Martin v Taylor

Case [2000] FCA 1002

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Martin v Taylor [2000] FCA 1002

JURISDICTION – Court exercising appellate jurisdiction – jurisdiction to set aside decision where proceedings below incompetent

Residential Tenancies Act 1997 (ACT), ss 47, 110, 115

ACT Supreme Court (Transfer) Act 1992 (Cth), s 48A
Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT), ss 3(2), 20, 34B
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), ss 4, 24(1)(b)

Guaranty Trust Co of New York v Hannay & Co [1915] 2 KB 536 referred
Russian Commercial & Industrial Bank v British Bank for Foreign Trade Ltd [1921] 2 AC 438 referred
Forster v Jododex Australia Pty Ltd (1972) 127 CLR 421 referred
Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564 referred
Oil Basins Ltd v Commonwealth (1993) 178 CLR 643 referred
Forestview Nominees Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (1998) 193 CLR 154 referred
Australasian Oil Exploration Ltd v Lachberg (1958) 101 CLR 119 referred
Robins v Incentive Dynamics Pty Ltd (1999) 91 FCR 423 applied
Chamberlain v R (No. 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521 referred
Ah Toy v Registrar of Companies (NT) (1985) 10 FCR 280 cited

Mossop, “The Judicial Power of the Australian Capital Territory” (1999) 27 Federal Law Review 19
Zamir and Woolf, The Declaratory Judgment (2nd ed, 1993)

ANTHONY GILBERT MARTIN & ANOR v BARRY ANTHONY TAYLOR & ANOR

A 44 of 1999

MILES, EINFELD & KENNY JJ
CANBERRA
27 JULY 2000

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

A 44 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

ANTHONY GILBERT MARTIN
First Appellant

SUE DOLORES MARTIN
Second Appellant

AND:

BARRY ANTHONY TAYLOR
First Respondent

INDIVIDUAL HOMES PTY LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) ACN 008 495 761
Second Respondent

JUDGES:

MILES, EINFELD and KENNY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

27 JULY 2000

WHERE MADE:

CANBERRA

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.   The appeal be allowed.

2.   The judgment, including the rulings and order, made by the primary judge on 27 May 1999 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, the proceeding No. SC 182 of 1999 in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory be dismissed as incompetent.

3.   There be no order as to costs of the proceeding below or on appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

A 44 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

ANTHONY GILBERT MARTIN
First Appellant

SUE DOLORES MARTIN
Second Appellant

AND:

BARRY ANTHONY TAYLOR
First Respondent

INDIVIDUAL HOMES PTY LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) ACN 008 495 761
Second Respondent

JUDGES:

MILES, EINFELD and KENNY JJ

DATE:

27 JULY 2000

PLACE:

CANBERRA

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MILES J:

  1. I have read the judgment of Einfeld and Kenny JJ in draft and agree that the appeal should be allowed and the ancillary orders made for the reasons advanced.

  2. I would add that the appeal was heard prior to the decisions given in subsequent proceedings brought in the Supreme Court by Individual Homes against the Martins.  In those proceedings the Supreme Court…

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Details
AGLC
Martin v Taylor [2000] FCA 1002
Case
[2000] FCA 1002
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This appeal concerns the relationship between the Australian Capital Territory's Residential Tenancies Tribunal (RTT) and the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory (Supreme Court). The Martins, who have resided on a property owned by Individual Homes Pty Ltd, a company under liquidation, appeal against a decision of the Supreme Court dismissing their application seeking rulings on various points of law. The primary judge found that the RTT lacked jurisdiction over the tenancy dispute and dismissed the application, save for the finding that the RTT had no jurisdiction. The key issue before the court was whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear the Martins' application for rulings on points of law and, if so, whether those rulings should be granted.

The court found that the Supreme Court did have jurisdiction to hear the application, but that the application was incompetent because it sought rulings on matters that were not justiciable. The court held that the Martins' claims regarding the validity of the winding up order and the existence of an implied tenancy at will were not justiciable in the Supreme Court. The court also held that the Martins' claim regarding the RTT's jurisdiction was justiciable, but that the RTT did not in fact lack jurisdiction. The court further held that the Martins' claims regarding the value of improvements and the statute of limitations were not justiciable in the Supreme Court.

The appeal was allowed, the judgment of the primary judge was set aside, and the proceeding was dismissed as incompetent. There was no order as to costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The judgment, including the rulings and order, made by the primary judge on 27 May 1999 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, the proceeding No. SC 182 of 1999 in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory be dismissed as incompetent.

3. There be no order as to costs of the proceeding below or on appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal from a judge of the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory (“the Supreme Court”). The circumstances leading to the present appeal, although not intrinsically complex, have nonetheless led to a great deal of litigation. It is necessary to review the history of this litigation in order to understand the nature of the present appeal.factual background Until its liquidation commenced in 1994, Individual Homes Pty Ltd (“Individual Homes”) was under the exclusive control of Mr & Mrs Martin, the plaintiffs below and the appellants in this Court. Individual Homes is the registered proprietor of a Crown Lease over land at 8 Grund Place, Kambah, in the Australian Capital Territory (“the property”) that was granted on 23 October 1979. The house in which the Martins have lived since October 1979 is on the property, to which they claim to have made substantial improvements. The precise nature of the arrangements between the Martins and Individual Homes regarding their residence remains unclear. Notwithstanding the already lengthy litigation, at the time this appeal was heard, no court (or tribunal) had yet made any definitive finding of fact about these arrangements. On 4 May 1994, upon the application of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (“CBA”), the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court made orders for the compulsory winding up of Individual Homes pursuant to s 460(1) of the Corporations Law. Mr B A Taylor, the first respondent on this appeal, was appointed the company’s liquidator. The Martins appealed. On 30 June 1994, a Full Court of this Court, by majority, made orders dismissing the “purported notice of appeal … as incompetent” and striking out a supplementary notice of appeal as an abuse of process. Subsequently, the High Court dismissed applications for special leave. All subsequent proceedings have arisen essentially out of efforts by Individual Homes, in liquidation, to recover possession of the property from the Martins, who have, on most occasions, not had the benefit of legal representation. They were not represented on the hearing of this appeal, and Mr Martin spoke on behalf of himself and his wife. After the order for winding up, Individual Homes (by its liquidator) sought to recover possession of the property upon the basis that the Martins were tenants at will, describing them as such in a notice to terminate dated 9 July 1994. Meanwhile, the Martins had initiated a second action in the Supreme Court, claiming that their entitlement to the property arose from two mortgages given by Individual Homes, as mortgagor, to each of them as mortgagees; that, upon the company’s default, they had each lodged a caveat on the relevant certificate of title; and that Mr Martin had assumed adverse possession on 15 June 1989, and Mrs Martin, on 6 March 1990. Individual Homes (in liquidation) began a separate action, seeking orders for the removal of the caveats and for vacant possession of the property. Both Supreme Court actions were heard together by Gallop J, who delivered judgment on 4 March 1997. His Honour gave judgment for Individual Homes, ordered that the caveats be removed, declared that the two alleged mortgages between Individual Homes and each of the Martins were void, and declared that the company was entitled to vacant possession of the property. Amongst other things, his Honour held that the mortgages upon which the Martins based their claim were “a ruse or device to defeat the rightful claims of the [Commonwealth Development Bank] and the CBA”. His Honour further held that Mrs Martin was not the beneficial owner of the property, “but rather a creditor of the defendant pursuant to loans made by her to the defendant so that a ‘proto-type’ display home could be built”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

On 24 December 1998, Individual Homes applied to the RTT for a termination and possession order under s 47 of the RT Act. The Tribunal heard the application on 12 March 1999 and reserved its decision. On account of the subsequent proceedings (outlined below), as at the date when this appeal was heard, the Tribunal had not yet given its decision. The Martins submitted at the RTT hearing that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the dispute. In an affidavit sworn on 31 March 1999, Mr Martin deposed that:[T]owards the very conclusion of the hearing … [the Martins were] advised that the Tribunal would not refer the points of law, including the question of jurisdiction, raised by the plaintiffs to the ACT Supreme Court under sections 124 & 125 of the ACT Residential Tenancies Act 1997. The Tribunal’s view was that the question of jurisdiction and points of law could, if desired, go on appeal after the decision of the Tribunal and or a Writ of Eviction of the Tribunal. On 16 March 1999, shortly after the RTT hearing, the Martins filed an originating application in the Supreme Court, seeking what they described as “Rulings on … points of law” and naming Individual Homes and its liquidator as defendants. By notice of motion dated 23 March 1999, Individual Homes and its liquidator sought to have the Martins’ application set aside. The primary judge heard the matter on 1 April 1999. In broad terms, the Martins submitted that the winding up of Individual Homes should be terminated; that the RTT had no jurisdiction over the property dispute; and that Individual Homes was not, in any event, entitled to possession until it had paid them the value of the improvements that they had allegedly made upon the property. Judgment was delivered on 27 May 1999. This is the subject of the present appeal. Briefly, the Martins’ submissions were all rejected, save one. The primary judge found, as the Martins submitted, that the RTT had no jurisdiction over the alleged tenancy at will between them and Individual Homes.the primary judge’s decision of 27 may 1999 In their originating application, the Martins had sought relief described as “Decisions on … points of law”. The six “rulings” or “decisions” sought were as follows:1. Whether the plaintiffs’ implied tenancy at will on 8 Grund Place Kambah commencing on the 23rd of October 1979 is paramount or to have priority, under sections 58(1)(d) and 85(1) of the ACT Land Titles Act 1925, over the second named defendant’s registration as proprietor of 8 Grund Place Kambah on the 27th of November 1979.2. Whether the first and or the second defendant is entitled to a Writ of Possession until the first and or second defendant pays into Court for the use of the plaintiffs the value of the improvements done by the plaintiffs on the said 8 Grund Place Kambah, namely the sum of dollars $270,000 in accordance with sections 58(1)(d), 85(1), 89, 152, 153 and 154(1)(b) & (c) of the Australian Capital Territory Land Titles Act 1925.3. Whether the winding up order of this Honourable Court of the 4th of May 1994 against the second named defendant should be terminated under section 482(1) of the Corporations Law.4. Whether the Residential Tenancies Tribunal of the Australian Capital Territory has jurisdiction under sections 4(2)(a) and 115 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1997 and section 70 of the ACT Landlord and Tenant Act 1949, to hear the application numbered RT615 of 1998 dated the 24th of December 1998 (based on the Notice to Quit dated the 18th of May 1998) by the second named defendant for a writ of possession of 8 Grund Place Kambah in the Australian Capital Territory against the plaintiffs.5. Whether the application in action R615 dated the 24th of December 1998 mentioned above under item 4, has any legal foundation.6. Whether action RT615 dated the 24th of December 1998 mentioned above under item 4 is statute barred under section 11(1) of the Australian Capital Territory Limitation Act 1985.As earlier mentioned, Individual Homes and its liquidator subsequently moved for an order that “the Originating Application dated 16 March 1999 in this matter be set aside”.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.