Khanam v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

KHANAM v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION [2017] FCCA 2983
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Application to review a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection not to revoke the cancellation of an Aged Dependent Relative visa – whether delegate erred in considering whether he was not satisfied that there was a ground for the cancellation – whether legal unreasonableness. 

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.101, 116, 128, 129, 131

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg.1.03

Cases cited:

F Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [1975] AC 295
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24;[1986]

HCA 40

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden (2016) 240 FCR 158; [2016] FCAFC 28
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437; [2014] FCAFC 1
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1; [2016] FCAFC 11
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS (2014) 309 ALR 67; [2014] FCAFC 16
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 259 ALR 429; [2009] HCA 39
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611; [2010] HCA 16
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99; [2013] FCA 317
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; [2001] HCA 30
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152; [2006] HCA 63
SZOOR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 202 FCR 1; [2012] FCAFC 58

Applicant: KHALEDA KHANAM
Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
File Number: SYG 39 of 2015
Judgment of: Judge Barnes
Hearing date: 9 August 2016
Date of Last Submission: 12 September 2016
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 5 December 2017

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Silva
Solicitors for the Applicant: Kailash Lawyers
Solicitors for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

  1. The parties are directed to confer and to either submit agreed orders to give effect to these reasons for judgment or notify the Court of the absence of agreement by 4:00pm on 19 December 2017.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 39 of 2015

KHALEDA KHANAM

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Background

  1. This is an application for judicial review pursuant to s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) filed on 7 January 2015. The Applicant relies on a further amended application filed on 16 August 2016 (referred to for convenience as the application).

  2. In the application the Applicant seeks review of two decisions made by an officer of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection.  The first is a decision made on 2 July 2014 pursuant to s.128 of the Act to cancel the Applicant’s Subclass 114 Other Family (Aged Dependent…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCCA 2983
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter came before Judge Barnes of the Federal Court of Australia. The applicant, Ms. Khanam, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Minister for Immigration. The dispute concerned the Minister's decision to cancel Ms. Khanam's visa, which was based on information suggesting that the sponsor of her visa was not who she claimed to be. Specifically, the Minister's delegate considered anonymous information received in 2007 and 2010, which identified the applicant's son as "RAZEE Saleh" or "Saleh Imam Al Razee" with a specific date of birth. This information was deemed consistent with details from a reliable source (the New Zealand Department of Immigration) that the sponsor had a brother named "Al Razi."

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the delegate's decision to equate the applicant's nephew with the sponsor's brother, based on the provided information, was legally unreasonable. The applicant argued that the similarity in the names "Saleh Imam Al Razee" and "Saleh Imam Al Razi" was so striking that it would be highly improbable for these to refer to different individuals. This, the applicant contended, meant the delegate's conclusion lacked an evident and intelligible justification.

The Court considered the concept of legal unreasonableness as articulated in *Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh* and the High Court decision in *Li*. Legal unreasonableness can arise either from an underlying jurisdictional error or, alternatively, when a decision is outcome-focused and lacks "common sense," appearing arbitrary or capricious. This latter category of unreasonableness occurs when a decision-maker has a "genuinely free discretion" but the exercise of that power lacks "an evident and intelligible justification." The Court noted that while the applicant submitted on the origin and pronunciation of the names, there was no evidence before it to support these contentions.

The Court did not make final orders in the provided text.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Reliance was also placed by the Applicant on the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437; [2014] FCAFC 1 at [44] as follows:In order to understand how the standard of legal unreasonableness is to be ascertained, it is important to see where the concept fits in terms of the court’s supervisory powers over executive or administrative decision-making. In Li, the judgments identify two different contexts in which the concept is employed. Legal unreasonableness can be a conclusion reached by a supervising court after the identification of an underlying jurisdictional error in the decision-making process: 297 ALR 225 ; [2013] HCA 18 at [27]–[28] per French CJ, at [72] per Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ; cf Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611; [2010] HCA 16 at [39] per Gummow A-CJ and Kiefel J. However, legal unreasonableness can also be outcome focused, without necessarily identifying another underlying jurisdictional error. The latter occurs in what French CJ (in Li 297 ALR 225; [2013] HCA 18 at [28]) calls “an area of decisional freedom”: it has the character of a choice that is arbitrary, capricious or without “common sense”. See also the plurality at [66] referring to an area within which a decision-maker has a genuinely free discretion. The plurality in Li described this as an inference to be drawn because the court cannot identify how the decision was arrived at. In those circumstances, the exercise of power is seen by the supervising court as lacking “an evident and intelligible justification”. Gageler J also uses language suggestive of review for legal unreasonableness being concerned with an examination by the supervising court of the outcome of the exercise of power (in Li 297 ALR 22 ; [2013] HCA 18 at [105]):“It is, of course, true that, as a measure in fact of time, space, quantity and conduct, reasonableness is a concept deeply rooted in the common law: and so, in such cases, is the power of a court to say whether a particular decision of that fact is or is not within the bounds of reason”: Giris Pty Ltd v FCT (1969) 119 CLR 365 at 383–384; [1969] HCA 5. Review by a court of the reasonableness of a decision made by another repository of power “is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process” but also with “whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law”: Dunsmuir v New Brunswick [2008] 1 SCR 190 at 220–221 [47]. (emphasis added by Applicant) The Applicant referred to the fact that in the anonymous information received by the Department in 2007 and 2010 the person said to be the Applicant’s son was described as “RAZEE Saleh, DOB: 24/01/1979” and as “Saleh Imam Al Razee DOB: 24.01.1979”. These details were said to be the same as those in the birth certificate for Saleh Imam Al Razee. It was pointed out that in the cancellation decision the delegate had suggested that information from a reliable source (later identified as the New Zealand Department of Immigration) that the sponsor had a brother by the name of Mr “Al Razi” was “consistent” with the anonymous information received by the Department on two separate occasions, notwithstanding that this anonymous information referred to a Mr “Al Razee”. It appears that it was intended to be suggested that a decision-maker could only have decided that the Applicant’s nephew and the brother disclosed by her sponsor were the same person. The Applicant submitted that the similarity in the names Saleh Imam Al Razee and Saleh Imam Al Razi was so overwhelming that it would be “extremely” rare for another person to have had the same name in these circumstances, although insofar as Counsel for the Applicant sought to address the origin and pronunciation of these names in submissions, there is no evidence before the Court in support of any such contentions.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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