Marshall v The State of Western Australia
[2007] WASCA 96
•7 MAY 2007
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: MARSHALL -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2007] WASCA 96
CORAM: ROBERTS-SMITH JA
PULLIN JA
MILLER AJA
HEARD: 9 FEBRUARY 2007
DELIVERED : 7 MAY 2007
FILE NO/S: CACR 28 of 2006
CACR 31 of 2006
CACR 76 of 2006
CACR 77 of 2006
BETWEEN: DAVID KENNETH MARSHALL
Appellant
AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :WILLIAMS DCJ
File No :IND 2016 of 2004
Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :H H JACKSON DCJ
File No :IND 1637 of 2004
Catchwords:
Criminal law - Drug offence - Possession of methylamphetamine with intent to sell or supply - Whether trial Judge required to direct jury that prosecution had to negative possession by cooccupants of house where drug located - Whether direction on circumstantial evidence adequate
Criminal law and procedure - Fresh evidence/new evidence - Witness testifying to the effect that she saw other people in the house with drugs - Whether evidence advanced appellant's case - Whether evidence cogent and credible
Criminal law - Drug offence possession of heroin with intent to sell or supply - Whether direction in relation to accused's right of silence adequate
Criminal law and procedure - Fresh evidence/new evidence - Witness claiming to have thrown package of drugs out of window of house where appellant arrested - Whether evidence assisted appellant's case - Whether evidence cogent and credible
Legislation:
Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 30(4)
Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 11
Result:
Appeals 28 and 76 of 2006 dismissed
Appeal 31 of 2006 allowed and conviction of appellant quashed
Order for re-trial on appeal 31 of 2006
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellant: Mr R D Young
Respondent: Ms C Barbagallo
Solicitors:
Appellant: Gunning Young
Respondent: State Director of Public Prosecutions
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Barca v The Queen (1975) 133 CLR 82
Barr v The Queen (2004) 14 NTLR 164
Bellissimo (1996) 84 A Crim R 465
Bounds v The Queen (2006) 80 ALJR 1380
Callander v The Queen (2004) 144 NTR 1
CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172
Clohessy v The Queen [2001] WASCA 314
Craig v The King (1933) 49 CLR 429
Cumming (1995) 86 A Crim R 156
de la Espriella‑Velasco v The Queen [2006] WASCA 31; (2006) 31 WAR 291
Featherstone v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 269
Gallagher v The Queen (1986) 160 CLR 392
General Motors‑Holden Pty Ltd v Moularas (1964) 111 CLR 234
Herbert v The Queen [2003] WASCA 61; (2003) 27 WAR 330
Jarvis v The Queen (1993) 20 WAR 201
Jones v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 192
King v The Queen (2003) 215 CLR 150
Lawless v The Queen (1979) 142 CLR 659
Lowndes v The Queen (1999) 195 CLR 665
Mickelberg v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 259
Mickelberg v The Queen (2004) 29 WAR 13
Mickelberg v The Queen, unreported; CCA SCt of WA; Library No 990056; 12 February 1999
Mill v The Queen (1988) 166 CLR 59
Papaluca v The Queen (2001) 123 A Crim R 322
Petty v The Queen (1991) 173 CLR 95
Pham v The Queen [2004] WASCA 104
R v Eaton [2005] QCA 191
R v Reeves (1992) 29 NSWLR 109
R v Smart [1983] 1 VR 265
Ratten v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 510
Rinaldi v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 53
Samuel v The State of Western Australia [2004] WASCA 154
Schlenka v The Queen [2004] WASCA 142
Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573
Swain (1989) 41 A Crim R 214
Tulloh v The Queen [2004] WASCA 169; (2004) 147 A Crim R 107
Vogel v The Queen [2002] WASCA 261
Watt v The Queen [2000] WASCA 354
Weiss v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 300
White v The Queen [2006] WASCA 62
Williams v Olsen [1999] WASCA 114
ROBERTS-SMITH JA: I have had the benefit of reading in draft the reasons of Pullin JA and Miller AJA. Subject to what I say below, I agree with both of them. I have a different view than Miller AJA about ground 3 in appeal CACR 31 of 2006 and would come to a different conclusion about that. My reasons are as follows.
I agree that Aaron Quinlan's evidence is properly to be characterised as "fresh" evidence. Whilst on one view it might be thought that with reasonable diligence it could have been obtained because (if the appellant's account were true) it was reasonable to believe the package must have come from someone in the appellant's house, I think that is too simplistic in the circumstances of the case. On Quinlan's own evidence he kept quiet about it both at the time and subsequently. He was not prepared to admit it when the appellant specifically asked him. He did not reveal to the appellant that it was his heroin until they were both in prison.
It is well established that great latitude must be extended to an appellant in determining what evidence could have been available at his trial, by reasonable diligence (Ratten v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 510, at 517 per Barwick CJ).
Where an appeal is based upon fresh evidence, the question is whether a miscarriage of justice has occurred (Gallagher v The Queen (1986) 160 CLR 392 per Mason and Deane JJ at 402; Dawson J at 413; Mickelberg v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 259 per Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 301).
The relevant test is whether the fresh evidence, if believed, "was likely to bring about a different verdict" (Ratten, (supra), per Barwick CJ at 520), or if the Court considers there is a significant possibility that the jury, acting reasonably, would have acquitted the appellant if the evidence had been before it (Gallagher v The Queen, (supra), per Mason and Deane JJ at 402; Gibbs CJ at 399). The appellate court has a responsibility to examine the probative value of the fresh evidence. As Rich and Dixon JJ explained in Craig v The King (1933) 49 CLR 429, 439, it cannot be said that a miscarriage of justice has occurred unless the fresh evidence has cogency and plausibility as well as relevancy. Their Honours added:
"The fresh evidence must, we think, be of such a character that, if considered in combination with the evidence already given upon the trial the result ought in the minds of reasonable men to be affected. Such evidence should be calculated at least to remove the certainty of the prisoner's guilt which the former evidence produced."
(These remarks were quoted with approval by Menzies J in Ratten, (supra), at 526, and Aickin J in Lawless v The Queen (1979) 142 CLR 659 at 686).
In Mickelberg v The Queen, (supra), Toohey and Gaudron JJ said (at 301 ‑ 302):
"In essence, the fresh evidence must be such that, when viewed in combination with the evidence given at trial, it can be said that the jury would have been likely to entertain a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused if all the evidence had been before it … or, if there be a practical difference, that there is 'a significant possibility that the jury, acting reasonably, would have acquitted the [accused] …' For ease of expression we proceed by reference to the formulation that the jury is likely to have entertained reasonable doubt had all the evidence been before it, noting, in that context, that it is necessary that the fresh evidence be credible in the sense that a reasonable jury could accept it as true, but it is not necessary that the court should think it likely that a reasonable jury would believe it." (My emphasis).
Clearly Quinlan's evidence is relevant.
Whatever ultimate view I might have about its cogency and plausibility, I am unable to conclude that it is evidence which a jury could not accept, or which, at least, could not leave a jury with a reasonable doubt. To that extent (which is sufficient for this appeal) I am of the same view as Pullin JA, that Quinlan's evidence was cogent, plausible and relevant.
I agree with Pullin JA that it would be logical for Quinlan or the appellant to dispose of illicit drugs in their possession by throwing them over the fence when police arrived. I cannot accept that the evidence suggests there were two packages.
Acceptance of that as a fact - or as a reasonable possibility - would involve accepting that, on the evidence and notwithstanding neither the appellant nor Quinlan knew about the other's package:
•both packages contained the same illicit drug (heroin);
•the quantities of the drug were in the same form and packed in the same way within the package;
•according to the evidence at trial and Quinlan's evidence on the appeal, both were wrapped in black plastic and sealed with black plastic tape and were of identical dimensions;
•both were thrown into the same area of the neighbour's yard.
When these points are considered in the context of the evidence at trial generally, it seems to me the proposition that there were two packages is not reasonably open.
On that understanding, there are only two possibilities with respect to Quinlan's evidence. They are that either Quinlan is telling the truth (in which case the drugs found in the neighbour's property are his and the appellant is innocent); or Quinlan is lying to protect his father (and the appellant is guilty).
Given my view that a jury could reasonably find that Quinlan is telling the truth - or at least be left with a reasonable doubt about that - the availability of this fresh evidence reveals a miscarriage of justice in the sense explained in the authorities to which I have referred above.
The DNA evidence does not detract from this. It is not the case that the DNA evidence shows the appellant's DNA was on the package. Ms Furmedge was rightly careful to explain that the profile from the taped package "matched the profile" of the appellant. DNA evidence cannot show that a particular sample definitively came from a particular individual. Such evidence speaks in terms of statistical likelihood that the sample came from someone other than the subject. That is how Ms Furmedge expressed it. She said the probability of finding the DNA profile located on the package coming from someone other than the appellant and unrelated to him, was less than one in ten billion. The qualification that her opinion was based on the assumption such a contributor was unrelated to the appellant is important. But it was never raised as an issue at the trial. It clearly is an issue if the other evidence is that the package belonged to the appellant's son. As to that, ordinary usage of the word would convey the meaning that the description of Quinlan as the appellant's son is that he is the appellant's biological son. It was not suggested otherwise in cross‑examination, nor at all.
Unlike Miller AJA, I do not see the "coincidence" of the appellant being apprehended at a point proximate to Quinlan's window at the side of the house, and that being the window through which Quinlan says he
threw the package, means Quinlan's evidence is not credible. Both the appellant's presence at that point at that time, and Quinlan throwing the package through the window, are explicable by the same event - namely the arrival of the police. The timing is explicable not on the basis it was coincidental, but on the basis it was consequential on that event. It seems to me this is a matter for a jury.
There is an obligation on an appellant to satisfy the Court there has, or may have been, a miscarriage of justice, where that is what the appellant asserts. In this case, taking Quinlan's evidence into account with all the other evidence given at trial, I am persuaded there is a significant possibility the jury may have returned a different verdict. I would accordingly allow the appeal against conviction in CACR 31/2006 on ground 3, set aside the conviction and order a retrial.
PULLIN JA: I agree with Miller AJA that appeals 28 and 76 of 2006 should be dismissed for the reasons given by him.
Ground 2 ‑ Appeal 31 of 2006
The facts are set out in Miller AJA's reasons for judgment. I agree with Miller AJA concerning ground 2 and add the following comments. I agree with Miller AJA that the evidence elicited by questions from prosecuting counsel was inadmissible. Once inadmissible evidence is led during a trial an "irregularity" occurs which will amount to a miscarriage of justice: Weiss v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 300 at [18] and [36]; Bounds v The Queen (2006) 80 ALJR 1380 at [78]; Rinaldi v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 53 at [178]. However, even though a miscarriage has occurred, this Court may decline to set aside a verdict where it considers that the miscarriage does not amount to a substantial miscarriage of justice: see s 30(4) Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA); Weiss [35], [39] and [40]; King v The Queen (2003) 215 CLR 150 at [100].
In this case the evidence led in response to the questions identified in Miller AJA's judgment was inadmissible because it may have led the jury to infer consciousness of guilt on the part of the appellant. The judgment of Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey and McHugh JJ in Petty v The Queen (1991) 173 CLR 95 makes it clear that this type of evidence is an erosion of the fundamental right of an accused to remain silent.
In R v Reeves (1992) 29 NSWLR 109 Hunt CJ explained that there are circumstances in which it may be relevant to ask questions about what was said by the accused during an investigation and that, once the
question is permitted, then the answer given must necessarily be admissible even if it discloses that the accused exercised his right to silence. It is not necessary to discuss the circumstances where this might occur because the circumstances did not exist in this case. Hunt CJ in Reeves went on to say:
" … where such evidence is given which discloses that the accused has exercised his right of silence, a direction should invariably be given ‑ as soon as the evidence is given and, if necessary, again in the summing up ‑ to make it clear to the jury that the accused had a fundamental right to remain silent and that his exercise of that right must not lead to any conclusion by them that he was guilty … It would usually be appropriate also to remind the jury that (if it be the fact) the accused had specifically been cautioned by the police that he was not obliged to answer any questions, so as to avoid any suggestion of a familiarity by the accused with criminal investigation procedures."
In R v Eaton [2005] QCA 191 Jerrard JA, McPherson JA and Philippides J agreeing, referred to the direction which might be given by a trial judge in those circumstances: see [19].
The case of Reeves, however, does not lay down any "hard or fast rule": see Callander v The Queen (2004) 144 NTR 1 at [23]. The circumstances in which inadmissible statements may emerge, and their significance, will vary considerably from case to case. So for example in Callander the admission of inadmissible evidence of this kind, and the failure to give a direction of the kind referred to in Reeves, did not amount to a substantial miscarriage of justice. Likewise see Eaton. The fact that no direction is sought by counsel immediately after the evidence is given is a factor relevant to deciding whether or not a substantial miscarriage has occurred: see for example Callander at [23]. However, sometimes the circumstances may be such that the failure to give the direction will amount to a substantial miscarriage of justice, with the result that the verdict will be set aside. See for example Barr v The Queen (2004) 14 NTLR 164.
This appellant was represented by counsel at trial. No direction was sought from the trial Judge at the time the inadmissible evidence was led. During the Judge's address to the jury his Honour said "an accused person doesn't have to speak to the police. An accused person doesn't have to give evidence. The onus is on the Crown or the State, the prosecution, to prove the charges that it lays and to do so beyond a reasonable doubt … ".
Counsel for the appellant did not request any further direction after the Judge's charge to the jury. Generally speaking an appellant will not be allowed to rely upon criticism of the Judge's charge which was not taken by way of exception at trial: General Motors‑Holden Pty Ltd v Moularas (1964) 111 CLR 234 at 242 per Barwick CJ and R v Smart [1983] 1 VR 265 at 297, unless the interests of justice demand otherwise: Pham v The Queen [2004] WASCA 104 at [15].
In my opinion, the fact that there was no objection to the questions, the fact that counsel for the appellant at trial did not seek a direction from the judge when the evidence was given, the fact that counsel for the appellant at trial did not ask for any further direction from the trial Judge after the Judge's charge to the jury, the fact that during summing up the trial Judge explained that the appellant did not have to speak to the police, and the strength of the circumstantial case against the appellant as outlined by Miller AJA, lead me to the conclusion that, although a miscarriage of justice occurred when the inadmissible evidence was led, ground 2 should be dismissed because no substantial miscarriage of justice occurred.
Ground 3 ‑ Appeal 31 of 2006
I have reached a different conclusion from Miller AJA in relation to ground 3. The evidence is set out in his Honour's reasons. Ground 3 is based upon the introduction of fresh evidence.
If both the appellant and Aaron Quinlan were drug users or drug dealers (Quinlan admitted he was both and the appellant was observed by the police engaging in activity which with other circumstantial evidence suggested that he was a dealer), then it is logical that if they were in possession of drugs both would seek to dispose of those drugs when police appeared. One obvious method of disposal in the circumstances of this case was to throw any drugs they had on them over the fence. Counsel for the appellant suggested that it would be too much of a coincidence that two packets could be thrown over the fence, one by the appellant while he was being chased by police and the other by Quinlan, but I do not see why this should be so. Quinlan's room was adjacent to the location where the appellant was apprehended.
Quinlan's evidence was that he threw a package containing drugs over the fence, but there was circumstantial evidence to indicate that a package was also thrown over the fence by the appellant. The circumstantial evidence was that the appellant was seen by the police exchanging something with another person, he then tried to evade the police in his car, when he reached his house he ran from the police until he was apprehended, a packet was found over the fence near where he was apprehended, he had the opportunity to throw the packet over the fence when he was unobserved, and DNA was found on the package. The significance of the DNA evidence was led via Ms Furmedge. Her evidence was that "the probability of finding this DNA profile - if the cellular material on the taped envelope had come from someone other than and unrelated to Marshall is less than one in 10 billion based on West Australian population data". (I will refer to the qualification ie "other than and unrelated" below). As it was circumstantial evidence, any hypothesis consistent with innocence would have to be negatived by the prosecution. The appellant's case is that the fresh evidence leaves open the possibility that the package found in the neighbour's yard was Quinlan's package.
When an appellant seeks to overturn a verdict on appeal by leading fresh evidence, the Court has a responsibility to examine the evidence in order to ascertain whether it is cogent, plausible and relevant. It is not necessary that the Court should positively believe the evidence. Although the Court inevitably will form its own assessment of the fresh evidence and of any additional evidence adduced which might tend to support, contradict or weaken the fresh evidence, it is necessary for the Court to keep in mind the possibility that, in some instances, a jury, acting reasonably, might come to a different view from the Court about the credibility of the witness or about the cogency of the fresh evidence: see White v The Queen [2006] WASCA 62 at [146] ‑ [147]. I would conclude on that test that Quinlan's evidence was cogent, plausible and relevant.
The question then is whether there is a significant possibility that, in the light of the fresh evidence and other admissible evidence led at trial, a jury acting reasonably would have acquitted the appellant: Mickelberg v The Queen (2004) 29 WAR 13 at [417].
In my opinion, the fact that Quinlan gave evidence that he threw a package over the fence does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the appellant did not also throw a package over the fence. There is some evidence that the packages were different if regard is had to evidence given at the trial and the evidence of Quinlan. The evidence that Quinlan gave was that the package which he threw over the fence was one which permitted the contents to be examined via an opening which he had installed when he manufactured the package. The package the neighbour found and gave to the police, and which contained the drugs with which the appellant was charged, had to be cut open before the neighbour could examine the contents. Quinlan's evidence at t/s 55 was as follows:
"Mr Quinlan, can you just explain again how the drugs were packaged?‑‑‑In a little plastic bag with tape wrapped around and a slit with two smaller bags; clip‑seal bags, you know, sealed bags; one with more sachet bags folded up and another one with Glad bags with quarts and halves and different amounts and two different - one with smaller packages, one with bigger packages.
When you say you had it taped up, what kind of tape did you use?‑‑‑Black electric tape.
Black electric tape. Where did you get that tape from?‑‑‑Probably just around the corner from a hardware store or the deli, you know?
Where was that tape kept in the house?‑‑‑In my room.
You said it was like a slit at the top, did you?‑‑‑Yes."
The neighbour's evidence at trial was at follows, at t/s 52 and 53:
"What did you do when you found that tape?‑‑‑When I found the package?
Yes?‑‑‑I took it inside and just slit one side of it open to try and ascertain what was inside it. Inside it was what looked like - well, it was tablets and some sort of powder in little plastic sachets.
…
When you found the package of course you took it inside to show your wife. Is that right?‑‑‑That's correct, yes.
I think you and she - nothing improper in this - opened it up?‑‑‑That's correct. We just slit the top, just well, one side of the package just to have a look inside it."
The neighbour's evidence leaves open the possibility, but not the certainty, that the contents were not examinable without cutting the package open. However, to be set against this evidence was the fact that Quinlan's description of the package, which he said he threw over the fence, was in other respects similar to the package which was found by the neighbour and given to the police.
It is also relevant to note that there is no evidence that the neighbour or the police carried out any general search of the neighbour's property to see if there were any other packages in the vicinity. When the neighbour found the package he took it inside, examined it, called the police, and when Detective Calzada attended to collect it, the neighbour merely showed the detective where he had found the package. That leaves open the possibility, but not the certainty, that there was another package in the garden which was not noticed by the neighbour.
While Quinlan was in the witness box, counsel for the appellant was invited to consider producing the bag which contained the drugs, possession of which the appellant was charged with, and showing it to Quinlan or showing him photographs of the bag and its contents. However, counsel for the appellant declined to do so. There are possible reasons why the bag was not shown to Quinlan. It is possible, for example that, Quinlan was not prepared to verify that the bag containing the drugs was the one he threw over the fence. However that is a matter of speculation and speculation cannot decide the appeal.
An important aspect of Quinlan's evidence was that he said that he had concealed the existence of the drugs he had in his possession from the appellant. He gave evidence that it was kept concealed in his room and that he had bought the tape he used to seal his package of drugs from a shop. He did not obtain the tape from the appellant. That being so, it would seem that the appellant's DNA could not have found its way onto the tape. That leads me to the DNA evidence led at trial. The evidence concerning DNA was expressed in terms of the probability against the DNA being that of someone other than "or unrelated" to the appellant. If Aaron Quinlan is in fact biologically related to the appellant then the evidence about the probability of the DNA not being that of someone other than "or unrelated" to the appellant becomes irrelevant. In light of the fresh evidence, the DNA evidence would have to be recast. The appellant did not lead any evidence that Quinlan was the appellant's biological son. Quinlan merely said he was the appellant's son. A person who refers to a person as his son or a person referring to someone as his father is not proof that there is a biological connection between them. Many modern families are composed of persons who are biologically unrelated but who are content to refer to each other by terms which might signify a biological connection.
However, during the appeal the respondent did not challenge Quinlan's claim to be the appellant's son, which leaves open the possibility that he was the appellant's biological son.
The result is that the fresh evidence leaves open the possibility that a jury acting reasonably may have been left with a reasonable doubt about the appellant's guilt and may have acquitted the appellant. I conclude that this is a significant possibility based on the evidence as it presently stands. If there is a retrial, it is likely that other evidence would be given, but that is not the concern of this Court.
In relation to appeal 31 of 2006, I would therefore uphold ground 3, allow the appeal, set aside the conviction and order a retrial.
I agree with Miller AJA's reasons in relation to the other grounds and in relation to the other appeals.
MILLER AJA: The appellant was tried in the District Court at Perth on two separate indictments. The first indictment (IND 2016 of 2004) alleged that on 22 January 2004 at Lathlain, the appellant had in his possession a prohibited drug, namely, methylamphetamine, with intent to sell or supply it to another. The appellant was tried on this indictment before Williams DCJ and a jury in the District Court at Perth on 1, 2 and 3 March 2006, and he was convicted. He was sentenced to imprisonment for 4 years with eligibility for parole.
The second indictment (IND 1637 of 2004) alleged that on 4 February 2002 at Mount Hawthorn, the appellant had in his possession a prohibited drug, namely, heroin, with intent to sell or supply it to another. He was tried on this indictment before Jackson DCJ and a jury in the District Court at Perth on 13, 14 and 15 March 2006. The appellant was convicted and sentenced on 12 April 2006 to an additional 18 months' imprisonment to be served cumulatively on the sentence imposed by Williams DCJ on 3 March 2006.
Grounds of appeal
Appeals 28 and 76 of 2006
Appeal against conviction
The appeal against conviction originally raised four grounds. One ground was abandoned, leaving the grounds as follows:
"1.The learned trial Judge erred in declining to direct the jury that the State had to negative possession by co‑occupants of the house at which the drugs were located.
PARTICULARS
(a)The Appellant was one of four people present at the house at which the drugs the subject of the indictment were found, but was the only person charged with possession thereof;
(b)The State did not open its case on the basis that the Appellant was in possession with any other person;
(c)In the circumstances, it was incumbent on the State to negative beyond reasonable doubt the possibility that one or more of the other people present at the house were in possession of the drugs.
2.The learned trial Judge erred in failing to direct the jury that before they could convict on circumstantial evidence, that evidence must not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but inconsistent with any other reasonable explanation.
3....
4.A miscarriage of justice resulted in the Appellant's case in that evidence which would have led to a different verdict was not available to be led at the time of the trial."
Appeal against sentence
The appeal against sentence is on one ground only. It is as follows:
"1.The learned sentencing Judge erred in that the sentence of 4 years imprisonment with parole was manifestly excessive having regard to the small quantity of drugs involved and sentencing patterns in comparable cases."
Appeals 31 and 77 of 2006
Appeal against conviction
The grounds of appeal against conviction were originally three, but the first was abandoned at the hearing of the appeal. The remaining grounds are:
"1....
2.The learned trial Judge erred in failing to direct the jury that the Appellant had a right to remain silent in the face of police questioning and that no adverse inference could be drawn from the exercise of that right in circumstances where the State prosecutor had impermissibly introduced evidence that the Appellant had declined to answer question out [sic] to him by police.
3.A miscarriage of justice resulted in the Appellant's case in that evidence which would have led to a different verdict was not available to be led at the time of the trial."
Appeal against sentence
The grounds of appeal against sentence are as follows:
"1.The learned sentencing Judge erred in making the sentence of 18 months imprisonment wholly cumulative on a sentence of 4 years imprisonment imposed on the Appellant on 3 March 2006, in circumstances where the effect of imposing that sentence is that the Appellant is required to serve the whole 18 months;
2.The accumulation of the 18 month sentence on the 4 year sentence previously imposed resulted in a total sentence of five and a half years imprisonment that was disproportionate to the gravity of the Appellant's offending behaviour having regard to the small quantities of drugs and sentencing patterns in comparable cases."
Appeals 28 and 76 of 2006
Appeal against conviction
The facts
On 22 January 2004, police arrived at an address in Streatley Road, Lathlain, where there was a rented house occupied by the appellant and his girlfriend, Fleur Chard‑Walker. When police arrived at the house, they observed the appellant working on a motor vehicle in the driveway. As the police pulled into the driveway, a Sergeant Brittain alighted from the vehicle and identified herself as a police officer. She requested that the appellant stop where he was, but he ran into the garage to the house and shut the roller door behind him. Sergeant Brittain and a Constable Armstrong ran straight to the garage door and attempted to open it, but found that it was locked. They then went straight to the front door of the house, where they tried to gain entry, but found the front door also locked. Occupants within the house failed to open it, so Constable Armstrong forced the door open with the use of a metal device.
The two police officers entered the house and walked down a hall area, through to a room at the rear of the premises. It was first described by Sergeant Brittain as a kitchen, but later as a family room. The appellant was in this room with three females. He was standing and the females were sitting on a couch. The two officers conducted a search of the premises. Sergeant Brittain went to the appellant's bedroom and there, in a side drawer, she located $450 in cash. A thorough search of the premises was conducted by police and other items seized included a set of scales found in a bedroom dresser, a sum of $6105 found in a radio in the dining room, $865 found in the main bedroom in a pocket of a pair of shorts and a clipseal bag containing a brown powder found in the garage of the house in a tent bag. This brown powder was later analysed and found to contain 13.4 grams of 21 per cent pure methylamphetamine.
At the conclusion of the search of the house, the appellant was shown a record of the possessions and drugs seized and advised that further inquiries would be conducted. Police then left the premises. He was later arrested on 2 April 2004.
The three female occupants at the house on 22 January 2004 were Fleur Chard‑Walker, Kylie Mayfield and Ascher Kitchener. Various items were seized from the three women, including drugs. Sergeant Brittain was uncertain in her evidence as to what drugs were seized from what women, but recalled seizing amphetamine from one of the three women and seizing some powder which she believed to be heroin from Ms Chard‑Walker. A small amount of cannabis was found in a bedroom occupied by a daughter of the appellant.
The prosecution case against the appellant relied upon circumstantial evidence. That evidence was as follows:
(1)The appellant rented the house in which the methylamphetamine was found. He lived in the house with Ms Chard‑Walker.
(2)The appellant paid $185 per week by way of rent, but the rent was overdue.
(3)When the police arrived at the house, the appellant ran to the garage and put down the roller door, which he locked.
(4)The methylamphetamine was found in that garage in the open mouth of a tent bag on a storage shelf.
(5)Three sets of scales were found in the house. One was a manual set and others were electronic scales. Deering precision scales were found in the garage.
(6)Mayfield and Kitchener were at the house when police arrived, but they did not live there.
(7)Drugs found in the house and in the possession of the women in the house were of a different character from those found in the garage.
(8)A large amount of money was found in the house. $865 was found in shorts belonging to the appellant which were in his bedroom; $6105 was found in cash hidden in the back of a radio in the dining room; and $450 was found in a bedside drawer in the appellant's bedroom.
(9)The appellant claimed that the $865 found was money for rent.
(10)A number of mobile phones were found in the premises: five behind the bar in the lounge area and five in a box under the bed in the master bedroom.
(11)An open box of Glucodin was found in the games room.
Grounds of appeal against conviction
Ground 1
This ground contends that the learned trial Judge erred in declining to direct the jury that the State had to negative possession by co‑occupants of the house at which the drugs were located.
The learned trial Judge made the following observations to the jury:
"So in this case you will need to be satisfied that Mr Marshall knew of the existence of the drug, and we are here talking about he [sic] 13.4 grams of brown powder which were found in the living room, family room. So you must be satisfied that he knew it was there and that he had control over it. It doesn't have to be to the exclusion of everybody else; you can have joint control. As I have said, you may have a television set at home and you know it's there and you are in a position to exercise dominion or control of it, but perhaps other people who live in the house are also in the same position
So that is what is called joint possession. So the state doesn't have to prove, for example, that other people in the house didn't have possession of the drugs. That's not the question here. The question here is that you have got to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that this accused was in possession. You don't have to worry about the others, all right?
Provided you're satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Marshall knew it was there and that he was exercising dominion or control over it, then that satisfies the requirement of possession, notwithstanding that there may be other people in the house who are in the same position, but has to obviously be to the exclusion of other people other than those who are acting jointly with him. So apart from the people who might be in joint possession of it, it has to be to the exclusion of others."
The ground of appeal is similar to that which was raised in Jones v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 192. There it was argued that the prosecution was required to negative possession by all persons who might have had access to the drug which was alleged to be in the possession of the appellant.
It was held in Jones (supra), at [24], that it is unnecessary for a trial Judge to give a direction that the State is required to negative possession by others who may be in the house in which drugs are located. Wheeler JA, at [18] et seq, dealt with the cases upon which counsel for the appellant relied in this appeal, saying:
"18 The appellant relies upon the cases of Filippetti (1978) 13 A Crim R 335 and Laiv The Queen [1990] WAR 151, referred to in ground 1.2(e). Both of those were cases in which an illicit drug was found in a place to which potentially a number of persons may have had access. In each case, the appellant was one of the persons who could have had access to the drug. In each case, there were indications that particularly linked the appellant with the drug, but those indications were either subjective (in Filippetti the appellant was described as becoming 'very agitated', while in Lai the appellant was said to have 'gone a bit paler and to have become fidgety' as the police approached closer to where the drugs were located), or equivocal (eg, in Fileppetti [sic Filippetti] the appellant said, 'I would like to find out who the bastard was that put me in.'). In each of those cases, the convictions were quashed.
19The reasoning in each of those cases was broadly as follows. It may be inferred, as a general rule, that a person who is in control of premises has knowledge of and dominion over items located there. However, that is not an inference that can be drawn in every case. Where the item is concealed, and there is no evidence to suggest by whom it is concealed, and where a number of persons are capable of having concealed the item, there is no reason to draw the inference that any particular person concealed the item. This is not because there is some proposition of law that it is necessary, in cases where items are concealed, to negative knowledge and control by all others. It is because in cases such as the two I have described there is a reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence, that hypothesis being that the items were placed where they were by some other person without the knowledge or consent of the appellant, and that the appellant remained unaware of them. Whether there is such an hypothesis, so as to prevent an inference adverse to a particular appellant from being drawn, is simply a question of fact."
Wheeler JA also referred to Papaluca v The Queen (2001) 123 A Crim R 322 and to Cumming (1995) 86 A Crim R 156. In the first of those cases, the appellant was charged with her husband with having possession of methylamphetamine which was found in a chicken noodle soup tin in the pantry of the house occupied by the appellant and her husband. The appellant admitted to being the person responsible for shopping and often purchasing soup, but said she did not purchase chicken noodle soup because she did not like it. The husband gave evidence at trial. He said that he and his wife did the shopping. He said that he never ate tinned soup, chicken noodle or otherwise. The Court held that, because the can of soup was clearly visible on a shelf within the kitchen pantry of the house in which the appellant lived, and because of the evidence relating to her access to and use of the pantry, it was open to the jury to reach a conclusion that any hypothesis consistent with innocence, namely, that the appellant had no knowledge of the existence of the can of soup, had been excluded.
In the second case, there was potential joint possession of methylamphetamine in transparent plastic containers in the refrigerator of a house which the appellant shared with her partner. The appellant denied to police that she had any knowledge of the containers in the fridge, or their contents. She conceded that she may have seen one of the plastic containers (described as a Tupperware crisper), but said she did not know what was inside it. She admitted owning the Tupperware container and she admitted doing the shopping and cooking for the household. Owen J dismissed the ground of appeal which contended that the trial Judge had erred by failing to direct the jury that it could not convict the appellant unless satisfied that she had exclusive possession of the drug. His Honour said, at 164:
"The prosecution case was presented on the basis that the appellant had possession of the methyl amphetamine. No evidence of joint possession was led. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that the learned trial judge should have directed the jury that the prosecution was required to prove that the appellant had exclusive possession of the methyl amphetamine. In my opinion the learned trial judge was not required to direct on the issue of exclusive possession. There was evidence before the jury from which an inference could be drawn that the appellant had possession of the methyl amphetamine irrespective of Merrett's involvement. Merrett's absence was explained to the jury both by counsel for the prosecution and the learned trial judge. The jury was duly directed that it could not and should not convict that appellant on the basis of an association with Merrett. Her case had to be considered separately. No more was required from the trial judge. This ground fails."
In Williams v Olsen [1999] WASCA 114, the appellant was charged with possession of heroin. He was sitting with his wife in a motor vehicle when police officers swooped on the vehicle. They searched the occupants and the vehicle. Located in the wife's handbag was a fold of heroin, and located in her underwear were another eight paper folds containing heroin. In the front of the car between the driver's seat and passenger's seat was a syringe. In a pocket of a jacket in the back of the car were two further folds of heroin. The jacket belonged to the appellant, but he denied knowledge of the folds in the jacket.
McKechnie J held, at [34], that the question for determination was whether the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the circumstances of the case was that of the guilt of the appellant. His Honour concluded that the prosecution evidence could not exclude beyond reasonable doubt an hypothesis consistent with innocence in relation to the two folds of heroin in the appellant's jacket. That hypothesis was that the appellant's wife had sole possession of all the heroin in the vehicle. She was the one who was found in possession of heroin, which included heroin folds similar in appearance to those in the jacket. She had the opportunity of putting heroin in the jacket during the day. The evidence was capable of establishing that the appellant had general knowledge of possession of heroin by his wife, but in the circumstances of the case that general knowledge was incapable of amounting to proof beyond reasonable doubt that he had particular knowledge of the two folds of heroin. This was not a case in which drugs were found in premises occupied by the person accused of the offence and there were special circumstances which linked the drugs with the appellant's wife.
Each of the cases I have reviewed turns on its own facts. In the present case, the prosecution was not required to prove that the methylamphetamine was not in the possession of others. All that it was required to do was prove that the appellant was in possession of that substance. The learned trial Judge's directions to the jury were correct and the ground must fail.
Ground 2
This ground contends that the direction on circumstantial evidence was inadequate because the jury was not told that, before they could convict on circumstantial evidence, that evidence must not only be consistent with guilt, but inconsistent with any other reasonable explanation.
What the learned trial Judge said about circumstantial evidence was as follows:
"I told you earlier that I would say something to you about inferences in relation to the circumstantial evidence to which I have already referred. You are of course entitled - and in fact you will have to draw inferences as to what happened but you should only draw logical inferences from facts which are proved to you. There is no room for guessing or speculating or conjecture or looking for theories unsupported by the evidence.
The position is that you may draw inferences from facts which you have in the first place found to be established. An inference is merely a logical deduction from such facts and before you may make an inference as against the accused you must be satisfied that it is the only inference that can be drawn consistent with the proven fact. When there are two or more competing inferences you must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the inference leading to a finding of guilt is the only reasonable inference.
If there is a reasonable inference other than that of guilt, you must acquit. If you think there is some alternative reasonable inference which you may draw and which is open to you on the facts, then no inference can be drawn as against the accused. If, however, after consideration you are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that an inference is the only inference to be drawn, then you may make that inference. As I said to you, your job is not to guess or speculate or conjecture or look for theories unsupported by the evidence."
The appellant's complaint is that the learned trial Judge failed to direct the jury as to how to go about an assessment of circumstantial evidence. It is said that the learned trial Judge should have directed the jury that, in a circumstantial case, guilt must not only be a rational inference, but the only rational inference that can be drawn from the circumstances, excluding any reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. However, as I read the learned trial Judge's direction, that is what his Honour said. Instead of using the word "rational", his Honour used the word "reasonable". There is no distinction to be drawn between the two. The words are interchangeable: Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Vol II, pages 1750, 1758.
It is also complained that the direction given was a direction about inferences and not a direction tailored to circumstantial evidence. There is no substance to this complaint, as the learned trial Judge prefaced his directions by indicating that what he was talking about was circumstantial evidence.
The extent to which a direction on the drawing of inferences needs to be given in a criminal trial depends on the circumstances. In Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573, Dawson J said, at 578:
"The learned trial judge gave the customary direction that, where the jury relied upon circumstantial evidence, guilt should not only be a rational inference but should be the only rational inference that could be drawn from the circumstances: see Hodge's case (1838) 2 Lewin 227 [168 ER 1136]; Peacock v The King (1911) 13 CLR 619; Plomp v The Queen (1963) 110 CLR 234. Whilst a direction of that kind is customarily given in cases turning upon circumstantial evidence, it is no more than an amplification of the rule that the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. In many, if not most, cases involving substantial circumstantial evidence, it will be a helpful direction. In other cases, particularly where the amount of circumstantial evidence involved is slight, a direction in those terms may be confusing rather than helpful. Sometimes such a direction may be necessary to enable the jury to go about their task properly. But there is no invariable rule of practice, let alone rule of law, that the direction should be given in every case involving circumstantial evidence. It will be for the trial judge in the first instance to determine whether it should be given. As Barwick CJ, speaking for the Court, observed in Grant v The Queen (1975) 11 ALR 503 at 504:
'Where the circumstances of the case seem to require that some such direction be given, the summing up regarded as a whole may prove to be, and generally may be likely to be, inadequate. On the other hand, having regard to the circumstances of the case and the nature of the summing up, the failure to give the special direction may not in a particular case result in an inadequacy of the summing up as a whole. It may none the less be concluded from the terms of the summing up that the jury were fully instructed.'"
In my opinion, this passage is particularly relevant to the present case. It was a simple case and one in which the jury would have had no difficulty in understanding that the critical issue was whether the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the prosecution was such as to lead only to the conclusion that it had been proven beyond reasonable doubt that the only rational inference that could be drawn in all the circumstances was one consistent with guilt. The learned trial Judge told the jury on numerous occasions that the question was whether the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was in possession of the methylamphetamine. The direction given in relation to circumstantial evidence was an amplification of the rule that the prosecution was required to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.
Counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon Clohessy v The Queen [2001] WASCA 314, where Wallwork J (with whom Steytler and Miller JJ agreed) said, at [19]:
"It is usual for Judges to tell juries that circumstantial evidence can prove a fact beyond reasonable doubt only if all other reasonable hypotheses are excluded and that before a jury can convict on circumstantial evidence, that evidence must not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but inconsistent with any other reasonable explanation. The jury should be told that it must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the circumstantial evidence from which the prosecution asks it to draw an inference of guilt is trustworthy evidence and is inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion than that the accused person is guilty."
I consider that the direction given by the learned trial Judge was essentially in these terms.
Counsel for the appellant also submitted that a direction in accordance with Barca v The Queen (1975) 133 CLR 82 per Gibbs, Stephen and Mason JJ, at 104, was required. The passage in question is in the following terms:
"When the case against an accused person rests substantially upon circumstantial evidence the jury cannot return a verdict of guilty unless the circumstances are 'such as to be inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused': Peacock v The King (1911) 13 CLR 619 at 634. To enable a jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused it is necessary not only that his guilt should be a rational inference but that it should be 'the only rational inference that the circumstances would enable them to draw': Plomp v The Queen (1963) 110 CLR 234 at 252; see also Thomas v The Queen (1960) 102 CLR 584 at 605‑606. However, 'an inference to be reasonable must rest upon something more than mere conjecture. The bare possibility of innocence should not prevent a jury from finding the prisoner guilty, if the inference of guilt is the only inference open to reasonable men upon a consideration of all the facts in evidence.' (Peacock v The King (1911) 13 CLR 619, at 661). These principles are well settled in Australia."
In my view, the direction given by the learned trial Judge was generally in these terms.
It was also contended that the learned trial Judge should have identified the circumstantial evidence and directed in relation to it. It is true that, when directing the jury in relation to the question of circumstantial evidence, the learned trial Judge did not turn his attention to the specific evidence which constituted that circumstantial evidence. However, the case was simple and the learned trial Judge did highlight, in the course of his directions, the evidence which constituted the circumstantial case brought by the prosecution. In doing so, his Honour indicated to the jury that he would be directing them shortly about the issue of drawing inferences. It was clearly stressed what evidence was circumstantial and, at the conclusion of this review of the evidence, the direction which I have quoted was given. In my view, it was an adequate direction.
That is not to say that in every case a trial Judge can be content with a direction that does not specify the circumstantial evidence which is the subject of the direction. As Dawson J pointed out in Shepherd (supra), at 578, where the amount of circumstantial evidence involved is slight, a direction in relation to circumstantial evidence may be more confusing than helpful. It is for the trial Judge to determine whether, in the circumstances, a direction should be given.
Here, a general direction on circumstantial evidence was given, but the question is whether it went far enough. In my view, it did. There will be cases where it will be necessary to amplify the direction by specific reference to the circumstantial evidence which is under consideration (Clohessy per Wallwork J, at [21]), but this was not one of them. In these circumstances, I would dismiss this ground of appeal.
Ground 4
This ground is pleaded in very brief terms. It simply contends that there was a miscarriage of justice by reason of the fact that evidence which would have led to a different verdict was not available to be led at the time of trial. The appellant seeks to adduce what is claimed to be fresh evidence by way of testimony of Fleur Chard‑Walker.
The first question which arises is whether the evidence is fresh evidence or new evidence. As Pullin JA pointed out in de la Espriella‑Velasco v The Queen [2006] WASCA 31; (2006) 31 WAR 291, at [152] ‑ [153], the distinction between "fresh" and "new" evidence is of importance:
" ... The distinction is important because 'new' evidence, after all, is evidence which was available and known by the convicted person to be available at the time of the original trial, or alternatively, 'constructively' (Ratten v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 510 at 517) known to be available at the time of the original trial. An accused will 'constructively' know about evidence if, although not actually aware of it, he or she could with reasonable diligence have discovered the evidence by the time of the original trial. Admittedly, 'great latitude' (Ratten (at 517)) must be extended to an accused in determining what evidence by reasonable diligence in his own interest he could have been able to produce at trial. This is because an accused will often be disadvantaged in intellectual terms, or in terms of financial and legal resources in the conduct of the case. The fact that such latitude must be shown may be the reason why it has been said that the distinction between 'fresh' and 'new' evidence is not as significant as it once was: Nolan v The Queen (unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, WA, No 99 of 1995, Malcolm CJ, Pidgeon and Murray JJ, 22 May 1997) [sic unreported; CCA SCt of WA; Library No 970260; 22 May 1997] . The distinction does, however, remain and is soundly based in principle. See Mickelberg v The Queen (at [415]). There will be many cases where no latitude should be granted because the accused is not disadvantaged in any way.
The reason for continuing to distinguish between 'new' and 'fresh' evidence is not to re‑establish a set of rules bordering on fixed rules but merely to recognise that, in many cases, the court is likely to exercise its discretion and refuse to admit further evidence - in circumstances where the convicted person chose not to lead the evidence at trial or did not lead evidence which was available on reasonable inquiry. The fact that a tactical decision was made not to lead evidence or the fact that there was a failure to make reasonable inquiry will be facts relevant to the court's decision about whether the convictions should be quashed and a retrial ordered. A decision made for tactical reasons is a decision which an accused person must live with. There will be no miscarriage of justice: Lawless v The Queen (1979) 142 CLR 659 at 675 ‑ 676."
When considering whether evidence is fresh or new, it is important to bear in mind the trial process in a criminal trial. In Ratten v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 510, Barwick CJ, at 517, said:
"It [a criminal trial] is a trial, not an inquisition: a trial in which the protagonists are the Crown on the one hand and the accused on the other. Each is free to decide the ground on which it or he will contest the issue, the evidence which it or he will call, and what questions whether in chief or in cross‑examination shall be asked; always, of course, subject to the rules of evidence, fairness and admissibility. The judge is to take no part in that contest, having his own role to perform in ensuring the propriety and fairness of the trial and in instructing the jury in the relevant law. Upon the evidence and under the judge's directions, the jury is to decide whether the accused is guilty or not. Consequently if the proceedings are not blemished by error on the part of the judge, whether it be on a matter of law or in the proper conduct of the proceedings, or by misconduct on the part of the jury, there has been a fair trial. It will not become an unfair trial because the accused of his own volition has not called evidence which was available to him at the time of his trial, or of which, bearing in mind his circumstances as an accused, he could reasonably have been expected to have become aware and which he could have been able to produce at the trial."
Against this background of authority, it is necessary to look at the sworn evidence of Ms Chard‑Walker before this Court on 9 February 2007. She said that, in January 2004, she was living at 64 Streatley Road, Lathlain with the appellant, his daughter, Sarah and Sarah's boyfriend. She recalled a day in January 2004 when police "did a search warrant" at the house. She said that she had been in bed all day and awoke at some time in the afternoon, and went into the back area of the house to a games room. There, she saw a girl named Kylie Mayfield, who had been staying in the house. There was also a friend with her, whom Ms Chard‑Walker said she did not expect to be there. This was Ascher Kitchener. She said that the two women were sitting around a table talking and they had scales and some bags with a substance in them on the table. She said that she tried to confront them about what they were doing. The substance they had looked "brown, kind of a beigey colour I think". She identified it as amphetamines.
Ms Chard‑Walker claimed that she was taken aback by what she saw. She asked where the appellant was because she did not want him to walk in on the women and the drugs. She was told not to worry because he was not home. She said she was asked for some bags and she went to her room to get them. When she produced the bags, she was told that they were too big. She then returned to her bedroom. The next thing she heard was a commotion in the games room and some loud banging at the door. She went out and saw Kylie, whom she heard calling, "police". She returned to her room, where she wrapped herself in a doona and then observed that the police came in through the front door. She was searched by police and heroin was found in a bag under the bed. She acknowledged it to be hers.
Ms Chard‑Walker said that Ascher was allowed to leave more or less straight away after she had been searched and Kylie was allowed to leave shortly afterwards. She was asked about the layout of the house and said that directly next door to the games room there was a garage "one door away". Ms Chard‑Walker was present when police located a quantity of drugs on a shelf in the garage. She made no comment at the time. She said she did not wish to get Kylie or Ascher into trouble and she did not want to incriminate herself.
Shortly after this day, Ms Chard‑Walker moved out of the house at Lathlain and went to Goomalling. She had broken up with the appellant. Later, she recommenced living with the appellant at a house in Mount Lawley. She then learned that he had been charged in relation to the amphetamines found at the Lathlain address.
Ms Chard‑Walker said that she had never told the appellant about what she had seen in the games room on the day the police arrived. She did not want him to know about it. Later, she told the appellant that the drugs in relation to which he had been charged with possession with intent to sell or supply were Kylie's drugs. Kylie had promised her that she would come forward if anybody was charged.
Ms Chard‑Walker stated that the time at which she had informed the appellant of this fact was prior to his trial. She said:
"Before he came to trial ‑ ‑ ‑?‑‑‑Yes.
‑ ‑ ‑ you had told him that the drugs that he was charged with having been in possession of actually belonged to someone else?‑‑‑Yes, I told him that even before he was charged because he wasn't charged till quite a while later. I just didn't tell him that I knew that I'd seen it in the first place because I hadn't stopped them or told them not to do it.
But what was the problem? If I can just explore that. Why wouldn't you say to him, 'Look, they were dealing with drugs on the very morning the police came and they must have stuck them out in the garage.' Did you tell him ‑ ‑ ‑?‑‑‑Well, I did.
You did tell him that?‑‑‑Well, yes, I told him that, but I just didn't tell him that I knew previously, you know, that morning. I didn't tell him that I'd seen them together, that I had any conversation with them. I mean, I had already asked those girls to make sure that, you know, I didn't have any knowledge of what was going on.
No, but the point is that you had told him before his trial ‑ ‑ ‑?‑‑‑Yes.
‑ ‑ ‑ that you had seen them that morning dealing in drugs?‑‑‑No, I told him that I'd spoken to Kylie about the matter and that she'd admitted to me that the drugs were hers and that if need be she would admit to them so that no‑one else in the house would get into trouble for them."
Ms Chard‑Walker said that she told the appellant's lawyer prior to the trial about what she had seen in the games room on the morning in question. She told him that Kylie had said she would come forward and admit to the possession of the drugs. She added that she told the lawyer "about the whole incident". This was definitely prior to the trial, because she thought she would be giving evidence.
When cross‑examined, Ms Chard‑Walker said that she was available to give evidence at trial, but she was never asked to do so. She admitted that she was herself a drug user in 2004, but claimed that the appellant was not, at that time, using drugs and it had been a long time beforehand that he had been a drug user.
To clarify exactly what it was that Ms Chard‑Walker had told the appellant and his lawyer about what she had seen on the day the police arrived, I asked her a number of questions. The following were her answers:
"Did you know that [Kylie] wasn't coming forward at the trial?‑‑‑Not until a lot later, no.
No, but before the trial?‑‑‑Yes, I did.
Then once you knew that she wasn't going to give the evidence - that's what I'm grappling to understand?‑‑‑Sorry?
If you knew she wasn't coming to give evidence ‑ ‑ ‑?‑‑‑Yes.
- - - why then wouldn't you have told him, 'I actually saw what happened that day. They have the drugs. They were dealing with them. They must have put it in the garage. I'll give that evidence'?‑‑‑Well, the time that I did tell him, I can't be exact, but it was certainly around that time because that's when I went to the lawyer and admitted to him what had happened. David was in gaol and I spoke to his sister about it and admitted to her. She immediately said, 'You've got to go see his lawyer. You've got to tell him this stuff because it's important.' And, you know, I sort of hesitated and said, 'Well, you know, is it really that important if, you know, Kylie is going to come forward?' And then Kylie wasn't coming forward because that was when the pressure was really put on her to come forward. I realised at that time that she probably had no intention in the first place. Yes, so then it was admitted to him but not while we were living together; not, you know, when you say that you expected that I would have.
Just let me get that clear. Before the trial he had been told exactly what you saw that day?‑‑‑Yes, he would have, yes, only just.
By you?‑‑‑Well, later by me on ‑ ‑ ‑
No, before the trial by you?‑‑‑Yes, initially he was told by his sister."
When questioned by Roberts‑Smith JA, Ms Chard‑Walker replied as follows:
"So after you knew that [Kylie] had bailed out before the trial you told both Mr Marshall and the lawyer. Is that right? Is that what you say?‑‑‑Well, I told the lawyer. I assumed he would have told Mr Marshall straightaway.
Yes?‑‑‑I told his sister, you know.
I thought you said earlier that after you had told the sister she must have told him and you then had a discussion with him about ‑ ‑ ‑?‑‑‑Yes.
- - - it, did you ‑ ‑ ‑?‑‑‑No. I was asked if I had told him personally.
Yes?‑‑‑And I did, but it would have been either the lawyer or his sister that he heard it from for the first time. That is what I'm saying.
Yes, but you then you spoke to him about it yourself then?‑‑‑Well, I had a conversation with him about it, yes.
What was the first time that you had that conversation with him?‑‑‑Well, it was quite some time after. I really don't remember exactly when.
Was it before the trial?‑‑‑Yes, it was."
It is quite clear that the testimony of Ms Chard‑Walker could not possibly be categorised as fresh evidence. Assuming it to be new evidence, it is evidence which the appellant chose not to lead at trial. This was a tactical decision on the part of the appellant and/or his counsel and a decision with which the appellant must live (Lawless v The Queen (supra), at 675 ‑ 676).
In all the circumstances, I would not admit the new or further evidence of Ms Chard‑Walker. A decision was made, for tactical reasons, not to call her to give evidence and there was no miscarriage of justice by reason of the fact that she did not give evidence.
In the circumstances, it is unnecessary to reach any conclusions about the cogency and/or credibility of the evidence. If I was required to do so, I would categorise the evidence as entirely without credibility or cogency. I do not consider the evidence of Ms Chard‑Walker that Kylie had been dealing with amphetamines on the morning in question and (by inference) had put them in the garage when the police arrived at the door to be credible. She gave no evidence about Kylie's knowledge of the layout of the house, nor did she give any evidence about the time it might have taken to get up from the games room area, go into the garage, deposit the drugs and get back to the games room before the police entered the house. I do not consider Ms Chard‑Walker's evidence about Kylie's purported intention to "come forward" to be capable of belief by a reasonable jury.
Further, Ms Chard‑Walker's testimony was undermined by reason of the fact that she had sworn in an affidavit on 11 August 2006 that at no time prior to the appellant's trial had she told either the appellant or his solicitor about what she knew. The relevant paragraphs of the affidavit are as follows:
"12.David and I moved to a new place in Mt Lawley. While we were there we had a falling out with Kylie because of some money she stole from us. She started threatening us. She then wound up going to gaol for some other drug charges and there was no chance of getting her to come forward.
13.I still didn't tell David or anyone else about what I had seen in the games room. David said that the police couldn't prove who the drugs belonged to, so I didn't think he would be found guilty.
14.I did not tell David's solicitor about what I had seen Kylie and Ascher doing the in [sic] games room. I told him about Kylie ringing me and about her saying that she would put her hand up if she had to, but without Kylie coming to court, that could not be used as evidence. I still didn't expect that David would be convicted and I was scared that he would be angry if he found out that I knew what had really happened, so I kept quiet about what I had seen.
15.When David was convicted I spoke to his sister Robyn ... She told me to ring David's solicitor, which I did. He told me that I should speak to another solicitor about the matter."
Ms Chard‑Walker appears to have sworn falsely on 11 August 2006 that it was not until after the trial of the appellant that she told the appellant's solicitor about what she had seen in the games room on the morning in question. I do not consider that her sworn evidence before the Court is capable of belief, nor do I think it would be likely to be believed by a jury of reasonable persons. Quite simply, the further evidence could not have produced a different result if it had been available at trial: CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172, per McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ, at [111]. I would dismiss this ground of appeal.
Appeal against sentence
The single ground of appeal against sentence is that the sentence of 4 years' imprisonment was manifestly excessive having regard to the small quantity of drugs involved and "sentencing patterns in comparable cases".
I turn first to the question of comparable cases. Counsel for the appellant made reference to four cases which spanned the four years 2000 to 2004. These, he said, were the only cases that he was able to find that dealt with small quantities of methylamphetamine similar to the quantity in the possession of the appellant in this case. That quantity was 13.4 grams of methylamphetamine.
Unfortunately, no assurance could be given by counsel that the cases to which he referred were the only reported cases which dealt with similar amounts of methylamphetamine, and the Court was left in the position where it simply had four cases between the years 2000 and 2004 in which the quantity of methylamphetamine was more or less the same. Each of these cases is quite clearly distinguishable from the present case.
The first case is Schlenka v The Queen [2004] WASCA 142, where a 28‑year‑old offender was convicted after trial of possession of 12.7 grams of high purity methylamphetamine with intent to sell or supply. He was sentenced to 1 year 8 months' imprisonment. A close examination of the facts of the case reveals that the offender was a drug addict who, in company with a co‑offender, had intended to use the drugs himself and also sell a quantity to others. There was evidence that he had undertaken a residential course of rehabilitation at Hannick House, an institution run under the auspices of St Patrick's Catholic Church in Fremantle and he had completed the course successfully. He had remained drug‑free during the period of the course. He had no prior criminal history at the time of the commission of the offence.
The Court (Murray, Miller and McLure JJ) considered the case to be an unusual one. The Court said, at [14]:
" ... The applicant was a person of prior good character. He had, for a short period, fallen into a lifestyle which exposed him to the regular use of amphetamines. He took that up, and soon acquired a substantial habit. Upon his arrest, of his own volition, he immediately set about remedying his fall into serious unlawful behaviour. He undertook that task with some determination and, upon the evidence provided to the sentencing Judge, he succeeded in rebuilding his life. He deserved substantial credit for that effort."
Samuel v The State of Western Australia [2004] WASCA 154 involved possession by a 47‑year‑old of 6.25 grams of methylamphetamine with intent to sell or supply. Following trial, he was sentenced to imprisonment for 2 years, suspended for a period of 2 years. The facts were exceptional. Roberts‑Smith J, at [40] ‑ [41], summarised them as follows:
" ... These [the facts] included that the applicant was a 47 year old first offender who had an unblemished history of some 17 years in this country, he was a good family man, married with two sons, was a good worker, the quantity of the drug was not large, he was not a drug user and there was no apparent explanation for his commission of the offence - indeed, his Honour said he failed to understand why the applicant would have committed it.
There was nothing to suggest the applicant was likely to commit any offence in the future."
Vogel v The Queen [2002] WASCA 261 was a case in which the offender was sentenced after trial to 3 years' imprisonment (2 years under present law) for possession with intent to sell or supply of 3.8 grams of methylamphetamine with a purity of 11 per cent and 2.86 grams of methylamphetamine with a purity of 37 per cent. The total quantity of methylamphetamine was about half of that in the possession of the appellant in this case. Wheeler J highlighted, at [9], the special circumstances of the case:
"There were significant personal factors in the applicant's favour. He was of previous good character, was employed, had favourable references, and had no significant criminal history. Although clearly old enough to know better, he was a relatively young man. The learned sentencing Judge also considered that it was possible that the applicant may have used some portion of the drugs in his possession for his own use, so that he did not take the view that all of the drug was for the purpose of distribution."
Watt v The Queen [2000] WASCA 354 was a case in which the offender had been convicted at trial of possession with intent to sell or supply of 6.74 grams of methylamphetamine with a purity between 18 and 22 per cent. He was sentenced to 4 years' imprisonment (2 years 8 months under present law) and appealed against that sentence. The appeal was dismissed. Miller J (with whom Kennedy and Wallwork JJ agreed) said, at [12]:
"Reference to other sentences imposed in other cases are seldom particularly helpful in these matters. What can be said about this case is that the sentence imposed was relatively severe for the quantity of drug in possession of the applicant but, on the other hand, the learned trial Judge was entitled to reach the conclusion that the applicant was a person who was dealing in drugs purely for commercial gain. That put him in a different light to a person who was a user of such a drug."
Miller J also said, at [5], that the personal circumstances of the applicant in relation to education, occupation, income, family history and criminal history were all in his favour. He was treated as "virtually a first offender".
From this review of the cases relied upon by counsel for the appellant, it can be seen that there are clearly factors which distinguish each of the cases from the present case.
It has been said on many occasions that there is little value in comparing sentences imposed in other cases without ensuring that one is comparing "like with like". I said as much in Watt (supra), at [12]. Rowland J (with whom Ipp J agreed) said much the same in Bellissimo (1996) 84 A Crim R 465, at 468 ‑ 469:
"It is generally impossible to make sensible comparisons when dealing with the antecedents of persons who have been before the courts.
...
In the end, one simply considers all of the facts and circumstances to ascertain whether it can be shown in this case that the learned sentencing judge's discretion has miscarried to the extent that it can be said that the sentence is manifestly excessive."
As the Court pointed out to counsel for the appellant during the hearing of the appeal, this is not a case in which a comprehensive analysis of comparable sentences in like cases was put before the Court. Counsel for the appellant disavowed any assurance that he had incorporated all the known cases, and, in the absence of such an analysis, it is difficult to deal with a ground of appeal which contends that the sentence imposed upon the appellant "was manifestly excessive having regard to ... sentencing patterns in comparable cases".
The exercise of looking at comparable cases to ensure an appropriate level of consistency in sentences imposed in this State was carried out in Tulloh v The Queen [2004] WASCA 169; (2004) 147 A Crim R 107. The appellant had been convicted after trial of possession with intent to sell or supply of a very substantial quantity of methylamphetamine. The methylamphetamine was contained within two packages which contained a total of 805 grams of high grade. The sentence imposed was 15 years' imprisonment (10 years under current law) and it was suggested, by reference to a number of decisions of this Court that the sentence was manifestly excessive. I endeavoured to review a number of those cases, at [21] ‑ [41]. McLure J, without attempting to be exhaustive, at [49], reviewed a number of recent relevant cases, all of which showed the 15‑year sentence imposed upon the appellant to be within a "relatively consistent sentencing range". The quantities of methylamphetamine under consideration in Tulloh were substantially greater than the quantity involved in the present case and little assistance can be derived from that decision for the purposes of this appeal. What the case does show is that, in appropriate circumstances, a more thorough review of comparable cases can be done.
The appellant in this case had prior convictions for drug‑related offences. He had been convicted and fined $1500 for possession of a prohibited drug in the Court of Petty Sessions at Perth on 1 December 1999. He had been convicted in the District Court at Perth on 7 February 2000 of six counts of possession of different drugs. Those drugs were amphetamines (in relation to which there was intent to sell or supply), cannabis, heroin, MDMA and an unspecified drug in relation to which there were two counts. He was sentenced to 3 years 6 months' imprisonment for those offences.
The appellant was 49 years of age at the time he was sentenced in the present case and it could not therefore be said that he had any mitigating factor in terms of youth. There were no other mitigating circumstances. Although a user of methylamphetamine only two or three times a week, he was clearly a drug dealer. In those circumstances, I do not consider that the sentence was beyond the range of a sound exercise of discretion on the part of the learned trial Judge.
The sentence was substantial and could be categorised as severe, but, in my view, it was not manifestly excessive. As the High Court pointed out in Lowndes v The Queen (1999) 195 CLR 665, at [15]:
" ... a court of criminal appeal may not substitute its own opinion for that of the sentencing judge merely because the appellate court would have exercised its discretion in a manner different from the manner in which the sentencing judge exercised his or her discretion. This is basic (House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499). The discretion which the law commits to sentencing judges is of vital importance in the administration of our system of criminal justice."
I would dismiss the ground of appeal against sentence.
Appeals 31 and 77 of 2006
Appeal against conviction
To understand the grounds of appeal against conviction, it is necessary to summarise the facts of the case. They reveal that, on 4 February 2002 a Detective Sergeant Calzada (whom I shall call "Detective Calzada") was driving his police vehicle in Mount Hawthorn when he observed a male person standing next to the driver's window of a parked vehicle. In that vehicle there was a female seated in the driver's position. There appeared to be an exchange between the two of some object. Detective Calzada stopped his vehicle and reversed back towards the parked car. As he did this, the male person got into his vehicle and took off at speed. The female drove off in a different direction. Detective Calzada followed the male's vehicle until it stopped at 45 Coogee Street, Mount Hawthorn. There, the driver got out and ran down a side of the house. Detective Calzada followed. The chase went down one side of the house, through the backyard and along the other side. Detective Calzada lost sight of the fleeing man for a couple of seconds, but when he caught up with him he was crouched down about halfway along the side of the house. He marked the position on a sketch plan which was tendered in evidence.
Quinlan stated that he was a prisoner on remand for charges of sexual assault and deprivation of liberty, but had previously been sentenced to imprisonment on two separate occasions, the first being for the offence of deprivation of liberty and threat to kill and the second being for assault, stealing a motor vehicle and breaching a community service order. He denied that he knew anything of his father's convictions for drug offences in 2000. Despite the fact that the appellant had been sentenced to imprisonment for 3 years 6 months, Quinlan denied that he had any knowledge of him previously being in gaol. He conceded that the appellant's girlfriend, Ms Chard‑Walker, "might have been" a drug user, but said that, despite the fact that she was living in the house with him, he did not know whether she was or not.
The evidence of Quinlan can be categorised as fresh evidence, because the evidence did not exist at the time of the trial and arguably could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered by the appellant: see Mickelberg v The Queen (2004) 29 WAR 13 per Steytler J, at [411]. According to the appellant, he kept quiet about what he had done and was not prepared to disclose it to the appellant when he asked whether the heroin was his.
Accepting the evidence of Quinlan to be fresh, the test is whether the appellant has established that there is a significant possibility that, in the light of all the admissible evidence (including that given at the trial), a jury, acting reasonably, would have acquitted him: Mickelberg (supra) per Steytler J, at [416] and cases therein referred to.
In Mickelberg v The Queen, unreported; CCA SCt of WA; Library No 990056; 12 February 1999, various authorities are summarised. The conclusion reached, at 22, is as follows:
"Although the ultimate question concerns the court's opinion as to the effect of the fresh or new evidence on a jury, it is inevitable that, in the process of answering that question, the court will form its own assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. Regard will be had to the fact that, as Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ pointed out in ... [M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487 at 494], 'a reasonable doubt experienced by the court is a doubt which a reasonable jury ought to have experienced'. Regard, however, will also be had to the possibility that, in some instances, a witness regarded by the court as credible beyond reasonable doubt, may be seen by a jury in a different light, and that a jury might have a different view of a witness, regarded by the court as not being capable of belief."
Applying these principles to the present case, I am quite unable to conclude, when regard is had to the totality of the evidence, that a jury acting reasonably would have acquitted the appellant.
I did not consider the testimony of Quinlan credible. The evidence at the trial of the appellant arguably established that he had run around the house and had been apprehended at the side of the house at a point proximate to where the package of heroin was found in the garden of the neighbour. I cannot accept that, by coincidence, Quinlan had thrown a package from his window (which appears to have been on the side nearest the location where the heroin was found) at or about the same time as the appellant was apprehended at that very point by a police officer. The appellant said in his testimony that he had not been apprehended at the side of the house at all, but had tripped on the back verandah of the house. However, it was clearly open to the jury to accept the testimony of the police officer. That evidence seems far more credible than the testimony of the appellant that he tripped and fell at the back verandah.
Quinlan did not identify the package which he claimed to have thrown out of his window and over the fence. He did not identify the precise location from where he had thrown the package. He did not even identify where his bedroom was in the house. He gave no evidence that he had returned after the police had left the house and recovered his "stash" which he had thrown over the fence. It seems hardly credible to me that, having thrown the heroin over the fence, he would not have gone looking for it when he returned. He did not give evidence as to how long he was away.
Perhaps the most telling factor against the credibility of Quinlan is the fact that the package found in the neighbour's garden was found to have the appellant's DNA on it. I use the phrase "appellant's DNA on it" in the knowledge that there was no evidence that the DNA was that of the appellant and only the appellant. As is always the case with DNA, the evidence was that the DNA found on the package matched the profile of the appellant. There was only a one in ten billion chance that it came from someone unrelated to the appellant. It is because of this that I term the DNA found on the package "the appellant's DNA".
No explanation was given by Quinlan as to how, if it was his package of heroin, the appellant's DNA could have been found on the package. There was no evidence at the trial of the appellant about whether the DNA on the package could have come from a close relative of the appellant and no attempt was made by counsel at the hearing of the appeal to put any such evidence before the Court.
The forensic scientist who testified at the trial was Ms Ann‑Marie Furmedge. She testified that she was given what she described as a taped envelope. When examined in a laboratory, it consisted of three pieces of tape folded into an envelope shape. Five samples of the tape were taken from the ends of the tape. A mixed DNA profile consistent with having come from two people was recovered. It could be separated into major and minor components. The major component DNA profile was recorded. There was insufficient minor component DNA for any interpretation. The major component was compared with a reference buccal sample labelled "David Kenneth Marshall". It had come from the appellant. Ms Furmedge was asked about the probability of the DNA coming from someone other than the appellant. She said:
" ... the probability of finding this DNA profile - if the cellular material on the taped envelope had come from someone other than and unrelated to Marshall is less than one in 10 billion based on West Australian population data.
So what is your opinion then in relation to the comparison?‑‑‑In my opinion the profile recovered from the taped envelope matched the profile from Marshall."
Ms Furmedge was extensively cross‑examined. The question of secondary transfer was raised. The following was her evidence:
"All right. I accept you said there's a match but what I'm talking about now is the issue of secondary transfer. Can you explain to the jury what secondary transfer means?‑‑‑Sure. It's if I have come into contact with one of you and maybe shaken your hand and then gone and touched something else it's that transfer of your DNA onto something else. I would expect to see my DNA there as well, as well as possibly some of yours. It doesn't always happen but it is - it is possible that that could happen.
All right. The scenario I'm putting is a possibility in this case in terms of as to how the DNA got on this package; is that it may have occurred unwittingly by the detective having had a lot of touch with Mr Marshall's hot, sweaty body and then unwittingly carrying the package and transferring it. That's a possible scenario as to how Mr Marshall's DNA got there. It may not be the only scenario but that is a possible scenario, isn't it, Ms Furmedge?‑‑‑I'd have to say anything is possible. If you put it like that, yes, it's possible that someone has transferred DNA. If they have come into contact with, say, my - I have contacted you I would expect to see my DNA there as well and in more amounts than yours if I had touched you. So secondary transfer is a possibility."
When re‑examined, Ms Furmedge said:
"EDWARDS, MR: Perhaps just arising out of the last matter and relating to secondary transfers; if I were to touch a person and that person was sweating and some hours later touched a packet what DNA would you expect to find on the packet if any?‑‑‑If there's been several hours between touching the person and then the packet?
Yes?‑‑‑I would have to say I would think it was unlikely that you would still transfer the person you touched several hours before onto another item."
The effect of Ms Furmedge's testimony was that secondary transfer of the appellant's DNA from the police officer who had seized him onto the package containing heroin which he later recovered from the neighbour's garden was a possibility because "anything is possible". But in such circumstances she would have expected to have seen more of the officer's DNA on the sample than the appellant's. The profile from the recovered taped envelope matched the profile of the appellant. There was a minor component of DNA which was insufficient for any DNA interpretation.
On this evidence, it was highly unlikely that if the appellant's DNA had been put onto the package by secondary transfer from the police officer, his DNA, but not the DNA of the police officer, would be the only recoverable DNA. Further, a considerable period of time had elapsed between the time at which the police officer seized the appellant at the house and the time at which he returned and collected the parcel from the neighbouring property.
The exact period of time between the detective's apprehension of the appellant and the time he returned to the neighbour's residence to retrieve the package which had been found is unclear. The evidence of Detective Calzada was that it was 3.30 pm on 4 February 2002 when he crossed Scarborough Beach Road in pursuit of the appellant. It was only a very short distance to the house at 45 Coogee Street, and it was within moments that Detective Calzada apprehended the appellant at the side of the house. It could only have been 3.35 pm, or thereabouts, when this occurred. Detective Calzada then rang for backup and the appellant stood with him, waiting for other officers to arrive. It is not clear how long this took, but it appears to have been shortly after the call was made. Meanwhile, Detective Calzada had been "holding onto" the appellant, whilst standing at the side of the roadway. Detective Calzada agreed in cross‑examination that the appellant was "pretty sweaty" and he was then placed in the van.
The appellant was taken to the office of the Stirling detectives and a decision was made to obtain a search warrant for 45 Coogee Street. Other detectives took the appellant back to 45 Coogee Street to execute the search warrant, leaving Detective Calzada at the office of the Stirling detectives.
A call came through to Detective Calzada that something had been found at 47 Coogee Street and he went to that address. It appears that it took approximately three‑quarters of an hour to an hour from the time of the call to the time that he got to 47 Coogee Street. When he did get there, he was handed the package which Mr Illingworth, the occupier of 47 Coogee Street, had found in the garden. By this time, the search warrant had been executed and was complete. The garage at 45 Coogee Street was searched and the appellant then taken away by other detectives.
In cross‑examination, Detective Calzada was asked whether he had a couple of hours during which the appellant was in his custody and during which time he organised the search warrant. He answered only that "we had some time", without agreeing to any specific period.
Mr Illingworth's testimony was that, in the late afternoon of 4 February 2002, he was walking in his front garden and discovered a small package in the garden. He took the package inside and his wife telephoned the police. Somebody then telephoned back to say that a police officer would be coming around. It took three‑quarters of an hour to an hour before that police officer arrived. It was Detective Calzada.
Sarah Lynne Marshall, the daughter of the appellant, testified that she had been at work during the day of 4 February 2002 and probably arrived home at about 6 pm. When she did so, she saw her father in the house, handcuffed to the kitchen table. Police were searching the house and the yard.
Detective Senior Constable Van Der Sluys testified that she went to 45 Coogee Street, Mount Hawthorn, at about 5 pm on 4 February 2002. At first, she thought that Detective Calzada was with her, but she later realised that this was not so and he had arrived later. She did recall Detective Calzada at the back of the house and she thought he had been involved in the execution of the search warrant. Initially, she had no recollection of Detective Calzada coming in with a package.
In cross‑examination, her recollection of events improved. She recalled that it was about 5 pm when she went to 45 Coogee Street and she was in company with Detective Royce. Whilst she and Detective Royce were standing in the backyard, Detective Calzada came through the back gate and said that he had been given a package by the neighbours. She guessed that it was 20 or 30 minutes after she had arrived at 45 Coogee Street before she saw him.
From this evidence, it can be concluded that Detective Calzada must have held the appellant at the side of the roadway at 45 Coogee Street at some unknown time after 3.30 pm until a police van appeared. No time was given as to when that van arrived. At approximately 6 pm, the appellant was back at 45 Coogee Street handcuffed to the table and the police were then searching the house and property. Detective Calzada was not there. In the late afternoon, the package was found and it took three‑quarters of an hour to an hour until Detective Calzada arrived. This must have been some time after 6 pm, because, by the time Detective Calzada returned to the scene, the search of the house had been completed. According to my calculations, anything up to three hours must have elapsed between the time the detective last held the appellant and the time he handled the package. Some hours, perhaps "several", had elapsed between the time Detective Calzada held the appellant and the time he collected the package. In the meantime, he had been attending to police duties at the detectives' office and had driven back to Coogee Street. The likelihood of secondary transference of the appellant's DNA onto the package seems remote.
The case against the appellant was circumstantial, but it included the fact that he had been spotted by a police officer passing something to a person in another vehicle and had then sped away from the scene to his residence where he ran around the side of the house before being apprehended. A parcel containing heroin was found in the garden of the neighbouring house in a position proximate to where that apprehension took place. The appellant's DNA profile, coming from a mixed DNA profile separated into major and minor components, was found on the package. It was only the major component of DNA profile which could be recorded.
In my view, the totality of the evidence was such that the testimony of Quinlan, with all of the shortcomings I have mentioned, could not have occasioned a reasonable jury a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the appellant. I do not consider that any jury could regard Quinlan in a different light from that which I have painted. His testimony lacked cogency and plausibility. He failed to identify the package which he claimed he had thrown over the fence. He was unable to account for the appellant's DNA being found on the package which was located in the neighbouring garden, even if that was the package which Quinlan claims he had thrown over the fence. If anyone's DNA was likely to be on it, one would have expected it to have been Quinlan's. In short, Quinlan's evidence was far too convenient for the appellant, and, in my view, a jury would see it that way. It simply fails the test of cogency and plausibility which the law requires.
In these circumstances, I do not consider that ground 3 of the grounds of appeal can succeed and I would dismiss that ground.
Appeal against sentence
The appeal against sentence is based on two grounds, but which, in effect, were argued as one. That ground is that the sentence of 18 months imprisonment made cumulative upon the sentence of 4 years' imprisonment imposed on the appellant on 3 March 2006 offends the totality principle and constitutes an offence disproportionate to the gravity of the appellant's offending behaviour. Although the second ground includes the contention that the overall sentence is excessive having regard "to the small quantities of drugs and sentencing patterns in comparable cases", no attempt was made to put before the Court any table of comparable cases where an appellant had been convicted of two separate and independent offences such as occurred in this case.
When sentencing the appellant, the learned trial Judge pointed out that the offences committed by the appellant were entirely separate, one in 2002 and the other in 2004. This being so, concurrency would not normally be appropriate. His Honour pointed out that totality was the issue and said:
"I really have to deal with you for the offence for which you were tried before me and to determine an appropriate sentence for that. Standing alone, I would have thought that it would probably call for a sentence of two years or thereabouts.
Given the sentence that you are already serving my view is that this sentence should be regarded as a cumulative one. I make allowance for the totality principle, not by making the order partly cumulative and partly concurrent but by imposing a cumulative term on your present term in a period of 18 months, so you are to serve 18 months cumulative on your present term in respect of the matter for which I deal with you. I make it a term which will be itself eligible for parole."
The learned trial Judge was correct to take the view that the two offences of which the appellant had been convicted required separate consideration and cumulative terms. This was conceded by counsel for the appellant. The question is whether the sentence of 18 months cumulative upon the 4 years previously imposed by Williams DCJ offends the totality principle.
That principle has been discussed in a number of cases. Probably the leading authority is Mill v The Queen (1988) 166 CLR 59, at 62 ‑ 63. The Court stated that the totality principle is a recognised principle of sentencing formulated to assist a Court when sentencing an offender for a number of offences. The Court approved the totality principle as expressed in the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia in the following terms, at 63:
"The totality principle has been recognized in Australia. In Reg v Knight (1981) 26 SASR 573 at 576, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia (Walters, Zelling and Williams JJ) said, in a joint judgment:
"it seems to us that when regard is had to the totality of the sentences which the applicant is required to undergo, it cannot be said that in all the circumstances of the case, the imposition of a cumulative sentence was incommensurate with the gravity of the whole of his proven criminal conduct or with his due deserts. To use the language of Lord Parker LCJ in Reg v Faulkner (1972) 56 Cr App R 594 at 596, 'at the end of the day, as one always must, one looks at the totality and asks whether it was too much'."
In this Court, a leading authority on the topic is Jarvis v The Queen (1993) 20 WAR 201 where Ipp J, at 206 ‑ 207, expressed the principle in the following way:
" ... in taking a 'last look' at the total imprisonment imposed, the court will continue to apply the principle that the sentence should be proportionate to the degree of criminality involved. That principle is, after all, basic to the law of sentencing: see Wicks v The Queen (1989) 3 WAR 372 at 379‑380. The crushing effect of a term of imprisonment is merely one of the mitigating factors that is to be taken into account when determining whether a particular term of imprisonment is proportionate to the criminality evinced.
While the subjective effect of a cumulative sentence upon a particular individual is plainly relevant, it cannot be regarded as of paramount importance. The difficulty expressed in Vaitos (at 301) by O'Bryan J with the concept that a richly deserved sentence should be reduced because the offender may feel crushed by it aptly illustrates its limitations as a mitigatory force.
The overriding principle is accordingly that the aggregate sentence (even when punishment is being imposed for multiple offences) should fairly and justly reflect the total criminality of the offender's conduct: see Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465; Evangelista v The Queen; R v Glenister [1980] 2 NSWLR 597 at 612; Lade v Mamarika (1986) 83 FLR 312."
The question is whether the effect of a cumulative sentence of 18 months imposed by the learned trial Judge in the present case constituted "the total criminality of the offender's conduct", or whether it was excessive and really had a crushing effect upon him. In all the circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the effective sentence of 5 years 6 months, which resulted from the cumulative term of 18 months imposed by the learned trial Judge in this case, constituted a proper reflection of the totality of the appellant's criminal conduct.
It is not appropriate to consider what period of time will be served before eligibility for parole. This was made clear in Swain (1989) 41 A Crim R 214, per Malcolm CJ (with whom Brinsden J agreed), at 216.
Counsel for the appellant relied on Featherstone v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 269, a case in which the sentencing Judge erroneously thought that, in sentencing two offenders to the same sentences, each would serve the same amount of time in custody before being released on parole. Steytler P (with whom McLure and Buss JJA agreed) said, at [24] ‑ [25]:
"Because the sentence imposed upon Robinson was to be served cumulatively upon that already being served by him, the length of the total sentence imposed was such that he would be eligible only to serve the last two years of the combined sentence on parole, being the period of parole for which he was already eligible under his existing sentence of imprisonment: s 93(1)(b) and s 94 of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA). Consequently, the effect of the sentence imposed by the sentencing Judge on Robinson was to extend the period that he would spend in prison by the full period of 2 years (including the 33 days already spent in custody in respect of the assault). This led the State, at the hearing of the appeal, to concede that the appeal should be allowed upon the basis that the sentencing Judge's evident intention had not been carried into effect with the consequence that the total sentence imposed upon Robinson infringed the totality principle (as to which see Postiglione v The Queen (1997) 189 CLR 295; Jarvis v The Queen (1993) 20 WAR 201).
It seemed to me that that concession was rightly made. ... "
This case does not translate to the present case. What the Court was saying in Featherstone v The State of Western Australia (supra) was that the Judge had sought to make parity between two offenders, but had erroneously thought that they would each serve the same period of time when, by reason of an earlier sentence imposed upon one of the offenders, that was not the case. This does not mean that, generally speaking, the question when a person will be released on parole can be taken into account by a sentencing Judge. To the contrary, sentences are to be imposed without regard to the length of time to be served in custody pending eligibility for parole (Swain (supra)).
The argument in the present case was really no more than an argument that, because the 18‑month term imposed by the learned sentencing Judge was cumulative upon the 4 years previously imposed by Williams DCJ, the resultant sentence was excessive because the severity of the term of imprisonment increased exponentially as it increased in length. This principle is recognised in Jarvis v The Queen by Ipp J at 207 and has since been further approved in Herbert v The Queen [2003] WASCA 61; (2003) 27 WAR 330.
Recognising that the severity of the term of imprisonment imposed upon the appellant did increase exponentially as it increased in length, the fact remains that the learned trial Judge in the present case specifically took into account the totality principle, and actually reduced the sentence he would otherwise have imposed by some 6 months to account for that fact.
Counsel for the appellant conceded that a cumulative sentence was inevitable, but argued that it should have been partly concurrent and partly cumulative, so that a period of 9 to 12 months was all that would be served in addition to the 4 years (assuming that that sentence stood).
In my view, to suggest that the sentence was of the order of 6 to 9 months too high is a ground of appeal that has no merit. It does not demonstrate the overall sentence to be manifestly excessive, nor does it suggest that the totality principle is not properly taken into account. It simply argues with the actual length of the sentence imposed, as to which I would repeat the reference that I have previous made to Lowndes v The Queen (supra). I would dismiss the appeal against sentence.
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