Krysiak v Public Transport Authority [No 2]

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   KRYSIAK -v- PUBLIC TRANSPORT AUTHORITY [No 2] [2017] WASC 103

CORAM:   PRITCHARD J

HEARD:   22 MARCH 2017

DELIVERED          :   13 APRIL 2017

FILE NO/S:   GDA 5 of 2016

BETWEEN:   EUGENIA KRYSIAK

Appellant

AND

PUBLIC TRANSPORT AUTHORITY
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :SENIOR MEMBER McNAB

File No  :EOA 34 of 2015

Catchwords:

Leave to appeal - Applicable principles - Turns on own facts

Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) - Indirect discrimination - Meaning of 'requirement or condition' with which a person with an impairment is unable to comply - Provision of a service - Whether change in a bus route constituted indirect discrimination

State Administrative Tribunal - Jurisdiction - Complaint referred under Equal Opportunity Act 1994 (WA) - Whether exercise of original jurisdiction

State Administrative Tribunal - Power - Procedure - Section 47 State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) - Whether Tribunal has power to strike out an application following referral of complaint by Equal Opportunity Commissioner

Legislation:

Building Act 2011 (WA), s 119, s 120, s 121, s 122
Dog Act 1976 (WA), s 16A, s 17, s 26, s 27
Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (Vic)
Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA), s 3, s 66A, s 66J, s 66K, s 66V, s 66ZE, s 66ZF, s 84, s 89, s 90, s 93, s 107
Mental Health Act 2014 (WA), s 494
Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA), s 236, s 244
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 5, s 13, s 15, s 17, s 27, s 29, s 36, s 42, s 47, s 105

Result:

Leave to appeal refused
Appeal dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     In person

Respondent:     Mr T E Pontre

Solicitors:

Appellant:     In person

Respondent:     State Solicitor for Western Australia

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Aigner v State of Queensland [2012] QCAT 397

Armstrong v Commissioner for Consumer Protection [2014] WASCA 71

Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd v Banovic [1989] HCA 56; (1989) 168 CLR 165

Chin v Legal Practice Board Western Australia [2009] WASCA 117

Edney v Public Transport Authority [2006] WASAT 362; (2006) 48 SR (WA) 93

Gough v State of Queensland [2013] QCAT 320

Lourey v Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2012] WASCA 112

Paridis v Settlement Agents Supervisory Board [2007] WASCA 97; (2007) 33 WAR 361

Waters v Public Transport Corp [1991] HCA 49; (1991) 173 CLR 349

  1. PRITCHARD J:  Mrs Krysiak is an elderly lady with limited mobility who lives in Mount Hawthorn.  Until 2015, she was a regular user of the number 15 bus route (the number 15 bus), which passed through Glendalough and Mount Hawthorn.  In 2015, the Public Transport Authority (PTA) decided to change the route for the number 15 bus,[1] with the result that Mrs Krysiak now has to walk further than she previously did to get to the nearest bus stop for the number 15 bus.  Because of…

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Details
Case
[2017] WASC 103
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Krysiak v Public Transport Authority [No 2] involved Mrs Krysiak, a disabled elderly woman with mobility issues, who brought a complaint to the State Administrative Tribunal (SAT) against the Public Transport Authority (PTA), alleging indirect discrimination on the grounds of age and impairment. Mrs Krysiak's complaint was based on the PTA's alteration of the route of bus number 15, which resulted in the nearest bus stop to her home being further away. Mrs Krysiak contended that this change constituted indirect discrimination under the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA). The tribunal dismissed the complaint, and Mrs Krysiak sought leave to appeal this decision.

The legal issues in the appeal were primarily centered on whether the alteration of the bus route constituted a 'requirement or condition' as defined in the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA), and if the tribunal had the jurisdiction and power to strike out the application following the referral of the complaint by the Equal Opportunity Commissioner. The central question was whether the change in the bus route, which made it more difficult for Mrs Krysiak to access public transport, constituted a discriminatory 'requirement or condition' under the Act.

The tribunal found that the alteration of the bus route did not constitute a 'requirement or condition' under the Act. This conclusion was based on the tribunal's interpretation of the Act and its comparison to similar provisions in the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (Vic), as discussed in the High Court case of Waters v Public Transport Corporation. The tribunal determined that the change in the bus route did not impose a new requirement or condition on passengers, but merely altered the location of the bus stop, which did not inherently discriminate against Mrs Krysiak based on her age or impairment. The tribunal also upheld its jurisdiction and power to strike out the application, finding no error in its decision-making process.

In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused. The tribunal's decision was upheld, and no substantial injustice resulted from the refusal of leave to appeal. The tribunal's interpretation of the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) and its comparison to relevant High Court jurisprudence provided a clear basis for its decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Background ‑ the nature of the complaint, the procedural history, and the Decision As I have observed, the EOC treated the complaint as alleging indirect discrimination on the grounds of age and impairment, in relation to the provision of a service, or access to places or vehicles. However, it was apparent from the Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions (SFIC) filed by Mrs Krysiak in the SAT that the complaint was not concerned with access to places or vehicles at all. (It was not alleged, for example, that Mrs Krysiak was refused entry to a bus, or that the terms on which she could obtain access to a bus were altered.) Rather, the complaint was concerned with the change in the route of the number 15 bus, which had the consequence that the nearest bus stop to Mrs Krysiak's home was further away than it had previously been. Consequently, in the SAT proceeding, the complaint was treated as one concerning alleged discrimination in the provision of services. And, in the appeal, the alleged discrimination the subject of the complaint was said to be discrimination in the provision of a service.[2][2] ts 54. The EO Act prohibits a person (the discriminator) who provides services from discriminating against another person on the ground of the other person's impairment, or age, by refusing to provide the other person with those services, in the terms or conditions on which the services are provided, or in the manner in which the services are made available.[3] [3] See, relevantly to this case, Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) s 66K(1), s 66ZF(1). The discrimination prohibited under the EO Act encompasses direct and indirect forms. In this case, in so far as the complaint alleged discrimination on the grounds of impairment and of age, the discrimination alleged was of an indirect kind. The EO Act provides that a person (the discriminator) discriminates against another person on the ground of impairment if the discriminator requires that person to comply with a 'requirement or condition' with which a substantially higher proportion of persons who do not have the same impairment comply or are able to comply, and which is not reasonable, and with which the aggrieved person is not able to comply.[4] Similarly, a person (the discriminator) will discriminate against another person on the ground of age if the discriminator requires that person to comply with a 'requirement or condition' with which a substantially higher proportion of persons who are not of the same age comply or are able to comply, and which is not reasonable, and with which the aggrieved person is not able to comply.[5] The EOC considered the complaint and dismissed it, pursuant to s 89 of the EO Act, on the basis that the complaint was lacking in substance. That was because the A/Commissioner concluded that Mrs Krysiak had presented 'no evidence that the proportion of persons with [her] impairments and age who were unable to comply with a requirement to walk a distance of about 500 m to the nearest bus stop was higher, compared to when the discontinued portion of route 15 was operating'.[6]

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Basis for an appeal against a decision of the SAT Mrs Krysiak seeks to appeal against the Decision, pursuant to s 105 of the SAT Act. As I have observed, Mrs Krysiak requires leave to appeal. The question of leave to appeal was referred to the hearing of the appeal, pursuant to an order made by Martino J on 19 January 2017. Mrs Krysiak filed written submissions in relation to the appeal. As Mrs Krysiak is an elderly lady, with mobility issues, for whom English is not her first language, I considered that there were exceptional circumstances[20] which warranted leave being granted to Mrs Krysiak's son to make oral submissions on her behalf at the hearing. Counsel for the PTA filed written submissions, and also attended the hearing and made oral submissions.[20] Hopes v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2016] WASC 198 [37] - [38] (Corboy J); Schagen v The Queen (1993) WAR 410, 412 (Malcolm CJ). An appeal against a decision of the SAT (other than in vocational matters[21]) may only be brought 'on a question of law'.[22] The questions of law raised by the grounds of appeal are discussed below. Counsel for the PTA did not dispute that those questions involved questions of law, and I have proceeded on the basis that the appeal raises two questions of law. [21] State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) s 105(13).[22] State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) s 105(2). Once it is determined that an appeal raises a question of law, leave to appeal should be granted if, in all of the circumstances, it is in the interests of justice to do so.[23] Whether it is in the interests of justice to grant leave to appeal will be informed by a variety of considerations, and there are no rigid or exhaustive guidelines governing the grant of leave.[24] Considerations which may be relevant to that question include the importance of the question of law, whether there is sufficient doubt about the question of law to justify the grant of leave, and whether substantial injustice would result if the error of law were not corrected.[25] [23] Lourey v Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2012] WASCA 112 [28] (Murphy JA); Chin v Legal Practice Board Western Australia [2009] WASCA 117 [12] (Pullin & Newnes JJA); Paridis v Settlement Agents Supervisory Board [2007] WASCA 97; (2007) 33 WAR 361, 372 [16] (Buss JA, Wheeler & Pullin JJA agreeing).[24] See the authorities discussed in Armstrong v Commissioner for Consumer Protection [2014] WASCA 71 [27] (Martin CJ).[25] Paridis v Settlement Agents Supervisory Board [2007] WASCA 97; (2007) 33 WAR 361, 372 ‑ 373 [17] ‑ [18] (Buss JA, Wheeler & Pullin JJA agreeing). In my view, leave to appeal should be refused. Although there is little authority at the appellate level in this State on the questions of law raised by this appeal, the applicable principles are clear, and the questions of law are not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave. Furthermore, in my view, the decision of the learned Senior Member was clearly correct, with the consequence that no substantial injustice will result from the refusal of leave to appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Waters v Public Transport Corporation[52] the High Court examined the construction and operation of provisions in the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (Vic) (the Vic EO Act) which were in similar terms to s 66A and s 66V of the EO Act. That case concerned a decision by the Public Transport Corporation of Victoria to introduce a number of changes to the public transport system. The first involved a new ticketing system, which required that passengers purchase tickets from retail shops, and validate those tickets by making a scratch mark in designated places to indicate the journey being undertaken. The second change was that conductors were removed from some trams. [52] Waters v Public Transport Corporation [1991] HCA 49; (1991) 173 CLR 349. Nine disabled complainants lodged complaints which alleged that the introduction of these changes constituted indirect discrimination on the grounds of impairment, contrary to the Vic EO Act. The complaints were referred to the Equal Opportunity Board of Victoria (which appears to have stood in a similar position to the SAT), which upheld the complaints in relation to the use of the scratch tickets and the removal of conductors. The Corporation appealed to the Supreme Court, where the appeal was allowed and the complaints were dismissed. The complainants then appealed to the High Court. The appeal was allowed by a majority of the members of the Court. The decision of the Supreme Court was set aside, and the complaints were remitted back to the Board for further determination. The Vic EO Act prohibited discrimination on the grounds of the status of a person (which included the impairment of the person) in the provision of a service. The definition of indirect discrimination on the ground of impairment was in similar terms to s 66A(3) of the EO Act. In particular, the relevant definition included the imposition, by a discriminator, of a 'requirement or condition' with which the aggrieved person could not comply but with which a substantially higher proportion of persons without an impairment could comply. One key aspect of the case concerned the question whether the use of scratch tickets, and the removal of conductors, constituted 'requirements or conditions' imposed by the Corporation in connection with the provision of a service. There was no dispute that the requirement to purchase a scratch ticket involved the imposition of a requirement or condition.[53] As for the removal of conductors, the Board had found that that change involved the imposition of a requirement or condition that passengers (including the complainants) use trams without the assistance of conductors. The Supreme Court held that the removal of a conductor from some trams did not constitute the imposition of a requirement or condition on either the travelling public or on the complainants in particular. A majority of the High Court disagreed with that view, and held that there had been no error in the Board's identification of the 'requirement or condition' as a condition that passengers travel on trams without the assistance of a conductor.[54] [53] Waters v Public Transport Corp [1991] HCA 49; (1991) 173 CLR 349, 356.[54] See Waters v Public Transport Corp [1991] HCA 49; (1991) 173 CLR 349, 361 ‑ 362 (Mason & Gaudron, Deane J agreeing at 382), 393 (Dawson & Toohey JJ).