JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
CITATION: KRYSIAK -v- PUBLIC TRANSPORT AUTHORITY [No 2] [2017] WASC 103
CORAM: PRITCHARD J
HEARD: 22 MARCH 2017
DELIVERED : 13 APRIL 2017
FILE NO/S: GDA 5 of 2016
BETWEEN: EUGENIA KRYSIAK
Appellant
AND
PUBLIC TRANSPORT AUTHORITY
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :SENIOR MEMBER McNAB
File No :EOA 34 of 2015
Catchwords:
Leave to appeal - Applicable principles - Turns on own facts
Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) - Indirect discrimination - Meaning of 'requirement or condition' with which a person with an impairment is unable to comply - Provision of a service - Whether change in a bus route constituted indirect discrimination
State Administrative Tribunal - Jurisdiction - Complaint referred under Equal Opportunity Act 1994 (WA) - Whether exercise of original jurisdiction
State Administrative Tribunal - Power - Procedure - Section 47 State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) - Whether Tribunal has power to strike out an application following referral of complaint by Equal Opportunity Commissioner
Legislation:
Building Act 2011 (WA), s 119, s 120, s 121, s 122
Dog Act 1976 (WA), s 16A, s 17, s 26, s 27
Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (Vic)
Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA), s 3, s 66A, s 66J, s 66K, s 66V, s 66ZE, s 66ZF, s 84, s 89, s 90, s 93, s 107
Mental Health Act 2014 (WA), s 494
Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA), s 236, s 244
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 5, s 13, s 15, s 17, s 27, s 29, s 36, s 42, s 47, s 105
Result:
Leave to appeal refused
Appeal dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellant: In person
Respondent: Mr T E Pontre
Solicitors:
Appellant: In person
Respondent: State Solicitor for Western Australia
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Aigner v State of Queensland [2012] QCAT 397
Armstrong v Commissioner for Consumer Protection [2014] WASCA 71
Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd v Banovic [1989] HCA 56; (1989) 168 CLR 165
Chin v Legal Practice Board Western Australia [2009] WASCA 117
Edney v Public Transport Authority [2006] WASAT 362; (2006) 48 SR (WA) 93
Gough v State of Queensland [2013] QCAT 320
Lourey v Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2012] WASCA 112
Paridis v Settlement Agents Supervisory Board [2007] WASCA 97; (2007) 33 WAR 361
Waters v Public Transport Corp [1991] HCA 49; (1991) 173 CLR 349
PRITCHARD J: Mrs Krysiak is an elderly lady with limited mobility who lives in Mount Hawthorn. Until 2015, she was a regular user of the number 15 bus route (the number 15 bus), which passed through Glendalough and Mount Hawthorn. In 2015, the Public Transport Authority (PTA) decided to change the route for the number 15 bus,[1] with the result that Mrs Krysiak now has to walk further than she previously did to get to the nearest bus stop for the number 15 bus. Because of…
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- Case
- [2017] WASC 103
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues in the appeal were primarily centered on whether the alteration of the bus route constituted a 'requirement or condition' as defined in the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA), and if the tribunal had the jurisdiction and power to strike out the application following the referral of the complaint by the Equal Opportunity Commissioner. The central question was whether the change in the bus route, which made it more difficult for Mrs Krysiak to access public transport, constituted a discriminatory 'requirement or condition' under the Act.
The tribunal found that the alteration of the bus route did not constitute a 'requirement or condition' under the Act. This conclusion was based on the tribunal's interpretation of the Act and its comparison to similar provisions in the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (Vic), as discussed in the High Court case of Waters v Public Transport Corporation. The tribunal determined that the change in the bus route did not impose a new requirement or condition on passengers, but merely altered the location of the bus stop, which did not inherently discriminate against Mrs Krysiak based on her age or impairment. The tribunal also upheld its jurisdiction and power to strike out the application, finding no error in its decision-making process.
In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused. The tribunal's decision was upheld, and no substantial injustice resulted from the refusal of leave to appeal. The tribunal's interpretation of the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) and its comparison to relevant High Court jurisprudence provided a clear basis for its decision.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Waters v Public Transport Corporation[52] the High Court examined the construction and operation of provisions in the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (Vic) (the Vic EO Act) which were in similar terms to s 66A and s 66V of the EO Act. That case concerned a decision by the Public Transport Corporation of Victoria to introduce a number of changes to the public transport system. The first involved a new ticketing system, which required that passengers purchase tickets from retail shops, and validate those tickets by making a scratch mark in designated places to indicate the journey being undertaken. The second change was that conductors were removed from some trams. [52] Waters v Public Transport Corporation [1991] HCA 49; (1991) 173 CLR 349. Nine disabled complainants lodged complaints which alleged that the introduction of these changes constituted indirect discrimination on the grounds of impairment, contrary to the Vic EO Act. The complaints were referred to the Equal Opportunity Board of Victoria (which appears to have stood in a similar position to the SAT), which upheld the complaints in relation to the use of the scratch tickets and the removal of conductors. The Corporation appealed to the Supreme Court, where the appeal was allowed and the complaints were dismissed. The complainants then appealed to the High Court. The appeal was allowed by a majority of the members of the Court. The decision of the Supreme Court was set aside, and the complaints were remitted back to the Board for further determination. The Vic EO Act prohibited discrimination on the grounds of the status of a person (which included the impairment of the person) in the provision of a service. The definition of indirect discrimination on the ground of impairment was in similar terms to s 66A(3) of the EO Act. In particular, the relevant definition included the imposition, by a discriminator, of a 'requirement or condition' with which the aggrieved person could not comply but with which a substantially higher proportion of persons without an impairment could comply. One key aspect of the case concerned the question whether the use of scratch tickets, and the removal of conductors, constituted 'requirements or conditions' imposed by the Corporation in connection with the provision of a service. There was no dispute that the requirement to purchase a scratch ticket involved the imposition of a requirement or condition.[53] As for the removal of conductors, the Board had found that that change involved the imposition of a requirement or condition that passengers (including the complainants) use trams without the assistance of conductors. The Supreme Court held that the removal of a conductor from some trams did not constitute the imposition of a requirement or condition on either the travelling public or on the complainants in particular. A majority of the High Court disagreed with that view, and held that there had been no error in the Board's identification of the 'requirement or condition' as a condition that passengers travel on trams without the assistance of a conductor.[54] [53] Waters v Public Transport Corp [1991] HCA 49; (1991) 173 CLR 349, 356.[54] See Waters v Public Transport Corp [1991] HCA 49; (1991) 173 CLR 349, 361 ‑ 362 (Mason & Gaudron, Deane J agreeing at 382), 393 (Dawson & Toohey JJ).