Nyoni v Shire of Kellerberrin (No 9)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Nyoni v Shire of Kellerberrin (No 9) [2016] FCA 472

File number: WAD 734 of 2015
Judge: MORTIMER J
Date of judgment: 5 May 2016
Catchwords: COSTS – application for security for costs – principles applicable to order for security for costs on an appeal – whether order for security would stultify appeal – whether appellant impecunious – whether the impecuniosity of the appellant arises out of the conduct that is the subject of the appeal
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 43, 56

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 36.09

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Bell Wholesale Co Ltd v Gates Export Corporation (1984) 2 FCR 1

Dye v Commonwealth Securities Ltd [2012] FCA 992

Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; 214 CLR 118

Kiefel v State of Victoria [2014] FCA 604

Madgwick v Kelly [2013] FCAFC 61; 212 FCR 1

Nyoni v Chee Koon Hee (No 4) [2013] FCA 948

Nyoni v Shire of Kellerberrin (No 7) [2016] FCA 135

Nyoni v Shire of Kellerberrin (No 8) [2016] FCA 245

Warren v Coombes [1979] HCA 9; 142 CLR 531

Date of hearing:  Determined on the papers
Registry: Western Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 30
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant was self-represented
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr S D Hubbard, DLA Piper Australia
Solicitor for the Second, Third and Fourth Respondents: Mr P Graham, Jarman McKenna
Counsel for the Fifth Respondent: The Fifth Respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

WAD 734 of 2015
BETWEEN:

EMSON NYONI

Appellant

AND:

SHIRE OF KELLERBERRIN

First Respondent

DARREN FRIEND

Second Respondent

STAN MCDONNEL (and others named in the Schedule)

Third Respondent

JUDGE:

MORTIMER J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 MAY 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The first respondent’s application for orders for security for costs is dismissed.

2.The second to fourth respondents’ application for security for costs is dismissed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MORTIMER J:

  1. This is the third interlocutory judgment in this appeal. In the other two judgments, I have set out the background to Mr Nyoni’s claims at trial, as well as tracing the manner in which Mr Nyoni’s appeal has been dealt with: see Nyoni v Shire of Kellerberrin (No 7) [2016] FCA 135; Nyoni v Shire of Kellerberrin (No 8) [2016] FCA 245.

  2. The respondents have sought orders for security for costs in the appeal. The making of this application was foreshadowed at the appeal case management hearing on 19 February 2016 and a timetable was set by directions for the filing of material in support and in opposition. There has been substantial compliance with that timetable, although­ – as has become something of a pattern – Mr Nyoni filed some of his material shortly after the time specified in the directions. That material…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 472
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Nyoni v Shire of Kellerberrin (No 9), the appellant, Mr Nyoni, appealed against the orders of the Federal Circuit Court (Western Australia) regarding his claims for damages against several respondents. The appellant sought to challenge the trial judge’s findings and the legal determinations made in dismissing his claims. The primary focus of the appeal was on the application for security for costs filed by the respondents, which the appellant sought to dismiss. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with determining whether an order for security for costs was appropriate in this appeal scenario, particularly considering the appellant’s financial status and the nature of the appeal.

The court examined several legal issues, including the principles governing the order for security for costs in an appeal context, the balance between access to justice and the potential chilling effect of such orders, and the specific circumstances of the appellant’s financial situation and the merits of the appeal. The court also considered whether the appellant's impecuniosity stemmed from the conduct forming the basis of the appeal, which would affect the discretion in ordering security for costs.

The Federal Court concluded that the principles guiding security for costs in appeals should not be used as a mechanism to stifle appeals or force an appellant to discontinue their appeal. The court emphasised that while security for costs is a process to secure a respondent’s costs in advance, it must be balanced against the fundamental right to appeal conferred by statute. The court noted that the appellant's impecuniosity and the vexatious nature of his conduct did not justify an order for security for costs, particularly when considering the appellant's right to appeal and the efficient administration of justice. The court ultimately decided that the appeal should proceed, and any costs issues would be addressed by the Full Court after the appeal was determined.

The court dismissed the respondents' applications for security for costs. The interlocutory applications were dismissed, and there would be no order as to costs at this stage. The appeal would continue to be heard and determined based on its merits.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The first respondent’s application for orders for security for costs is dismissed.

2. The second to fourth respondents’ application for security for costs is dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

An order for security for costs should not be used as an alternative way of striking out an appeal. Nor should it be used to push an appellant towards discontinuing an appeal. Rather, it is a process available to secure, in advance, the costs of a respondent to an appeal where the circumstances justify reversing the sequence which usually applies: namely that costs orders are made, if at all, after a proceeding has been heard and determined. But, as I have attempted to demonstrate, the whole notion of providing monetary security in advance must be balanced carefully against access to justice considerations, in the light of the conferral by the Federal Court Act of a right of appeal, which an appellant has regularly exercised. Where an appellant has sufficient funds, there will be no access to justice issues in a security for costs application, and other discretionary factors will no doubt assume more importance. CONCLUSION The respondents have to date conducted themselves responsibly in this appeal, in the face of some baseless and intemperate allegations by Mr Nyoni, and various inappropriate applications (such as the introduction into the appeal of entirely new claims) which have been without much legal merit. No doubt Mr Nyoni is a thorn in their respective sides. However, in my opinion, an order that he provide security for costs is not appropriate, no matter how vexatious aspects of his conduct may be. The appeal has now been sufficiently regularised that it will be conducted on the basis of a tolerably intelligible notice of appeal, and will be argued and concluded in a one day hearing. If the appeal lacks merit to the extent the respondents submit, it should be a relatively straightforward task to prepare for the appeal, and to persuade the appeal court that is so. As I said in Kiefel at [88]:The discretion is exercised, in my opinion, because the Court concludes that it is fair in the particular circumstances of a case that a particular respondent not assume the risk usually assumed by respondents in litigation, and have available something in addition to the usual mechanisms for pursuing costs orders. In my opinion, the interests of the administration of justice are best served, in the face of a determined self-represented litigant such as Mr Nyoni, by the substantive appeal being heard and determined in an efficient way, as soon as reasonably practicable. The resources of the parties and the Court are best focused on this outcome. If Mr Nyoni is unsuccessful, so be it. On the respondents’ submissions, the appeal should be easily dealt with on its merits. The question of costs will then fall for consideration by the Full Court. However, Mr Nyoni will have been able to exercise his right to appeal in the usual manner which, in the circumstances of this case, I consider to be the predominant consideration. The interlocutory applications will be dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Kiefel, I noted that the potential chilling effect of requirements to provide security for costs on individual litigants are well recognised, and the impediment which such orders could otherwise impose on access to justice means, at first-instance level, an individual impecunious litigant will rarely be ordered to provide security. At [35] – [38] of Kiefel, I noted that there were varying approaches to such applications in the context of appeals, and I noted that the historical context of some of the authorities relied on diminished, in my opinion, their relevance to access to justice considerations in Australian courts in the 21st century. I adhere to my opinion that, in the context of an appeal as of right (a matter I emphasised in Kiefel at [38]), there is no basis for any gloss or presumption on the operation of the principles at first instance. Access to justice, and the effective exercise of a right of appeal for an individual litigant, whether impecunious or of limited means, may often be for all practical purposes stifled if significant security for costs orders are made. I also referred to the identification by Allsop CJ and Middleton J in Madgwick v Kelly [2013] FCAFC 61; 212 FCR 1 at [92] of two components of fairness in the exercise of the s 56 discretion: fairness as to whether security should be ordered, and then fairness as to the amount. For the purposes of this application, I also refer to and adopt the opinions I expressed at [44] and [46] of Kiefel.CONSIDERATION OF RELEVANT FACTORS IN THIS APPLICATIONProspects of success The respondents submit none of the appellant’s grounds of appeal have any reasonable prospects of success, emphasising that the trial judge’s dismissal of each of the appellant’s claims was based on findings of fact (at least in part) and that the bar for overturning findings of fact on appeal was high. Whether or not the latter proposition accurately reflects the nuances of the application of the well-known passages of Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; 214 CLR 118 at [28]-[29], and the materiality threshold described in Warren v Coombes [1979] HCA 9; 142 CLR 531, need not be pursued. An appellate court will correct error in a trial judge’s decisions, whether as to law or fact or both, in circumstances where the appellate court considers it is warranted. Mr Nyoni’s appeal, even after the considerable amount of work which has been applied to the notice of appeal, is fact intensive, and also raises questions of law concerning the law of trespass, the law of accessorial liability, alleged breaches of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), the tort of misfeasance in public office, evidence law and the adequacy of damages. I do not consider it appropriate in a wide ranging appeal, especially where the appellant succeeded against the fifth respondent, for the court on a security for costs application to second guess the outcome of the appeal, or even express detailed views about the prospects of the various grounds.Impecuniosity or access to assets to satisfy costs orders