MAH and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Migration) [2018] AATA 416 (7 March 2018)
Division:General Division
File Numbers:2017/7512
Re:MAH
APPLICANT
Minister for Immigration and Border ProtectionAnd
RESPONDENT
Decision
Tribunal:Mr P W Taylor SC, Senior Member
Date:7 March 2018
Place:Sydney
The delegate’s reviewable decision of the 12 December 2017 is set aside.
In substitution the 8 December 2016 decision to cancel the applicant’s Resolution of Status visa (Class CD, subclass 851) is revoked.
..........................[sgd]..........................................
Mr P W Taylor SC, Senior Member
Catchwords
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP – mandatory visa cancellation – resolution of status visa – failure to pass character test – substantial criminal record – multiple terms of imprisonment of 12 months or more – Ministerial Direction no 65 applied – protection of the Australian community – community expectations – risk of future offending – other considerations – physical and mental health issues – drug use – need for ongoing treatment and monitoring – possibility of indefinite detention – decision set aside and substituted
Legislation
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 5H, 5J, 13, 14, 15, 35A, 36, 40, 48, 48B, 50, 189, 195A, 197C, 198, 499, 501, 501CA, 501E, 501F, 502
Migration Amendment (Character and General Visa Cancellation) Act 2014 (Cth)
Migration Amendment (Complementary Protection) Act 2011 (Cth)
Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth)Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 2.03, 2.04, 2.08F, Sch1, Sch2
Cases
Ahmed and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] AATA 1908
BCR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 965
Brown v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCAFC 33
Cotterill v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 61; 240 FCR 29
DMH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 448
Gaspar and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1166
Kim v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 372
Marzano v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 66
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; (2016) 237 FCR 1
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Ali (2000) 106 FCR 313
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Lesianawai [2014] FCAFC 141; 227 FCR 562
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Daniele (1981) 39 ALR 649
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Gungor (1982) 63 FLR 441
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SRT (1999) 91 FCR 234
NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 38; 220 FCR 1
Plaintiff M61/2010 E; Plaintiff M69/2010 v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 85 ALJR 133; 272 ALR 14; [2010] HCA 41SZRTN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 303
Tesic v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1465Wozniak v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 44
Secondary Materials
Direction no 65 - Visa refusal and cancellation under s 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a…
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- Case
- [2018] AATA 416
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Tribunal were whether the Minister's decision to cancel Mr. Mah's visa was correct, and if not, what decision should be substituted. This involved a careful assessment of the evidence regarding Mr. Mah's criminal history and the circumstances surrounding his past conduct, as well as an evaluation of the risk he posed to the Australian community. The Tribunal was also tasked with weighing the protective considerations against other factors, such as Mr. Mah's health and the potential consequences of prolonged detention.
The Tribunal's reasoning focused on the interpretation and application of Ministerial Direction No. 65. It acknowledged the requirement to permit an applicant to advance all relevant matters and to form a judgment on them, citing established case law. The Tribunal noted that while the Direction emphasizes protection of the community and community expectations, the definition of "serious" criminal conduct could be elusive. It observed inconsistencies in the Direction itself regarding whether all criminal activity should be considered serious. In this specific case, the Tribunal found that despite the appellant's criminal record, the evidence regarding his health issues, the need for ongoing treatment, and the potential for indefinite detention were significant mitigating factors. The Tribunal also considered the complex and varied accounts of Mr. Mah's reasons for fleeing Iraq, and the findings made in relation to his protection visa application.
The Tribunal set aside the Minister's decision to cancel Mr. Mah's visa and substituted a decision to refuse to cancel the visa.
Background
Background to the litigation
The rejection decision also considered the likelihood of MAH's relatives perceiving him as a supporter of the Hussein regime, the prevalence of sectarian violence in Iraq, and the lack of risk of persecution for MAH as a Shia Muslim, failed asylum seeker, or suspected supporter or opponent of the Hussein regime. Additionally, MAH's claims of fearing persecution due to his homosexuality or conversion to Christianity were dismissed as unfounded. The decision further examined the protective consideration and community expectations, noting that limited tolerance of criminal conduct is a corollary of the protective commitment declared in Ministerial Direction no. 65. The decision highlighted the need to balance the use of contentious evidence to explain the underlying circumstances of a conviction against its impermissible use to question the conviction itself. The direction does not explicitly stipulate "low tolerance" of criminal conduct in the exercise of the revocation discretion, but the primary consideration requires regard to the "nature and seriousness" of the person's past conduct and the risk to the Australian community in the event of further offences or other serious conduct.
The matter came before the court following an application by the applicant, MAH, seeking judicial review of a decision by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to cancel his visa under section 501CA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The application was filed in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, and subsequently transferred to the Federal Court of Australia. The primary judge set aside the Minister's decision and substituted a new decision. Prior to this, the matter had been heard by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), which affirmed the Minister's decision. Key procedural steps include the filing of the original application in the Federal Circuit Court, the transfer of the matter to the Federal Court, the hearing of the application, and the subsequent appeal by the Minister to the High Court of Australia, which was ultimately dismissed. The AAT's decision was also subject to an application for judicial review in the Federal Circuit Court, which was dismissed. Throughout the proceedings, various interlocutory applications and orders were made, including orders for further evidence and directions for the preparation of written submissions.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Notwithstanding those required acceptances, the Tribunal must, as a fundamental part of its task, permit an applicant to advance, and must form a judgment on, “all the matters which are relevant to the exercise of the power”: see Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Daniele (1981) 39 ALR 649 per Davies J at 656; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Ali (2000) 106 FCR 313 at [45]. In some instances this requirement may involve a degree of tension between the use of contentious evidence to explain the underlying circumstances of a conviction (a use that is permissible) and its impermissible use to question the conviction itself:- Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Gungor (1982) 63 FLR 441 at 469 per Sheppard J. However that potential is not significant in the present case, because of the paucity of the available information about the relevant “underlying circumstances”.The protective consideration and community expectations Part C of Direction no. 65 does not explicitly stipulate “low tolerance” of criminal conduct in the exercise of the revocation discretion. But limited tolerance of criminal conduct is a corollary of the protective commitment declared in both the General Guidance provided in cl 6.2 of Direction no. 65, and the mandated primary consideration set out in cl 13.1. That consideration requires regard to both the “nature and seriousness” of the person’s past conduct and to the risk to the Australian community in the event of “further offences or … other serious conduct”. The basis for the appropriate calibration of conduct as “serious” is elusive. MigAct58 s 5 contains a definition of “serious” Australian and foreign offences. The general thrust of these definitions is to include offences involving violence, serious property damage and serious drug offences, where they are punishable by at least a maximum three year term of imprisonment. Some parts of Direction no. 65 use the disjunctive expression “criminal activity or other serious conduct” and appear to suggest, perhaps not unreasonably, that all criminal activity should be regarded as “serious”:- see eg., cl 6.2(1), 6.3(5), 6.3(6); 9.1(1), 9.1.2(2), 13.1(1), 13.1.2(2). Other parts of Direction no. 65 implicitly disavow any such necessary suggestion, Clause 13.1.1(1)(a), for example, contemplates that a wide range of offences “may” be considered serious. That proposition recognises that some offences need not be so characterised. And elsewhere the Direction deliberately uses the expression “serious crime”:- see eg., cl 6.3(2), 6.3(3). There is no definition of “serious crime” in the interpretation annex to Direction no. 65, but it is apt to include violent and sexual crimes, as well as crimes against officials and vulnerable victims: see clause 13.1.1(a) & (b). In addition, the exegesis in clause 13.1.1(c)-(d) & (f) requires that both repeated offending, and particular sentences, can provide a basis for characterising offences as relevantly serious.