LPD Holdings (Aust) Pty Ltd v Russells

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

LPD Holdings (Aust) Pty Ltd v Russells [2017] QSC 45

PARTIES:

LPD HOLDINGS (AUST) PTY LTD
ACN 060 214 511

(applicant)

v
RUSSELLS (A FIRM)

(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

No 2571 of 2015

DIVISION:

Trial

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

31 March 2017

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

14 February 2017; Respondent’s Supplementary Written Submissions filed 1 March 2017; Applicant’s Written Submissions in Reply filed 2 March 2017

JUDGE:

Flanagan J

ORDER:

Respondent’s application filed 7 December 2016 is dismissed.  I will hear the parties as to costs.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – ENDING PROCEEDINGS EARLY – SUMMARY DISPOSAL – SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT OR RESPONDENT: STAY OR DISMISSAL OF PROCEEDINGS - where the respondent seeks summary judgment pursuant to rule 293 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 – where the respondent seeks summary dismissal of the applicant’s proceedings pursuant to rule 658 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 or the inherent jurisdiction of the Court – where the present proceedings constitute an application under statute for an order for the assessment of legal costs – whether the legal costs payable by the applicant to the respondent give rise to a res judicata, having been finally determined in District Court proceedings – whether a costs agreement can compromise the applicant’s rights to an assessment of the whole of the legal costs it paid to the respondent – test for summary dismissal on the basis of res judicata or issue estoppel – whether the previous proceedings and current proceedings concern the same cause of action and give rise to a res judicata – whether default judgment can found a successful plea of res judicata

ESTOPPEL – ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT - RES JUDICATA OR CAUSE OF ACTION ESTOPPEL - ANSHUN ESTOPPEL - ISSUE ESTOPPEL – where the applicant seeks summary dismissal - whether a judgment obtained by default gives rise to an Anshun type estoppel

Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 335(1), s 335(3), s 335(5), s 335(10)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 293, r 658, r 743A, r 743B

Atthow v McElhone [2010] QSC 177, cited

Australian Granites Ltd v Eisenwerk Hensel Bayreuth
Dipl.-lng Burkhardt GmbH [2001] 1 Qd R 461, cited

Bazos v Doman [2001] NSWCA 347, cited

Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464, cited

Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd [No 2] [1967] 1 AC 853, cited
Clout & Ors v Klein & Ors [2001] QSC 401, cited

Commonwealth Bank of Australia v White (No 4) [2001] VSC 511, cited

Cordes v Dr Peter Ironside Pty Ltd [2010] 2 Qd R 235, cited

Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62, cited

Edington v Board of Trustees of the State Public Sector Superannuation Scheme [2012] QSC 211, cited

General Steel Industries Inc. v Commissioner for Railways (N.S.W.) (1964) 112 C.L.R. 125, cited
Higgins v Higgins [2005] 2 Qd…

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Details
Case
[2017] QSC 45
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

LPD Holdings (Aust) Pty Ltd filed an application in the Supreme Court of Queensland, seeking an assessment of the legal costs it paid to Russells (A Firm) in relation to certain legal services provided. Russells opposed the application on the grounds that LPD had previously agreed to the amount of fees and costs payable and that the application was barred by the doctrine of res judicata or issue estoppel. The primary issue for the Court was whether the previous proceedings in the District Court, which resulted in a default judgment for Russells, justified the dismissal of LPD's current application for an assessment of legal costs. The Court had to consider whether the previous proceedings and the current proceedings concerned the same cause of action and if a default judgment could found a successful plea of res judicata.

The Court held that LPD's rights to an assessment of legal costs were not compromised by the September 2013 Agreement. The agreement only addressed the payment of outstanding accounts and established a regime for payments for work done over the following six months. It did not contain any form of release from claims or preclude past and future costs from being assessed under the statutory regime governing legal costs. Additionally, if the agreement amounted to a compromise of LPD's rights, it would be void as against public policy as it would amount to an unlawful attempt to oust the jurisdiction of the court to order an assessment of legal costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed LPD's appeal against the decision of Botting DCJ, who refused to set aside the default judgment. The Court of Appeal held that LPD's contentions were not sufficient to warrant setting aside the default judgment. The Court concluded that there was no triable issue and that the order should be the dismissal of the application with costs to be assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Respondent’s application filed 7 December 2016 is dismissed. I will hear the parties as to costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

LPD submits that the previous District Court proceedings do not give rise to the application of either res judicata, issue estoppel or Anshun estoppel justifying the entry of judgment pursuant to rule 658 or the Court’s inherent jurisdiction.Background By an agreement in writing dated 27 May 2010 (“the May 2010 Retainer”) LPD engaged Russells to provide the following legal services: “Advice to the Client in relation to recent conduct of the board of Macarthur Minerals Limited, the conduct of any dispute in regard to that conduct, and advice and assistance concerning the Client’s investment in Macarthur Minerals in general.Such other services which are, in the Firm’s opinion, reasonably necessary for that purpose or which are, in the Firm’s opinion, incidental thereto.” Pursuant to the May 2010 Retainer Russells acted for LPD in Supreme Court proceedings 6351 of 2012 and 11108 of 2012. On 2 September 2013 LPD and Russells entered into an agreement varying the May 2010 Retainer (“the September 2013 Agreement”). Prior to the September 2013 Agreement Russells had given and LPD had paid numerous tax invoices for legal services provided pursuant to the May 2010 Retainer. The first invoice, no. 9691, was sent on 8 July 2010. On 28 March 2014 Russells wrote to LPD giving notice of its intention to cease to act.District Court Proceedings On 9 May 2014 Russells filed a claim and statement of claim in the District Court, being proceedings BD1716/14. The claim sought the payment of the sum of $172,947.31 together with interest, pursuant to section 58 of the Civil Proceedings Act 2011. Paragraph 3 of the statement of claim referred to the May 2010 Retainer and paragraph 5 referred to the September 2013 Agreement. The material terms of the September 2013 Agreement were pleaded in paragraph 6. These material terms included:(a)the agreement was a written variation of the May 2010 Retainer;(b)LPD acknowledged its indebtedness to Russells for $180,348.96 being sums due pursuant to the May 2010 Retainer since 5 June 2013;(c)LPD agreed to make payments of $17,500 to Russells on dates from 1 July 2013 to 1 December 2013;(d)if Russells’ usual fees for any month were less than $17,500 Russells would credit the balance to the current debts, and if they were greater, Russells would accept the sum of $17,500;(e)LPD would pay future barristers’ fees in advance;(f)Russells would make no charge for any professional fees for any work involved in the amendment of the statement of claim in certain Supreme Court proceedings, following the judgment of McMurdo J delivered 28 August 2013. Paragraph 7 of the statement of claim pleaded that pursuant to the May 2010 Retainer, as varied by the September 2013 Agreement, Russells rendered further services to LPD, more particularly set out in five invoices respectively dated 23 August 2013, 6 November 2013 (two invoices), 6 December 2013 and 28 March 2014. Paragraph 9 of the statement of claim pleaded that since the September 2013 Agreement LPD had paid certain sums but that an amount of $172,947.31 remained payable by LPD to Russells.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

His Honour noted that LPD was unable to identify any claims for legal costs which were either baseless or excessive. Botting DCJ continued:“I think the client’s position is made the more difficult because of, as I perceive it, an agreement entered into in September of 2013 in which each party compromised, as I perceive it, their respective positions in respect of the fees payable and to be paid. As I say, that document appears to me to be an agreement by the parties by which their various rights essentially merge into the new rights created by the agreement of September 2013.In the circumstances, I am not persuaded that there is a triable issue such as would warrant my setting aside the judgment by default. I think I may have already mentioned that there is, in fact, not a draft defence that has been put before me. But, in the circumstances, that, perhaps, does not carry as much weight as it would in other cases. If I had come to a different conclusion, then I would have set aside the judgment, only on the basis that there be some condition imposed. It is not necessary to think through exactly what it would be, but – which would do something, anyway, to secure the plaintiff’s costs of the assessment. But, as I say, at the end of the day, I am not satisfied that this is a proper case for me to exercise the discretion in favour of the applicant and set aside the default judgment. The order should be, I suppose, application dismissed and costs to be assessed.”[2]Botting DCJ ordered that the application be dismissed. LPD not only sought to set aside the default judgment but also the relief referred to in [17] above.[2] Transcript of judgment, 5 August 2014, 3, lines 28-46.Court of Appeal Decision LPD appealed the order of Botting DCJ, refusing the application to set aside default judgment. Margaret McMurdo P (with whom Gotterson and Philippides JJA agreed) wrote the primary judgment. Her Honour noted that LPD in its amended written submissions in reply sought an amendment of the notice of appeal seeking “a declaration that the (September 2013) agreement does not compromise (LPD’s) rights to an assessment of its legal costs, and hence (LPD) does not pursue that part of paragraph 2B of the draft amended notice of appeal attached to the reply dated 7 November 2014 which sought a declaration that the agreement did not compromise ‘any other rights to question the conduct of the respondent in the performance of its retainer’”.[3] Her Honour identified LPD’s contentions as follows:“LPD contends that it paid a total of about $1.4m in fees to Russells.[4] Its last bill was dated 28 March 2014 so that its application for an assessment of costs was well within time.[5] The litigation was complex but the size of the bill in comparison to the stage of litigation reached was extraordinary and in itself justified an order for a costs assessment.There was no basis for the judge to conclude that LPD’s rights as to costs were compromised in the September 2013 agreement. The agreement did nothing more than compromise the due date for the payment of the then outstanding accounts and establish a regime for payments for work done over the following six months. It did not contain any form of release from claims and it did not have the effect of releasing Russells from having its costs assessed. It did not vary the original agreement retainer which informed LPD of its right to an assessment. It was nonsense to suggest that the agreement precluded past and future costs from being assessed under the statutory regime which governs legal costs.Alternatively, if the September 2013 agreement amounted to a compromise of LPD’s rights to an assessment of costs, LPD argued it was void as against public policy. It would amount to an unlawful attempt to oust the jurisdiction of the court to order an assessment of legal costs and was therefore void: Westfield Management Limited v AMP Capital Property Nominees Limited.[6]”[7][3] LPD Holdings (Aust) Pty Ltd v Russells (A Firm) [2015] QCA 122 per Margaret McMurdo P at [10].[4] I note that in paragraph 18 of the Points of Defence the respondent denies that the applicant has paid a total of $1,442,766.81 in respect of legal costs. The respondent does not dispute that an amount in excess of $1.4m was paid by the applicant but the amounts paid totalled $788,673.44 for the respondent’s fees (ex GST), $516,416.61 in disbursements (including Counsel’s fees, ex GST) and $129,687.36 GST.[5] Legal Profession Act, section 335(5).[6] (2012) 247 CLR 129, 143 [46] and [50]; [2012] HCA 54.[7] LPD Holdings (Aust) Pty Ltd v Russells (A Firm) [2015] QCA 122 per Margaret McMurdo P at [13]-[15].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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