Luu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Luu v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs

[2002] FCAFC 369

MIGRATION – deportation order – deportee in immigration detention pending deportation – decision not to revoke deportation order – decision not to release deportee from immigration detention pending deportation – whether deportee was accorded procedural fairness in the making of the decisions – whether there was evidence upon which a risk of deportee absconding if released from immigration detention could be found – whether decisions so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have made them.

MIGRATION – deportee in immigration detention – decision not to release deportee from immigration detention pending deportation – whether protection of Australian community a relevant consideration to decision.

MIGRATION – deportee in immigration detention – decision not to release deportee from immigration detention pending deportation – whether continued detention was indeterminate or punitive and was thereby in contravention of Migration Act 1958 – whether continued detention was indeterminate preventative or punitive and was thereby in contravention of Articles 7, 9 and 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 so that such contraventions were relevant matters which had to be taken into account in making the decision.

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 206, 253, 200, 417, 206
Wartime Refugees Removal Act 1949 (Cth)

Minh v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1998) 86 FCR 304 – referred to
Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 596 – referred to
Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1997) 175 CLR 564 – referred to
Pilbara Aboriginal Land Council Aboriginal Corporation Inc v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (2000) 103 FCR 539, [2000] FCA 1113 – referred to
Nguyen v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 887 – referred to
Betkhoshabeh v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1999) 92 FCR 504, [1999] FCA 470 - discussed
Tuiletufuga v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1998) 87 FCR 389 – referred to
Cabal v Secretary, Department of Justice (Victoria) [2000] FCA 1227, (2000) 177 ALR 306, [2000] FCA 949 – referred to
Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155 – referred to
Videto v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 8 FCR 167 – referred to
Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd (1950) 81 CLR 418 - applied
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 –referred to
Broussard v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 21 FCR 472 – referred to
Foxtel Management Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2000) 173 ALR 362, [2002] FCA 589 - discussed
Luu v Renevier (1989) 91 ALR 39 - discussed
Tickner v Bropho (1993) 114 ALR 409 – referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611, [1999] HCA 21 - cited
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Betkhoshabeh (1999) 55 ALD 609, [1999] FCA 980 – referred to
Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin

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Details
Case
[2002] FCAFC 369
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Luu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involved the appellant, Mr Luu, who was challenging the decision of the respondent to detain him in immigration detention despite his completion of a criminal sentence. The dispute arose from the respondent's refusal to release Mr Luu from detention, based on the risk he posed to the community and the likelihood of him evading deportation if released. The Federal Court was tasked with reviewing the decision-making process of the respondent and determining whether the detention was justified under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

The court had to consider whether the respondent's decision to detain Mr Luu was procedurally fair and whether it was unreasonable given the circumstances. Key issues included whether the respondent was required to inform Mr Luu of the basis for the decision, particularly regarding the reliance on outdated material and the risk of flight. The court also examined whether the respondent's decision to detain Mr Luu was based on an improper purpose, such as securing his preventive detention. The respondent argued that the appellant's claims of procedural unfairness and improper purpose were not properly before the court as they were not raised at the first instance.

The court found that the respondent was not required to inform Mr Luu of the reliance on outdated material and the risk of flight, as these did not constitute critical issues that would significantly impact the decision. The court also rejected the claim that the detention was for an improper purpose, emphasizing that the focus should remain on the statutory powers and the objective criteria for detention. The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 253 of the Act deals with detention of a deportee. It empowers the respondent to detain a person against whom an order for deportation is in force in immigration detention: s 253(2). Sub-sections (8), (9), (10) and (11) provide:“(8)A deportee may be kept in immigration detention or such detention as the Minister or the Secretary directs:(a)pending deportation, until he or she is placed on board a vessel for deportation;(b)at any port or place in Australia at which the vessel calls after he or she has been placed on board; or(c)on board the vessel until its departure from its last port or place of call in Australia.(9)In spite of anything else in this section, the Minister or the Secretary may at any time order the release (either unconditionally or subject to specified conditions) of a person who is in detention under this section.(10)An officer may, without warrant, detain a person who:(a)has been released from detention under subsection (9) subject to conditions; and(b)has breached any of those conditions.(11)Nothing contained in, or done under, this section prevents the Supreme Court of a State or Territory or the High Court from ordering the release from detention of a person held in detention under this section where the Court finds that there is no valid deportation order in force in relation to that person.”REASONS FOR THE DECISIONS The statement of reasons of the respondent for the two decisions is divided into three sections: findings on material questions of fact, evidence on which findings were based, and reasons for decision. The findings on material questions of fact were as follows:(a)Mr Luu was convicted of Intentionally Causing Serious Injury (2 counts) and Causing Injury Intentionally (1 count) and was sentenced to 3 years and 9 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 2 years and 3 months.(b)My Delegate issued a deportation order against Mr Luu on 9 May 1997.(c)The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘the AAT’) affirmed the deportation order on 5 September 1997.(d)My Delegate decided against Mr Luu’s release on 8 January 1998.(e)The offences committed by Mr Luu were most serious.(f)The risk of Mr Luu re-offending is significantly high. He constitutes a continuing danger to the Australian Community, in particular to his victims.(g)There is a risk that Mr Luu would attempt to avoid deportation by evading the Department if he were released from detention.(h)The Australian Government’s negotiations with the Vietnamese Government towards concluding a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in relation to the return of criminal deportees have progressed substantially in recent times and there is a high probability that a MOU will be concluded later in the year.”The evidence upon which those findings were based was said to be contained in an undated departmental minute at the foot of which the respondent on 12 March 2001 indicated his decisions, and briefing material concerning negotiations with the Vietnamese government towards concluding a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for the return of criminal deportees from Australia to Vietnam.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the appellant’s supplementary submissions, the appellant also sought leave to further amend the grounds of appeal to add the claim that the respondent, in deciding not to release the appellant from immigration detention, exercised the power under s 253(9) for the improper purpose of securing the preventive detention of the appellant. Again, the contention was not raised before the judge at first instance. The respondent opposed the application. Through senior counsel, he asserted that, had the claim been made at first instance, the respondent would have been able to, and would have, led evidence as to the purpose of the detention. In Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd (1950) 81 CLR 418 at 438, Latham CJ said:“Where a point is not taken in the court below and evidence could have been given there which by any possibility could have prevented the point from succeeding, it cannot be taken afterwards.”In the light of the assertion by the respondent through senior counsel, and because the proposed ground of review may provoke a focus upon the subjective purpose of the respondent in a way which the grounds of the application to the Court did not previously do, we consider the appellant should be refused leave to amend the grounds of appeal to raise the point.CONSIDERATION OF THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL(a) Procedural fairness and unreasonableness The grounds of appeal claim that the judge at first instance erred in holding that the respondent, to accord procedural fairness to the appellant, need not have informed the appellant:.that he would be relying, without further investigation, on material current as at 1998, and.that he would be acting on the basis that there was a risk of flight if the appellant were released from immigration detention. As noted above, there was no dispute that the respondent was obliged to accord procedural fairness to the appellant in making the two decisions complained of. Nor was there any real dispute about the principles to be applied in determining the content of the obligation to accord procedural fairness in particular circumstances. See generally Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 585; Broussard v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 21 FCR 472 at 481. The respondent’s outline of contentions acknowledged that:“(a)the appellant was entitled to put information and submissions to the Minister in support of his application;(b)the appellant was entitled to an opportunity to rebut or comment upon any adverse material from other sources on which the Minister proposed to rely;(c)the Minister was not obliged to notify to the appellant his mental processes or provisional views before making his decision, or to make the appellant’s case for him;(d)however, the Minister was required to identify to the appellant the ‘gravamen’ or substance of any critical issues on which the decision might turn and which were not apparent from the nature of the power or the terms of the statute: and(e)the Minister was required to advise the appellant of any adverse conclusions which would not obviously be open on the known material.”