Lam v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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[2019] HCATrans 174

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S141 of 2019

B e t w e e n -

SHU YUEN LAM

Plaintiff

and

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Defendant

GORDON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 30 AUGUST 2019, AT 10.20 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

HER HONOUR:   For the reasons that I now publish the application for a constitutional or other writ should be dismissed with costs.  I publish those reasons.

In matter S141 of 2019, the order of the Court is:

1.The plaintiff’s application for a constitutional or other writ filed on 8 May 2019 is dismissed with costs.

I publish that order and direct that the reasons as published be incorporated into the transcript.

On 8 May 2019, the plaintiff filed an application for a constitutional or other writ, supported by an affidavit affirmed by the plaintiff on 8 May 2019, seeking to “quash” a decision by a delegate of the defendant (“the Minister”) dated 3 April 2019 to refuse to grant the plaintiff a Temporary Graduate (Class VC) Temporary Graduate (Graduate Work) (subclass 485) visa (“the second delegate’s decision”).

The defendant filed his response on 26 July 2019.  The plaintiff then filed a reply on 5 August 2019. 

For the reasons that follow, the application for a constitutional or other writ should be dismissed pursuant to r 25.09.1 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth).

Background

On 30 November 2015, the plaintiff applied for a Temporary Graduate (Graduate Work) (subclass 485) visa.  On 8 March 2016, a delegate of the Minister refused the application (“the first delegate’s decision”).  On 15 August 2018, the plaintiff applied for a constitutional or other writ.  On 12 March 2019, Nettle J set aside the first delegate’s decision[1].

On 3 April 2019, a delegate (being a different delegate to the delegate who made the decision that was quashed by Nettle J) made a decision to refuse to grant the plaintiff the visa (“the second delegate’s decision”). 

Application should be dismissed

As the Minister submitted, each of the first delegate’s decision and the second delegate’s decision was a “Part 5 - reviewable decision” within the meaning of s 338 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and, as such, is subject to merits review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) if the plaintiff lodged an application with the Tribunal within the prescribed time limits[2].  In respect of the first delegate’s decision, the plaintiff’s application to the Tribunal was out of time and, thus, this Court was the only forum in which the plaintiff could have validly challenged the first delegate’s decision.

[2]Migration Act, s 347(1)(b); Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg 4.10.

The position with respect to the second delegate’s decision is different.  The plaintiff lodged an application for review of that decision with the Tribunal on 24 April 2019.  The Minister accepts that…

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Details
Case
[2019] HCATrans 174
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The plaintiff sought a constitutional or other writ from the High Court of Australia to quash a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection on 3 April 2019, which refused the plaintiff a Temporary Graduate (subclass 485) visa. This decision followed an earlier refusal of the same visa application, which had been set aside by Nettle J of the High Court on 12 March 2019. The defendant, the Minister, filed a response, and the plaintiff filed a reply.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether it was appropriate to entertain the plaintiff's application for a constitutional or other writ, given the existence of statutory review mechanisms. Specifically, the court had to determine if the plaintiff had exhausted available avenues of appeal or review, or if there were exceptional circumstances justifying the High Court's intervention in its original jurisdiction.

The court reasoned that both the initial and the subsequent decisions to refuse the visa were "Part 5 - reviewable decisions" under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), meaning they were subject to merits review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. While the plaintiff's challenge to the first decision was made in the High Court because the Tribunal application was out of time, the plaintiff had subsequently lodged a valid application with the Tribunal to review the second delegate's decision. Citing established principles, the court held that a litigant must generally exhaust statutory rights of appeal or review before invoking the original jurisdiction of the High Court for a writ. As there were no exceptional circumstances presented to warrant deviation from this principle, and the plaintiff was actively pursuing review of the second decision in the Tribunal, the court found it inappropriate to consider the application. The court also rejected the plaintiff's submission for a stay of proceedings.

Consequently, the High Court dismissed the plaintiff's application for a constitutional or other writ with costs, pursuant to rule 25.09.1 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth).

Background

Background to the litigation

S-Hu Yuen Lam applied for a Temporary Graduate (Graduate Work) (subclass 485) visa on 30 November 2015. On 8 March 2016, a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection refused the application. On 15 August 2018, Lam applied for a writ of quo warranto to challenge the delegate's decision. On 12 March 2019, Nettle J set aside the delegate's decision. On 3 April 2019, a different delegate of the Minister made a decision to again refuse Lam's visa application. Lam then filed an application for a constitutional or other writ in the High Court, seeking to "quash" the second delegate's decision. Lam lodged an application for review of the second delegate's decision with the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on 24 April 2019. The Minister accepts that Lam's application to the Tribunal was lodged within the prescribed time limit and is valid on its face, ongoing and yet to be concluded. The Minister also accepts that if the Tribunal's decision is unfavourable to Lam, Lam would be able to seek judicial review before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The Minister submitted that the second delegate's decision is a "Part 5 - reviewable decision" within the meaning of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and is subject to merits review by the Tribunal. It is not appropriate for the High Court to determine Lam's application for a writ because Lam has not exhausted its statutory rights of appeal. The proper course is for Lam to agitate the issues in the Tribunal rather than seek to raise them in the High Court. Therefore, Lam's application for a writ should be dismissed.

In the case of Lam v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the plaintiff, S-Hu Yuen Lam, applied to the High Court for a constitutional or other writ on 8 May 2019, seeking to challenge a decision by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection dated 3 April 2019. This decision had refused the plaintiff a Temporary Graduate (Graduate Work) (subclass 485) visa. The defendant, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, filed a response on 26 July 2019, and the plaintiff submitted a reply on 5 August 2019. The matter came before the High Court for the plaintiff's application to be dismissed. The plaintiff had previously applied for a visa on 30 November 2015, which was refused by a delegate on 8 March 2016. The plaintiff subsequently applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) for a review of the decision, but this application was out of time. Nettle J set aside the first delegate's decision on 12 March 2019, and a new delegate issued the decision on 3 April 2019 that the plaintiff sought to challenge in the High Court. However, the plaintiff had also lodged an application for review of the second delegate's decision with the AAT on 24 April 2019, which was within the prescribed time limit and was ongoing. Consequently, the High Court held that the plaintiff should have exhausted her statutory rights of appeal before seeking to challenge the decision in the Court, making the application an abuse of process.

The case highlights the importance of exhausting statutory rights of appeal before seeking relief in the High Court. In this instance, the plaintiff had a valid application with the AAT for review of the second delegate's decision, and the Court found it inappropriate to entertain the application for a writ without the plaintiff exhausting her statutory rights of review first. The application was dismissed with costs, reflecting the Court's view that the plaintiff should have pursued her statutory remedies before approaching the High Court directly.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Is the second delegate's decision a reviewable decision under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)?
2. Did the plaintiff exhaust all statutory rights of appeal before filing the application for a writ in the High Court?
3. Are there any exceptional circumstances that warrant the High Court considering the application without exhausting statutory rights of review?
4. Is the plaintiff's application for a writ an abuse of process given the available statutory review mechanisms?

Held
1. The court concluded that the second delegate's decision is a reviewable decision under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). As such, the decision is subject to merits review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) if an application is lodged within the prescribed time limits.

2. The court found that the plaintiff did not exhaust all statutory rights of appeal before filing the application for a writ in the High Court. The plaintiff had lodged an application for review of the second delegate's decision with the Tribunal within the prescribed time limit.

3. The court determined that there are no exceptional circumstances that warrant the High Court considering the application without the plaintiff exhausting their statutory rights of review. The plaintiff must pursue the issues in the Tribunal instead of seeking to raise them in the High Court.

4. The court held that the plaintiff's application for a writ is an abuse of process given the available statutory review mechanisms. The plaintiff is seeking to review the decision in the Tribunal, which is the proper course of action.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court dismissed the plaintiff's application for a writ, holding that the second delegate's decision to refuse a visa is a reviewable decision under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and thus subject to merits review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The court confirmed that the second delegate's decision is amenable to appeal, meaning the plaintiff must exhaust all statutory rights of review before seeking relief from the High Court. The court noted that the plaintiff had indeed lodged an application for review with the AAT, which was valid and ongoing. The plaintiff did not present any exceptional circumstances that would warrant the High Court considering the application without exhausting statutory rights of review, nor did the plaintiff identify any facts or matters that might constitute an exceptional circumstance.

The court further held that the plaintiff's application for a writ was an abuse of process, given the available statutory review mechanisms. This aligns with the principle that a litigant must exhaust statutory rights of appeal before the High Court will entertain an application for mandamus or prohibition. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the proceedings should be stayed rather than dismissed, finding that a stay would serve no purpose as the statutory review process was still ongoing and effective.

In reaching its decision, the court followed the established principle that the High Court should not interfere with decisions that are amenable to appeal, regardless of whether leave is required for that appeal. This principle was articulated by Nettle J in Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union v Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate and further supported by Gageler J in Waters v Federal Court of Australia and the Judges Thereof. The court distinguished the current case from those where the High Court may intervene due to exceptional circumstances or where the statutory review process is ineffective or unavailable.

The ratio decidendi of the decision is that the High Court will not entertain an application for a writ to review a decision that is subject to merits review by the AAT unless the statutory rights of review have been exhausted or there are exceptional circumstances warranting direct review by the High Court. In this case, the statutory review process was both available and effective, thus warranting dismissal of the plaintiff's application.