Kiefel v State of Victoria

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kiefel v State of Victoria [2014] FCA 604

Citation: Kiefel v State of Victoria [2014] FCA 604
Appeal from: Kiefel v State of Victoria [2013] FCA 1398
Parties: JAMES KIEFEL (BY HIS NEXT FRIEND, WENDY KIEFEL) v STATE OF VICTORIA (DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT)
File number: VID 59 of 2014
Judge: MORTIMER J
Date of judgment: 12 June 2014
Catchwords: COSTS – Application for security for costs against litigation representative – role and function of litigation representative – principles applicable to order for security for costs on an appeal –where litigation representative and appellant resident outside Australia – whether order for security would stultify appeal –whether litigation representative impecunious – public interest in disability discrimination proceedings involving education in public schools – application refused.
Legislation:

Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 56
Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1335
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 52

Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) O 28 r 3
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 9.64, 36.09

Cases cited:

Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Dzienciol (by his guardian ad litem Dzienciol) [2001] WASC 305 (S)
Australia China Business Bureau v MCP Australia Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 1207
Bell Wholesale Co Ltd v Gates Export Corporation (1984) 2 FCR 1
Branir v Owston Nominees (No 2) (2001) 117 FCR 424; [2001] FCA 1833
Cameron’s Unit Services Pty Ltd v Kevin R Whelpton & Associates (Australia) Pty Ltd (1986) 13 FCR 46
Cowell v Taylor (1886) 31 Ch D 34
Dae Boong International Company Pty Ltd v Gray [2009] NSWCA 11
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v P (1987) 11 NSWLR 200
Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62
Dye v Commonwealth Securities Ltd [2012] FCA 992
Farrell (by her next friend Waugh) v Royal Kings Park Tennis Club (Inc) [2007] WASCA 173
Fernando (by his tutor, John Ley) v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 9) [2009] FCA 833
FletchervCommissioner of Taxation (1992) 37 FCR 288
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; [2003] HCA 22
Kennedy v McGeechan [1978] 1 NSWLR 314
L v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (2006) 91 ALD 258; [2006] FCAFC 114
Logue v Hansen Technologies Ltd (2003) 125 FCR 590; [2003] FCA 81
Madgwick v Kelly (2013) 212 FCR 1; [2013] FCAFC 61
Masterman-Lister v Brutton and Co (Nos 1 and 2) [2003] 1 WLR 1511
NSW Insurance Ministerial Corporation v Abualfoul (1999) 94 FCR 247; [1999] FCA 433
Re Beth [2013] VSC 189
Rhodes v Swithenbank (1889) 22 QBD 577
Skyring v Sweeney [1999] FCA 61
Tait v Bindal People [2002] FCA 322
Walker v State of Victoria [2012] FCAFC 38

Daniell’s Chancery Practice (7th ed, 1932)

Date of hearing: 21 May 2014
Date of last submissions: 21 May 2014
Place: Melbourne
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 93
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr J Brett
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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 604
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Kiefel v State of Victoria involved the State of Victoria, as the respondent, seeking an order for security for costs against the appellant, Mrs. Kiefel, who is the litigation representative for her son, James, in a disability discrimination proceeding. The appeal originated from a decision made in the Federal Magistrates Court, which was subsequently transferred to the Federal Court of Australia. The central legal issue before the court was whether the respondent should be required to provide security for costs amounting to $52,943.24, and if so, whether such an order would unduly hinder the appellant's right to appeal.

The court considered various factors, including the role and function of a litigation representative, particularly in cases involving the interests of a disabled child. The court was mindful that requiring the appellant to provide a significant sum of money could potentially stymie the right to appeal unless there were extraordinary circumstances. The court also weighed the public interest in disability discrimination cases involving education in public schools, and the possibility that the appeal could be stultified if security was ordered. Ultimately, the court found that while the appellant had the capacity to pay some sum by way of security, the evidence did not permit the conclusion that she could only provide a sum substantially less than that sought by the State. The court also noted that the change in James' situation and the family's relocation to the USA reduced the public interest in the matters to be ventilated on appeal.

The court exercised its discretion and dismissed the respondent's application for security for costs. The court emphasized the importance of ensuring that the exercise of its discretion was judicial and based on the unique circumstances of the case. The court also highlighted the potential chilling effect of security for costs orders on access to justice, and the need to balance this against the respondent's right to protect its interests. The court's decision reflects a cautious approach to the exercise of its discretion, and the importance of ensuring that the right to appeal is not unduly hindered. The court's final order was to dismiss the interlocutory application for security for costs filed by the respondent on 6 May 2014.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The interlocutory application for security for costs, filed by the respondent on 6 May 2014, is dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves an application for security for costs filed by the State of Victoria against the litigation representative of Mrs Kiefel in an appeal. The underlying proceeding concerns alleged disability discrimination in the provision of educational services to Mrs Kiefel's son, James, in Victoria public schools. Mrs Kiefel and her family reside in the USA. On 14 February 2014, the State conducted searches to identify any assets Mrs Kiefel or her husband, Mr Kiefel, held in Australia. The searches revealed that Mr Kiefel held an interest in a property in Blackburn, Victoria, but Mrs Kiefel had no registered interests in real property within Australia. The State's solicitors wrote to Mrs Kiefel's solicitors on 17 March 2014, indicating their intention to seek security for costs and requesting details of Mrs Kiefel's assets in Australia. Following this, on 17 April 2014, a letter was sent to Mrs Kiefel's solicitors requesting security for the State's costs in the amount of $52,943.24.

The underlying proceeding was commenced by an application filed in the Federal Magistrates Court on 5 February 2010. The proceeding was transferred to the Federal Court of Australia on 23 December 2010. The respondent filed its defence on 21 April 2011. The State filed its interlocutory application for security for costs on 6 May 2014. This application is the subject of the current case note.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

For the reasons set out below, I have decided it is not appropriate to make an order for security for costs. The application will be dismissed.EVIDENCE ON THE APPLICATION In support of its application, and pursuant to the requirement set out in r 36.09(2), the State relies on an affidavit of Ms Alexandra Jane Cuthbertson, sworn 6 May 2014. In that affidavit, Ms Cuthbertson sets out details of searches undertaken by the State on 14 February 2014, in order to identify any assets Mrs Kiefel, or her husband Mr Peter Kiefel, may hold in Australia. Ms Cuthbertson deposes:The above searches show that the Appellant’s Next Friend currently has no registered interest in real property within Australia, but that Mr Kiefel holds a registered interest in a property located at 15 Pakenham Street, Blackburn Victoria (the Blackburn property).The searches show that the Blackburn property was previously held jointly by the Appellant’s Next Friend and Mr Kiefel. On 27 March 2011, an application was made to transfer the Appellant’s Next Friend’s interest in the Blackburn property to Mr Kiefel for “natural love and affection”. The transfer was completed on 6 May 2011. The underlying proceeding to which this appeal relates was commenced by application filed in the Federal Magistrates Court on 5 February 2010. Pursuant to orders made on 23 December 2010, the proceeding was transferred to the Federal Court of Australia. The Respondent filed its defence to the Applicant’s claim on 21 April 2011. Ms Cuthbertson deposes that, on 17 March 2014, the State’s solicitors wrote to the appellant’s solicitors, indicating the State’s intention to seek security for costs, and requesting details of Mrs Kiefel’s interest in the Blackburn property, and any other assets, including personal property, in Australia. No response was received from the appellant’s legal representatives, and a follow-up letter was sent by the State on 11 April 2014. On 15 April 2014, Mr Joseph Ridley, solicitor for the appellant, sent an email to the State’s solicitors, stating:• Our client does not hold any interest in 15 Pakenham Street, Blackburn Victoria (the Blackburn property);• Our client does not hold any other interests in any other real property in Australia;• Our client does not hold any interests in any other assets in Australia. In her evidence, Ms Cuthbertson states that, on 17 April 2014, a letter was sent to the appellant’s solicitors requesting that Mrs Kiefel provide security for the State’s costs in the amount of $52,943.24 (including GST). Ms Cuthbertson’s affidavit annexes a series of email correspondence between the parties’ legal representatives, dated 28 April 2014, regarding the respondent’s request for security for costs. In email correspondence to Ms Rachel Nicolson, Mr Ridley states:I confirm that my client is not in a position to forward the sum of $52,943.24 to your office being your request for security of costs. …I confirm … that my client does not have any interests in the property in which you inquired into by letter dated 17 March 2014.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The only sound basis to consider the exercise of discretion is whether the Court should order Mrs Kiefel to pay the $52,943.24 sought, or a rounded figure close to it.CONCLUSION This has not been an easy decision. The Court has power to order security against a litigation representative. The role and function of such a representative, especially when the proceeding concerns the interests of a disabled child, means the Court should be cautious before requiring such security. In a proceeding concerning whether he has been subjected to unlawful discrimination, placing James in a position where he cannot exercise his right to appeal because his parent has failed to provide a significant sum of money as ordered seems in my opinion to lack fairness unless there were the most extraordinary of circumstances. The circumstances of this case cause me concern, but they are not so extraordinary as to persuade me I should interfere with James’ right of appeal. I have found that, on the current state of the evidence, Mrs Kiefel has capacity to pay some sum by way of security. The evidence does not permit me to infer that she can only provide a sum substantially less than that sought by the State. The State’s estimate of $52,943.24 as its taxable costs has not been challenged by evidence or submission. If security were to be ordered, there is no basis in the evidence to strike a sum substantially less than that sought by the State on the basis of Mrs Kiefel’s capacity to access funds. Any sum ordered will need to be provided relatively quickly because the appeal is listed in August 2014 and steps will need to be taken to prepare the matter. Mrs Kiefel has not established, and there is no basis in the evidence in any event, to conclude the appeal will be stultified if security is ordered. The Kiefel family, including James and Mrs Kiefel, have resided in the USA for three years now and I infer will continue to stay there while James’ educational and developmental needs are being better met there, from his parents’ perspective. Mrs Kiefel has been ordered by the primary judge to pay what I infer will be a large sum in costs for the trial. There is presently no real property or other asset belonging to Mrs Kiefel in Australia against which that costs judgment can be executed. Execution of any further costs judgment on the appeal will be problematic, in part because the Kiefels remain outside the jurisdiction. The change in James’ situation, and the inference I have drawn that this proceeding is no longer directed at coercive orders designed to deliver to James a different kind of educational experience in Victoria, reduces the public interest in the matters to be ventilated on appeal. It might also be seen to increase the risk of non-satisfaction of any costs orders made against Mrs Kiefel on appeal, in the sense that, by her own election, she has moved her family on and taken a different path to address what she perceives to be James’ educational needs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Farrell [2007] WASCA 173, the Court was first concerned with the existence of the power to award costs at all against a next friend. Buss JA noted the “general rule” articulated by Sackville J in NSW Insurance 94 FCR 247; [1999] FCA 433 as justified by the considerations Sackville J set out. Buss JA noted (at [31]) that, if the next friend has acted properly in the proceedings, he or she will be entitled to an indemnity from the plaintiff or appellant. He also considered the fact that a next friend has the conduct of the proceedings was significant in construing the costs discretion in the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) as extending to the award of costs against a next friend. In relation to the exercise of a power to order security, his Honour did not undertake any explicit analysis of that and it seems to me his Honour saw the exposure to an order for security for costs as flowing implicitly from exposure to a general order for costs at the conclusion of the proceeding.CONSIDERATIONThe appropriate approach in principle Like the costs power itself, the Court’s power under s 56 is widely expressed. It is closely linked to the Court’s general costs power and I see no reason to construe s 56 in a way which introduces discordance between the established approach to the costs direction in s 43 of the Federal Court Act. There is nothing in the text, context or purpose of either provision which suggests Parliament intended to constrain the discretions in s 43 or s 56 so as to place a litigation representative appointed under the Federal Court Rules in a different position in terms of potential exposure to costs to a party who had the conduct of a proceeding. A variety of factors may well mean the discretions are differently exercised, but the power exists. The power conferred on the Court by s 56 to order payment of security for costs is a “wide power”, which “must be exercised judicially, but that is the only relevant limitation”, and “each case must depend on its own circumstances”: Bell Wholesale Co Ltd v Gates Export Corporation (1984) 2 FCR 1 at 3-4. The potential chilling effect of requirements to provide security for costs on individual litigants are well recognised, and the impediment which such orders could otherwise impose on access to justice means, at first-instance level, an individual impecunious litigant will rarely be ordered to provide security. The State of Victoria contended there was a different approach generally taken on appeal and there are authorities which support that proposition. One explanation is that the judgment under appeal, representing the exercise of the litigant’s right to access the court, is presumed to be correct: see Kennedy v McGeechan [1978] 1 NSWLR 314 at 315; FletchervCommissioner of Taxation (1992) 37 FCR 288 at 292 per Hill J. Many authorities, and the State’s submissions, refer to a case from the 19th century, Cowell v Taylor (1886) 31 Ch D 34, where Bowen LJ said (at 38): The general rule is that poverty is no bar to a litigant, that, from time immemorial, has been the rule at common law, and also, I believe, in equity. There is an exception in the case of appeals, but there the appellant has had the benefit of a decision by one of Her Majesty’s courts, and so an insolvent party is not excluded from the courts, but only prevented, if he cannot find security, from dragging his opponent from one court to another.