Kelk v Australian Postal Corporation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kelk v Australian Postal Corporation [2014] FCA 147

Citation: Kelk v Australian Postal Corporation [2014] FCA 147
Parties: ANDREA KELK v AUSTRALIAN POSTAL CORPORATION
File number(s): QUD 140 of 2013
Judge(s): GREENWOOD J
Date of judgment: 28 February 2014
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – consideration of an appeal under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) – consideration of whether the applicant appellant has properly framed a question of law – consideration of whether the applicant appellant has demonstrated an error of law in the discharge of the review function by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in reviewing a reconsideration decision made under the provisions of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth)
Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), ss 25(4), 43(1), 44
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth), ss 5A, 5B, 14, 19, 24, 27, 62(4), 64
Cases cited: Kelk and Australian Postal Corporation [2013] AATA 75 - cited
Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 - cited and quoted
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 - cited
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko‑Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 - cited
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Al‑Miahi [2001] FCA 744 - cited and quoted
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 - cited
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 - cited
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 87 ALJR 618 - cited and quoted
Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council [1977] AC 1014 - cited
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 - cited
Date of hearing: 15 October 2013
Date of last submissions: 24 September 2013
Place: Brisbane
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 225
Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: A.C. Harding
Solicitor for the Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

QUD 140 of 2013

BETWEEN:

ANDREA KELK
Applicant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN POSTAL CORPORATION
Respondent

JUDGE:

GREENWOOD J

DATE OF ORDER:

28 FEBRUARY 2014

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

QUD 140 of 2013

BETWEEN:

ANDREA KELK
Applicant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN POSTAL CORPORATION
Respondent

JUDGE:

GREENWOOD J

DATE:

28 FEBRUARY 2014

PLACE:

BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. These proceedings concern an application by way of an appeal under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (the “AAT Act”) from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) constituted by Deputy President Hack SC. The Tribunal’s decision was delivered on 15 February 2003: Kelk and Australian Postal Corporation [2013] AATA 75.

  2. By that decision, the Tribunal affirmed…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 147
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Kelk v Australian Postal Corporation, the appellant, Mrs Kelk, sought to appeal against the findings of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), arguing that the Tribunal had erred in its assessment of her credibility as a witness. The primary issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had properly considered relevant evidence in determining Mrs Kelk's reliability, particularly in light of new evidence presented by Mrs Kelk on the morning of the hearing. The court was also required to address the respondent's objection to the competency of the appeal, arguing that the notice of appeal did not frame precise questions of law.

The court examined the evidence presented by Mrs Kelk and the circumstances under which it was submitted. The Tribunal had noted that Mrs Kelk sought to introduce a significant number of documents that were not previously before it. The court acknowledged that the timing of the submission of this evidence, on the morning of the hearing, did not afford the respondent adequate opportunity to review and respond to it. However, the court held that the late introduction of evidence did not necessarily invalidate the appeal. The court emphasised the importance of the AAT considering all relevant evidence, including that which was presented for the first time, to ensure a fair and just determination of the case. The court found that the appeal was competent and proceeded to consider the merits of the case.

Ultimately, the court determined that the Tribunal had not erred in its assessment of Mrs Kelk's credibility. The court found that the Tribunal had appropriately considered the evidence before it and that the new evidence presented by Mrs Kelk did not alter the Tribunal's findings. The court held that the Tribunal's decision to deem Mrs Kelk an unreliable witness was supported by the evidence and that the AAT was entitled to make such a finding based on the material before it. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

It can be seen that Mrs Kelk’s fundamental proposition is that the Tribunal fell into error by failing to take into account the evidence of Ms McCormick and the three categories of documents described at [13] of these reasons in making a finding of fact that Mrs Kelk was, before the Tribunal, an unreliable witness who had, in particular respects, concocted her evidence. Mrs Kelk contends that in failing to have regard to the identified material, the Tribunal failed to have regard to considerations relevant to that factual question which was fundamental to an adverse determination of the four applications before the Tribunal. The respondent has filed a notice of objection to the competency of the appeal on the footing that the notice of appeal does not frame a precise question or questions of law to be determined on the appeal. Some further background matters On the morning of the hearing, Mrs Kelk sought to hand up a Part C volume of documents she proposed to rely upon in support of the application. Mr Harding of Counsel on behalf of the respondent told the Court that he had been given the documents only at 10.00am that morning and had not had a chance to determine whether Mrs Kelk’s volume contained any material not properly before the Tribunal (T, p 2, lns 29‑40). Although Mrs Kelk initially contended that her Part C volume of documents contained only material before the Tribunal, it emerged in the course of exchanges with Mrs Kelk that a significant number of documents contained within her Part C volume were not documents falling within the “T documents” before the Tribunal nor documents otherwise admitted into evidence as exhibits in the course of the hearing before the Tribunal. It therefore became necessary to identify the documents within Mrs Kelk’s Part C folder which were copies of material not in evidence before the Tribunal. In addition, Mrs Kelk sought to agitate on the morning of the hearing before this Court, an interlocutory application (in effect, under r 33.29 of the Federal Court Rules 2011) for leave to rely upon additional evidence which supported, she contended, the veracity of the evidence she had given before the Tribunal in her statements and in her oral evidence. Mrs Kelk’s interlocutory application filed on 17 September 2013 was supported by an affidavit filed on the same date. In her affidavit, Mrs Kelk said that the documents were “relevant in proving [her] credibility” and represented evidence demonstrating a denial of “procedural fairness” and a “denial of natural justice”. Paragraph 2(c) of her affidavit lists 23 documents she sought leave to rely upon in seeking to demonstrate error of law on the part of the Tribunal, having regard to the grounds Mrs Kelk agitates. At para 2(d) of her affidavit, Mrs Kelk deposes that the evidence was not adduced before the Tribunal because “during the Tribunal process, the appellant was not accused of concocting allegations and exaggerating her evidence, and her credibility regarding specific events was not challenged”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

At para 54, the Tribunal notes that Dr Varghese who saw Mrs Kelk in December 2011 also diagnosed her as exhibiting a state of “major depression”. At para 54, the Tribunal addresses aspects of that part of Dr Varghese’s report (dated 23 February 2012, Ex 31) falling under the section headed “Conclusions”. In particular, the Tribunal notes paras (i), (ii) and (iii) of that section of Dr Varghese’s report. However, it is contextually useful to note what Dr Varghese said in that section which is set out below:CONCLUSIONSThe documentation clarifies issues with respect to Ms Kelk’s neurological symptoms in her arms and her voice and swallowing problems. There is also information with respect to previous presentations with somatic symptoms and psychiatric presentations preceding 2007.Overall the new information does not cause me to change the basic thrust of the opinion expressed provisionally other than to note that Ms Kelk’s emotional symptoms first manifested in 2001 as against 2007.I trust the following is useful to the Tribunal. (i) The principle clinical issue is that Ms Kelk suffers from Recurrent Major Depression meaning that she has had several episodes of depression since 2001. It is also probable that there has been a Dysthymic Disorder of varying intensity with perhaps periods of remission between the episodes of Major Depression. (ii)A consistent feature of Ms Kelk’s depressive illness is that the depression has manifested with a variety of somatic symptoms as outlined in the General Practitioner notes and the General Practitioner’s reports.(iii) Ms Kelk’s neurological‑like symptoms in her arms and her voice and swallowing problems do not represent organic disease. Rather they are symptomatic of depressive illness, in other words they represent depressive equivalents. The implication is that as the depression lifts the symptoms should remit. (iv) If the physical symptoms persist even after Major Depression is in remission, then the symptoms can be considered to represent a somatoform disorder of a conversion type. Please note however that any such putative somatoform disorder does not represent an illness or disease. Rather it is a description of behaviour which could appropriately be called abnormal illness behaviour. The symptoms are something she “does” and “reports” as against something she “has”. (v) It is generally regarded as unsafe to diagnose a primary somatoform disorder in the presence of significant depression. Hence at the present time I consider that the symptoms are symptomatic of depression. (vi) The cause of Ms Kelk’s Recurrent Major Depression is multifactorial as described in the provisional formulation. Constitutional factors are of particular importance. I note the family history of alcohol dependence. I also note developmental adversity that would predispose to depression. As discussed in the provisional formulation, episodes of Major Depression can occur for no apparent reason and be a reflection of the natural history of Recurrent Major Depression. However it is known that psychosocial adversity can precipitate individual episodes or prolong episodes and this would be more relevant if there was chronic Dysthymia in addition to episodes of Major Depression. In Ms Kelk’s case it would seem that the marital situation is a significant issue in her depression even though she did not report this to me. Other issues that may have been of importance at various times include her daughter’s problems at birth and the miscarriage. The extent to which there are any ongoing problems with Ms Kelk’s daughter is not clear. (vii) As to the influence of the work situation in the genesis or prolongation of Ms Kelk’s depression, this is ultimately an issue of fact that needs to be determined by the AAT. If one accepts Ms Kelk’s account of the issues at work including her allegations of harassment and bullying, being required to work whether typing or in a call centre in conditions that were inappropriate and demanding, then these issues could play a part in the genesis of depression or prolongation of depression within a multifactorial model. An alternative construct is that as a result of Ms Kelk developing depression she found it more difficult to cope with the normal demands of work and her depressive cognitions lead her to experience the workplace as demanding, and unsupportive and her supervisors as critical and bullying. Under this construct Ms Kelk’s experience of “work stress” is a result of depression as against the cause of her depression. Thus deciding on the direction of causality requires a judgement of fact. (viii) Allowing that the judgement of the facts of the case by the AAT may cause me to change my opinion, I am inclined to the view that Ms Kelk’s episodes of Major Depression were unrelated to work but that she began to experience work as adverse and stressful as a result of a recurrent depressive illness and intermittent Dysthymia. [original bold emphasis]

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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