Robins v Incentive Dynamics Pty Ltd

Case [1999] FCA 1651

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Robins v Incentive Dynamics Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1651

JURISDICTION – Court exercising appellate jurisdiction – jurisdiction to set aside decision made without jurisdiction – form of orders – whether relief should be withheld or modified to enable respondents to take advantage of Federal Courts (State Jurisdiction) Act 1999 (Cth).

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), ss 5(2), 24(1), 28(1), 32, 43(1)
Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (NSW), s 4(1)
Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (Cth), s 9(2)
Federal Courts (State Jurisdiction) Act 1999 (NSW), ss 3, 4, 6, 11, 14
Corporations (NSW) Act 1990 (NSW), s 42(3)
Corporations Act 1989 (Cth), s 56(2)

Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 163 ALR 270, followed
Gould v Brown (1998) 193 CLR 346, cited
Cameron v Cole (1944) 68 CLR 571, followed
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Merribee Pastoral Industries Pty Ltd (1998) 84 FCR 367, cited
Ah Yick v Lehmert (1905) 2 CLR 593, followed
Chamberlain v The Queen (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521, cited
Mercator Property Consultants Pty Ltd v Christmas Island Resort Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1572, cited
Kovac v R (1977) 15 ALR 637, cited
Anderson v R (1977) 19 ALR 212, cited
R v Tait (1979) 24 ALR 473, cited
Quinn v Given (1980) 29 ALR 88, cited
Johns v Australian Securities Commission (1993) 178 CLR 408, considered
Commissioner of State Revenue (Victoria) v Royal Insurance Australia Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 51, cited
Federated Engine-Drivers and Firemen’s Association of Australasia v The Broken Hill Proprietary Company Ltd (1911) 12 CLR 398, cited

DOUGLAS ROBERT McNEILL ROBINS & ORS v INCENTIVE DYNAMICS PTY LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) (ACN 003 294 700) & ANOR
N 684 OF 1999

PAGBY PTY LTD (ACN 005 203 136) v INCENTIVE DYNAMICS PTY LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) (ACN 003 294 700) & ANOR
V 387 OF 1999

JUDGES:      BRANSON, SACKVILLE J & KIEFEL JJ
DATE:           26 NOVEMBER 1999

PLACE:         SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 684 of 1999

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:                  DOUGLAS ROBERT McNEILL ROBINS
   First Appellant

JOHN HAIGH ROBINS
   Second Appellant

COLDWICK PTY LIMITED
   Third Appellant

ROBINS HAIGH McNEILL PTY LIMITED
   Fourth Appellant

CHERYL ANN CHANG
   Fifth Appellant

AND:   INCENTIVE DYNAMICS PTY LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION)
   (ACN 003 294 700)
   First Respondent

ROBERT WILLIAM MORTON (In his capacity as Official 

Liquidator of Incentive Dynamics Pty Ltd)

Second Respondent

JUDGES:

BRANSON, SACKVILLE & KIEFEL JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

26 NOVEMBER 1999

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.   The appeal be allowed.

2.   Orders 1, 2, 4, 5 and 8 of the orders made by the primary Judge on 12 July 1999 be set aside.

3.   Order 9 made by the primary Judge on 12 July 1999 be set aside insofar as it applies to the first, second, third and fourth appellants.

4.   In…

Continue reading Robins v Incentive Dynamics Pty Ltd

Sign in free to access the full text

Details
AGLC
Robins v Incentive Dynamics Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1651
Case
[1999] FCA 1651
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The parties involved in the case were Robins and Incentive Dynamics Pty Ltd. The dispute arose in the Federal Court of Australia and pertained to jurisdictional issues under the State Jurisdiction Act. The central legal issues revolved around the definitions and implications of "ineffective judgments" and "State matters" within the context of the Act, and whether the Federal Court had the jurisdiction to hear the case. Additionally, the case addressed the effect of an ineffective judgment on the rights and liabilities of the parties, and the procedure for treating a proceeding in a federal court as one in the Supreme Court.

The court examined the definitions provided in the State Jurisdiction Act, particularly sections 3 and 4, to determine what constitutes an "ineffective judgment" and a "State matter". It was established that an "ineffective judgment" refers to a judgment made by the Federal Court in a State matter, which was purported to be conferred by a State Act, before the commencement of the Act. The court also considered section 6 of the Act, which declares the rights and liabilities of persons to be as if the ineffective judgments were valid judgments of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the court looked at section 11, which provides a procedure for treating a federal court proceeding as one in the Supreme Court, including the implications for limitation laws.

The reasoning of the court led to the conclusion that the Federal Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case, as it was a State matter. The court found that the ineffective judgments made by the Federal Court did not confer any valid jurisdiction and that the proceedings should have been dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and specific orders made by the primary Judge were set aside. The court ordered that the proceedings against certain respondents be dismissed for want of jurisdiction and directed that the respondents pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal.

The final orders of the court were to allow the appeal, set aside certain orders made by the primary Judge, and dismiss the proceedings against specific respondents for lack of jurisdiction. The respondents were also ordered to pay the costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. Orders 1, 2, 4, 5 and 8 of the orders made by the primary Judge on 12 July 1999 be set aside.

3. Order 9 made by the primary Judge on 12 July 1999 be set aside insofar as it applies to the first, second, third and fourth appellants.

4. In lieu of orders referred to in pars 2 and 3, an order be made that the proceedings against the first respondent Douglas Robert McNeill Robins, the second respondent John Haigh Robins, the fifth respondent Coldwick Pty Limited, the sixth respondent Robins Haigh McNeill Pty Limited and the eighth respondent Cheryl Ann Chang, be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

5. The respondents pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal.

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. Order 6 and Order 11 made by the primary Judge on 12 July 1999 be set aside.

3. Order 9 made by the primary Judge on 12 July 1999 be set aside insofar as it applies to the appellant.

4. In lieu of the orders referred to in pars 2 and 3, an order be made that the proceedings against the seventh respondent, Pagby Pty Limited, be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

5. The respondents pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The two key concepts in the State Jurisdiction Act are those of an “ineffective judgment” and a “State matter”. A “State matter” is defined in s 3 to mean “a matter(a)in which the Supreme Court has jurisdiction otherwise than by reason of a law of the Commonwealth or of another State or a Territory, or(b)…; or(c)in respect of which a relevant State Act purports or purported to confer jurisdiction on a federal court, or(d)…”.Section 4 explains what is meant by an “ineffective judgment”:“(1)A reference in this Act to an ineffective judgment is a reference to a judgment of a federal court in a State matter given or recorded, before the commencement of this section, in the purported exercise of jurisdiction purporting to have been conferred on the federal court by a relevant State Act.(2)If:(a)a Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in its appellate jurisdiction has purported to affirm, reverse or vary an ineffective judgment, or(b)…,a reference in this Act to the ineffective judgment is a reference to the ineffective judgment in the form in which, and to the extent to which, it purports or purported to have effect from time to time.” Section 6 of the State Jurisdiction Act addresses the effect of an ineffective judgment of the Federal Court:“6 The rights and liabilities of all persons are, by force of this Act, declared to be, and always to have been, the same as if:(a)each ineffective judgment of:(i)the Federal Court of Australia, otherwise than as a Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia, or(ii)…had been a valid judgment of the Supreme Court in a Division constituted by a Judge of the Supreme Court, and(b)each ineffective judgment of:(i)a Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia, or(ii)…,had been a valid judgment of the Supreme Court in the Court of Appeal.” Section 11 provides a procedure whereby a proceeding in a “federal court” may be treated as a proceeding in the Supreme Court. One consequence of the proceeding being treated in this way is that, for the purposes of any “limitation law” (a defined expression), it is deemed to have been brought in the Supreme Court on the day on which the proceeding was first recorded as a proceeding in the federal court: s 11(3)(b). Section 11(1) defines a “relevant order” as follows:“(a)an order of a federal court, whether made before or after the commencement of this section, dismissing, striking out or staying a proceeding relating to a State matter for want of jurisdiction, or(b)a declaration by a federal court, whether made before or after the commencement of this section, that it has no jurisdiction to hear and determine a proceeding relating to a State matter, or(c)any other decision or determination by a federal court, whether made before or after the commencement of this section, that it has no jurisdiction to hear and determine a proceeding relating to a State matter.”Sub-sections 11(2) and (3) establish the procedure for the proceeding to be treated as a proceeding in the Supreme Court:“(2)A person who was a party to a proceeding in which a relevant order is made may apply to the Supreme Court for an order that the proceeding be treated as a proceeding in the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court may make such an order.(3)If the Supreme court makes an order under subsection (2), the proceeding, despite the relevant order:(a)becomes, and must be recorded by the Supreme Court as, a proceeding in the Supreme Court, and…”.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.