Heg v Queensland Police Service & UHB

Link copied
Case Copied 14 min read

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

HEG v Queensland Police Service & UHB [2024] QDC 134

PARTIES:

HEG

(appellant)

v
QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE

(first respondent)

and
UHB

(second respondent)

FILE NO:

D4/29

DIVISION:

Appellate

PROCEEDING:

Appeal pursuant to s 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld)

ORIGINATING COURT:

Emerald Magistrates Court

DELIVERED ON:

29 August 2024

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

9 August 2024

JUDGE:

Kent KC DCJ

ORDER:

Appeal dismissed

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL – Domestic Violence – Where a protection order was made against the appellant – Where the application for protection order was issued as a Police Protection Notice by the first respondent – Where a hearing proceeded in the Magistrates Court – Where there was an audio recording of alleged domestic violence incidents – Whether the Magistrate erred in find that domestic violence had occurred – Where the second respondent was cross-examined by the appellant’s representative – Whether the second respondent was a credible witness – Whether the Magistrate failed to give sufficient reasons for rejecting the appellant’s evidence – Whether there was an error in the Magistrate’s fact finding

LEGISLATION

Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) ss 4, 8, 37, 164

CASES

CF v KT [2022] QDC 37
Drew v Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd [2009] QCA 66
MDE v MLG & Anor [2015] QDC 151
Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247

COUNSEL:

G McGuire for the appellant
T Boettcher for the first respondent

SOLICITORS:

Anne Murray & Co for the appellant
Queensland Police Service Legal Services for the first respondent

Introduction

  1. The appellant appeals pursuant to s 164 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (“the DV Act”), against a protection order under s 37 of that Act, made against him, as respondent, by a Magistrate in the Emerald Magistrates Court on 9 April 2024. The order was for the benefit of the second respondent, the aggrieved.

  2. The application for the protection order had been made by the first respondent pursuant to a Police Protection Notice (“PPN”) on 17 March 2023.

    Background

  3. The parties had been in a relationship previously for approximately five years and had lived together for approximately two years of that time.  They have three biological children together and the second respondent has one older son who also resides with her.  The relevant interactions occurred when the parties were living together at Clermont.

  4. The basis of the Police Protection Notice was an incident on 12 March 2023 (“the 12 March incident”) where the appellant continued to touch the breasts of the second respondent despite her repetitively asking him to stop.  The appellant then accused her of infidelity and demanded she unlock her phone.  He then threw her phone at her, hitting her in the stomach.

    Grounds of Appeal

  5. The notice of appeal includes grounds criticising the Magistrate’s finding of acts of domestic violence on 10 January 2023 and 12 March 2023, and that the making of a protection order was not necessary or desirable.  The further…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Heg v Queensland Police Service & UHB and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2024] QDC 134
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Heg, appealed against a protection order made by the first respondent, the Queensland Police Service (QPS), pursuant to a Police Protection Notice (PPN) on 17 March 2023. The second respondent, UHB, was the complainant in the proceedings. The central dispute revolved around whether domestic violence had occurred and if the making of the protection order was necessary or desirable. The case was heard in the Queensland District Court.

The primary legal issues addressed by the court were whether the Magistrate erred in finding that domestic violence had occurred, whether the second respondent was a credible witness, and if the Magistrate failed to give sufficient reasons for rejecting the appellant’s evidence. The appellant argued that the Magistrate uncritically accepted the second respondent's evidence, particularly regarding text messages between the parties. The appellant further contended that the Magistrate's reasons were insufficient and did not adequately address the evidence.

The court examined the evidence presented, including an audio recording of the alleged domestic violence incidents. The Magistrate concluded that the incidents amounted to domestic violence and found the second respondent's evidence credible. The court found that the Magistrate's reasoning process was not flawed and that the conclusion was open to the Magistrate, considering the whole of the evidence. The court highlighted the importance of organised and structured reasons in such cases, suggesting that such an approach could benefit both the judicial officer and the parties involved. Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed as no legal, factual, or discretionary error was identified in the Magistrate's decision.

ORDERS:
The appeal was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed

Background

Background to the litigation

The application for the protection order had been made by the first respondent pursuant to a Police Protection Notice (“PPN”) on 17 March 2023.Background The parties had been in a relationship previously for approximately five years and had lived together for approximately two years of that time. They have three biological children together and the second respondent has one older son who also resides with her. The relevant interactions occurred when the parties were living together at Clermont. The basis of the Police Protection Notice was an incident on 12 March 2023 (“the 12 March incident”) where the appellant continued to touch the breasts of the second respondent despite her repetitively asking him to stop. The appellant then accused her of infidelity and demanded she unlock her phone. He then threw her phone at her, hitting her in the stomach.Grounds of Appeal The notice of appeal includes grounds criticising the Magistrate’s finding of acts of domestic violence on 10 January 2023 and 12 March 2023, and that the making of a protection order was not necessary or desirable. The further particulars are that the tone of the audio recording of the 12 March incident involving the touching of the second respondent’s breasts was inconsistent with her claim of being in fear of her life, and that her evidence of, in effect, masking her fear during this time was implausible. It is further said that the second respondent was generally not credible or reliable and her evidence is criticised generally as being: argumentative and unresponsive; lacking reasonable concessions; and it was incredulous (a more accurate adjective is incredible) and implausible that she had, as she said, complained to police who failed to act on her complaints. It was also said that her evidence suffered from not being properly tested. The second ground of appeal is a failure to give sufficient reasons for rejecting the appellant’s evidence and accepting the second respondent’s evidence. A further ground, added by leave at the hearing, was that the Magistrate failed to adequately take into account text messages between the parties and prevented proper cross-examination of the second respondent on the content of those messages. The appellant seeks orders allowing the appeal and setting aside the Magistrate’s decision, with the possibility of a remittal of the matter to the Magistrates Court for a fresh hearing.Nature of the Appeal In an appeal of this nature, the powers of the appellate court are exercisable only where the appellant demonstrates that, having regard to all of the evidence, the order the subject of the appeal is a result of some legal, factual or discretionary error. It is important to pay regard to the advantage of the Magistrate who witnessed the evidence being given and due weight must be accorded to the views adopted by the Magistrate (see, for example, CF v KT [2022] QDC 37 at [6] and the cases there referred to). This particular jurisdiction is governed by its legislative scheme. Section 4(1) of the DV Act provides that the safety, protection and well-being of people who fear or experience domestic violence, including children, are paramount.Discretion to Make a Protection Order

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Magistrate recorded the nature of the evidence as to this incident (decision T1-5 lines 11 – 16) and again found that it amounted to domestic violence at T1-7 lines 44 – 47. The same observations as to the fact-finding process apply to this incident as set out in [21] above. His Honour’s conclusion is not shown to be flawed.Second Respondent’s Evidence Generally Not CredibleClermont Police The appellant argues, in essence, that where there are significant challenges to the second respondent’s creditworthiness generally, acceptance of her evidence on any topic is unjustified and in error. Thus, the appellant submits that it is incredible that the second respondent would have complained to the Clermont police, as she says she did, but they took no action; see, for example, her evidence at T1-7 of the transcript of the evidence. The events as they are described by the second respondent do seem at least curious, particularly if, as she says, she had observable bruising. The appellant is critical of the comment by the Magistrate in response to this submission at T1-30 of the transcript: “wouldn’t be the first time”. I am not in a position to make any findings in relation to this matter, as no police officers from the Clermont station were called to give evidence, which was understandable as the occasion was not precisely identified. I do note, however – relevantly to the comment by the Magistrate – that there has been a background of systemic concern about the response of the Queensland Police Service (“QPS”) to domestic and family violence. This gave rise to more than one inquiry, including that which resulted in the report “A Call for Change” published in November 2022. This is in the public domain and, in my view, I am entitled to take judicial notice of it. Its existence was mentioned at the hearing of the appeal. The commentary in that report, including that commencing at p 42 under the heading “A problem that persists”, identifies, inter alia, that many previous reviews and reports – conducted internally and externally to the QPS – have examined its responses to domestic and family violence and repeatedly identified multiple shortcomings with the QPS response. This is not, of course, to make any adverse findings or even criticisms of any police officer, or indeed the staff of the Clermont Police Station, as to the interactions in this case. All it does do is provide context for the observation of his Honour (“wouldn’t be the first time”), which is criticised by the appellant. The comment is understandable – and thus not damaging to the quality of the reasoning process - in the context of the narrative outlined above. It is, in any case, not a central issue.Text messages In a further challenge to the second respondent’s creditworthiness, the appellant points to a number of text messages in evidence between the parties which tend to show an atmosphere of complaint, aggression and abuse flowing both ways between the parties at various times. No doubt this may well be correct. The appellant complains that this line of cross-examination was curtailed by the Magistrate at T1-23, line 41. The argument advanced about pursuit of those matters referred to demonstrating that the second respondent had a particular attitude towards her own son, which prompted the response from the Magistrate that, in the circumstances where there was no cross-application (that is, presumably, by the appellant for a protection order), he could not see the relevance. The advocate for the appellant did not persist.

Decision

Reasons for decision

As has been said previously, the question of whether an order is necessary or desirable invokes a very wide and general power and should be construed in a liberal manner to enable a proper response to protection from domestic violence (MDE v MLG & Anor [2015] QDC 151 at [55]). The parties have children together which raises the potential of ongoing contact. The first respondent submits that the conclusion on this limb was open to the Magistrate and the appellant did not submit otherwise at the hearing of the appeal.Conclusion As outlined above, the appellant’s complaint is really the uncritical acceptance of the second respondent, particularly in relation to the text messages. However, in my conclusion, it was open to the Magistrate, in the context of the whole of the evidence, to accept the evidence of the second respondent on any facts that were contentious. Moreover, as outlined above, in the context of the recordings a significant portion of the evidence was not contentious. Thus, the findings were open to the Magistrate. No legal, factual or discretionary error has been identified, the reasons expressed were sufficient, and, in the circumstances, the appeal is dismissed. I do note, however, for the guidance of Magistrates in hearings of this kind, that the delivery of ex tempore reasons such as these could be better organised than in this case. The reasons were, as in CF v KT, somewhat discursive. A better approach would be to organise such remarks under headings, such as, for example: the nature of the application; the legislative framework; a summary of the evidence; a summary of the submissions; relevant factual findings and the reasons therefor; and the conclusion. Approaching the matter in this way would have the benefits of imposing the discipline of fleshing out the reasoning process in the mind of the judicial officer, and at the same time exposing the reasons, and necessarily making it easier for the losing party to understand. It may also make the judgment both easier for an appellate court to understand, and possibly more difficult to attack on appeal. I offer this not as a counsel of perfection but hopefully as a practical guide.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established