Kestell v Davey [No 3]

Case [2023] WASC 289


JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CIVIL

CITATION:   KESTELL -v- DAVEY [No 3] [2023] WASC 289

CORAM:   SMITH J

HEARD:   5-9 & 20 DECEMBER 2022

DELIVERED          :   4 AUGUST 2023

FILE NO/S:   CIV 1727 of 2021

BETWEEN:   TIMOTHY ARTHUR KESTELL

Plaintiff

AND

GRANT LAWRENCE BURNAFORD DAVEY

First Defendant

KAYELEKERA RESOURCES PTY LTD

Second Defendant

DAVEY HOLDINGS (AUS) PTY LTD

Third Defendant

DAVEY MANAGEMENT (AUS) PTY LTD

Fourth Defendant


Catchwords:

Contract - Terms partly oral, in writing and inferred by acts, conduct and communications exchanged over time

Contract - Whether substance of matters agreed constituted an agreement to agree - Whether terms vague or uncertain or not supported by consideration

Practice and procedure - Voir dire - Whether expert handwriting evidence admissible - Relevance - Basis rule - Statement of reasoning rule - Reasoning of expert insufficiently transparent - Expert opinion inadmissible

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

Declaration made that the second defendant holds 50,954,438 shares of Lotus Resources Ltd on trust for the plaintiff or his nominee

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff : Mr G D Cobby SC & Mr A J Papamatheos
First Defendant : Mr M L Bennett & Mr N Ekanayake
Second Defendant : Mr M L Bennett & Mr N Ekanayake
Third Defendant : Mr M L Bennett & Mr N Ekanayake
Fourth Defendant : Mr M L Bennett & Mr N Ekanayake

Solicitors:

Plaintiff : Tottle Partners
First Defendant : Bennett
Second Defendant : Bennett
Third Defendant : Bennett
Fourth Defendant : Bennett

Cases referred to in decision:

Anaconda Nickel Ltd v Tarmoola Australia Pty Ltd [2000] WASCA 27; (2000) 22 WAR 101

Australian Broadcasting Corporation v XIVTH Commonwealth Games Ltd (1988) 18 NSWLR 540

Australian Goldfields NL (in liq) v North Australian Diamonds NL [2009] WASCA 98

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar [2012] HCA 17; (2012) 86 ALJR 522

Automasters Australia Pty Ltd v Bruness Pty Ltd [2004] WASCA 229

BBH v The Queen [2012] HCA 9; (2012) 245 CLR 499

Beer v Duracraft Pty Ltd [2004] WASCA 192

Belgravia Nominees Pty Ltd v Lowe Pty Ltd [No 6] [2019] WASC 5

Blenkinsop v Wilson [2019] WASC 77

BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 180 CLR 266

Brown v Gould [1972] Ch 53

Claremont 24-7 Pty Ltd v Invox Pty Ltd [No 2] [2015] WASC 220

Classic Maritime Inc v Lion Diversified Holdings Berhad [2009] EWHC 1142

Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar [2011] HCA 21; (2011) 243 CLR 588

Fazio v Fazio [2012] WASCA 72

Forbes Engineering (Asia) Pte Limited v Forbes (No 4) [2009] FCA 675

Girgis v Poliwka [No 6] [2019] WASC 230

Global Container Lines Ltd v State Black Sea Shipping Co [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep 127

Goldsmith v Sandilands [2002] HCA 31; (2000) 76 ALJR 1024

Huntingdale Village Pty Ltd (Receivers And Managers Appointed) v Corrs Chambers Westgarth (a Firm) [No 3] [2016] WASC 366

Ironside v Thisainayagan [2016] WASC 174

John Holland Pty Ltd v Kellogg Brown &…

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Details
AGLC
Kestell v Davey [No 3] [2023] WASC 289
Case
[2023] WASC 289
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Kestell v Davey [No 3] involved a dispute between the plaintiff and the defendants over the terms of a contract that had been partly oral, partly written, and partly inferred through acts, conduct, and communications over time. The contract in question was for the sale of real estate, and the plaintiff sought to enforce the contract and recover damages for its breach. The defendants argued that the terms of the contract were vague or uncertain, or not supported by consideration. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, which had to determine whether the substance of the matters agreed upon constituted an agreement to agree, and whether the terms were vague or uncertain or not supported by consideration.

The court was required to decide several legal issues, including whether the substance of the matters agreed upon constituted an agreement to agree, and whether the terms were vague or uncertain or not supported by consideration. The court also had to consider whether expert handwriting evidence was admissible in the case, and whether the expert's reasoning was sufficiently transparent to be considered reliable.

The court found that the substance of the matters agreed upon did constitute an agreement to agree, and that the terms were not vague or uncertain or not supported by consideration. The court also found that the expert handwriting evidence was inadmissible because the expert's reasoning was not sufficiently transparent. The court held that the plaintiff had adequately justified the contention of the unusual difficulty and complexity of the matter by pointing to the nature of the proceedings that required the court to construe a series of informal (oral and inferred) agreements from a large volume of documentary evidence and lengthy witness cross-examination. Consequently, the court found that the Determination limits for certain items were inadequate due to the unusual difficulty, complexity, and importance of the proceedings as a whole.

The court ordered that the defendants pay the plaintiff's costs of the proceedings, including costs associated with the Items for which the plaintiff had claimed. The court found that the defendants' claim that these were features which the court grapples with on a daily basis and therefore should not give rise to a special costs order, understated the unusual difficulty and complexity of the factual findings that were required to be considered.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Deciding whether there is 'unusual difficulty' involves an evaluative judgment by which the court compares its experience of the particular case and the usual run of civil cases determined in the court.[499] This is also the approach to the other two descriptors. In O'Rourke v P & B Corporation Pty Ltd,[500] Martin CJ stated:[501]… the word 'unusual' means unusual having regard to what one might describe as the usual run of civil cases. The question is not, for example, in this case, whether this was an unusually difficult, complex or important case for specific performance of a contract for the sale of land which at the time the contract was entered into was not subdivided. Rather, the question is whether this was an unusually difficult, complex or important case, having regard to the usual run of civil cases determined in the Supreme Court and generally in the District Court, because, of course, the Scale is generally applicable to proceedings in both courts.It also seems to me that the assessment of the question of whether or not there is 'unusual difficulty, complexity or importance' is essentially a value judgment to be made by the court, and which the court is particularly well qualified to make, having regard to the fact that the court has heard and determined the trial and can take into account the court's experience of the usual run of civil cases in the superior courts of the State.[499] Blatchford v Laine [2018] WASC 207 (S) [49] (Vaughan J); Sino Iron Pty Ltd v Mineralogy Pty Ltd [No 2] [2017] WASCA 76 (S) [15].[500] O'Rourke v P & B Corporation Pty Ltd [2008] WASC 36 (S).[501] O'Rourke v P & B Corporation Pty Ltd [2008] WASC 36 (S) [23] ‑ [24]. Having heard and determined the trial and taking account of the court's experience of the usual run of civil cases, I accept the plaintiff's submissions that the Determination limits for Items 1(a), 1(c), 7(b), 19, 22(a), and 22(b) are inadequate due to the unusual difficulty, complexity and importance of the proceedings as a whole. The plaintiff has adequately justified the contention of the unusual difficulty and complexity of the matter by pointing to the nature of the proceedings that required the court to construe a series of informal (oral and inferred) agreements from a large volume of documentary evidence and lengthy witness cross-examination. In my opinion, the defendants claim that these are features which the court grapples with on a daily basis and therefore should not give rise to a special costs order, understate the unusual difficulty and complexity of the factual findings that were required to be considered through numerous oral and written communications, which communications were largely informal over a lengthy period of time in determining whether the parties had entered into a concluded contract. Although the trial of the action was completed in six days, the issues raised by the parties were complex and resulted in lengthy 196 page reasons for decision. Consequently, it is not surprising that the plaintiff's legal representatives spent more time than is allowable on work relating to the Items claimed by the plaintiff.