FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Nyoni v Cho [2019] FCA 560
ORDERS
NSD 35 of 2019
BETWEEN: EMSON NYONI
Applicant
AND: REGISTRAR CHO
Respondent
JUDGE:
GRIFFITHS J
DATE OF ORDER:
24 APRIL 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The interlocutory application filed on 24 April 2019 be allowed.
2.The originating application be dismissed.
3.There be no…
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- AGLC
- Nyoni v Cho [2019] FCA 560
- Case
- [2019] FCA 560
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court found that the impugned conduct concerning Colvin J was not conduct relating to a decision of an administrative character made under an enactment, and thus, it did not fall within the scope of the ADJR Act's jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that judicial review under the ADJR Act is limited to administrative decisions, and the actions of a Judge performing judicial functions do not constitute administrative decisions. Furthermore, the Court held that the originating processes were frivolous or vexatious, as they were obviously untenable and doomed to fail. The Court also noted that the applicant's repeated attempts to file similar documents constituted an abuse of the Court’s process.
Based on the above findings, the Court dismissed both judicial review applications. The Court did not make any order as to costs. The Court's reasoning was grounded in the jurisdictional limits of the ADJR Act and the well-established principles regarding the nature of administrative decisions and the criteria for determining frivolous or vexatious applications.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The interlocutory application filed on 24 April 2019 be allowed.
2. The originating application be dismissed.
3. There be no order as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It is unnecessary to summarise those submissions because they are substantially reflected in the reasons below for dismissing both originating applications. Consideration and determination of the applications I will now address the two judicial review applications in relation to the Registrar’s decisions. The Court has jurisdiction under the ADJR Act to review decisions by a Registrar under r 2.26 because such a decision is a decision of an administrative character made under an enactment and is not a decision of a judicial character (see Satchithanantham v National Australia Bank Limited [2010] FCAFC 47; 268 ALR 222 (Satchithanantham) at [49]-[50]; Murphy FCAFC at [32] and [38] and Bird v Registrar, Federal Court of Australia [2016] FCA 21 at [25] per Collier J). Rule 2.26 of 2011 FCRs provides as follows:A Registrar may refuse to accept a document (including a document that would, if accepted, become an originating application) if the Registrar is satisfied that the document is an abuse of the process of the Court or is frivolous or vexatious:(a) on the face of the document; or(b)by reference to any documents already filed or submitted for filing with the document. The power of a Registrar to refuse to accept a document for filing turns on the Registrar’s satisfaction that the document is an abuse of process of the Court or is frivolous or vexatious. That satisfaction must be honestly and actually formed but it is amenable to judicial review, including in an appropriate case under the relevant provisions of the ADJR Act. It is incontestable that judicial review does not extend to a review of the merits of the Registrar’s decision apart from a case where the ground of unreasonableness involves an examination of the outcome of the decision for the limited purpose of that particular judicial review ground. In Rahman v Hedge [2012] FCA 68 at [5]-[6] (Rahman) Perram J held that the Registrar’s “satisfaction” of the particular state of affairs referred to in the predecessor to r 2.26 (i.e. Order 46 r 7A) was amenable to judicial review, including by reference to Gibbs J’s well-known statements in Buck v Bavone 135 CLR 110 at 118-119. I respectfully agree. It is well established that a document is:(a)an abuse of process if “it can clearly be seen to be doomed to fail” (SZQYP v Hannigan [2012] FCA 723 (SZQYP) at [30]; and(b)frivolous or vexatious, if it is “obviously untenable or utterly hopeless” (SZQYP at [30]). The purpose of a Registrar’s power not to accept a document for filing is “to assist the Registrar to maintain efficient operation of the registry and, thereby, the Court” (see Bizuneh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 42; 128 FCR 353 (Bizuneh) at [15], with reference to an earlier similar provision). Referring to the previous r 7A (which not only conferred a power on the Registrar expressed in similar terms to those in r 2.26 but also empowered a Registrar in his or her discretion to “seek a direction of a Judge who may direct him” on the question whether a document should be accepted for filing), the Full Court in Bizuneh said at [17]:17.Rule 7A provides for a Judge to act in aid of administration of the Court. There is no application to the Court by motion or otherwise and no requirement for a party to be heard. It involves determination of administrative obligations with respect to documents presented to a Registrar having regard to the character of the documents on their face. No order or decree intended to bind a party and no determination of right is made by a Judge where assistance is provided to a Registrar under r 7A.