Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
There are four grounds of appeal. They read as follows:"1.Non-disclosure by the prosecution of material evidence, exculpatory of the Appellant, resulted in a miscarriage of justice.Particulars of Undisclosed Evidence1.1On the afternoon of Friday 6 September 2002 the Appellant's Toyota motor vehicle was examined by Mr S E Egan ("Egan"), a scientist from the Path Centre in Perth. He found no visible signs of blood.1.2Egan then conducted Kastle Meyer presumptive blood tests over the cargo area of the rear of the Toyota. The tests were negative. No traces of blood were found.1.3Egan's notes and drawings made on 6 September 2002 and his interim report dated 10 September 2002 concerning the tests carried out by him on 6 September 2002 and the negative results, were not disclosed to the Appellant or his legal representatives.2.Evidence obtained since the trial, particulars of which appear below, in conjunction with the undisclosed evidence particularised above, is capable of raising a reasonable doubt as to whether there was any of the deceased's blood in the Appellant's Toyota, consistent with it having been used to carry her body, rendering the verdict unsafe or unsatisfactory.Particulars of Fresh Evidence2.1A report of Professor Barry Boettcher ("Boettcher") dated 7 November 2005 as follows:(a)The results of DNA tests on swabs from:• the back of the rear seat;•the floor of the boot and the side panel; and•the inside of the tailgate;of the Appellant's Toyota 'showed little evidence of any possible blood in these areas of the vehicle. No blood was demonstrated in these areas' (para 1.1.4 report).(b)The only evidence of DNA obtained from swabs in the area in the back of the vehicle produced a profile that excluded the DNA as being that of the deceased, and was consistent with being the Appellant's (para 1.1.4 report).(c)A positive result to luminol examination is not necessarily a positive identification of blood being present in those areas (para 2 report).(d)There are no records of observable blood stains being seen in the back seat area (para 2 report).(e)It is not certain that the DNA came from the deceased's blood. 'It could have come from, for example, skin cells that were in the area that was swabbed' (para 2 report).(f)Tests undertaken in the relevant part of the Appellant's Toyota showed only the possibility of blood, but 'The presence of blood in the area was not definitely established' (para 2 report).(g)Testing of swabs taken from these areas produced identifiable DNA from only one area and this was not the deceased's but was consistent with coming from the Appellant (para 2 report) and•there were no appreciable indications of blood in this specific area of the vehicle (para 2 report);•the only DNA identifiable in swabs taken from this specific area was not from the deceased but was consistent with coming from the Appellant (para 2 report).2.2A further report of Boettcher dated 10 November 2005 as follows:(a)The likelihood of obtaining important DNA profile results from either the set of swabs taken by Egan on 6 September 2002 or Police Officer Peter William Malins ('Malins') would not have been known to the prosecution until testing was complete (p.2 pt C).(b)The swabs taken by Egan comprised Batch 2. The swabs taken by Malins (PM 6‑10), together with samples of the deceased's DNA comprised Batch 3. The Incoming Exhibits Log shows that Batch 3 was received by Egan on 7 September 2002 (p.1 pt E).(c)The swabs collected by Malins together with samples of the deceased's DNA, were tested before the swabs taken by Egan on Friday 6 September 2002 (p.2 pt C).(d)Batch 2 was received by Egan on 7 September 2002. It was not submitted for testing until 9 September 2002, whereas the items that comprised Batch 3 (also received on 7 September 2002) were submitted for testing two days before, on 7 September 2002 (p.2 pt A).3.The conduct of the Appellant's defence by his counsel was such that the Appellant did not have a fair trial, and there was a miscarriage of justice.Particulars[J] as a 'person of interest'3.1The Appellant's counsel failed to request or to view a videotaped interview by the police of … [J] conducted on 4 September 2002, although the Appellant had told his counsel that his wife (the deceased) had been having an affair with … [J], and the Appellant had requested his counsel to view the videotaped interview, which would have been made available by the prosecution.3.2During the videotaped interview, … [J] initially told the police that his relationship with the deceased was simply that of financial adviser and client, whom he saw about twice a year, which was substantially what he stated in his witness statement, provided to the defence as part of the prosecution brief.3.3However, in the videotaped interview … [J] ultimately admitted that he had been having sexual relations with the deceased over a number of years, and that he had been visiting her at her unit 'once or twice a month'.3.4Several weeks before the trial, which began on Monday 15 March 2004, the Appellant's counsel was provided by the prosecution with a Path Centre report dated 2 February 2004 ('the Path Centre report') containing an analysis of semen and other fluid stains found on the doona cover on the bed in the unit of the deceased. The semen matched the DNA of … [J], and the other fluid stains indicated that sexual intercourse had occurred on the doona.3.5On the second day of the trial, the author of the Path Centre report, Dr. Bogdanovicius [sic], was called as a prosecution witness. His examination in chief did not refer to the analysis of the semen and other fluid stains in the Path Centre report. When the Appellant's counsel asked the Appellant whether he wished her to cross‑examine Dr Bogdanovicius [sic], to elicit evidence that … [J's] semen was on the doona cover, and that sexual intercourse had occurred, the Appellant said that he wanted her to do so.3.6When the Appellant's counsel, in accordance with his instruction, began to cross‑examine Dr Bogdanovicius [sic] about the Path Centre report, prosecuting counsel said, in the absence of the jury, that if the purpose of this line of questioning was in order to establish that 'a third party' … [J] was 'a person of interest' (meaning a possible suspect) … [J] would be called by the prosecution to give evidence. The Appellant's counsel was granted a brief adjournment to consider the matter.3.7During the short adjournment, the Appellant's counsel did not confer with him on the matter, or seek his instructions, but told him that she was not going to continue with that line of questioning because the trial judge had told her that she would rule against her doing so.3.8The trial judge had not said that she would rule against that line of questioning, but when the trial resumed the Appellant's counsel did not continue with it.3.9The prosecution therefore did not call … [J]. The result was that defence counsel abandoned the forensic opportunity to establish, through cross examination of Dr. Bogdanovicius [sic] and … [J], that … [J] was a recent visitor to the deceased's unit, and may have been responsible for her death.Election not to call evidence3.10On Friday 12 September 2004, the Appellant's counsel had a brief (less than half an hour) discussion with him about the forthcoming trial. The Appellant expected to give evidence in his defence and there was no suggestion that he should not. He had provided his legal representatives with extensive notes for that purpose.3.11On the morning of the first day of his trial, in the courtroom and before the prosecution case had started, the Appellant's counsel said to him words to the effect 'I don't want you to give evidence. That way, I can address the jury last'. She then produced, and asked him to sign (which he did) a typed 1 page document stating (inter alia): 'Having considered the advice given to me, I elect not to give evidence'.3.12There had been no discussion between the Appellant and his counsel before she produced the typed page for his signature, and no advice was given to him on the matter, other than that his counsel would have the right to address last. The Appellant's agreement not to give evidence was uninformed. Properly advised, he would have given evidence, and called witnesses on his behalf.Failure to properly prepare defence3.13The Appellant's counsel failed to proof witnesses who could give evidence capable of undermining the prosecution case and who had provided statements that formed part of the prosecution brief. These included witnesses who lived very close to the deceased and did not at the relevant time hear any gun shot. These witnesses were not called at trial by the prosecution. Further, those witnesses who were with the Appellant at the Lone Ranger Shooting Club earlier in the evening of Monday 2 September 2002 [sic].3.14As a result of her failure to proof these witnesses, the Appellant's counsel lost the opportunity to call them as witnesses for the defence before the Primary Court.4.The learned trial judge misdirected the jury on significant factual issues, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.Particulars4.1Her Honour told the jury that it was not in dispute that Anne Rinaldi was killed with a rifle (t/s 173, 179). In fact, there was no evidence that this was so. No gunshot residue was found in the deceased's unit, despite forensic testing. Although a spent cartridge was found by police on the floor of the unit, but [sic] there was no evidence of how or when it had got there.4.2Her Honour referred (t/s 174) to evidence of Anne Rinaldi's blood, when the evidence was that it was DNA and cellular material, and not necessarily blood."