Mallett and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy
[2018] AATA 3739
•4 October 2018
Mallett and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy [2018] AATA 3739 (4 October 2018)
Division:TAXATION & COMMERCIAL DIVISION
File Number: 2017/6704
Re:Le Neve Ann Mallett
APPLICANT
AndInspector-General in Bankruptcy
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Deputy President R I Hanger QC
Date:4 October 2018
Place:Brisbane
The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.
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Deputy President R I Hanger QC
CATCHWORDS
BANKRUPTCY – objection to discharge – where bankruptcy trustee filed a notice to objection to the Applicant’s discharge from bankruptcy – where the Applicant put money in a trust account prior to becoming a bankrupt – where most of the trust money had been spent – whether the Applicant made a transfer that was void against the trustee because it was made to defeat creditors – whether the Applicant failed to adequately explain the purpose for which money was spent – whether the Applicant failed to comply with a trustee’s request for written information about her property – decision under review affirmed
LEGISLATION
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act1975 (Cth), s 25
Bankruptcy Act1966 (Cth), ss 120, 121, 122, 139ZQ, 149, 149B, 149C, 149D, 149H, 149N, 149Q
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), s 14ZZR
CASES
Phillips and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy (2012) 58 AAR 452; 131 ALD 564; [2012] AATA 788
Re Melbourne and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1988) 14 ALD 415
Van Reesema v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1983) 50 ALR 253
Re Hall (1994) 14 ACSR 488
Trustees of the Property of Cummins (A Bankrupt) v Cummins (2006) 227 CLR 278
BQRW v Commissioner of Taxation (2014) 63 AAR 503; [2014] AATA 410
Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Alvaro (1996) 66 FCR 372
Woods v Ulusoylu (2017) 319 FLR 413
Re Marks and Secretary, Department of Defence (1987) 11 ALD 456
Delahunty v Inspector-General in Bankruptcy [2006] AATA 610
SECONDARY MATERIALS
The Honourable Bruce McPherson, “Avoiding Transactions Insolvency” (a paper presented at a conference on corporate insolvency law at Bond University 6-7 April 1991)
REASONS FOR DECISION
Deputy President R I Hanger QC
4 October 2018
BACKGROUND
Dr Mallett became bankrupt on 17 June 2014 and in the normal course of events would have been discharged from bankruptcy on 17 June 2017. However, because of certain matters which will be described hereunder, her bankruptcy may continue for another five years. She seeks to avoid that.
This application is made pursuant to section 149Q(a) of the Bankruptcy Act1966 (Cth) (“the Act”) and section 25(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act1975 (Cth) for a review of the decision made by the Inspector-General in Bankruptcy on a review of the decision of a trustee in bankruptcy to file a notice of objection to Dr Mallett’s discharge from bankruptcy.
Dr Mallett owned shares in ABC Learning Centres Ltd. However, those shares were subject to margin loan facilities, entered into with a number of margin lenders. Between February and March 2008, margin calls were made by the margin lenders on the shares. She could not meet them and in consequence of that her shares were sold by the lenders.
In October 2008 Dr Mallett commenced Supreme Court proceedings against her then-husband Mr Groves and the margin lenders. The claim was made in relation to the margin calls; she claimed she did not grant the security for the margin loans. Dr Mallett therefore argued that Mr Groves and the lenders did not have the right to sell the shares or receive the money from the sales.
The share sale gave rise to an unfunded capital gains tax liability. The ATO subsequently issued Dr Mallett an income tax assessment for $6.5 million in September 2009. Between when the tax assessment was issued in September 2009 and April 2012, extensive negotiations took place between Dr Mallett and the ATO in relation to this tax liability. The ATO was kept well informed of the Supreme Court proceedings. Proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia relating to the tax liability were put on hold until the decision in the Supreme Court had been handed down.
Dr Mallett sought, and in January 2010 received, legal advice about the best way to protect her assets. The ostensible reason for the protection she sought was to protect the assets from her husband, Mr Groves. She was going through a particularly bitter divorce at the time. The advice provided to her by her solicitors Cooper Grace Ward Lawyers was that she should establish a discretionary family trust into which the assets could be transferred. Accordingly, she established the L G Family Trust in April 2010 and became the sole Director of the trustee company. In April 2010 she also exercised a deed of gift which gifted $3.1 million to the trust. Between September and November 2010, she transferred money from term deposits into an account owned by the family trust. She retained full control of the funds between 2010 and 2014.
The Supreme Court proceedings initiated by Dr Mallett were dismissed in October 2013.
Dr Mallett became bankrupt on her own petition on 17 June 2014 and was therefore due to be discharged automatically pursuant to section 149(4) of the Act on 17 June 2017. By the time she became bankrupt, there was only $14,558.39 left in the accounts held by the trust. Evidence before me indicated that she had paid $400,000 to the ATO; $81,000 approximately for accounting expenses; $41,000 approximately for school fees; $29,000 for children’s general expenses; and legal fees amounting to approximately $2.4 million dollars. On 16 June 2017 her trustee in bankruptcy, Mr Clout, lodged a notice of objection to her discharge with the official receiver pursuant to section 149B of the Act.
The effect of the notice of objection was to extend Dr Mallett’s bankruptcy for a further period of five years to 18 June 2022.
The notice contained 3 grounds of objection under section 149D(1) of the Act:
Ground 1: Section 149D(1)(ab) (special ground) – a transfer was void against the trustee because of section 121 of the Act;
Ground 2: Section 149D(1)(g)(i) (special ground) at any time during the period of 5 years immediately before the commencement of the bankruptcy, or during the period of bankruptcy, the bankrupt spent money but failed to adequately explain to the trustee the purpose for which the money was spent; and
Ground 3: Section 149D(1)(d) (special ground) – the bankrupt, when requested in writing by the trustee to provide written information about the bankrupt’s property, income or expected income failed to comply with the request.
On 15 August 2017, Dr Mallett lodged a request for a review of the notice of objection with the Inspector-General pursuant to section 149K of the Act. On 9 October 2017, she was sent the Inspector-General’s response to the request for a review of the notice of objection. The decision cancelled the grounds 2 and 3 but confirmed ground 1. Dr Mallett has applied for a review of that decision to this tribunal.
The jurisdiction of this tribunal is to be found in section 149Q of the Act and the decision being reviewed or re-made is the decision of the Inspector-General, not the decision of the trustee (Phillips and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy (2012) 58 AAR 452; 131 ALD 564; [2012] AATA 788). Therefore, the decision of this tribunal must be made within the parameters of section 149N.
The tribunal must cancel the objection if it is satisfied that for each of the grounds of objection raised by the trustee in bankruptcy, one of the four paragraphs of sub-section 149N(1) applies. The tribunal will still have to engage in this inquiry in respect of each ground of objection despite the fact that the Inspector-General was not satisfied that grounds 2 and 3 were made out (Re Melbourne and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1988) 14 ALD 415).
Each of grounds 1, 2 and 3 are “special grounds” within the meaning of that term as defined in section 149N(1A) of the Act. This modifies the effect of section 149N(1). Thus, where the Tribunal would otherwise have to cancel the objection under section 149N(1), it must not do so if it is satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to support the existence of any of the grounds raised and that Dr Mallett did not have a reasonable excuse for her conduct or failures which constituted the special grounds: paragraphs 149N(1A)(b) and (c).
For the sake of completeness, section 149N provides as follows:
(1) On a review of a decision, if the Inspector-General is satisfied that:
(a) the ground or grounds on which the objection was made was not a ground or were not grounds specified in subsection 149D(1); or
(b) there is insufficient evidence to support the existence of the ground or grounds of objection; or
(c) the reasons given for objecting on the ground or those grounds do not justify the making of the objection; or
(d) a previous objection that was made on that ground or those grounds, or on grounds that included that ground or those grounds, was cancelled;
the Inspector-General must cancel the objection.
(1A) An objection must not be cancelled under subsection (1) if:
(a) the objection specifies at least one special ground; and
(b) there is sufficient evidence to support the existence of at least one special ground specified in the objection; and
(c) the bankrupt fails to establish that the bankrupt had a reasonable excuse for the conduct or failure that constituted the special ground
For this purpose, special ground means a ground specified in paragraphs 149D(1)(ab), (d), (da), (e),(f), (g), (h), (ha), (ia), (k), or (ma).
It is important to note that the focus of the Tribunal’s inquiry must be on the objection, as examined through the lens of section 149N. All three grounds noted above are “special grounds” for the purposes of s 149N. This means that, even if one of the other reasons for cancelling the objection as provided in s 149N(1) exist, the objection cannot be cancelled if there is sufficient evidence to support the existence of that special ground: paragraph 149N(1A)(b). This effectively imposes the minimum threshold before an objection on a special ground can be cancelled of being satisfied that there is insufficient evidence to support the existence of that special ground.
GROUND 1
Discussion in relation to the application of paragraph 149N(1A)(b)
So far as is relevant, paragraph 149N(1A)(b) provides that objection must not be cancelled if “there is sufficient evidence to support the existence of at least one special ground specified in the objection” (my underlining).
Section 149C provides that the notice of objection by the trustee must set out the grounds of the objection and refer to the evidence establishing that ground.
Section 149C(2) provides that a notice of objection is not invalid merely because it does not state the ground or grounds of objection precisely as set out in subsection 149D(1), provided that the ground can reasonably be identified from the terms of the notice.
The notice of objection from the trustee was based on the transfer of the approximately $3.1 million to the trust; but at the time of the bankruptcy approximately $14,558 remained in the trust. Dr Mallett submits that because the smaller number was not specified in the notice of objection, the Inspector-General was obliged to conclude that there was not sufficient evidence to support the ground specified in the notice.
After the hearing, I directed that the parties provide additional written submissions on this point, with particular view to the fact that there were transfers of approximately $42,000 into the trust account and $32,000 out of it in the months leading to Dr Mallett’s bankruptcy. In their written submissions, the parties were united in considering that the incoming and outgoing funds were part of the $3.1 million and its dissipations, mentioned above. In the absence of contrary evidence, I find that this was the case. Consequently, I must find that the $14,558.39 was part of the $3.1 million. The question for present purposes is what this means in the context of the objection.
I have formed the view that the subject of the objection was not the presence of the approximately $14,558 in the trust account. Rather, it was the gift of around $3.1 million from Dr Mallett to the trust. This much is clear from paragraphs 1(h) and 2(b) of the notice, which referred to the transfer of $3.1 million into the trust account. There is no doubt that a right to be discharged from bankruptcy is a right of great value (Van Reesema v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1983) 50 ALR 253), and that a bankrupt is entitled to be fully informed as to the basis on which a notice of objection has been filed (Re Hall (1994) 14 ACSR 488). Only if the trustee shows that he has addressed his mind to the right question should an objection be allowed to stand (Van Reesema per Sheppard J at 267 L23). Ultimately, the bankrupt must be fully informed by the notice of objection as to the basis upon which the objection is filed so that he or she can determine whether to take the matter further.
In the notice of objection to discharge, the trustee set out the history of the establishment of the trust and of the transfer and expenditure of the money in the trust. He further set out the allegation that the transfer of the approximately $3.1 million was void against the trustee in bankruptcy because of the provisions of section 121, which relates to transfers to defeat creditors. Additionally, he set out the amount and dates of the transactions and the amount expended by the trust and how the money was spent. Although he did not engage with the issue of whether the funds would otherwise have formed part of Dr Mallett’s estate, there can be no doubt that the objection related to the transfer of funds to the trust, or that the trustee in bankruptcy thought that transfer constituted a transfer to defeat creditors. Dr Mallett could have had no doubt of the basis on which the application was made to enable her to determine whether to take the matter further.
This issue does not appear to have been raised before the Inspector-General.
I am satisfied that the ground was properly specified in the objection as required by the subsection and that the precise amount of money did not have to be specified.
The main purpose of the transferor
This second submission of Dr Mallett is that the Inspector-General erred in finding that the transferor’s main purpose in making the transfer of approximately $3.1 million to the L G Family Trust was to prevent the transferred property from becoming divisible among the transferor’s creditors pursuant to section 121 of the Act. This is a special ground of objection pursuant to paragraph 149D(1)(ab).
(a)Under section 121, a transfer will be void against the trustee if: The property that was transferred “would probably have become part of the transferor’s estate or would probably have been available to creditors” had it not been transferred; and
(b)The main purpose of the transfer was either “to prevent the transferred property from being divisible among the transferor’s creditors” or “to hinder or delay the process of making property available for division among the transferor’s creditors”.
With respect to paragraph 121(1)(b)(i), it is not sufficient to show that there are conflicting inferences to be drawn from the behaviour of Dr Mallett. The main purpose of the impugned transaction must be to prevent the transferred property from becoming divisible among the transferor’s creditors (Trustees of the Property of Cummins (A Bankrupt) v Cummins (2006) 227 CLR 278 at 292).
No new evidence was called in this hearing. Dr Mallett had sought advice from her solicitors, allegedly to protect her assets from her husband. She only needed that protection if he became a creditor pursuant to an order in her extant divorce proceedings. At the time that she sought advice from her solicitors the divorce proceedings had turned particularly hostile. Her litigation had been proceeding since October 2008 and at about this time her husband was threatening to remove Supreme Court proceedings into the Family Court. Additionally, she feared that her husband would use proceedings in the Family Court to attack both her and her children and to deprive them of the benefit of the funds which she held in her name. She had no other significant asset. She received the solicitor’s advice in January 2010, a few months after receiving an income tax assessment for approximately $6.5 million in September 2009. She had a large debt to the Commissioner of Taxation and feared possible debts to her husband and possible debts in respect of legal proceedings.
The advice she received from her solicitors on 29 January 2010 said, “When considering whether you should own assets in your own name or in a company or trust you should select a structure which… protects the assets as much as possible from the risks of claims by third parties”.
I am satisfied that the main purpose for creating the trust and putting approximately $3.1 million into it was to prevent that property becoming available to her creditors which might at some point include her husband but also at that point did include a significant creditor, being the Commissioner of Taxation.
This finding is fortified by the provisions of section 121(2):
The transferor’s main purpose in making the transfer is taken to be the purpose described in paragraph (1)(b) if it can reasonably be inferred from all the circumstances that, at the time of the transfer, the transferor was, or was about to become, insolvent.
At the time of the transfer of the moneys to the trust, Dr Mallett had an outstanding tax liability of $6.5 million and did not have resources to pay the debt. Although she was challenging the imposition of that tax liability in the Federal Court, section 14ZZR of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) provides that the fact of an ongoing appeal in relation to a taxation decision does not “in the meantime interfere with, or affect, the decision and any tax or other amount may be recovered as if no appeal was pending.”
At the time of the transfer, Dr Mallett was relying on winning her Supreme Court proceedings. Had she been successful in those proceedings, it seems that her tax issues would also have largely resolved. However, as discussed above, she had an outstanding tax liability far in excess of the value of her assets, and which remained payable even though she was appealing it. She was therefore insolvent at the time of the transfer. Thus, pursuant to section 121(2), the requirements of paragraph 121(1)(b)(i) were satisfied as at the time of the transfer.
Would the property transferred to the trust have become part of her estate?
I must now address Dr Mallett’s next submission, which relates to the applicability of paragraph 121(1)(a). If, as is the case here, the requirements of either limb of paragraph 121(1)(b) have been met, paragraph 121(1)(a) provides that the transfer is void if the property also would probably have become part of the transferor’s estate or would probably have been available to creditors if the property had not been transferred.
I have already set out how the $3.1 million was spent by the trust in the period before Dr Mallett became a bankrupt. It paid legal fees, some income tax, school expenses and general living expenses. I am satisfied that the money that the trust spent would have been spent by Dr Mallett in the same way as it was in fact spent whether or not the trust had been created and the money paid into it. Further, its transfers to, among others, Dr Mallett’s lawyers, do not meet the threshold of being a transfer with the main purpose of either preventing the property from becoming divisible among her creditors or to delay the property becoming available for division. Lacking that purpose, those transfers out of the trust account cannot be said to be void. Further, those funds would not have formed part of Dr Mallett’s estate but for their being transferred into the trust account.
While I have found that most of the $3.1 million would have been expended in any event, there remains the amount of $14,558.39 in the trust that remained when Dr Mallett became a bankrupt. There is no evidence before me supporting any contention that those funds would not have been expended. That small amount would have been available to the trustee.
Therefore, I am satisfied within the meaning of paragraph 149N(1A)(b) that there is sufficient evidence to support the existence of at least one special ground specified in the objection.
Did she have a reasonable excuse for her conduct?
I turn then to consider whether Dr Mallett fails to establish that she had a reasonable excuse for the conduct or failure that constituted the special ground pursuant to paragraph 149N(1A)(c); that special ground being the transfer of around $3.1 million into the trust accounts.
While the remaining funds, some $14,558.39, constitute a very small amount of money in the overall scheme of things, in view of the findings that I have already made I can find no reasonable excuse for her conduct.
Leave to deliver further submissions
Some weeks after the hearing in this matter Dr Mallett sought to reopen her case to make a further submission on matters of law. I heard submissions from both parties in relation to that application to reopen and in the interests of justice allowed it. It would not be unfair to the respondent to allow further argument and the justice of the case favoured such leave being granted to Dr Mallett (BQRW and Commissioner of Taxation (2014) 63 AAR 503; [2014] AATA 410).
Paragraph 149D(1)(ab) sets out the grounds on which a trustee may object to a discharge of a bankrupt. One of the grounds of objection is that there has been a transfer that is void against the trustee in bankruptcy because of section 121. Dr Mallett submits that a transaction is not void because of the provisions of section 121 of the Act for the purposes of paragraph 149D(1)(ab), until the trustee calls for delivery or revesting of the property the subject of the impugned transfer or institutes proceedings to recover that property.
In a letter from Dr Mallett’s solicitor dated 3 November 2017, Dr Mallett asserts that on the day prior to the date she would have been discharged automatically, the trustee had at no time asserted that the transfer was void; had not made any demand for the balance funds to be paid to him despite disclosure of the existence of the fund; and had not attempted to examine anyone, or to institute proceedings for the recovery of the property before the transaction becomes void pursuant to the provisions of section 121 about the circumstances of the transaction. In short, it is asserted that the trustee did not take any step at any time to recover the balanced funds. That appears to be correct.
Dr Mallett submits that if a trustee does nothing to enforce his right to elect to avoid a transaction, there could be situations which might continue for years and relating to a small debt which might constitute a ground for objecting to a discharge and that being the case, “void” in the context of section 149D means void in the sense that the trustee has exercised his election to avoid. The submission is that this should be the favoured interpretation because; it accords more closely with the plain words of the Act; it’s the meaning which most closely fits the particular context of the provision; and, it’s the construction which accords most closely with the purpose of the objections regime which is a different regime to the voidable transactions regime.
The submission raises the old question of the meaning of “void” in the context of the Act. Section 121(1) provides that a transfer of property by a person who later becomes a bankrupt to another person is void against the trustee in the transferor’s bankruptcy. As Justice McPherson pointed out in his learned paper “Avoiding Transactions Insolvency” (a paper presented at a conference on corporate insolvency law at Bond University 6-7 April 1991): The use of the word “void” in this context, goes back as far as 1376; the word “void” has always been understood to mean “voidable”; that avoidance in the sense in which it is used requires a positive act or election to avoid without which the transaction does not become void.
Dr Mallett relies upon a statement made in Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Alvaro (1996) 66 FCR 372 at 426:
Although s 121 states that a disposition to which it applies is void, the courts will treat the disposition as effective until impugned in proceedings brought by the trustee in bankruptcy. Thus, where there is a disposition of property to which s 121 of the Act applies, the title which the donee receives is a defeasible one... Until the title is defeased by the trustee in bankruptcy calling for delivery up or revesting of the property to the trustee or by instituting proceedings to establish the trustee’s entitlement to the property, the donee may deal with the property as owner and is not required to account for any profit made.
Their Honours were not however dealing with the question as to whether the provisions of section 121 of the Act had been satisfied. They were dealing with the relief which is available to the Official Trustee. It is important to maintain the distinction between establishing the elements required to satisfy section 121 and the determination of what relief may be available (Woods v Ulusoylu (2017) 319 FLR 413). The decision in Alvaro is not authority for the proposition that a trustee in bankruptcy is entitled to no relief if title in property transferred to defeat creditors has passed to a third party before the trustee elects to “avoid” the transaction.
Drummond J put the matter succinctly:
The Bankruptcy Act provisions [i.e. each of sections 120 to 122 of the act] do not in their terms require, as a further condition of their operation, that the trustee in bankruptcy or the liquidator take action, e.g. by electing to challenge the transaction in question, before it will be avoided. Of course, unless the trustee or liquidator challenges a transfer a property that is within the avoidance sections of that Act, the transfer will, as a matter of practical reality, stand… Only the trustee (or the liquidator) has standing to rely on the statutory provisions. Such transfers are void ‘only against the trustee and not against anyone else’: Re Cummins (188) ----- (Westpac v Bell Group (2012) 44 WAR 1; [2012] WASCA 157 at [2535])
The term “void as against the trustee in bankruptcy” is used in the context of sections 120, 121, 122, 139ZQ and in each case means voidable and as a principle of statutory construction should, if possible, be given the same meaning for the purposes of paragraph 149D(1)(ab). It would be a strange situation if the word “void” used in section 149D referring to section 121 carried a different meaning in that section to the meaning it bears in section 121. There is nothing that compels such a conclusion despite the best efforts on behalf of Dr Mallett. Rather, if “void” means voidable, as appears to be the case, action under section 121 to avoid a transaction is not a condition precedent to a trustee objecting to a bankrupt’s discharge from bankruptcy. All that is necessary is a transaction which satisfies the criteria of section 121 such that a trustee may avoid the transaction.
I reject the submission that a transaction is not void because of the provisions of section 121 of the Act for the purposes of paragraph 149D(1)(ab), until the trustee calls for delivery or revesting of the property the subject of the impugned transfer or institutes proceedings to recover that property.
Conclusion
Because of the findings I have made, that Dr Mallett has no reasonable excuse for the transfer of the sum of $14,558.39, she falls within the provisions of section 149N(1A) and the tribunal must not cancel the objection and must confirm the Inspector-General’s decision as required by section 149(3). I note however that pursuant to section 149H the trustee has the right to cease to object to the discharge.
OTHER MATTERS
Given the decision I have made in ground one it is probably not necessary to deal with grounds 2 and 3, but in the event that there is an appeal in this matter it is desirable that I do so. The trustee’s objections in grounds 2 and 3 were cancelled by the Inspector-General and accepted by both parties in these proceedings. However, in Re Melbourne and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1988) 14 ALD 415 the tribunal held that it was not able to rely on concessions to reach a conclusion on all issues involved in the application. It had to consider them. To the same effect is the decision in Re Marks and Secretary, Department of Defence (1987) 11 ALD 456 at 459.
Grounds 2 & 3
Ground 2 is an objection by the trustee that Dr Mallett had spent money in the 5 years immediately before the commencement of her bankruptcy and had failed to adequately explain to the trustee the purpose for which that money was spent (paragraph 149(1)(g)(i)).
Ground 3 is an objection by the trustee that the bankrupt, when requested in writing by the trustee to provide written information about the bankrupt’s property, income or expected income, failed to comply with the request (paragraph 149D(1)(d)).
Both of these grounds deal with Dr Mallett’s responses to the trustee’s enquiries and those enquiries were to determine how and why she spent money prior to the bankruptcy. The trustee was of the view that the answers were inadequate, and Dr Mallett contends that they were. The Inspector-General decided it was unnecessary to determine this point because he was of the opinion that she had a reasonable excuse for the failure pursuant to paragraph 149(1A)(c).
In Delahunty v Inspector-General in Bankruptcy [2006] AATA 610, the fact that a bankrupt was not warned about the prospect of an objection being made in the event of unsatisfactory answers was said to constitute a reasonable excuse. The final piece of correspondence in the chain seeking information from the bankrupt prior to the objection being lodged contained no warning. It should have done so. It has been said on many occasions that the right to a discharge from bankruptcy is a valuable and important right and as a matter of logic it follows that a warning of the ramifications of not complying with requests by the trustee may carry grave consequences.
I therefore uphold the decision of the Inspector-General on grounds 2 and 3.
CONCLUSION
The decision under review is affirmed.
I certify that the preceding 57 (fifty -seven) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Deputy President R I Hanger QC
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Associate
Dated: 4 October 2018
Dates of hearing: 16 April, 18 May 2018 Date final submissions received: 14 September 2018 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr G Lister Solicitors for the Applicant: Synkronos Legal Counsel for the Respondent: Mr G W Dietz Solicitors for the Respondent: Matthews Folbigg Lawyers
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