KO and KP v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police (GD)

[2005] NSWADTAP 56

Appeal Panel - Internal

CITATION:	KO and KP v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police (GD) [2005] NSWADTAP 56
PARTIES:	APPELLANT KO and KP RESPONDENT Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police
FILE NUMBER:	059012
HEARING DATES:	18/05/2005
SUBMISSIONS CLOSED:	05/18/2005
DATE OF DECISION:	11/07/2005
DECISION UNDER APPEAL:	KO and KP v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police [2005] NSWADT 18
BEFORE:	O'Connor K - DCJ (President); Montgomery S - Judicial Member; Antonios Z - Non Judicial Member
CATCHWORDS:	adequacy of reasons - fact finding - procedural fairness - scope of Application
MATTER FOR DECISION:	Principal matter
FILE NUMBER UNDER APPEAL:	043178 and 043179
DATE OF DECISION UNDER APPEAL:	02/04/2005
LEGISLATION CITED:	Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 Police Service Act 1990 Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998
CASES CITED:	KO and KP v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police [2005] NSWADT 18 KO and Anor v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Service [2004] NSWADT 3 KO and Anor v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police (GD) [2004] NSWADTAP 21 NZ v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police [2005] NSWADT 213 OA v New South Wales Department of Housing [2005] NSWADT 233 Vice-Chancellor Macquarie University v FM [2005] NSWCA 192 Department of Education and Training v GA (No. 3) [2004] NSWADTAP 50 GA v Department of Education and Training and NSW Police [2004] NSWADTAP 18 Azzopardi v Tasman UEB Industries Ltd [1985] 4 NSWLR 139 Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247 Beale v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1997) 48 NSWLR 430 Minister for Community Services v CE (No. 1) (CSD) [2002] NSWADTAP 7 Woodside & anor v Director General, Department of Community Services [2000] NSWADTAP 8 Peter Roberts Motors Pty Ltd v Moreira & anor (EOD) [2002] NSWADTAP 44
REPRESENTATION:	APPELLANT In person (KP) RESPONDENT P McLaughlin, solicitor, New South Wales Police
ORDERS:	Appeal dismissed

1 This appeal arises from two applications for review of conduct made under the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (the Privacy Act). The application was dismissed by the Tribunal: see KO and KPv Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police [2005] NSWADT 18.

2 The matter has a long history. The Tribunal’s decision was its second dismissing the application. The first decision, also dismissing the application (KO and Anor v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Service [2004] NSWADT 3 was set aside by the Appeal Panel (KO and Anor v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police (GD) [2004] NSWADTAP 21). We will refer to these three decisions at different stages of this decision as the ‘first Tribunal decision’, ‘the first Appeal Panel decision’ and the ‘second Tribunal decision’.

3 [KP is the father of KO. KO has not taken an active part in these proceedings. KP will be referred to in these reasons as the appellant.]

4 The following passages from the first Appeal Panel decision provide part of the background to the present appeal:

‘3 The Information Protection Principle (IPP) relating to disclosure of personal information is found in s 18 of the Privacy Act. It provides in essence that personal information may only be disclosed with the express consent of the individual to whom it relates in certain circumstances. The agency position is that compliance with this IPP does not need to be considered, as the information disclosed does not fall within the statutory meaning of ‘personal information’. ‘Personal information’ (see s 4(1)) does not include (see s 4(3)):
‘(h) information about an individual arising out of a complaint made under Part 8A of the Police Service Act 1990 .’
4 This case concerns a police officer’s disclosure of personal information about KO which occurred in the course of the investigation of a complaint of police misconduct made by KO. When the disclosure came to his attention, KP applied on his son’s behalf to the agency pursuant to s 53 of the Privacy Act for internal review of the conduct. In the letter of application dated 7 February 2003), asserting [sic]:
‘The investigating officer in charge of the above complaint, Inspector Stephen Oswald, breached the Act in or about August 2002 by unlawful disclosure of personal information about [KO] to his employer [named]. I did not become aware of the breaches until 4 September 2002. As a result of Inspector Oswald’s breaches, [KO] lost his job and now seeks accountability and compensation.’
…

30 What is clear is that on 30 May 2002 KO made a complaint alleging police misconduct. The complaint related to his arrest that day at Richmond Railway Station and his subsequent detention in custody and questioning at Penrith Police Station. After being held for about 2 hours, he was charged with two railway offences and released. At around mid-day the police were on duty at the railway station checking tickets. KO and a friend had alighted from a train. KO did not immediately produce his ticket (he had one), but instead questioned the police’s right to ask to see it, and questioned their right to ask for his name and address. Ultimately the charge as to refusing to give name and address was dismissed. He was convicted of an offence relating to smoking on railway premises, and fined $100. KO made a complaint before he left the police station over his treatment. Subsequently it was allocated for investigation to Inspector Oswald of the Hawkesbury LAC. In the course of his investigation he obtained a statement from KO’s father, KP. That occurred on 18 August 2002. As noted earlier, that statement caused Inspector Oswald to approach KO’s employer. The employer was made aware of the events of 30 May 2002. KP and KO have complained that the disclosure of personal information about KO that occurred on that occasion contravened the Privacy Act. Further, as noted earlier, they claim that the disclosure led to KO losing his job, and that KO should be compensated by way of damages.’

5 The information as to the circumstances that had led to KO’s arrest on 30 May 2002, and the statements which he had made to police on that occasion, including references to the nature of his employment, appear in the records furnished to Inspector Oswald, to whom responsibility was given for investigating KO’s complaint relating to the police conduct. There was no dispute that this information constituted ‘personal information’ within the meaning of s 4(1) of the Privacy Act.

6 The justification for Inspector Oswald approaching the employer in circumstances where the matters of complaint bore entirely on the conduct of the arresting police has been hotly contested. If Inspector Oswald was not acting lawfully in approaching the employer, or if, though that was lawful, the disclosures relating to KO contravened the Privacy Act, then KO is entitled, at least, to a finding to that effect, and possibly an order of the kind set out in s 55(2) of the Privacy Act.

7 In the second Tribunal decision at [22] the Tribunal described the background in this way:

‘22 The background facts in these proceedings are not in significant contest. The evidence establishes that on 30 May 2002 the applicant son, who was a former electrical apprentice, was arrested for smoking on a railway platform in Sydney and for refusing to provide the police with his name at the time. He was on his way to work as a casual trades assistant at a [named] building site. He was in the company of a fellow worker from the said building site. He was arrested, about midday that day. He was placed inside a police van, driven to the [named] police station and subjected to charging procedures. On that same day, he made a formal written complaint to the police about the circumstances of his arrest and treatment by the police. He gave a written statement to this effect that day (exhibit A2, page 22). Before his arrival at the police station, he had managed to telephone his father on his mobile phone, who arrived at the police station and assisted him in making his formal complaint about, inter alia , alleged police misconduct, trespass and assault. Certain statements were written or taken over the next few months in relation to the formal complaint (for example, at exhibit A2, pages 28, 31 & 41). The police opened a file on the “CIS” (Complaints Information System) and Inspector Oswald was allocated the task of conducting investigation. Eventually, on 18 Aug 2002 Detective Inspector Oswald interviewed the applicant father and took a lengthy statement. In that statement the applicant father set out in very great detail the events of 30 May 2002. At one point in the interview, the applicant father said that he intended to seek compensation for loss of wages and for expenses for the day. Also at the interview, he stated that he drove his son to work after the arrest incident and all the workers have gone home as it was 3.50 pm. He said that his son was employed by a building company working at a large building site in Sydney as a "supervising electrical mechanic" where he was the on-site supervisor, supervising the daily activities of about 6 to 10 employees and that he is employed on a full-time basis.

23 …

24 The complaints that the applicant son made to the police were serious complaints. They involved police mistreatment and alleged criminal matters. It was alleged, inter alia, that:

a) he was unlawfully arrested and falsely imprisoned;

b) he was assaulted a number of times by police officers; and

c) there was gross misconduct by police officers in the handling of his arrest, conduct to the police station, charging procedures and his brief detention.’

8 As noted in the passages quoted from the first Tribunal decision and the first Appeal Panel decision, the initial position taken by the respondent was that Inspector Oswald’s conduct fell entirely outside the purview of the Privacy Act because the personal information placed in issue fell within the exception to s 4(1) found at s 4(3)(h), already mentioned. The basic problem, as the first Appeal Panel decision saw it, with the first Tribunal decision involved a failure to have Inspector Oswald give an account of his conduct by way of evidence to the Tribunal. There had been a denial of procedural fairness to the applicants. It was necessary, as the first Appeal Panel saw it, for the Tribunal to inform itself properly as to the nature of the conduct put in issue before going on to consider whether the conduct fell within the scope of the exception.

9 On remittal, the Tribunal heard evidence from Inspector Oswald among others. The hearing took four days. The Tribunal dismissed the two applications, one filed by KO, the other filed by KP.

10 The Tribunal commenced by referring to the history of the matter. The first point of substance related to the scope of the application before the Tribunal. The Tribunal noted Tribunal authorities dealing with this issue, in particular the importance of what is said by the applicant in the application for internal review as to the conduct put in issue. The Tribunal concluded:

‘13 In the present case, the internal review application plainly related to a particular disclosure by a particular, named, officer of the respondent on a particular occasion. Indeed, it is the only relevant conduct referred to in the relevant sense. Notwithstanding that a wide spectrum of contraventions of the IPPs is later alleged in the application (by a naming of the provisions only) the scope of the application is about the disclosure of certain personal information. I accept the submission of the respondent that these applications do not concern, for example, collection or storage of the alleged personal information.’

11 The first three objections in this appeal by the appellant are to aspects of the Tribunal’s reasoning in relation to the scope of the application. He makes three points. The first is that at para [11] of its reasons the Tribunal made an error when it said that there was no subsequent correspondence between the parties clarifying the conduct complained of in the internal review application. The appellant referred to material in the file contradicting, he felt, this conclusion. We have reviewed the material. Arguably, the Tribunal overstated the situation; but, if there was an error, it is a minor one, and did not, in our view, materially affect the ultimate judgment it was called on to make.

12 The second of the objections goes to the accuracy of the Tribunal’s statement of the principles developed by the Tribunal in approaching the question of the scope of the application. We do not agree with the submissions of the respondent in reply that all that is involved in this exercise is a fact-finding one, and therefore the conclusion is immune from review on error of law grounds. It is the case that what the Tribunal is called on to do is to make a finding of fact, but the finding is jurisdictional in effect. Accordingly an erroneous finding of fact may lead to the Tribunal misapprehending its jurisdiction. In these circumstances, we think an appellant is entitled to raise the issue as involving a possible error of law.

13 In our view the Tribunal accurately stated the interpretations that the Tribunal has developed on the approach to be taken in determining this question. In our view, it is clear from the scheme of the Act, in particular ss 53 and 55, that the scope of the application for internal review, reasonably construed, provides the scope for the agency’s examination of the application. Unless there is some widening of the application within that process which is accepted by the agency, the application for internal review, reasonably construed, sets the scope for the application for review of the conduct by the Tribunal. It is plain from the scheme of the Act that the Parliament intended that the agency have the first opportunity, always, to deal with the matters of complaint. Except in the case where the agency fails to respond to the application for internal review, the scheme of the Act contemplates that the internal review report and its outcomes will be among the material that is placed before the Tribunal. We will not, on this occasion, deal at length with these questions. In addition to the authorities noted by the Tribunal, we refer also to recent statements on this matter by the President in NZ v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police [2005] NSWADT 213; and OA v New South Wales Department of Housing [2005] NSWADT 233 [5]-[7].

14 The question of what is the scope of the application, reasonably construed, is one of fact but, as we have indicated, affecting jurisdiction. Its determination is not driven, in any significant way, in our view by any recitation of Information Protection Principles that may appear in the applicant’s application. Often there will be no recitation of Information Protection Principles. Sometimes there will be a detailed recitation seeking to bring into play many, or every one of, the Principles. The key question is what facts and circumstances has the applicant referred to which might give rise to questions of compliance with the Information Protection Principles, and to identify the relevant Principles.

15 It is necessary, once having identified the facts and circumstances, to link them to the record keeping environment of the organisation (as to which, see Vice-Chancellor Macquarie University v FM [2005] NSWCA 192) and to the Information Protection Principles.

16 The information given to the employer was recorded information. In this instance we think it is clear that the conduct in issue was the communication of aspects of that information by the officer investigating KO’s complaint against the police to KO’s former employer.

17 The conduct was, reasonably we think, characterised as raising a disclosure question. There is no error of law, in our view, in the conclusion reached by the Tribunal.

18 The third of the objections relates to the Tribunal’s statement at para [15]:

‘15 The Tribunal in these matters does not have jurisdiction to deal with matters other than the disclosure issue in that it was not “reasonably open” to the agency to conclude that the internal review application related to any other conduct – Department of Education and Training v GA (No. 3) [2004] NSWADTAP 50 at [20].’

19 The appellant contends that the Tribunal failed to exercise its authority in drawing this conclusion. The Tribunal made, as we have indicated, we think a reasonable judgment as to the scope of the application. It was here simply reiterating that point, drawing on a statement in one of the authorities. In making this assessment the Tribunal has to put itself in the position of the hypothetical reasonable administrator construing the communication reasonably. That is all the words are seeking to convey.

20 The Tribunal then moved to setting out the issues which it was called upon to decide. It described them as follows:

‘ The Issues

16 Primarily, the Tribunal is required to resolve the following issues:

a) Did the disclosure made by the police officer in August 2001 to the employer constitute disclosure of “personal information” within the meaning of section 4 of the Privacy Act?

b) If it did, did a contravention of the IPPs occur?

c) If so, should the Tribunal take any action on the matter by way of making an order or orders under section 55(2) of the Privacy Act?

d) As a part of a consideration of the damages sought by the applicants, was the loss or damages suffered by the applicants “ because of the conduct” of the agency complained of within the meaning of section 55(2)(a)?

e) Did the applicants’ loss constitute “financial loss or psychological harm” within the meaning of section 55(4)(b) of the Act? and,

f) Did the applicant father have standing to pursue his application before the Tribunal within the meaning of sections 52, 53 and 55(1) of the Act?’

21 The Tribunal then set out the evidence before the Tribunal. It referred to the documentary evidence before the Tribunal at its first hearing. It referred to oral evidence given by KP at the first hearing. At the second hearing the respondent submitted a 243 page folder of material it regarded as relevant. The Tribunal itemised this material. It then noted that KO and KP submitted various affidavits which included one from a job supervisor of KO and one from a fellow worker. The Tribunal received oral evidence, over four days, several witnesses being: the employer to whom Inspector Oswald spoke, two of the supervisors at the building site where KO had been employed, Inspector Oswald, an electrical engineer employed at the site after KO left, and KO himself.

22 The Tribunal then goes on to detail the evidence of Inspector Oswald, which it accepted. Essentially the Tribunal sought to examine the question of whether it was proper to have made contact with the employer. The primary allegations did not in any way implicate the employer. The employer was relevant, in Inspector Oswald’s opinion, because it was necessary to the conduct of a sound investigation that an attempt be made to evaluate the veracity of the witnesses, both the applicant and the police that had interacted with him that day. He had said at the police station that day that he needed to go as soon as possible as he was “the supervisor of a $7 million contract and I must keep in contact with the people on-site” and it was alleged that he had also said to the police that he needed to have his mobile phone as “I have an apprentice on site who has to be able to contact me.” Inspector Oswald thought it would it be helpful in assessing the truthfulness of KO to speak to his employer. He suspected that KO had ‘embellished’ what had occurred on the day. In light of what the managing director told him about the nature of KO’s duties he formed the view that KO was not truthful.

23 The Tribunal referred to Inspector Oswald’s training in investigation work. It referred to his evidence that he had treated the investigation of KO’s complaint as both a Part 8A investigation (alleged misconduct of the police) and a criminal investigation.

24 The Tribunal said:

‘31 In oral examination, he agreed that he told the Managing Director that day that he was investigating a complaint made by KO against some police officers relating to smoking at the named railway station. He did not recall whether he told him about the arrest of KO made that day.

32 In cross examination, the Inspector accepted that at some point after the original complaint had been made by KO, KP was also regarded by him as a complainant. He said that after he had interviewed the Managing Director (and was told: that the [sic] KO was a casual trades assistant and not the supervisor of the site; that KO was not a supervisor at all of any part of the building project; and that it appears that KO had put himself down for and been paid by the company for attending work on the very day he had been arrested) he formed the opinion that the applicant son was not being entirely truthful in a number of respects.’

25 The Tribunal said that the managing director’s evidence as to what was said was as follows, and what he then did, was:

‘36 He said the Inspector had told him that he was with Internal Affairs, and that KO had been arrested for smoking at a railway station and that he had been abusive to police and he had made a complaint against the police. He said the total value of the particular job on the subject site to the company was about $500,000 and not $7 million. He explained the circumstances that gave rise to his telephone call to his pay office at the police station on 21 August 2002. It was his idea and he decided to do it as he had earlier had the impression from the Inspector that KO had been working on 30 May 2002. He also wanted to know why the applicant was not at work on that day.’

26 As to the allegation that he had ‘terminated’ the job, the managing director’s evidence, accepted by the Tribunal, was that KO had been employed on a casual basis as a casual trades assistant to undertake a particular job at the site, and he had been terminated when the need for the job ended.

27 As to this aspect of the Tribunal’s deliberations, the appellant has made three objections.

28 First he claimed that he had been the subject of a denial of procedural fairness in that while ‘attempting to conduct cross-examination of Inspector Oswald, [he] experienced incessant interjections by both the Respondent and the Tribunal’. He also complained that the Tribunal had refused to allow him any further cross-examination after only a few unanswered questions had been put to a witness. He complained that the Tribunal ‘falsely assured’ him that the respondent’s failure to rebut any prior written submissions made any further cross-examination unnecessary due to the inferences available to be drawn by the Tribunal. He claims that ‘The Tribunal subsequently reneged on that assurance’.

29 We have reviewed the transcript of the proceedings. The hearing was a protracted one over four days. In our view, contrary to the appellants’ submission, the Tribunal was generous in the extent to which it allowed the witnesses to be examined. There was, here, a relatively narrow set of circumstances to be examined.

30 The appellant was given ample opportunity to present what was, for the most part, his son’s rather than his own case. The appellant was the advocate for his son. The appellant is not a qualified legal practitioner, and is, therefore, not bound by the ethical standards of that profession. The Tribunal will often have to involve itself more actively in the management of the proceedings where the case is being presented by someone not trained in the law, and conversant with the traditions and ethical standards of the law. This is particularly so where the advocate has a partisan involvement. In this instance there can be no doubt about the partisan view that KP brings to this matter. He feels his son was wronged. He himself also has an application on foot. In these circumstances, there is a great risk that attributes to be expected of legal practitioners will be absent – detachment and recognition that the advocate’s ultimate duty is to the court and not the client. There is a real possibility that interchanges between a partisan, non-lawyer advocate and witnesses will descend into vituperation, and this may occur vis a vis the advocate appearing on the other side. This situation places special demands on the Tribunal.

31 In our view, the Tribunal exercised the flexible powers given to it by s 73 of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (which include the limiting of the time of the parties, see s 73(5)(d)) in a way which did not infringe the fundamental obligation to afford procedural fairness.

32 In our earlier decision we reflected on the difficulties that self-represented persons can have in conducting proceedings in the Tribunal, and the particular difficulties that can arise in privacy cases. On this occasion, we think that the Tribunal attended to these difficulties in a very careful way.

33 The appellant’s second objection goes to the Tribunal’s conclusion as to whether the investigation was a Part 8A one. The point is critical, as if it is, the exception to the meaning of ‘personal information’ is attracted. We will deal with it in the next section of our reasons.

34 The third objection to this part of the Tribunal’s deliberations is that the Tribunal erred in law by ‘ignoring critical considerations regarding serious contradictions within the evidence of the ‘managing director’ and between the evidence of other credible witnesses that corroborated all of the applicants’ assertions.’

35 We have reviewed the transcript of proceedings. The Tribunal allowed generous amounts of time to the hearing of witnesses. It engaged, in our view, in an entirely conventional fact-finding process, and its findings were reasonably open to be made on the evidence before it.

36 The Tribunal then moved on the key question, whether the conduct identified gave rise to a breach or breaches of the Information Protection Principles. The Tribunal repeated its view, expressed in the earlier case, and also expressed in the first Appeal Panel decision, that Inspector Oswald was engaged in a Part 8A investigation. Therefore, on its face, the information in issue attracted the protection of the exception.

37 The further question, arguably, was whether the Part 8A investigation had miscarried when the disclosure was made to the employer of KO’s complaint and the circumstances of the day of 30 April 2002. It might then be contended that the disclosure fell subject to the Act, and a contravention had occurred. As to this matter the Tribunal. The Tribunal said:

‘42. … It was disclosed to the Managing Director on 21 August 2002 as a necessary part of the investigation itself by an experienced criminal investigator. As a necessary part, it plainly “arose out of” the said investigation. The Inspector wanted to test the credibility of the applicants’ allegations. He did that by informing the Managing Director (and the Site Supervisor) of the complaint and earlier arrest of the applicant son in order to put the questions he was asking in their proper context and obtain relevant cooperation and a detailed written statement.

43 The information in issue has plainly “resulted, proceeded or originated from a complaint made under Part 8A” (ibid, [2004] NSWADTAP 21 at [30]) and is relevant to that complaint - GA v Department of Education and Training and NSW Police [2004] NSWADTAP 18 at [55]. The relationship of the said information to the complaint is neither tenuous nor indeterminate - KO & KP v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police (GD) [2004] NSWADTAP 21 at [32].

44 It might be said it was not strictly necessary for all of the information in issue to have been disclosed by the Inspector to the Managing Director. However, as I have found, the Inspector was an experienced criminal investigator and he considered it necessary at the time to release some information concerning the complaint itself to the Managing Director in the course of the conduct of his Part 8A investigation. He was entitled to fully test the credit of the complainants in all relevant respects by his chosen method based upon his experience, and that is what he did.

45 Accordingly, the information in issue was not personal information under the Privacy Act.’

38 As to these conclusions the appellant makes three objections. He challenges the conclusion that it was clearly a Part 8A investigation. He claims that the Tribunal provided inadequate reasons by failing to address significant submissions by the applicants regarding the relevance of credibility information to a Part 8A investigation. He also contends that the Tribunal failed to adhere to the Appeal Panel’s previous decision, which he asserts emphasised the necessity to assess every piece of personal information in isolation, regarding the relevant provisions of the Act, with the result that it exceeded its authority.

39 Clearly the Tribunal must give adequate reasons for its decisions. But it is clear law that the reasons need not, therefore, descend to a point-by-point account of the evidence, and all the conflicts, nor a point-by-point recitation and then analysis of every point made in submissions. The work of courts and tribunals would grind to a halt if that was the standard required of the law. What is necessary is an account of the reasoning of the Tribunal sufficient to enable the parties, firstly, and, secondly, the wider audience (importantly, appellate bodies) to understand the process of thought that the Tribunal engaged in. This can often be achieved by quite summary accounts of critical evidence, and indications as to why it was accepted if it was disputed. As to the legal submissions, there is no duty, as we see it, to record these at any length. The Tribunal merely needs to expose the legal reasoning which it prefers. It will often do this in a manner which involves direct reference to the competing submissions.

40 There are no fixed rules as to the contents of reasons for decision. Ultimately it falls to appeal bodies, such as the Appeal Panel in this instance, to make a judgment. We do not see the reasons in this case as infringing the standards relating to this responsibility laid down in the leading cases such as Azzopardi v Tasman UEB Industries Ltd [1985] 4 NSWLR 139, Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247 and Beale v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1997) 48 NSWLR 430. See further the discussion of these principles by Appeal Panels of the Tribunal in cases such as Minister for Community Services v CE (No. 1) (CSD) [2002] NSWADTAP 7 and Woodside & anor v Director General, Department of Community Services [2000] NSWADTAP 8; and Peter Roberts Motors Pty Ltd v Moreira & anor (EOD) [2002] NSWADTAP 44.

41 In this instance the Tribunal clearly exposed the primary issues, it obtained evidence as to the conduct in issue (this had been a problem on the first occasion that it dealt with the applications), it clearly explained its findings (there was ample underlying material to support those findings) and it dealt, we think, adequately with the legal issues (there had in our view on the previous occasion been a failure to deal with the question of the exemption precisely).

42 The final objection is that it is required of Tribunals that they consider each piece of personal information in isolation, and this did not occur. It is said that in the first Appeal Panel decision we said this. We do not think that is a reasonable interpretation of our prior decision. This point appears to be based on the following statement in our previous reasons:

‘65 In these circumstances procedural fairness requires that the conduct be properly identified, and findings as to contravention be entered on the basis of the conduct identified.’

43 We are satisfied that this has occurred on this occasion.

44 The Tribunal then went on briefly to look at the alternative head of exemption relied upon by the respondent, the applicability of s 27(2) of the Act. This, and further aspects, of the Tribunal’s reasoning was not put in issue by the appeal.

45 We have had regard to the detailed submissions in reply filed by the respondent, but have not found it necessary to refer them.

Order

Appeal dismissed.