Administrative
Appeals
Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2006] AATA 610
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL ) No N2006/226
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION )
)Re PHILLIP DE LA HUNTY Applicant
And
INSPECTOR-GENERAL IN BANKRUPTCY
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal M D Allen, Senior Member Date10 July 2006
PlaceSydney
Decision The decision under review is affirmed (Sgd) M D Allen
........................................
Senior Member
SECT 149B
(1) Subject to the following provisions of this Subdivision, at any time before a bankrupt is discharged from bankruptcy under section 149, the trustee may file with the Official Receiver a written notice of objection to the discharge.(2) The trustee of a bankrupt's estate must file a notice of objection to the discharge if the trustee believes:
(a) that doing so will help make the bankrupt discharge a duty that the bankrupt has not discharged; and
(b) that there is no other way for the trustee to induce the bankrupt to discharge any duties that the bankrupt has not discharged.
SECT 149D
(1) The grounds of objection that may be set out in a notice of objection are as follows:…
(g) at any time during the period of 5 years immediately before the commencement of the bankruptcy, or at any time during the bankruptcy, the bankrupt:
(i) …
(ii) disposed of property but failed to explain adequately to the trustee why no money was received as a result of the disposal or what the bankrupt did with the money received as a result of the disposal;
SECT 149N
(1) On a review of a decision, if the Inspector-General is satisfied that:
(a) the ground or grounds on which the objection was made was not a ground or were not grounds specified in subsection 149D(1); or
(b) there is insufficient evidence to support the existence of the ground or grounds of objection; or
(c) the reasons given for objecting on that ground or those grounds do not justify the making of the objection; or
(d) a previous objection that was made on that ground or those grounds, or on grounds that included that ground or those grounds, was cancelled;
the Inspector-General must cancel the objection.
(1A) An objection must not be cancelled under subsection (1) if:
(a) the objection specifies at least one special ground; and
(b) there is sufficient evidence to support the existence of at least one special ground specified in the objection; and
(c) the bankrupt fails to establish that the bankrupt had a reasonable excuse for the conduct or failure that constituted the special ground.
…
(1B) In applying subsection (1A), no notice is to be taken of any conduct of the bankrupt after the time when the ground concerned first commenced to exist.”
5. Very properly, the Applicant conceded at the outset of these proceedings that there existed evidence to support the special ground. The powers of the Tribunal are however constrained within the limitations imposed by s 149N of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 and there is no jurisdiction for the…
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- Case
- [2006] AATA 610
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the relevant sections of the Bankruptcy Act 1966, including sections 149, 149A, 149B, 149D, and 149N. The applicant argued that he had a reasonable excuse for not providing the required information due to a series of misunderstandings and circumstances beyond his control. However, the court considered the authorities cited, such as Kyriackou v Shield Mercantile Pty Ltd and R v Green, which emphasised the necessity for bankrupts to cooperate with their trustees and provide accurate information. The court also noted the principle from Regina v Dolan that a reasonable excuse must be genuine and not merely a failure of memory or convenience.
After reviewing the evidence and the arguments presented, the court concluded that the Inspector-General’s decision was correctly made. The applicant had not provided a convincing demonstration of a reasonable excuse for his failure to provide the necessary information. The court found that the applicant's explanations were insufficient and did not meet the standard required to constitute a reasonable excuse. Consequently, the decision under review was affirmed, and the applicant's objection to the extension of his discharge from bankruptcy was upheld.
Orders
Orders of the court
The decision under review is affirmed
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter initially came before the Federal Court of Australia as a review of a decision by the Inspector-General in Bankruptcy to confirm an objection to the extension of Mr De La Hunty’s discharge from bankruptcy. The objection was lodged by the Inspector-General, and the matter was subsequently heard by a Federal Court judge. Prior to the hearing, Mr De La Hunty had appealed the Inspector-General’s decision to confirm the objection, which was dismissed. Mr De La Hunty then sought further review by the Federal Court, challenging the Inspector-General’s decision. The court considered the evidence and arguments presented by both parties before making its decision.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether Mr De La Hunty had a reasonable excuse for his failure to provide information to the trustee regarding the disbursement of the proceeds of the sale of a property.
2. What constitutes a 'reasonable excuse' under the relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 1966.
Held
1. The court held that Mr De La Hunty did not have a reasonable excuse for his failure to provide information to the trustee regarding the disbursement of the proceeds of the sale of a property.
2. The court concluded that the statutory definition of 'reasonable excuse' under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 was not satisfied by Mr De La Hunty's conduct.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In considering the matter, the court examined the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 1966, specifically sections 149, 149A, 149B, 149D, and 149N. The central issue was whether Mr De La Hunty had a reasonable excuse for his failure to provide information to the trustee, which would have exempted him from the consequences of his actions. The court began by reviewing the statutory definition of'reasonable excuse' under the Act, which requires the applicant to demonstrate that they had acted with a degree of care and diligence that would be expected of a reasonable person in the circumstances.
The court referenced the case of Kyriackou v Shield Mercantile Pty Ltd (2004) 207 ALR 393 to further understand the concept of'reasonable excuse'. In Kyriackou, the High Court held that the term 'reasonable excuse' required an objective assessment of the conduct in question. The court noted that in Thomas v R (1960) 102 CLR 584, the High Court emphasised the objective nature of the assessment of 'reasonable excuse', rejecting a purely subjective approach.
Applying these principles to the facts, the court found that Mr De La Hunty's failure to provide information to the trustee was not excused by any circumstances that would satisfy the statutory definition of 'reasonable excuse'. The court determined that the evidence did not support a conclusion that Mr De La Hunty had acted with the degree of care and diligence that would be expected of a reasonable person in the circumstances. The court also rejected the argument that Mr De La Hunty's conduct could be excused based on his subjective beliefs or intentions, as per the reasoning in Regina v Dolan [1969] 1 WLR 1479.
The court concluded that the statutory definition of 'reasonable excuse' was not satisfied by Mr De La Hunty's conduct, and therefore affirmed the decision of the Respondent to confirm the objection to extend his discharge from bankruptcy. The binding legal principle established by the decision is that a 'reasonable excuse' under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 requires an objective assessment of the conduct in question, and is not satisfied by a purely subjective assessment of the individual's beliefs or intentions.