FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Kiefel v State of Victoria [2014] FCA 604
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 604
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered various factors, including the role and function of a litigation representative, particularly in cases involving the interests of a disabled child. The court was mindful that requiring the appellant to provide a significant sum of money could potentially stymie the right to appeal unless there were extraordinary circumstances. The court also weighed the public interest in disability discrimination cases involving education in public schools, and the possibility that the appeal could be stultified if security was ordered. Ultimately, the court found that while the appellant had the capacity to pay some sum by way of security, the evidence did not permit the conclusion that she could only provide a sum substantially less than that sought by the State. The court also noted that the change in James' situation and the family's relocation to the USA reduced the public interest in the matters to be ventilated on appeal.
The court exercised its discretion and dismissed the respondent's application for security for costs. The court emphasized the importance of ensuring that the exercise of its discretion was judicial and based on the unique circumstances of the case. The court also highlighted the potential chilling effect of security for costs orders on access to justice, and the need to balance this against the respondent's right to protect its interests. The court's decision reflects a cautious approach to the exercise of its discretion, and the importance of ensuring that the right to appeal is not unduly hindered. The court's final order was to dismiss the interlocutory application for security for costs filed by the respondent on 6 May 2014.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The interlocutory application for security for costs, filed by the respondent on 6 May 2014, is dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The underlying proceeding was commenced by an application filed in the Federal Magistrates Court on 5 February 2010. The proceeding was transferred to the Federal Court of Australia on 23 December 2010. The respondent filed its defence on 21 April 2011. The State filed its interlocutory application for security for costs on 6 May 2014. This application is the subject of the current case note.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Farrell [2007] WASCA 173, the Court was first concerned with the existence of the power to award costs at all against a next friend. Buss JA noted the “general rule” articulated by Sackville J in NSW Insurance 94 FCR 247; [1999] FCA 433 as justified by the considerations Sackville J set out. Buss JA noted (at [31]) that, if the next friend has acted properly in the proceedings, he or she will be entitled to an indemnity from the plaintiff or appellant. He also considered the fact that a next friend has the conduct of the proceedings was significant in construing the costs discretion in the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) as extending to the award of costs against a next friend. In relation to the exercise of a power to order security, his Honour did not undertake any explicit analysis of that and it seems to me his Honour saw the exposure to an order for security for costs as flowing implicitly from exposure to a general order for costs at the conclusion of the proceeding.CONSIDERATIONThe appropriate approach in principle Like the costs power itself, the Court’s power under s 56 is widely expressed. It is closely linked to the Court’s general costs power and I see no reason to construe s 56 in a way which introduces discordance between the established approach to the costs direction in s 43 of the Federal Court Act. There is nothing in the text, context or purpose of either provision which suggests Parliament intended to constrain the discretions in s 43 or s 56 so as to place a litigation representative appointed under the Federal Court Rules in a different position in terms of potential exposure to costs to a party who had the conduct of a proceeding. A variety of factors may well mean the discretions are differently exercised, but the power exists. The power conferred on the Court by s 56 to order payment of security for costs is a “wide power”, which “must be exercised judicially, but that is the only relevant limitation”, and “each case must depend on its own circumstances”: Bell Wholesale Co Ltd v Gates Export Corporation (1984) 2 FCR 1 at 3-4. The potential chilling effect of requirements to provide security for costs on individual litigants are well recognised, and the impediment which such orders could otherwise impose on access to justice means, at first-instance level, an individual impecunious litigant will rarely be ordered to provide security. The State of Victoria contended there was a different approach generally taken on appeal and there are authorities which support that proposition. One explanation is that the judgment under appeal, representing the exercise of the litigant’s right to access the court, is presumed to be correct: see Kennedy v McGeechan [1978] 1 NSWLR 314 at 315; FletchervCommissioner of Taxation (1992) 37 FCR 288 at 292 per Hill J. Many authorities, and the State’s submissions, refer to a case from the 19th century, Cowell v Taylor (1886) 31 Ch D 34, where Bowen LJ said (at 38): The general rule is that poverty is no bar to a litigant, that, from time immemorial, has been the rule at common law, and also, I believe, in equity. There is an exception in the case of appeals, but there the appellant has had the benefit of a decision by one of Her Majesty’s courts, and so an insolvent party is not excluded from the courts, but only prevented, if he cannot find security, from dragging his opponent from one court to another.