SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Liquorland (Aust) P/L v Gold Coast CC & Anor
[2002] QCA 248PARTIES:
LIQUORLAND (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD
ACN 007 572 414
(applicant/applicant/appellant)
v
GOLD COAST CITY COUNCIL
(respondent/first respondent)
PERRY DAVIES
(co-respondent/second respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 2754 of 2002
P&E Appeal No 5404 of 2001DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Application for Leave Integrated Planning Act
ORIGINATING COURT:
Planning and Environment Court at Southport
DELIVERED ON:
19 July 2002
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
26 June 2002
JUDGES:
Davies, Williams and Jerrard JJA
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders madeORDER:
1. Application for leave to appeal granted.
2. Appeal dismissed.
3. Appeal to the Planning and Environment Court against the decision of the Council on 21 September 2001 dismissed.
4. Appellant pay respondents' costs of this appeal.CATCHWORDS:
ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING - DEVELOPMENT CONTROL - CONSENTS, APPROVALS AND PERMITS - CONDITIONS - GENERALLY - where the Council approved a development with conditions - where the Council subsequently approved a second development in respect of the subject land with conditions - whether a condition in the second approval was inconsistent with a condition of the earlier approval still in effect for the development - whether s 3.5.32 of the Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Qld) applies
ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING - DEVELOPMENT CONTROL - CONSENTS, APPROVALS AND PERMITS - CONDITIONS - GENERALLY - where the Council approved the development of a hotel with conditions - where the Council subsequently approved development in the hotel - whether there was an invalidating inconsistency between a condition in the approval for the hotel and the approval for the development in the hotel
ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING - DEVELOPMENT CONTROL - CONSENTS, APPROVALS AND PERMITS - CONDITIONS - GENERALLY - where two development applications made to the Council - whether the applicant to the Council should have applied for the entire proposed use in one application - whether the development approval was piecemeal - whether the principle in Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council should be applied
Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Qld), s 3.5.32, s 6.1.23
Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council (1980) 145 CLR 485, distinguished
COUNSEL:
P J Lyons QC for the applicant/appellant
R S Litster for the first respondent
N M Cooke QC, with W L Cochrane, for the second respondentSOLICITORS:
McCullough Robertson for the applicant/appellant
McDonald Balanda & Associates (Surfers Paradise) for the first respondent
Hickey Lawyers (Bundall) for the second respondentDAVIES JA:
1. This appeal and the questions in issue
The applicant ("Liquorland") seeks leave to appeal against a judgment of the Planning and Environment Court given on 11 February 2002. Liquorland had appealed against a decision of the respondent Council ("the Council") on 21 September 2001 to grant a development approval to the second respondent ("Davies") for the conduct of "Indoor Recreation (Gaming Machines) in association with an approved Hotel" on land at West Burleigh, subject…
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- Case
- [2002] QCA 248
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court involved whether section 3.5.32 of the Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Qld) applied to make the conditions inconsistent and whether the principle in Pioneer Concrete should be applied to invalidate the approvals due to piecemeal development. The court had to consider the nature of the conditions and whether they could co-exist or if one superseded the other. Additionally, the court examined whether the two development applications should have been combined into one.
The court found that section 3.5.32 did not apply to render the conditions inconsistent. The court determined that the conditions could co-exist, and there was no invalidation. Regarding the principle in Pioneer Concrete, the court held that it did not apply as the approvals did not amount to piecemeal development. The court held that the Council's decisions were valid and dismissed the appeal. The court granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal itself, and the appeal to the Planning and Environment Court was also dismissed. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondents' costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Application for leave to appeal granted.
2. Appeal dismissed.
3. Appeal to the Planning and Environment Court against the decision of the Council on 21 September 2001 dismissed.
4. Appellant pay respondents' costs of this appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the Court of Appeal as an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court had previously dismissed Liquorland's application for judicial review of the Council's decision. The appeal to the Court of Appeal was heard by a panel of three judges. Liquorland argued that there was an invalidating inconsistency between conditions in the two Council approvals and that the two developments should have been applied for together. The Council argued that there was no inconsistency and that the two approvals were valid. The Court of Appeal heard argument from both parties and reserved its decision.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether a condition in the second approval was inconsistent with a condition of the earlier approval still in effect for the development.
2. Whether s 3.5.32 of the Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Qld) applies in this case.
3. Whether there was an invalidating inconsistency between a condition in the approval for the hotel and the approval for the development in the hotel.
4. Whether the applicant to the Council should have applied for the entire proposed use in one application.
5. Whether the development approval was piecemeal.
6. Whether the principle in Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council should be applied.
Held
1. The court concluded that a condition in the second approval was not inconsistent with a condition of the earlier approval still in effect for the development.
2. The court determined that s 3.5.32 of the Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Qld) does not apply in this case.
3. The court held that there was no invalidating inconsistency between a condition in the approval for the hotel and the approval for the development in the hotel.
4. The court found that the applicant to the Council should have applied for the entire proposed use in one application.
5. The court ruled that the development approval was not piecemeal.
6. The court decided not to apply the principle in Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined the conditions attached to the two approvals and determined that the second condition did not conflict with the first. The court reasoned that because the approvals were for different phases of the development, the conditions could be viewed as sequential and not contradictory. Regarding s 3.5.32, the court held that the provision was not applicable as it concerns the revocation of approval rather than the consistency of conditions. The court further clarified that the approvals for the hotel and the subsequent development within it were not inconsistent, as they related to different stages of the project. The court opined that the applicant should have sought a single approval for the entire project to avoid piecemeal development. The court found no merit in applying the principle from Pioneer Concrete, as the case concerned different principles and factual circumstances. The court’s decision focused on the interpretation of conditions and the sequential nature of development approvals, establishing that conditions can be applied in stages without invalidating inconsistency if they are not contradictory.