McD Asia Pacific LLC v Hoseyin Dogon

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TRADE MARKS ACT 1995



DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS

Re:Opposition by McD Asia Pacific LLC to registration of trade mark application 1509266(29) - MCKebabs - filed in the name of Huseyin Dogan.

Delegate: Iain Campbell Thompson
Representation: Opponent: Khajaque Kortian, solicitor and partner in the firm Spruson & Ferguson
Applicant: Written submissions by CK Stewart.
Decision: 2014 ATMO 52
s52 proceedings; s60: proposed mode of use or derivation of the Trade Mark are not factors that may be taken into account while assessing likelihood of deception or confusion – opposed application to be considered for full breadth of claim; reputation of Opponent’s ‘Mc-’ family of trade marks; likelihood of confusion; registration refused.
Costs – having regard to the conduct of proceedings, the Opponent may not claim item 13 of Schedule 8 to the Regulations.

Background

  1. In this matter Huseyin Dogan (‘the Applicant’) has applied under the Trade Marks Act 1995 (‘the Act’) to register a trade mark the amended[1] form of which appears below:

    Application No:           1509266
    Priority Date:               20 August 2012
    Goods:  Class 29: Kebabs
    Trade Mark:                MCKebabs

    (‘the Trade Mark’)

    [1] The Trade Mark was amended by the Applicant from McKebabs to MCKebabs on 7 November 2013.

  2. The Trade Mark was duly examined in compliance with section 31 of the Act, accepted for possible registration and advertised as such in the Australian Official Journal of Trade Marks on 22 November 2012.

  3. On 22 February 2013 McD Asia Pacific LLC (‘the Opponent’) filed Notice of Opposition (‘the Notice’) to the registration of the Trade Mark. The Notice includes the section 60 ground under which I will decide this matter.

  4. The Opponent filed evidence in support of its Opposition.  The Applicant did not then file evidence in answer.

  5. The parties were both informed of their right to be heard or, on payment of the official fee, make written submissions for consideration at a hearing.

  6. The Opponent elected to be heard and I was tasked, as a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks, to hear this matter in Sydney at 2 pm on 7 April 2014.  On 12 March 2014 I issued draft directions to the parties setting out a timetable for the exchange of a written summary of submissions from the Opponent on 20 March 2014 and from the Applicant on 3 April 2014.  Neither party objected to the timetable or gave any indication as to whether or not they would file such submissions and as a consequence the directions were set.

  7. A written summary of submissions was received from the Applicant on Friday 4 April 2014 and from the Opponent on the morning of the hearing on 7 April 2014.

  8. Khajaque Kortian, solicitor and partner of Spruson & Ferguson, represented the Opponent at the hearing in person.  The Applicant relied on written submissions by CK Stewart.

    Evidence

  9. The evidence in support comprises statutory declarations by:

    Madeleine Fitzpatrick made on 22 May 2013; and

    Khajaque Kortian made on 22 May 2013

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Details
Case
[2014] ATMO 52
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This decision concerns an opposition by McD Asia Pacific LLC (the Opponent) to the registration of a trade mark by Hoseyin Dogon (the Applicant). The dispute arose from the Applicant's attempt to register a trade mark, which the Opponent opposed. The matter was heard by Iain Campbell Thompson, a Hearing Officer in the Trade Marks Hearings.

The primary legal issue before the Hearing Officer was whether to allow the Applicant to adduce further evidence in support of his application, and if so, whether the grounds of opposition were established. The Applicant sought to rely on a statutory declaration detailing his reasons for adopting the trade mark, his business experience, and his intended use of the mark. The Opponent relied on earlier statutory declarations.

The Hearing Officer determined that the Applicant's further evidence should not be admitted. Applying the principles from *Oxon Italia SpA’s Application* and *Gregory Paul Roebuck v News Ltd*, the Hearing Officer found that the facts in the declaration could reasonably have been obtained earlier and were not germane to the grounds of opposition. The Hearing Officer emphasised that the assessment of a trade mark application should be based on the potential use of the mark within the scope of the registration, not on past or intended use, citing *Berlei Hestia Industries Ltd v The Bali Company Inc*. Consequently, the Hearing Officer refused to register the trade mark.

The Hearing Officer also addressed the issue of costs. While acknowledging that costs are generally awarded against the unsuccessful party, the Hearing Officer noted that neither party had complied with directions regarding the exchange of submissions. Accordingly, costs were awarded against the Applicant, but the Opponent was precluded from claiming costs related to a specific item concerning its preparation for the hearing.

Background

Background to the litigation

McD Asia Pacific LLC sought to register a trade mark application for "MC" in relation to various goods and services, including halal kebabs. The application was opposed by Hoseyin Dogon, who argued that the mark was likely to cause confusion with an earlier trade mark "MC" for similar goods and services. The dispute arose from McD Asia Pacific LLC's attempt to register a trade mark that was similar to an existing mark, leading to concerns about potential confusion in the marketplace.

The case involved the submission of evidence by both parties. The Opponent, Hoseyin Dogon, was represented by Khajaque Kortian, who presented statutory declarations made by Madeleine Fitzpatrick and himself on 22 May 2013. These declarations outlined the basis for the opposition, focusing on the likelihood of confusion with the existing trade mark. In contrast, the Applicant, McD Asia Pacific LLC, initially did not file any evidence in answer to the opposition. However, on 5 April 2014, the Applicant lodged a statutory declaration by the Applicant himself as further evidence. This declaration was not initially accompanied by the necessary application to file further evidence or the required fee, though these formalities were later attended to on 7 April 2014.

The Applicant's further evidence included details about the Applicant's reasons for adopting the trade mark, prior business experience, intended use of the trade mark, and the significance of the letters "MC" to the Applicant. Despite the Applicant's assertions that the mark "MC" stands for "My Country" and that he adopted it due to his Turkish heritage, the Hearing Officer, Iain Campbell Thompson, decided not to admit this declaration into evidence. The Officer determined that the facts could have been obtained earlier and were not pertinent to the grounds of opposition. The Officer emphasised that the decision should focus on the potential use of the trade mark by the Applicant rather than the Applicant's past or intended use.

The proceedings also highlighted issues concerning the formalities of filing evidence. The Intellectual Property Legislation Amendment (Raising the Bar) Regulation 2013 affected the process, but the regulations applicable to this case were those in effect before the amendment came into force on 15 April 2013. The Officer's decision not to allow the Applicant's further evidence was influenced by principles outlined in Oxon Italia SpA’s Application, which require that the evidence be crucial, credible, and could not have been obtained earlier. Ultimately, the Officer's ruling was that the new evidence did not meet these criteria and thus was not admissible.

The matter of McD Asia Pacific LLC v Hoseyin Dogon came before the court as a trade mark opposition proceeding. The Applicant, McD Asia Pacific LLC, filed an application for registration of a trade mark, which was opposed by the Opponent, Hoseyin Dogon. The proceedings involved an initial opposition, which was followed by a hearing before the Registrar. At the hearing, the Applicant presented evidence in the form of statutory declarations, while the Opponent was represented by Khajaque Kortian, a solicitor from Spruson & Ferguson. The Applicant attempted to introduce further evidence on the morning of the hearing, but the Registrar declined to admit it due to procedural non-compliance and irrelevance to the grounds of opposition. The Registrar ultimately decided to refuse the registration of the trade mark based on the evidence and submissions presented. The decision included a consideration of costs, with the unsuccessful Applicant bearing the costs of the proceedings, although the Opponent was not entitled to certain costs related to case preparation.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Khajaque Kortian, solicitor and partner of Spruson & Ferguson, represented the Opponent at the hearing in person. The Applicant relied on written submissions by CK Stewart.Evidence The evidence in support comprises statutory declarations by:Madeleine Fitzpatrick made on 22 May 2013; andKhajaque Kortian made on 22 May 2013Formalities As previously noted, the Applicant did not file evidence in answer. However, on or about 5 April 2014 the Applicant lodged a statutory declaration by himself as further evidence. This declaration was not accompanied by an application to file further evidence or a fee and these formalities were attended to by the Applicant on the morning of 7 April 2014. Concerning the Applicant’s further evidence, there are a number of factors which must be considered concerning its admissibility; as explained by a delegate of the Registrar in Gregory Paul Roebuck v News Ltd [2014] ATMO 19 at [11]:The principles for deciding whether it is appropriate to allow an application for further evidence[2] were set out in the UK case of Oxon Italia SpA’s Application [1981] FSR 408. In summary, they are: that the evidence could not reasonably have been obtained earlier; that the evidence would have an important influence on the result of the case; and that it is credible. There is also the question of the public interest in allowing the evidence in, bearing in mind that fresh evidence cannot be excluded on appeal to the court. As Hearing Officer Homann observed in Studio Buying Systems Srl v Buying Systems (Aust) Pty Ltd (1991) 22 IPR 580 at 585, ‘Obviously it would be preferable for the matter to be finally decided by the registrar if the admission of further evidence would allow this to be done.’[2] The Intellectual Property Legislation Amendment (Raising the Bar) Regulation 2013 (No. 1) came into effect on 15 April 2013. The amending Regulation has repealed regulation 5.15, which provided for the service of further evidence. However, the repealed further evidence provisions continue to apply here, because the opposition was commenced by a notice of opposition filed before 15 April 2013. (See regulation 22.9(1), Item 1.) The further evidence upon which the Applicant seeks to rely states his reasons for adopting the trade mark, his prior experience in running small businesses, his intention to sell halal kebabs and his intended mode of use of the Trade Mark. The Applicant further asserts that he adopted the Trade Mark because he is Turkish and that the letters MC in the Trade Mark stand for the words ‘My Country’. At the hearing I stated that I would not allow this declaration into evidence. This is because the facts to which the declaration attests could reasonably have been obtained and declared earlier and those facts are not, in any case, germane to the grounds under which these proceedings are prosecuted by the Opponent. In particular, I am not to decide this matter by reference to how the Applicant intends to use the Trade Mark or how the Applicant may have used the Trade Mark but by a consideration of what the Applicant may do within the scope of the registration if the Trade Mark is registered. In the words of Mason J in Berlei Hestia Industries Ltd v The Bali Company Inc [1973] HCA 43; (1973) 129 CLR 353 at 362:“...the question whether there is a likelihood of confusion is to be answered, not by reference to the manner in which the respondent has used its mark in the past, but by reference to the use to which it can properly put the mark. The issue is whether that use would give rise to a real danger of confusion.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

At the relevant date, subsection 55(1) of the Act provided:55Decision(1)Unless the proceedings are discontinued or dismissed, the Registrar must, at the end, decide:(a)to refuse to register the trade mark; or(b)to register the trade mark (with or without conditions or limitations) in respect of the goods and/or services then specified in the application;having regard to the extent (if any) to which any ground on which the application was opposed has been established.Note:For limitations see section 6. I refuse to register application 1509266.Costs Section 202 of the Act provides:202Registrar’s powersThe Registrar may, for the purposes of this Act:(a)summon witnesses; and(b)receive written or oral evidence on oath or affirmation; and(c)require the production of documents or articles; and(d)award costs against a party to proceedings brought before the Registrar; and(e)notify, as he or she considers fit, any person of any matter that, in his or her opinion, should be brought to the person’s notice.Note:For the awarding of costs see section 221. The use of the word ‘may’ in section 202 indicates that the power to award costs against a party to proceedings before the Registrar is discretionary. That is, considerations in the exercise of the power may have regard to the conduct of the proceedings before the Registrar. Section 221 further emphasises the discretionary nature of the power as does regulation 21.13. Having regard to the conduct of the proceedings here, I note that neither party complied with the Registrar’s directions in relation to the timetable for the exchange of a summary of each party’s submissions prior to the hearing. Accordingly, while I award costs against the Applicant as it is the unsuccessful party, the Opponent may not claim its costs in relation to item 13 of Schedule 8 of the Trade Mark Regulations 1995 in relation to its preparation of its case for hearing. Iain Campbell ThompsonHearing OfficerTrade Marks Hearings12 June 2014

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In McD Asia Pacific LLC v Hoseyin Dogon, the case primarily addressed the admissibility of the Applicant’s statutory declaration filed post the stipulated time, the relevance of the Applicant’s reasons for adopting the trade mark and his intended use, the refusal of the trade mark application based on the grounds of opposition, the awarding of costs, and the discretion of the Registrar in awarding costs in opposition proceedings.

The court considered the admissibility of the Applicant’s statutory declaration filed after the stipulated time. The principles guiding the admissibility of late evidence were outlined in Gregory Paul Roebuck v News Ltd. The court noted that the evidence could not reasonably have been obtained earlier and did not have an important influence on the result of the case. The Applicant’s reasons for adopting the trade mark and his intended use of the trade mark were deemed irrelevant to the grounds of opposition raised by the Opponent. The court held that the decision should not be influenced by how the Applicant intended to use the trade mark but by what the Applicant could do within the scope of the registration if the trade mark were registered. This aligns with the principle articulated by Mason J in Berlei Hestia Industries Ltd v The Bali Company Inc, where the court determined that the likelihood of confusion should be assessed based on the proper use of the mark.

The court then moved to the refusal of the trade mark application. It was established that the trade mark application should be refused based on the evidence presented and the grounds of opposition. The Applicant’s late filing of the statutory declaration did not sway the decision, as it was found to be irrelevant to the grounds of opposition. The refusal was grounded on the principle that the use of the mark must not result in a real danger of confusion, and the Applicant’s intended use was not a factor in this determination.

The court addressed the awarding of costs, noting that section 202 of the Act grants the Registrar the discretionary power to award costs. The decision to award costs against the Applicant, who was the unsuccessful party, was influenced by the parties’ non-compliance with the Registrar’s directions concerning the exchange of summaries of submissions. However, the Opponent was not entitled to claim its costs related to the preparation of its case for hearing, as per item 13 of Schedule 8 of the Trade Mark Regulations 1995.

Finally, the court highlighted the Registrar’s discretion in awarding costs in trade mark opposition proceedings, emphasizing that such discretion should consider the conduct of the proceedings. The Registrar’s power to award costs is discretionary and can take into account various factors, including the adherence to procedural directions. This aspect of the decision underscores the importance of procedural compliance in opposition proceedings.

In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that the admissibility of late evidence in trade mark opposition proceedings must be assessed based on its relevance and influence on the outcome, and the Registrar’s discretion in awarding costs should consider the conduct of the parties in relation to procedural compliance.