SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Magistrates Appeals: Criminal)
BARNES v POLICE
[2006] SASC 295
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Gray
28 September 2006
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL AND INQUIRY AFTER CONVICTION - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE - OTHER MATTERS
Appeal against decision of magistrate not to exercise discretion to suspend sentence of imprisonment imposed in respect of charge of drive whilst disqualified - appeal on grounds that when sentencing, magistrate had had regard to two irrelevant considerations - Held - appeal allowed - sentence imposed by magistrate set aside - appellant re-sentenced to six weeks' imprisonment suspended upon his entry into bond to be of good behaviour for two years.
Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA) s 91, referred to.
Police v Maxwell (1998) 102 ACrimR 374; Crafter v Police [2001] SASC 316; Duncan v R (1983) 47 ALR 746 at 749; R v Van Der Horst [2006] SASC 243, considered.
BARNES v POLICE
[2006] SASC 295GRAY J:
This is an appeal against a sentence imposed by a Magistrate for the offence of driving whilst disqualified contrary to section 91 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA). This offence occurred on 10 August 2004.
Background
On 5 July 2006, the appellant, Todd Trevor Barnes, pleaded guilty to the offences of theft, driving whilst disqualified, driving with excess blood alcohol and failing to wear a seat belt properly adjusted and fastened. On 31 July 2006, the appellant was sentenced in respect of all of the offending.
This appeal is concerned only with the charge of driving whilst disqualified and the sentence imposed in respect of that charge.
On 10 August 2004 at approximately 6.20 pm, the appellant was apprehended whilst driving on Main South Road at Darlington. He was not wearing a seat belt. His driver’s licence had been disqualified for the period 24 October 2001 to 23 January 2006. The appellant submitted to a breath analysis test for which a result of 0.102 grams in a hundred millilitres of blood was obtained. The appellant was aware that he was disqualified from driving and had no reason for not wearing his seat belt.
The magistrate summarised the submissions put by counsel for the appellant as to the circumstances leading to the offending:
... It was put to me that you had been drinking heavily, that you had an argument with your partner, that you then went to the local shops where you were assaulted. You returned home. You were again drinking. You were on ADHD medication at the time. You were not thinking straight and you therefore drove your vehicle. In relation to the theft charge, it was said that you had some money but you were on limited income hence the reason why you stole the items of food.
The history of this matter is intertwined with another charge of driving whilst disqualified. On 25 July 2004, 17 days prior to the commission of the drive disqualified…
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues in this case revolve around the appellant's argument that the magistrate erred in the exercise of her sentencing discretion by considering two irrelevant factors. First, the appellant contends that the magistrate inappropriately identified certain features of the offence as aggravating circumstances. Second, the appellant claims that the magistrate incorrectly took into account the approach of the magistrate who dealt with an earlier charge of driving while disqualified, thus failing to properly discharge her role as the sentencing magistrate for the present offence. The court had to determine whether the magistrate's consideration of these factors constituted an error in the exercise of her sentencing discretion.
The court found that the appellant's appeal was well-founded. The magistrate's consideration of certain features of the offence as aggravating circumstances was deemed inappropriate, as such circumstances are not typically considered aggravating factors in cases of driving while disqualified. Furthermore, the magistrate's reliance on the approach taken by the sentencing magistrate in the earlier charge was found to be an error in the exercise of her discretion. As a result, the sentence imposed by the magistrate was set aside, and the appellant was sentenced to six weeks' imprisonment, suspended upon his entry into a supervised bond to be of good behaviour for two years. In all other respects, the orders of the magistrate remained unchanged.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Counsel for the appellant submitted that the magistrate erred in the exercise of her sentencing discretion by taking into account two irrelevant considerations. First, the magistrate, it was said, identified certain features of the offending that she inappropriately characterised as aggravating circumstances. Second, the magistrate had regard, incorrectly, to the approach taken by the magistrate who dealt with the 25 July 2004 driving whilst disqualified charge, and, in so doing, failed to properly discharge her role as the sentencing magistrate with respect to the present offending.Consideration of aggravating features Counsel for the appellant drew the Court’s attention to the following passage of the magistrate’s sentencing remarks, which, counsel contended, indicated error in the magistrate’s reasoning:The aggravating features of the driving disqualified charge now before me, as I have said, are that you had been apprehended 16 days before driving whilst disqualified and yet you again drove knowing about the seriousness of that offence having previously been imprisoned in relation to a similar offence. …The aggravating feature of the offending before me is that you have again driven a car at a time when you knew you were disqualified, whilst again being under the influence of alcohol. In Police v Maxwell,[1] Bleby J cast doubt upon whether such circumstances as those identified by the magistrate can be viewed as aggravating features of the offence of driving whilst disqualified. Bleby J observed:[2]Here the offence is driving whilst disqualified. All that is required is an act of driving. The circumstances of aggravation or otherwise will relate to the circumstances in which the defendant came to be driving, whether the act of driving was trifling or substantial, and the reasons and the purpose for which the defendant was driving. Above all, it will depend on whether the offence can be said to be contumacious, in the sense discussed by Mullighan J in Police v Cadd (1997) 69 SASR 150 at 179. That is, whether the defendant was driving with an attitude of total disregard of a disqualification in disobedience to the authority which imposed the suspension. …I have already said that this offence will seldom be aggravated by the manner of driving, and that that will normally be the subject of the separate penalty. What aggravates this type of offence is the reason for, and circumstances of the driving itself, and the nature and extent of the disregard of the law, given that the disqualification itself will invariably have been imposed by a court or competent statutory authority because of some other breaches of the law. Unlike many other offences, the offender’s previous record may well indicate a continuing attitude of disobedience to the law which is directly relevant in assessing the gravity of the offence in question. [1] Police v Maxwell (1998) 102 ACrimR 374.[2] Police v Maxwell (1998) 102 ACrimR 374 at 378-379. In Crafter v Police,[3] Mullighan J remarked to similar effect:[4]The learned Magistrate obviously took a very serious view of the manner of driving of the appellant. It is fair to say that he behaved as a lout and he is fortunate that he was not charged with a more serious offence. However, as he must be separately punished for the offence of damaging a road, this conduct should not be regarded as a matter of aggravation when considering the sentence for driving disqualified. He is not to be punished twice for the same conduct: Long v Police (1998) 72 SASR 515.[3] Crafter v Police [2001] SASC 316.[4] Crafter v Police [2001] SASC 316 at [15].