LPD Holdings (Aust) Pty Ltd v Russells (A Firm)

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

LPD Holdings (Aust) Pty Ltd v Russells (A Firm) [2015] QCA 122

PARTIES:

LPD HOLDINGS (AUST) PTY LTD
ACN 060 214 511
(appellant)
v
RUSSELLS (A FIRM)
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 8254 of 2014
DC No 1716 of 2014

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:


District Court at Brisbane – Unreported, 5 August 2014

DELIVERED ON:

26 June 2015

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

20 March 2015

JUDGES:

Margaret McMurdo P and Gotterson and Philippides JJA
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made

ORDERS:

1.   The application for leave to amend the notice of appeal is refused.

2.   The appeal is dismissed with costs.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS – IN GENERAL – OTHER MATTERS – where the appellant is the former client of the respondent, a law firm – where the respondent brought a claim against the appellant for the recovery of legal costs and disbursements – where the appellant did not file a notice of intention to defend or defence within the required time and default judgment was entered in favour of the respondent – where the appellant applied to the court below for orders that the default judgment be set aside, the whole of the legal costs be assessed, and the respondent deliver to the appellant itemised bills in respect of the costs – where the primary judge held that while the appellant’s delay in instituting its application was minimal and no impediment to its success, it had not demonstrated it had a reasonable defence to the respondent’s claim – where the primary judge also found that an agreement in September 2013 compromised each parties’ positions as to fees payable – where the primary judge dismissed the appellant’s application – where the appellant filed a notice of appeal – where the appellant originally contended that the primary judge erred in failing to give sufficient weight to the appellant’s explanation for the delay; in finding that the appellant had no defence to the claim; in taking into account the probable cost of the assessment of the appellant’s costs; in finding that the bills were itemised bills; and in finding that the appellant’s rights to an assessment of its costs merged in the September 2013 agreement – where the appellant amended its grounds of appeal in its second proposed amended notice of appeal to include the ground: that to the extent the September 2013 agreement precluded a court from ordering that the legal costs be assessed, it is void as against public policy – where at the hearing of the appeal the appellant remained confused as to its proposed grounds of appeal and the orders it was seeking – where counsel for the appellant submitted that it was now only seeking a declaration that the September 2013 agreement did not compromise the appellant’s rights to an assessment of its legal costs – where the appellant is seeking to…

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Details
Case
[2015] QCA 122
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of LPD Holdings (Aust) Pty Ltd v Russells (A Firm), LPD, the former client of the law firm Russells, sought to challenge a default judgment entered against it for the recovery of legal costs and disbursements. The primary judge dismissed LPD’s application to set aside the default judgment, assess the legal costs, and obtain itemised bills from Russells. LPD appealed this decision, initially contending that the primary judge erred in various respects but later seeking only a declaration that a 2013 agreement did not compromise its rights to an assessment of its legal costs.

The court had to determine whether the primary judge's dismissal of LPD's application was correct and whether the court should grant the declaration sought by LPD on appeal. The court noted that LPD had conceded it had no grounds to set aside the default judgment and had paid the full amount, and it was clear that the application to assess costs was misconceived because the costs exceeded the District Court jurisdictional limit. The court further found that LPD did not argue below that the 2013 agreement was void as being against public policy, and if it were to entertain such an argument on appeal, it should be rejected.

The court held that the application to amend the notice of appeal should be refused and the appeal dismissed with costs. The court reasoned that while it had the power to make a declaration, it would be reluctant to do so unless it was clearly in the interests of justice. Given that LPD had already conceded it had no grounds to set aside the default judgment and had paid the full amount, and its application to assess costs was misconceived, the court found the appeal pointless and misconceived. The court concluded that it was not an appropriate case for the declaration sought by LPD.

ORDERS:
1. The application for leave to amend the notice of appeal is refused.
2. The appeal is dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to amend the notice of appeal is refused.

2. The appeal is dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

LPD did not argue below that the September 2013 agreement was void as being against public policy. If the Court entertained the argument on appeal, it should be rejected. There is nothing against public policy or the terms of the Legal Profession Act which prohibit a solicitor and client from reaching a genuine compromise in a costs dispute. Costs applications must be made under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR) which provide for the resolution of disputes by alternative dispute resolution. The application to amend the notice of appeal should be refused. The declaration should not be granted. The appeal should be dismissed with costs.Conclusion The primary judge considered the case “curious”. Like Alice’s adventures in Wonderland, this case on appeal became “curiouser and curiouser.”[17] As Russells rightly identifies and as counsel for LPD well knows, appeals are from orders, not reasons. The primary judge dismissed LPD’s application with costs. Its application is set out in [1] of these reasons.[17]Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, Ch 2. LPD sought at first instance to set aside the default judgment entered on 23 June 2014. LPD now concedes it has no grounds to set aside that judgment which it has paid in full. The primary judge was right to refuse this part of LPD’s application. LPD sought at first instance to have all Russells’ costs assessed in accordance with the Legal Profession Act and the UCPR. LPD now concedes that this was misconceived as its costs were about $1.4m, well in excess of the District Court jurisdictional limit. For that reason and without considering LPD’s arguments as to the construction of the Legal Profession Act, the primary judge was right to dismiss this part of LPD’s application. LPD also sought at first instance an order that Russells deliver itemised bills in respect of seven invoices. LPD no longer seeks that order. It follows that the primary judge was right to dismiss this part of LPD’s application and properly dismissed the whole application with costs. This Court has the power to make a declaration of the kind sought by LPD in its proposed amended notice of appeal. But an appeal court is not a court at first instance and would be reluctant to grant a declaration unless to do so was clearly in the interests of justice. The declaration was not sought at first instance. The appeal itself has become pointless and is misconceived. I am unpersuaded this is an appropriate case for this Court to grant a declaration of the kind sought. LPD has brought an application in the Trial Division of the Supreme Court for a costs assessment of Russells’ bills. If LPD wishes to apply for a declaration concerning the September 2013 agreement, the sensible course would be for it to do so in the Trial Division, with the application perhaps returnable at the hearing of LPD’s application for the costs assessment. For these reasons the application for leave to amend the notice of appeal should be refused and the appeal dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established