IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S210 of 2018
B e t w e e n -
SHU YUEN LAM
Plaintiff
and
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Defendant
NETTLE J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON TUESDAY, 12 MARCH 2019, AT 9.26 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
HIS HONOUR: For the reasons which I now direct be incorporated into the transcript, it is ordered that:
1.The plaintiff’s application for a constitutional or other writ is allowed.
2.The decision of the Minister’s delegate of 18 March 2016 to refuse the plaintiff’s application for visa is quashed.
3.The Minister is ordered to determine the plaintiff’s application for visa according to law.
This is an Application for a Constitutional or other Writ under Pt 25 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth) by which the plaintiff seeks certiorari to quash a decision of the Minister’s delegate of 18 March 2016 to refuse to grant the plaintiff a Temporary Graduate (Graduate Work) (Subclass 485) visa, and mandamus to compel the Minister to determine the application for visa according to law. The application is very substantially out of time, but as will appear there is a satisfactory explanation for the delay.
On 30 November 2015, the plaintiff applied for a Temporary Graduate (Graduate Work) (Subclass 485) visa.
The criteria for the grant of a Subclass 485 visa included, under reg 485.224 of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), the following:
“(1)The skills of the applicant for the applicant’s nominated skilled occupation have been assessed, during the last 3 years, by a relevant assessing authority as suitable for that occupation.
(1A)If the assessment is expressed to be valid for a particular period, that period has not ended.
(2)If the applicant’s skills were assessed on the basis of a qualification obtained in Australia while the applicant held a student visa, the qualification was obtained as a result of studying a registered course.”
At the time of lodging his application for visa, the plaintiff had not been assessed by a relevant assessing authority as suitable for his occupation of Carpenter 331212, but he had undergone the assessment process and evidently expected that he would pass the assessment.
Contrary to his expectation, on 11 December 2015, the plaintiff received a letter from the assessing authority, Trades Recognition Australia (“the TRA”) (which is part of the Commonwealth Department of Education and Training), that he had not been successful in obtaining a skills assessment as a carpenter. The letter stated inter alia as follows:
“TRA could not verify your work statement from GoodSmile Australia as you have provided an address, landline telephone number and mobile telephone number which could not be linked to the business by TRA. If you intend to apply for a review or reapply, you need to provide certified copies of independently verifiable evidence to identify a link between the business address, landline telephone number and mobile telephone number and GoodSmile Australia. This…
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- Case
- [2019] HCATrans 43
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the Minister's delegate acted with legal unreasonableness in refusing Mr. Lam's visa application on 18 March 2016, rather than waiting for the outcome of a skills assessment review by Trades Recognition Australia (TRA). Mr. Lam had applied for the visa on 30 November 2015, and a key criterion was a skills assessment by a relevant authority. While his initial assessment was unsuccessful, he lodged a review application with TRA on 4 March 2016, which was acknowledged and stated to be typically completed within 30 working days. The delegate refused the visa on 18 March 2016, despite Mr. Lam having uploaded the TRA acknowledgement letter on 6 March 2016, and only six days later, on 24 March 2016, the TRA review was successful.
The Court reasoned that the delegate's decision to refuse the visa without waiting for the TRA review outcome was legally unreasonable. The plaintiff's act of providing the TRA letter implicitly requested a deferral, and the delegate was aware from the letter that the review was pending and likely to take up to 30 days. The Court found no evidence that the delegate considered the possibility of waiting, nor that there were good reasons to proceed immediately. The delegate's failure to engage with the possibility of a short delay, especially when it could mean the difference between success and failure for the applicant, demonstrated a degree of arbitrariness rendering the decision legally unreasonable. The Court also rejected the Minister's argument that the applicant could rely on a successful review at a later merits review stage, stating that this did not excuse an initial unreasonable decision.
Consequently, the High Court allowed Mr. Lam's application for a constitutional writ. The decision of the Minister's delegate to refuse the visa application was quashed, and the Minister was ordered to determine Mr. Lam's visa application according to law.
Background
Background to the litigation
The plaintiff’s case is that the delegate acted with legal unreasonableness in proceeding to make a decision to reject the visa application without waiting for the TRA to assess the review application for the plaintiff’s nominated skilled occupation of carpenter. The plaintiff submits that, given that the delegate was on notice from 6 March 2016 that the TRA was reviewing the plaintiff’s skills assessment and that the review would likely take no more than 30 days to complete, and given what may fairly be described as the admission constituted of the statement in the Department’s automated email of 26 March 2016 that the delegate understood that it could take more than 28 days for the TRA to complete an assessment, no reasonable decision-maker would have proceeded without waiting the 30 days unless there were good reason to do so, and there was none. The Minister contended to the contrary that there was an evident basis for the delegate proceeding to determine the application without waiting the extra time, inasmuch as the delegate was under a statutory obligation to consider the visa application and it was not apparent that the plaintiff specifically requested the delegate to defer making a decision until the TRA’s review was completed. However, the Court rejected the Minister’s submission and considered that the delegate acted with legal unreasonableness in adopting the course she did.
The matter came before the High Court of Australia as an application for a constitutional or other writ under Part 25 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth). The plaintiff, Shu Yuen Lam, sought certiorari to quash a decision of the Minister’s delegate dated 18 March 2016, which had refused to grant her a Temporary Graduate (Graduate Work) (Subclass 485) visa, as well as mandamus to compel the Minister to determine her visa application according to law. The application was filed on 15 August 2018, which was significantly out of time. However, Lam applied for an extension of time, which was granted by the Court, finding that there was a satisfactory explanation for the delay. Prior to this application, Lam had applied for merits review of the delegate’s decision to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), but she was one day late in filing her application and consequently, the AAT found it had no jurisdiction to hear the matter. Unaware that the High Court had exclusive jurisdiction to review primary decisions under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), Lam filed an application for judicial review in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 1 July 2016. The Minister filed a response contending that the Federal Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction, and Lam, having consulted the Federal Circuit Court website, believed the court did have jurisdiction. Consequently, the matter stood in the lists of the Federal Circuit Court awaiting hearing until the Minister filed written submissions on 6 July 2018. Upon reading the submissions, Lam discontinued the proceeding on 17 July 2018.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Did the delegate act with legal unreasonableness in proceeding to make a decision to reject the plaintiff's visa application without waiting for the outcome of the TRA review?
2. Was there an evident basis for the delegate to proceed to determine the visa application without waiting the time required for completion of the TRA review?
3. Was the delay in the plaintiff's application for judicial review sufficiently justified to warrant an extension of time under section 486A of the Migration Act?
4. Did the Federal Circuit Court have jurisdiction to review the delegate's decision, or was the High Court the only court with such jurisdiction?
5. Was the Minister's contention that the Federal Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to the extent that the plaintiff should be ordered to pay the Minister's costs of the proceeding in the Federal Circuit Court properly decided?
Held
1. The delegate acted with legal unreasonableness in proceeding to make a decision to reject the plaintiff's visa application without waiting for the outcome of the TRA review. The appeal was allowed, and the decision of the Minister’s delegate was quashed.
2. There was no evident basis for the delegate to proceed to determine the visa application without waiting the time required for completion of the TRA review. The court rejected the Minister’s submission, concluding that the delegate acted with legal unreasonableness.
3. The delay in the plaintiff's application for judicial review was sufficiently justified to warrant an extension of time under section 486A of the Migration Act. The Court granted the plaintiff’s application for an extension of time.
4. The Federal Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction to review the delegate's decision; the High Court was the only court with such jurisdiction. The plaintiff’s application for a writ in the Federal Circuit Court was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
5. The Minister's contention that the Federal Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to the extent that the plaintiff should be ordered to pay the Minister's costs of the proceeding in the Federal Circuit Court was not properly decided. The order for the plaintiff to pay the Minister's costs in the Federal Circuit Court was set aside.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The primary issue in Lam v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection was whether the delegate acted with legal unreasonableness in proceeding to make a decision to reject the plaintiff's visa application without waiting for the outcome of the Trades Recognition Australia (TRA) review. The Court found that the delegate acted with legal unreasonableness by not waiting for the outcome of the TRA review. The Court held that the delegate was on notice that the TRA was reviewing the plaintiff's skills assessment and that the review would likely take no more than 30 days to complete. The Court concluded that no reasonable decision-maker would have proceeded without waiting the 30 days unless there were good reason to do so, and there was none. The Court further held that it was necessarily implicit in the plaintiff's act of furnishing the TRA letter to the delegate that the plaintiff was requesting that the delegate stay her hand until the review had been completed.
The Court also considered whether there was an evident basis for the delegate to proceed to determine the visa application without waiting the time required for completion of the TRA review. The Minister contended that there was an evident basis for the delegate proceeding to determine the application without waiting the extra time, inasmuch as the delegate was under a statutory obligation to consider the visa application. However, the Court rejected this argument, finding that the delegate entirely failed to engage with the possibility of delaying her decision until the likely completion of the TRA review within the next 30 days. The Court held that the delegate acted with legal unreasonableness in adopting the course she did.
The Court also considered whether the delay in the plaintiff's application for judicial review was sufficiently justified to warrant an extension of time under section 486A of the Migration Act. The Court found that there was a satisfactory reason for the delay and that the plaintiff's case was compelling. The Court held that the delay was the product of the plaintiff's understandable ignorance of the arcane complexities and interrelationship of merits review and judicial review under the Migration Act.
The Court also considered whether the Federal Circuit Court had jurisdiction to review the delegate's decision, or whether the High Court was the only court with such jurisdiction. The Court held that only the High Court had jurisdiction to review the decision of a primary decision-maker under the Migration Act. The Court further held that the Minister's contention that the Federal Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to the extent that the plaintiff should be ordered to pay the Minister's costs of the proceeding in the Federal Circuit Court was properly decided.
In conclusion, the ratio decidendi of Lam v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection is that a delegate must consider all relevant factors before making a decision, and that a delegate's failure to wait for the outcome of a pending review when the delay is likely to be short and the outcome likely to be determinative of the application is legally unreasonable. The Court also held that only the High Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of a primary decision-maker under the Migration Act. The Court did not depart from or distinguish any prior authority in reaching its decision.