SZRTN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZRTN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 303

Citation: SZRTN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 303
Appeal from: Confidential v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] AATA 818
Parties: SZRTN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 2551 of 2013
Judge: KATZMANN J
Date of judgment: 31 March 2014
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – refusal of visa on character grounds under s 501 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether exercise by Administrative Appeals Tribunal of its discretion to refuse to grant the visa miscarried – refusal by Tribunal to give weight to certain written statements where makers not called to give oral evidence – Ministerial Direction No 55 – application of paragraph 6.3(4) of Direction

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – jurisdictional error – whether denial of procedural fairness to give no weight to written statements – whether illogical or irrational to give no weight to the statements – whether Tribunal failed to take into account relevant considerations – whether Tribunal failed to take into account evidence of remorse – whether Tribunal ignored part of paragraph 6.3(4) of Ministerial Direction No 55 – whether Tribunal took into account irrelevant considerations – whether considerations not expressly mentioned in Direction are irrelevant – whether Tribunal failed to complete the exercise of its jurisdiction by failing to expressly weigh in the balance all relevant considerations or by failing to consider whether the other considerations carried more weight than any of the primary considerations

Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 496, 499, 501
Cases cited: Bulstrode v Trimble [1970] VR 840
Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576
Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital (1989) 17 NSWLR 553
F Hoffman-La Roche and Co AG v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [1975] AC 295
Fletcher v Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 19 FCR 442
Goldie v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 111 FCR 378
Kim and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] AATA 239
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS [2014] FCAFC 16
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs vWu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323
Msumba and Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 31 AAR 192; [2000] AATA 87
Ngaronoa v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 244 ALR 119; [2007] FCAFC 196
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476
Reedy and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] AATA 363
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152
Telstra Corporation Limited v Kendall (1995) 55 FCR 221
Uelese v Minister…
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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 303
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

SZRTN sought judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) affirming the Minister's refusal of his visa application on character grounds. The Tribunal found that the applicant posed an unacceptable risk of committing further serious offences and causing harm to the Australian community. The applicant contended that the Tribunal erred in failing to give weight to certain written statements and in not considering his rehabilitation and remorse. The court was required to determine whether the Tribunal's exercise of discretion miscarried by committing jurisdictional error in failing to consider relevant matters or taking into account irrelevant considerations.

The court found that the Tribunal did not commit jurisdictional error. The Tribunal was not bound to give weight to the written statements merely because they were admitted without objection and the authors were not called to give evidence. The court held that there is no principle requiring a tribunal to accept unchallenged or untested evidence. The Tribunal had considered the statements but declined to give them any weight based on their contents. The Tribunal was not obliged to consider evidence of the applicant's remorse since it was not a material question of fact. The court held that the Tribunal properly exercised its discretion in finding that the applicant posed an unacceptable risk to the Australian community despite evidence of rehabilitation.

The application for judicial review was dismissed. The applicant was ordered to pay the Minister's costs. The court found that the Tribunal's decision was neither illogical nor irrational and was based on a proper consideration of the relevant factors. The Tribunal did not fail to take into account relevant considerations or take into account irrelevant considerations. The court held that the Tribunal properly exercised its discretion in refusing the applicant's visa application on character grounds.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

A decision of a delegate may be reviewed on its merits in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. In that event, the Tribunal may exercise the discretion reposed in the Minister or his delegate as the case may be. In the present case, the delegate’s decision was affirmed by the Tribunal, which found that there was an unacceptable risk that the applicant would commit further serious offences and cause serious harm to the Australian community if he were granted a visa. Although a decision under s 501 of the Act is a “privative clause decision” (Migration Act, s 474), it may be challenged for jurisdictional error: Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476. In this application, the applicant seeks to do just that. For the following reasons, however, his challenge fails.Background The applicant has a tragic background. He arrived in Australia from New Zealand at the age of five in the company of his father, after his parents’ marriage had broken down. He claims to have never known his mother. The applicant arrived in Australia on a one-month visitor visa. When the visa expired, no application was made for any other visa. Consequently, the applicant’s presence in Australia was unlawful. That remained the position until sometime in 2008, when he was about 27, at which time he was granted a Bridging E (Class WE) visa. Since then, he has held a succession of bridging visas. Within months of his arrival, the applicant was abandoned by his father, who returned to New Zealand. At this point, he was taken to live with an uncle and aunt and their children. He remained in their care until he was 13, but he was never permitted to go to school or anywhere else, even to see a doctor. He said that when he fought with his cousins, he would receive a “hiding” from his uncle. From the age of about 9, he lived in his uncle’s garage, which made him feel isolated from the family. He said he was only permitted to eat if there was food left over. At about the age of 13, he moved in with another uncle who also gave him a “hiding” from time to time. After six months, he left his uncle’s house and lived on the streets, sleeping rough or at the homes of friends or acquaintances. There he was introduced to drugs and alcohol. From the age of 18, he moved around from suburb to suburb. At 24 or 25, he moved to the Central Coast of New South Wales. Thereafter, he spent various periods of time in gaol, had an on-off relationship with a woman, and spent short periods of time living at the homes of two of his uncles. According to the evidence before the Tribunal, the applicant’s history of offending began when he was a juvenile. He was convicted of larceny at the age of 16. His offending thereafter ranged from relatively minor offences, such as driving while disqualified, to crimes of violence, such as armed robbery. In 2011, he was convicted of a number of offences, including resisting and assaulting a police officer. He spent about eight months in gaol for these offences. On his release in April 2012, he was taken to the Villawood Immigration Detention Centre, where he has remained ever since. The only formal education he ever undertook occurred in gaol and in immigration detention. It was in gaol that he was first given tuition in reading and writing, although he admitted to very limited literacy skills.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Ground 7 must be rejected.Ground 8: Did the Tribunal fail to complete the exercise of its jurisdiction by failing to take into account evidence of the applicant’s rehabilitation? In ground 8, the applicant alleges that the Tribunal failed to take into account evidence of the applicant’s rehabilitation by the time of the decision, contrary to subpara 11.1.2(2) of the Direction because it failed to make a finding about whether the applicant was genuinely remorseful. The underlying premise of this submission is that the Tribunal was bound to make a finding on this question and that the failure to do so is a jurisdictional error. It was not. Section 43(2B) of the AAT Act provides that, where the Tribunal gives its reasons in writing, those reasons must include its findings on material questions of fact. A failure to make a particular finding by no means necessarily results in jurisdictional error. The High Court made this plain in Yusuf in the analogous context of s 430 of the Migration Act (relating to the obligation of the Refugee Review Tribunal to prepare a written statement setting out its findings on material questions of fact). In Yusuf, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ said (at [68]) that the obligation to set out material questions of fact did not impose an obligation to make findings on every matter of fact objectively material to the decision the Tribunal was required to make. It required no more than that the Tribunal set out its findings on those questions of fact which it considered to be material to the decision which it made. Their Honours held (at [68]):Neither expressly nor impliedly does this section require the Tribunal to make, and then set out, some findings additional to those which it actually made. It is true, however, as their Honours went on to point out at [69], that a court asked to review a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal may infer that if a matter is not mentioned in the Tribunal’s reasons, the Tribunal did not regard it as material, and that might reveal some jurisdictional error. The same may be said of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. But that is not this case. Whether the applicant was remorseful, was not a material question of fact. Indeed, it was not in question at all. The Minister did not advance any submission suggesting that the applicant’s evidence on the subject should be rejected. What was in question was whether, notwithstanding his expressions of remorse, he remained a risk to the Australian community. That was the issue the Tribunal addressed. To that end, the Tribunal was required by the Direction to take a number of matters into account. Relevantly, that included evidence of rehabilitation. The obligation to take into account evidence of rehabilitation appears in subpara 11.1.2(2) of the Direction. It reads:The risk to the Australian community should the person commit further offences or engage in other serious conduct(1)… (2)Decision-makers should also consider whether the purpose of the intended stay reflects strong or compassionate reasons for granting a short-stay visa. In making the risk assessment, decision-makers must have regard to, cumulatively:a)The nature of the harm to individuals or the Australian community should the person engage in further criminal or other serious conduct; andb)The likelihood of the person engaging in further criminal or other serious conduct, taking into account:i. information and evidence from independent and authoritative sources on the likelihood of the person reoffending; andii. evidence of any rehabilitation achieved by the time of the decision, giving weight to time spent in the community since their most recent offence (noting that decisions should not be delayed in order for rehabilitative courses to be undertaken); andiii. the duration of the intended stay in Australia.(Emphasis added.)

Decision

Reasons for decision

Only one other consideration was said to be relevant in this case. That was the consideration in para 12(1)(a):Impact of visa refusal on immediate family members in Australia, where those family members are Australian citizens, Australian permanent residents, or people who have a right to remain in Australia indefinitely[.]The Tribunal’s decision After summarising the relevant parts of the Direction, the Tribunal proceeded to consider the primary considerations. On the subject of the protection of the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct, the Tribunal examined first the nature and seriousness of the applicant’s conduct and then the risk to the Australian community were he to commit further offences or engage in other serious conduct. The Tribunal considered that the applicant posed an unacceptable risk of future harm to the Australian community. It noted that he had a criminal history spanning more than 14 years from his first conviction at age 16. While it understandably discounted his first offence, which it ascribed to his youth and homelessness, it noted that he had continued to offend, and that his offences ranged from “repeatedly driving while disqualified, to crimes of violence including robbery, assault with a weapon, and assaulting police officers”. It recorded that he had been sentenced to two terms of 12 months’ imprisonment and to lesser terms on six occasions. It observed that between 1997 and 2011, the applicant had committed over 30 offences with an average of one or two years between offences. The Tribunal said that the applicant’s record showed that he had not been deterred from crime, had not learned from his mistakes, and showed “a continuing disregard for the law in many ways”. A table of the applicant’s convictions and sentences was annexed to the Tribunal’s reasons. The Tribunal emphasised the statement in the Direction that there is low tolerance for visa applicants with a criminal history like that of the applicant. The Tribunal considered the evidence going to the question of rehabilitation but was unimpressed by it. It stated (at [32]):There is no expert assessment before us of the probability of future offending by the Applicant, but the regular repetition of offences, the lack of an alternative law-abiding structured life and the apparent inability to be deterred by penalties must point to a high likelihood that the Australian public would be at risk of further harm of the same kind if he were to be free in the community. While observing that the Direction recognises that Australia may afford a higher level of tolerance of criminal or other serious conduct in the case of a non-citizen who has lived in the Australian community for most of his life, the Tribunal found (at [37]) that the applicant had “contributed little if anything to the Australian community” and had been “largely removed from the education, work and social structures of it”. The Tribunal considered that a bridging visa was not a “short-stay visa” within the meaning of the Direction and so did not consider whether there were compassionate grounds for granting the visa.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

There is no principle of law that requires a court to accept unchallenged or untested evidence: Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital (1989) 17 NSWLR 553 at 588; JD Heydon, Cross on Evidence (9th ed), [17460]. Where the evidence-in-chief of a witness on a particular subject appears unconvincing, the fact that the witness was not cross-examined “would, or might, be of little importance in deciding whether to accept his evidence”: Bulstrode v Trimble [1970] VR 840 at 848. There is no reason to suppose that these principles do not apply equally to tribunals. The legislative direction that the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence (AAT Act, s 33) says nothing about the sufficiency of the material upon which the parties might rely to satisfy it that the decision under review should be set aside. For the reasons given in relation to ground 1 at [61]–[66] above, the Tribunal’s finding was neither illogical nor irrational. In those circumstances, this ground of review does not lie. As Crennan and Bell JJ put it in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [135], “a decision will not be illogical or irrational if there is room for a logical or rational person to reach the same decision on the material before the decision maker”.Ground 6: Did the Tribunal fail to take into account relevant considerations by giving no weight to Exhibits A5–A13? As the applicant acknowledged, an administrative decision will only be vitiated by a failure to take into account a relevant consideration if the consideration is one the Tribunal was bound to take into account. If the relevant factors are not expressly stated, they are to be determined by implication from the subject matter, scope and purpose of the statute: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39–40. Here, the Tribunal was bound to take into account the matters referred to in the Direction: Migration Act, s 499(2A). Exhibits A5–A13, however, were not relevant considerations in this sense. The considerations that were relevant to the task the Tribunal was obliged to carry out “are to be identified primarily, perhaps even entirely, by reference to the Act rather than the particular facts of the case that the Tribunal is called on to consider”: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 (“Yusuf”) at [73]. Whilst it is true, as the applicant submitted, that the evidence of the makers of the statements may have pertained to various matters referred to in the Direction, the fact that the Tribunal did not give any weight to the statements does not mean that the Tribunal failed to take those matters into account. The fact is the Tribunal did consider the evidence but declined to give it any weight. The Tribunal was not bound to give the statements any weight. Certainly, as I have already observed, the fact that they were admitted without objection and the authors had not been required for cross-examination did not by themselves make the evidence in the statements compelling. Whether they should have been accorded any weight depended on their contents. It was for the Tribunal to decide whether they were persuasive and therefore what weight to attach to them. The Tribunal did not fall into jurisdictional error in concluding that they should not be given any weight.