Renshaw v Queensland Mining Corporation Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Renshaw v Queensland Mining Corporation Limited [2016] FCA 994

Appeal from: Queensland Mining Corporation Ltd v Renshaw [2016] FCCA 979
File number: NSD 678 of 2016
Judge: KATZMANN J
Date of judgment: 23 August 2016
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — Security for costs — appeal from sequestration order — where appellant did not ultimately contend that he was solvent
Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 2G, 36(1), item7

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 44(1)(c), 58(1)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 56

Federal Court Rules 2001 (Cth) rr 19.01, 36.09

Cases cited:

Addenbrooke Pty Ltd v Duncan (No 3) [2014] FCA 322

Bell Wholesale Co Ltd v Gates Export Corporation (1984) 2 FCR 1

Cowell v Taylor (1885) 31 Ch D 34

Dye v Commonwealth Securities Ltd [2012] FCA 992

Kiefel v State of Victoria [2014] FCA 604

Knight v Beyond Properties Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 764

Madgwick v Kelly (2013) 212 FCR 1

Maher v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2013] FCA 1143

Moussa v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2011] FCA 67

Nati v Bunt (No 2) [2013] FCA 325

Prynew Pty Ltd v Nemeth [2010] NSWCA 94

Re Scerri (1998) 82 FCR 146

Totev v Sfar (2008) 167 FCR 193

Waters v Commonwealth(Australian Taxation Office) [2015] FCAFC 46; 108 ACSR 445

Date of hearing: 16 August 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 36
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr J T Johnson
Solicitor for the Appellant: Beazley Boorman Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr N Furlan
Solicitor for the Respondent: Jurisbridge Legal

ORDERS

NSD 678 of 2016
BETWEEN:

HOWARD VICTOR RENSHAW

Appellant

AND:

QUEENSLAND MINING CORPORATION LIMITED ACN 109 962 469

Respondent

JUDGE:

KATZMANN J

DATE OF ORDER:

23 AUGUST 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appellant give security for the respondent’s costs of the appeal by paying into court by 30 September 2016 the sum of $35,000 or by otherwise providing security for that amount in a manner satisfactory to the respondent. 

2.The respondent notify chambers if and when order 1 is satisfied.

3.In the event that order 1 is not complied with, the appeal be dismissed.

4.In the event that order 1 is complied with, the respondent have liberty to apply for additional security.

5.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of its interlocutory application filed on 4 July 2016.

6.Liberty to apply be granted in relation to the form of order 1.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 27 April 2016 a sequestration order was made against the estate of Howard Renshaw.  Mr Renshaw has appealed from the judgment in which the order was made, seeking to have it set aside.  By an interlocutory application filed on 4 July 2016, the petitioning creditor, Queensland Mining Corporation Ltd (QMCL) applies for security for costs.…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 994
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Renshaw v Queensland Mining Corporation Limited is an appeal against the security for costs orders made by the Federal Circuit Court. The appellant, Renshaw, appealed against the primary judge’s decision to order security for costs of approximately $50,000 to be provided by him to the respondent, Queensland Mining Corporation Limited, within a certain time period. The appeal was based on the argument that the security for costs order was excessive and should be reduced, and that the order should be stayed indefinitely if the security was not provided. The legal issues in the case were whether the security for costs order was excessive and should be reduced, and whether the order should be stayed indefinitely if the security was not provided. The court held that the security for costs order should be reduced to $35,000 and that the order should not be stayed indefinitely if the security was not provided. The court reasoned that the appeal was expected to last no more than half a day and that the respondent’s counsel was very familiar with the case, having appeared in the hearing before the primary judge. The court also noted that bankruptcy proceedings affect the rights of other creditors and that there is a public interest in the timely disposition of bankruptcy proceedings. The court proposed giving the appellant until 30 September 2016 to come up with the security, in default of which the appeal will be dismissed. The court made the following orders: the appellant to give security for the respondent’s costs of the appeal by paying into court by 30 September 2016 the sum of $35,000 or by otherwise providing security for that amount in a manner satisfactory to the respondent, the respondent to notify chambers if and when order 1 is satisfied, in the event that order 1 is not complied with, the appeal be dismissed, in the event that order 1 is complied with, the respondent have liberty to apply for additional security, the appellant to pay the respondent’s costs of its interlocutory application filed on 4 July 2016, and liberty to apply be granted in relation to the form of order 1.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appellant give security for the respondent’s costs of the appeal by paying into court by 30 September 2016 the sum of $35,000 or by otherwise providing security for that amount in a manner satisfactory to the respondent.

2. The respondent notify chambers if and when order 1 is satisfied.

3. In the event that order 1 is not complied with, the appeal be dismissed.

4. In the event that order 1 is complied with, the respondent have liberty to apply for additional security.

5. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of its interlocutory application filed on 4 July 2016.

6. Liberty to apply be granted in relation to the form of order 1.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In the first affidavit Mr Du said that a partner at his firm, Derek Xu, estimated the costs of the appeal in the range of $35,000 to $50,000. He explained the method by which Mr Xu had reached this conclusion. It is unnecessary to refer to it here, however, because the estimate is not challenged. Background Section 40(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) provides that a debtor commits an act of bankruptcy in each of the cases listed in the subsection. Paragraph 40(1)(g) provides that a debtor commits an act of bankruptcy:if a creditor who has obtained against the debtor a final judgment or final order, being a judgment or order the execution of which has not been stayed, has served on the debtor in Australia … a bankruptcy notice under this Act and the debtor does not … within the time specified in the notice … comply with the requirements of the notice or satisfy the Court that he or she has a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand equal to or exceeding the amount of the judgment debt or sum payable under the final order, as the case may be, being a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand that he or she could not have set up in the action or proceeding in which the judgment or order was obtained. A debtor has 21 days in which to comply with a bankruptcy notice: see Re Scerri (1998) 82 FCR 146. In the event that an application is made to the court to set aside the notice before the expiration of the 21 days, the court may extend the time for compliance (subject to s 41(6C), which is presently irrelevant): s 41(6A)(b). On 28 January 2015 Mr Renshaw applied to the Federal Circuit Court to set aside the bankruptcy notice and, on 9 February 2015, relying on s 41(6A) of the Act, the District Registrar extended the time for compliance up to and including 31 March 2015. But Mr Renshaw’s application to set aside the bankruptcy notice was not heard on that day. It was not heard until 4 June 2016. Still, s 41(7) provides that:Where, before the expiration of the time fixed for compliance with the requirements of a bankruptcy notice, the debtor has applied to the Court for an order setting aside the bankruptcy notice on the ground that the debtor has such a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand as is referred to in paragraph 40(1)(g), and the Court has not, before the expiration of that time, determined whether it is satisfied that the debtor has such a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand, that time shall be deemed to have been extended, immediately before its expiration, until and including the day on which the Court determines whether it is so satisfied. The creditor’s petition was filed in the Federal Circuit Court on 30 July 2015. The alleged debt was an amount of $382,273.81 made up of a judgment debt of $363,000 and post-judgment interest. The act of bankruptcy upon which the petition was based was his failure to comply on or before 4 June 2015 with the requirements of a bankruptcy notice served on him on 8 January 2015 or to satisfy the Court that he had a counter-claim, set-off or cross-demand equal to or greater than the sum claimed in the notice which could not have been set up in the action in which the judgment was obtained (apparently relying on s 40(1)(g)).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

QMCL seeks orders in the following terms:1.The Appellant give security for the Respondent’s costs of the appeal by paying into court the sum of $50,000 or by otherwise providing security for that amount in a manner satisfactory to the Respondent. Until that security is provided, there will be a stay of the proceedings. The security is to be provided before 31 August 2016.2.In the event that the security has not been provided, an order for the dismissal of the proceedings under rule 36.09(1)(c) Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).3.…4.The parties have liberty to apply for additional security for costs at any stage of the proceedings.5.Costs.The evidence The interlocutory application is supported by two affidavits affirmed by Jonathan Lesse Du, the solicitor with the day to day carriage of the appeal for QMCL. Mr Renshaw offered no evidence. The affidavits set out the background to the making of the sequestration orders. In the first, affirmed on 4 July 2016, Mr Du also annexes documents showing that Mr Renshaw is the registered owner of a property in New South Wales, that he is a joint tenant of the property with a Rui Shi, and that the property is subject to a first mortgage to the ANZ Bank. In the second, Mr Du set out in detail Mr Renshaw’s conduct in the hearing of the creditor’s petition and stated his opinion (to which no objection was taken) that “[t]he actions and representations of Mr Renshaw have caused QMCL to incur unnecessary costs in the proceedings below”. In the first affidavit Mr Du said that a partner at his firm, Derek Xu, estimated the costs of the appeal in the range of $35,000 to $50,000. He explained the method by which Mr Xu had reached this conclusion. It is unnecessary to refer to it here, however, because the estimate is not challenged. Background Section 40(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) provides that a debtor commits an act of bankruptcy in each of the cases listed in the subsection. Paragraph 40(1)(g) provides that a debtor commits an act of bankruptcy:if a creditor who has obtained against the debtor a final judgment or final order, being a judgment or order the execution of which has not been stayed, has served on the debtor in Australia … a bankruptcy notice under this Act and the debtor does not … within the time specified in the notice … comply with the requirements of the notice or satisfy the Court that he or she has a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand equal to or exceeding the amount of the judgment debt or sum payable under the final order, as the case may be, being a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand that he or she could not have set up in the action or proceeding in which the judgment or order was obtained. A debtor has 21 days in which to comply with a bankruptcy notice: see Re Scerri (1998) 82 FCR 146. In the event that an application is made to the court to set aside the notice before the expiration of the 21 days, the court may extend the time for compliance (subject to s 41(6C), which is presently irrelevant): s 41(6A)(b).

Decision

Reasons for decision

The next question is in what amount security should be ordered. As the appeal is expected to last no more than half a day and as QMCL’s counsel is very familiar with the case, having appeared in the hearing before the primary judge, I consider that the order should be made at the bottom end of Mr Du’s estimated range. If that proves too conservative, which I doubt, QMCL can always apply for additional security.Conclusion Mr Renshaw should be ordered to provide security in the sum of $35,000. In the event that the order be insufficient to protect QMCL, QMCL is at liberty to apply for additional security. Mr Johnson argued against the making of proposed order 2 (in effect, a self-executing order seeing the appeal dismissed under r 36.09(1)(c) if the security is not provided within the requisite period). Instead, he urged the court instead to stay the proceeding indefinitely. It seems to me, however, that a stay would be singularly inappropriate in a matter of this nature. Bankruptcy is not mere inter partes litigation. It affects the rights of other creditors. There is also a public interest in the timely disposition of bankruptcy proceedings. In Totev v Sfar (2008) 167 FCR 193 at [17] Emmett J said that “[c]ourts exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction must be assiduous in avoiding delay in dealing with any question concerning the making of a sequestration order”. As I foreshadowed at the hearing, however, I am minded to extend the time for the provision of security from the date proposed in QMCL’s application. I propose giving Mr Renshaw until 30 September 2016 to come up with the security, in default of which the appeal will be dismissed. If he does, then the appeal can be heard during the next Appeals and Full Court sitting period in November. With these variations, then, the orders QMCL seeks will be made.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.