he used these words. There were repeated requests by the appellant – some of which were in a raised tone of voice – to talk to her.(c)The first respondent’s version of events was that she ultimately agreed to call the appellant to defuse the situation and entice the appellant to leave. The appellant responded to the effect that if the first respondent did not call him, he would be very angry. (d)On the same day the first respondent received a phone call which did not display the caller’s identity and thereafter a further then calls. (e)The last call was received when the first respondent was in fact at the police station. She answered this call, discovered it was the appellant and provided the phone to the police officer. The officer gave evidence that the caller identified himself as the appellant and then hung up. (f)When the first respondent returned home accompanied by two police officers, the appellant was waiting for her at her apartment, uninvited. The appellant failed to move on as directed by the police and was arrested. On the first mention date, 23 October 2014, the appellant gave consent (without admissions) for a temporary protection order that “the respondent be of good behaviour towards the aggrieved and not commit domestic violence against the aggrieved.” The appellant and the respondent were in a relationship for approximately seven or eight months, which ended in late August 2014. The application was heard and determined on 21 January 2015. The police prosecutor represented the applicant, and the appellant was represented at the hearing. The aggrieved first respondent was not present during the hearing. The prosecution relied upon several witness statements of Constable Dunstan, MLG and two other constables, Caleb Mainey and Scott Casey O’Donovan. The appellant’s evidence comprised a Statement of Evidence filed 5 January 2015 and an earlier signed statement dated 22 October 2014, which contained admissions, an apology and promises and undertaking about his future conduct.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In my respectful view, the trial magistrate erred in exercising the discretion by acting upon a wrong principle in determining whether the order was “necessary or desirable” and allowed erroneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect her.Relevant consideration (Ground 2) The appellant’s second ground of appeal is that the magistrate failed to consider the impact of the loss of the weapons license and was required to do so. The appellant was a recreational sports shooter. The consequences of a protection order vis-à-vis the appellant was not a relevant consideration required by s 37 of the Act. At best, s 80 of the Act required the magistrate to consider matters relating to weapons before making a domestic violence order. Section 10B of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) provides that a person against whom a protection order is made cannot apply for a weapons license for a period of 5 years from the date of a domestic violence order (other than a temporary protection order). The appellant’s weapons license was canvassed in submissions, and the consequences of an order were well known to the appellant. Indeed, the prospect of losing his weapons license was the main motive for defeating the application. In my view, this ground cannot be sustained.Procedural Error (Ground 4) The appellant’s fourth ground of appeal is that the magistrate made a procedural error because the signed written statement of the appellant was not sworn; and that it should have been sworn at the hearing. By virtue of s 145 of the Act, the magistrate was not bound by the rules of evidence, or any practices or procedures applying to courts of record; and could inform herself in any way she considered appropriate. The appellant’s statement formed part of the material before the court. The appellant was not required to strictly prove its contents by oath or affirmation. It is clear from the transcript of the hearing and the reasons, that the magistrate did have regard to the appellant’s Statement of Evidence filed 5 January 2015. For these reasons, this ground will fail.Challenge to fact finding based on witness’ credit (Ground 5 & 6) The appellant also challenges the magistrate’s finding of fact:(a)In relation to the circumstances of the appellant’s arrest (appeal ground 5); and(b)In relation to the appellant’s explanation for making contact with the first respondent (appeal ground 6). These case authorities dealing with findings of fact based on witness’s credit are particularly relevant if the trial involved oral testimony and cross examination.[5][5]Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472 at 479; Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 at [26]-[30]; Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531 at 551 affirmed in Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 at 127 [25] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow J and Kirby J The witnesses in this case were not subjected to cross-examination. Instead, evidence was provided in writing following submissions by both sides. The great difficulty for the appellant in this appeal is that the majority of the trial magistrate’s findings were based on Her Honour’s views of the appellant’s evidence presented to her and her assessment of that evidence. That is clear from the reasons given.