SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Magistrates Appeals: Criminal)
HART v POLICE
[2007] SASC 430
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Gray
7 December 2007
CRIMINAL LAW - JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - JUDGMENT AND PUNISHMENT - SENTENCE - FACTORS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT - MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS - TIME SPENT IN CUSTODY
CRIMINAL LAW - JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - JUDGMENT AND PUNISHMENT - SENTENCE - FACTORS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT - MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS - OFFENCE COMMITTED WHILE ON BAIL OR PROBATION AND EFFECT OF BREACH OF PROBATION
Appeal against sentence – appellant convicted of driving while disqualified – at time of the offending appellant on parole for various offences including driving related offences for which imprisonment of two years and ten months, with non-parole period of nine months had been imposed – appellant pleaded guilty to driving at dangerous speed and manner, failing to comply with request to stop his vehicle, driving with excess blood alcohol – Magistrate sentenced appellant to four months imprisonment for the offence of driving under disqualification – appellant’s parole cancelled – Magistrate ordered pursuant to s 75 of the Correctional Services Act 1982 (SA), appellant was to serve the balance of earlier sentence – total term of imprisonment to be served by the appellant was two years, two months and 29 days with non-parole period of 12 months – whether sentence for driving while disqualified to be cumulative on the unexpired portion of appellant’s existing non-parole period - whether Magistrate erred in approach to sentencing – whether Magistrate erred in not suspending sentence – whether sentence for offence of driving under disqualification manifestly excessive – whether Magistrate should have taken into account appellant’s time in custody – whether Magistrate erred in considering manner of appellant’s driving an aggravating factor – double jeopardy - whether other authorities of assistance in arriving at appropriate sentence – whether Magistrate erred in failing to give regard to factors in s 10 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) – whether Magistrate’s reasons inadequate.
Held: Appeal allowed, appellant re-sentenced: Sentence imposed by Magistrate with respect to the offence of driving while disqualified set aside – head sentence of 12 weeks reduced to seven days on account of appellant’s guilty plea, contrition and time already spent in custody – other mitigating features present - circumstances of offending do not require suspension - Magistrate’s consideration of appellant’s manner of driving as an aggravating factor lead to error - Magistrate’s reasons brief but adequate – appropriate sentence to be determined by facts and circumstances of each case – term of imprisonment of seven days to be cumulative on the unexpired portion of appellant’s existing non-parole period of one year, ten months and 29 days – total term of imprisonment of one year, 11 months and five days to have commenced on date of sentencing by Magistrate – good prospects for rehabilitation and unusual circumstances warrant shorter non-parole period of six months.
Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA) s 91; Correctional Services Act
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- Case
- [2007] SASC 430
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court identified several legal issues, including whether the sentence for driving while disqualified should be cumulative on the unexpired portion of the appellant's existing non-parole period, whether the magistrate erred in their sentencing approach, and whether the sentence was manifestly excessive. The court also examined whether the magistrate adequately considered the appellant's time in custody and other relevant factors, as well as the double jeopardy principle in sentencing. The reasoning of the court focused on the individual circumstances of the case, the inappropriate consideration of the appellant's driving manner, and the need to account for the time already spent in custody.
The court allowed the appeal, set aside the sentence imposed by the magistrate, and re-sentenced the appellant. The re-sentenced term of imprisonment was reduced to seven days, taking into account the appellant's guilty plea, contrition, and time already spent in custody. The court also considered the mitigating factors present and the appellant's prospects for rehabilitation. The total term of imprisonment was fixed at one year, eleven months, and five days, with a non-parole period of six months. This decision acknowledged the unusual circumstances of the case and the appellant's potential for rehabilitation.
The final orders of the court were that the sentence imposed by the magistrate for the offence of driving while disqualified was set aside, and the appellant was re-sentenced to a term of imprisonment of seven days. This term was to be cumulative on the unexpired portion of his existing non-parole period. The total term of imprisonment was set at one year, eleven months, and five days, with a non-parole period of six months. The appellant would be eligible for parole on 12 March 2008.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The sentence imposed by the Magistrate will need to be set aside, and the appellant re-sentenced in accordance with the statutory requirements. There will be a need to bring into account the time that the appellant has spent in custody, in accordance with the authorities. An Irrelevant Consideration The appellant submitted that the Magistrate took into account an irrelevant consideration when he concluded: “Your driving whilst disqualified is aggravated by the manner in which you drove”. The appellant contended that the speed at, and manner in which he drove was not an aggravating factor. That conduct was the subject of a separate charge.[4] In the present case the appellant had been charged with, pleaded guilty to, and separately sentenced for the offence of driving at a speed and in a manner dangerous to the public. He should not be punished twice for the same conduct.[4] See Barnes v Police [2006] SASC 295 at [18]-[20]; citing Police v Maxwell (1998) 102 A Crim R 374 and Long v Police (1998) 72 SASR 515. The Crown accepted that the Magistrate should not have treated the speed at, and the manner in which the appellant drove as an aggravating factor of the offence of driving while disqualified. The speed and manner of driving, itself the subject of another charge, was not relevant to sentencing for the offence of driving while disqualified.[5][5] Maxwell v Police (1998) 102 A Crim R 374 at 379. It is probable that this incorrect approach to sentencing led the Magistrate to impose a heavier sentence than would otherwise have been appropriate. For this further reason it will be necessary to set aside the sentence imposed on this count and re-sentence the appellant. Three further complaints were advanced on the appeal, and it is convenient to provide my brief reasons for their rejection.Current Sentencing Practice The appellant referred to authorities where lower sentences were imposed for driving while under a disqualification. It was said that these other authorities demonstrated that the sentence imposed in the present case was manifestly excessive. This submission should be rejected. These other authorities are of little assistance, as each turn on their own facts. For this reason, this Court has emphasised that comparing a particular sentence with past cases will generally be of little value and assistance in allowing a court to arrive at an appropriate sentence. In O’Donnell,[6] Hogarth, Zelling and Wells JJ observed:This is the position in practically every case where this type of argument is put forward, that the facts of the cases cited are different, the circumstances in which the offence was committed are different, the offender is different, and the matters which have to be taken into consideration by the Judge are different. It is but rarely that lists of previous sentences, with short notes of the facts appended, are of use to a Court of Criminal Appeal.[6] R v O’Donnell (1974) 7 SASR 114 at 115; cited with approval by Mullighan J in R v Hitchens (1995) 184 LSJS 337.