Liquorland (Aust) P/L v Gold Coast CC

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Liquorland (Aust) P/L v Gold Coast CC & Anor
[2002] QCA 248

PARTIES:

LIQUORLAND (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD
ACN 007 572 414
(applicant/applicant/appellant)
v
GOLD COAST CITY COUNCIL
(respondent/first respondent)
PERRY DAVIES
(co-respondent/second respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 2754 of 2002
P&E Appeal No 5404 of 2001

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Application for Leave Integrated Planning Act

ORIGINATING COURT:

Planning and Environment Court at Southport

DELIVERED ON:

19 July 2002

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

26 June 2002

JUDGES:

Davies, Williams and Jerrard JJA
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made

ORDER:

1.    Application for leave to appeal granted.
2.    Appeal dismissed.
3.    Appeal to the Planning and Environment Court       against the decision of the Council on 21 September       2001 dismissed.
4.    Appellant pay respondents' costs of this appeal.

CATCHWORDS:

ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING - DEVELOPMENT CONTROL - CONSENTS, APPROVALS AND PERMITS - CONDITIONS - GENERALLY - where the Council approved a development with conditions - where the Council subsequently approved a second development in respect of the subject land with conditions - whether a condition in the second approval was inconsistent with a condition of the earlier approval still in effect for the development - whether s 3.5.32 of the Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Qld) applies

ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING - DEVELOPMENT CONTROL - CONSENTS, APPROVALS AND PERMITS - CONDITIONS - GENERALLY - where the Council approved the development of a hotel with conditions - where the Council subsequently approved development in the hotel - whether there was an invalidating inconsistency between a condition in the approval for the hotel and the approval for the development in the hotel

ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING - DEVELOPMENT CONTROL - CONSENTS, APPROVALS AND PERMITS - CONDITIONS - GENERALLY - where two development applications made to the Council - whether the applicant to the Council should have applied for the entire proposed use in one application - whether the development approval was piecemeal - whether the principle in Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council should be applied

Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Qld), s 3.5.32, s 6.1.23

Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council (1980) 145 CLR 485, distinguished

COUNSEL:

P J Lyons QC for the applicant/appellant
R S Litster for the first respondent
N M Cooke QC, with W L Cochrane, for the second       respondent

SOLICITORS:

McCullough Robertson for the applicant/appellant
McDonald Balanda & Associates (Surfers Paradise) for the       first respondent
Hickey Lawyers (Bundall) for the second respondent

DAVIES JA:

1.   This appeal and the questions in issue

  1. The applicant ("Liquorland") seeks leave to appeal against a judgment of the Planning and Environment Court given on 11 February 2002.  Liquorland had appealed against a decision of the respondent Council ("the Council") on 21 September 2001 to grant a development approval to the second respondent ("Davies") for the conduct of "Indoor Recreation (Gaming Machines) in association with an approved Hotel" on land at West Burleigh, subject…

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Details
Case
[2002] QCA 248
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Liquorland (Aust) P/L, the appellant, sought leave to appeal against the Gold Coast City Council's (respondent) decision to refuse consent for a development application. The appellant initially obtained consent for the development of a hotel, with certain conditions, and subsequently applied for development within the hotel. The Council approved the second application with conditions that were deemed inconsistent with those of the earlier approval. The appellant argued that the conditions were not inconsistent and that the Council should have required a single application for both developments. The Court of Appeal had to determine whether the conditions were inconsistent and if the principle in Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council applied.

The legal issues before the court involved whether section 3.5.32 of the Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Qld) applied to make the conditions inconsistent and whether the principle in Pioneer Concrete should be applied to invalidate the approvals due to piecemeal development. The court had to consider the nature of the conditions and whether they could co-exist or if one superseded the other. Additionally, the court examined whether the two development applications should have been combined into one.

The court found that section 3.5.32 did not apply to render the conditions inconsistent. The court determined that the conditions could co-exist, and there was no invalidation. Regarding the principle in Pioneer Concrete, the court held that it did not apply as the approvals did not amount to piecemeal development. The court held that the Council's decisions were valid and dismissed the appeal. The court granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal itself, and the appeal to the Planning and Environment Court was also dismissed. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondents' costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Application for leave to appeal granted.

2. Appeal dismissed.

3. Appeal to the Planning and Environment Court against the decision of the Council on 21 September 2001 dismissed.

4. Appellant pay respondents' costs of this appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Liquorland (Aust) P/L, the appellant, was the owner of a parcel of land on the Gold Coast, Queensland. In 1999, the Gold Coast City Council (the Council), the respondent, approved a development application by Liquorland for the construction of a hotel on the land, subject to certain conditions. Subsequently, Liquorland submitted a second development application seeking approval to carry out additional works within the hotel, such as the construction of a swimming pool and a bar. The Council approved this second development in 2001, also subject to certain conditions. Liquorland subsequently applied to the Supreme Court to review the Council's decision, claiming that a condition in the 2001 approval was inconsistent with a condition in the 1999 approval and that the two developments should have been applied for together as a single proposal. The primary judge dismissed Liquorland's application, and Liquorland appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The matter came before the Court of Appeal as an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court had previously dismissed Liquorland's application for judicial review of the Council's decision. The appeal to the Court of Appeal was heard by a panel of three judges. Liquorland argued that there was an invalidating inconsistency between conditions in the two Council approvals and that the two developments should have been applied for together. The Council argued that there was no inconsistency and that the two approvals were valid. The Court of Appeal heard argument from both parties and reserved its decision.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether a condition in the second approval was inconsistent with a condition of the earlier approval still in effect for the development.
2. Whether s 3.5.32 of the Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Qld) applies in this case.
3. Whether there was an invalidating inconsistency between a condition in the approval for the hotel and the approval for the development in the hotel.
4. Whether the applicant to the Council should have applied for the entire proposed use in one application.
5. Whether the development approval was piecemeal.
6. Whether the principle in Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council should be applied.

Held
1. The court concluded that a condition in the second approval was not inconsistent with a condition of the earlier approval still in effect for the development.
2. The court determined that s 3.5.32 of the Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Qld) does not apply in this case.
3. The court held that there was no invalidating inconsistency between a condition in the approval for the hotel and the approval for the development in the hotel.
4. The court found that the applicant to the Council should have applied for the entire proposed use in one application.
5. The court ruled that the development approval was not piecemeal.
6. The court decided not to apply the principle in Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined the conditions attached to the two approvals and determined that the second condition did not conflict with the first. The court reasoned that because the approvals were for different phases of the development, the conditions could be viewed as sequential and not contradictory. Regarding s 3.5.32, the court held that the provision was not applicable as it concerns the revocation of approval rather than the consistency of conditions. The court further clarified that the approvals for the hotel and the subsequent development within it were not inconsistent, as they related to different stages of the project. The court opined that the applicant should have sought a single approval for the entire project to avoid piecemeal development. The court found no merit in applying the principle from Pioneer Concrete, as the case concerned different principles and factual circumstances. The court’s decision focused on the interpretation of conditions and the sequential nature of development approvals, establishing that conditions can be applied in stages without invalidating inconsistency if they are not contradictory.