FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Prahauser v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2020] FCA 1658
ORDERS
SAD 32 of 2020 BETWEEN: GERHARD PRAHAUSER
Applicant
AND: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
First Respondent
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
WHITE J
DATE OF ORDER:
17 NOVEMBER 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed.
2.The Applicant is to pay the costs of the Second Respondent, to be taxed in default of agreement.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
WHITE J:
On 3 February 2020, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) affirmed a decision of the Social Services and Child Support Division of the Tribunal (AAT1) made…
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 1658
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The Applicant is to pay the costs of the Second Respondent, to be taxed in default of agreement.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Tribunal also had other medical reports and documents but these were dated well after the assessment period applicable in the applicant’s case. It was not suggested that they were of assistance presently.Consideration I note again the stringent standard to be satisfied before a finding of legal unreasonableness can be made. The question in a case like the present is, as Allsop CJ noted in Stretton, whether a decision‑maker could reasonably have come to the decision under review. As was noted by Bromberg J in Sesalim, that decision required necessarily a “broad evaluative judgment” about which reasonable minds could differ. Accordingly, the applicant must get over a high hurdle in order to establish legal unreasonableness. In this case, there was some evidence before the Tribunal which could have supported an assessment rating of 10 in respect of the applicant’s spinal function. However, there was other evidence which indicated that an assessment rating of 5, in accordance with the criteria in the Tables set out earlier in these reasons, would be appropriate. For example, the Tribunal had the report of the neurologist, Dr Leyden, of 6 June 2017 in which he described the applicant having “intermittent altered sensations down the left arm and [an] intermittent feeling of weakness in the left finger grip” but described these as “relatively minor”. The JCA Report recorded the applicant’s spinal condition as having “mild functional impact” on activities using hands or arms. The JCA Report also noted that the applicant was right hand dominant and had not reported symptoms or impacts in his right arm. It considered that the applicant was able to do some tasks with his right hand. The JCA Report assessed the applicant’s functional impairment resulting from the cervical spine condition as “mild”. It is true that the report of Dr Middleton suggested that the impairment could have been assessed at a greater level. However, it was for the Tribunal to evaluate the evidence and there was material before it upon which it could make the assessment which it reached. I refer again to the criteria for the assessment ratings of 5 and 10 contained in Table 4 set out earlier in these reasons. The first criteria for a rating of 10 is that the person is “able to sit in or drive a car for at least 30 minutes”. The manner in which this is expressed raises the query of whether the word “able” was intended to be “unable” but that query can be put to one side. If the person is able to sit in or drive a car for at least 30 minutes, then at least one of the four matters must apply. Of those, that which seems most open to the applicant is “the person has difficulty moving their head to look in all directions (eg turning their head to over their shoulder)”. The applicant did report in general terms a difficulty of that kind. However, even that assessment involves some evaluation of the nature and extent of the restriction. That evaluation was for the Tribunal member. I note again that the examples of the impairments in the Tables are not intended to be definitional, but are instead illustrative. Their application involves, almost inevitably, assessments on which reasonable minds may differ.