Prahauser v Administrative Appeals Tribunal

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Prahauser v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2020] FCA 1658

Appeal from: Prahauser v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2020] AATA 105
File number: SAD 32 of 2020
Judgment of: WHITE J
Date of judgment: 17 November 2020
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appeal under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) – whether error of law in the review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal of a decision made under the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) – whether decision of Tribunal legally unreasonable – appeal dismissed.
Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 25, 43, 44

Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) ss 26, 27, 94

Society Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) ss 41, 42, 179

Cases cited:

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223

AZAFG v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 81; (2016) 242 FCR 566

Haritos v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCAFC 92; (2015) 233 FCR 315

Kelk v Australian Postal Corporation [2014] FCA 147

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; (2016) 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; (2018) 264 CLR 541

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332

Osland v Secretary to the Department of Justice [2010] HCA 24; (2010) 241 CLR 320

Plaintiff S53‑2019 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2019] HCA 42

Re Bobera and Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2012] AATA 922

Re Fanning and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2014] AATA 447

Secretary, Department of Social Services and Seyfang [2016] AATA 243

Sesalim v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2018] FCA 1159; (2018) 75 AAR 476

TTY167 v Republic of Nauru [2018] HCA 61; (2018) 362 ALR 246

Division: General Division
Registry: South Australia
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 91
Date of hearing: 12 June 2020
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr R Bonig
Solicitor for the Applicant: Finlaysons
Counsel for the First Respondent: The First Respondent did not appear
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr B Dube
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers

ORDERS

SAD 32 of 2020
BETWEEN:

GERHARD PRAHAUSER

Applicant

AND:

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

First Respondent

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

WHITE J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 NOVEMBER 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed. 

2.The Applicant is to pay the costs of the Second Respondent, to be taxed in default of agreement.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

WHITE J:

  1. On 3 February 2020, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) affirmed a decision of the Social Services and Child Support Division of the Tribunal (AAT1) made…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 1658
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Prahauser appealed against a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) affirming a decision of the Department of Human Services (DHS) to refuse his application for a disability support pension. The applicant argued that the AAT had made an error of law in finding that his impairments did not total 20 points or more under the Impairment Tables during the assessment period and, if so, whether he had a continuing inability to work. The Federal Court found that the Tribunal had not erred in finding that there was insufficient evidence to rate the applicant's impairments at 10 points under the Impairment Tables. The Court found that the Tribunal had considered all the evidence before it and had made a decision which was open on the material before it. The Court found that the Tribunal had not erred in applying Table 4 of the Impairment Tables in assessing the applicant's spinal condition. The Court found that the Tribunal's assessment of the applicant's spinal condition as having "mild functional impact" on activities using hands or arms was open on the evidence before it. The Court found that the Tribunal's decision was not legally unreasonable and dismissed the appeal. The Court ordered that the applicant pay the costs of the Second Respondent.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The Applicant is to pay the costs of the Second Respondent, to be taxed in default of agreement.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Tribunal member identified the main issue for determination as being whether the applicant’s impairments could be assigned 20 points or more under the Impairment Tables during the assessment period and, if so, whether he had a continuing inability to work.The evidence in the Tribunal The applicant gave oral evidence in the Tribunal. In addition, the Tribunal received reports from his general medical practitioner, Dr Middleton; from a pain and rehabilitation specialist, Dr Vo; and from a urologist, Dr Horsell. Dr Middleton had provided medical certificates dated 5 May, 23 June and 24 September 2017 as well as reports dated 23 June 2017, February 2018, March 2018 and 7 February 2019. Dr Vo had provided two reports, in October and November 2019. Dr Horsell provided two reports dated 18 November 2019 and 9 December 2019. There were also other medical reports and certificates. In addition, the Tribunal had a “Job Capacity Assessment Report” dated 20 September 2017 (the JCA Report). The assessment on which the JCA Report was based had been made by a registered psychologist (by telephone) on 14 August 2017. The Tribunal described the applicant’s evidence about his medical conditions and their effects as “clear, consistent and honest”, at [18]. The Tribunal decision The Tribunal commenced its consideration by noting, correctly, that it was required to consider the applicant’s condition as it was during the 13 week assessment period. In this respect, the Tribunal referred to Re Bobera and Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2012] AATA 922 at [34]; Re Fanning and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2014] AATA 447 at [33]; and to Secretary, Department of Social Services and Seyfang [2016] AATA 243 at [23]. In the last of these decisions, Bean DP said (correctly):[I] am required to have regard to the state of affairs during the assessment period, and without regard to later developments. Whilst I may have regard to evidence which came into existence after the assessment period, this is relevant only in so far as it assists in establishing the true state of affairs during the assessment period. The Tribunal found that the applicant did have a physical impairment with the consequence that s 94(1)(a) was satisfied. The Tribunal found that the applicant’s upper limb condition, lower limb condition and spinal condition had been fully diagnosed, treated and stabilised during the assessment period and gave each an impairment rating of five points. It did not give any rating to the applicant’s condition of mild urinary incontinence on the basis that it was not fully diagnosed, fully treated or stabilised during the assessment period, at [72]. With respect to the applicant’s claimed condition of fatigue, the Tribunal member said: [75]Impairment Table 1 relates to functions requiring physical exertion and stamina. The Tribunal does not consider that the evidence about fatigue is sufficient to conclude that it was fully diagnosed, treated and stabilised. Accordingly, no impairment rating can be given. (Emphasis added)

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal described the applicant’s evidence about his medical conditions and their effects as “clear, consistent and honest”, at [18]. The Tribunal decision The Tribunal commenced its consideration by noting, correctly, that it was required to consider the applicant’s condition as it was during the 13 week assessment period. In this respect, the Tribunal referred to Re Bobera and Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2012] AATA 922 at [34]; Re Fanning and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2014] AATA 447 at [33]; and to Secretary, Department of Social Services and Seyfang [2016] AATA 243 at [23]. In the last of these decisions, Bean DP said (correctly):[I] am required to have regard to the state of affairs during the assessment period, and without regard to later developments. Whilst I may have regard to evidence which came into existence after the assessment period, this is relevant only in so far as it assists in establishing the true state of affairs during the assessment period. The Tribunal found that the applicant did have a physical impairment with the consequence that s 94(1)(a) was satisfied. The Tribunal found that the applicant’s upper limb condition, lower limb condition and spinal condition had been fully diagnosed, treated and stabilised during the assessment period and gave each an impairment rating of five points. It did not give any rating to the applicant’s condition of mild urinary incontinence on the basis that it was not fully diagnosed, fully treated or stabilised during the assessment period, at [72]. With respect to the applicant’s claimed condition of fatigue, the Tribunal member said: [75]Impairment Table 1 relates to functions requiring physical exertion and stamina. The Tribunal does not consider that the evidence about fatigue is sufficient to conclude that it was fully diagnosed, treated and stabilised. Accordingly, no impairment rating can be given. (Emphasis added) The Tribunal member then concluded that, because the applicant’s impairment points totalled 15, he did not have an impairment or combination of impairments attracting a rating of at least 20 points under the Impairment Tables during the assessment period, and, accordingly, did not satisfy s 94(1)(b) of the SS Act. That meant that the decision of AAT1 should be affirmed. It also meant that it was not necessary for the Tribunal member to consider whether the applicant had a continuing inability to work within the meaning of s 94(1)(c) of the SS Act during the assessment period. The questions of law As already noted, the appeal to this Court under s 44(1) of the AAT Act lies on a question of law only. The applicant’s FANA to this Court identifies the questions of law on which his appeal lies as follows:1.The Tribunal erred in finding that there was insufficient evidence as it did in paragraph 75 to the effect that the impairment in Table 1 was not capable of being given an Impairment Rating.2.Whether the Tribunal erred in law in the application of Table 4 of the [Impairment Tables]. 2.1Whether the Tribunal’s application of Table 4 of the [Impairment Tables], particularly its decision to find the applicant suffered only mild spinal functional impact, lacks rational justification such that the decision was so unreasonable that no decision maker could have reasonably arrived at that decision.(Emphasis added)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Tribunal also had other medical reports and documents but these were dated well after the assessment period applicable in the applicant’s case. It was not suggested that they were of assistance presently.Consideration I note again the stringent standard to be satisfied before a finding of legal unreasonableness can be made. The question in a case like the present is, as Allsop CJ noted in Stretton, whether a decision‑maker could reasonably have come to the decision under review. As was noted by Bromberg J in Sesalim, that decision required necessarily a “broad evaluative judgment” about which reasonable minds could differ. Accordingly, the applicant must get over a high hurdle in order to establish legal unreasonableness. In this case, there was some evidence before the Tribunal which could have supported an assessment rating of 10 in respect of the applicant’s spinal function. However, there was other evidence which indicated that an assessment rating of 5, in accordance with the criteria in the Tables set out earlier in these reasons, would be appropriate. For example, the Tribunal had the report of the neurologist, Dr Leyden, of 6 June 2017 in which he described the applicant having “intermittent altered sensations down the left arm and [an] intermittent feeling of weakness in the left finger grip” but described these as “relatively minor”. The JCA Report recorded the applicant’s spinal condition as having “mild functional impact” on activities using hands or arms. The JCA Report also noted that the applicant was right hand dominant and had not reported symptoms or impacts in his right arm. It considered that the applicant was able to do some tasks with his right hand. The JCA Report assessed the applicant’s functional impairment resulting from the cervical spine condition as “mild”. It is true that the report of Dr Middleton suggested that the impairment could have been assessed at a greater level. However, it was for the Tribunal to evaluate the evidence and there was material before it upon which it could make the assessment which it reached. I refer again to the criteria for the assessment ratings of 5 and 10 contained in Table 4 set out earlier in these reasons. The first criteria for a rating of 10 is that the person is “able to sit in or drive a car for at least 30 minutes”. The manner in which this is expressed raises the query of whether the word “able” was intended to be “unable” but that query can be put to one side. If the person is able to sit in or drive a car for at least 30 minutes, then at least one of the four matters must apply. Of those, that which seems most open to the applicant is “the person has difficulty moving their head to look in all directions (eg turning their head to over their shoulder)”. The applicant did report in general terms a difficulty of that kind. However, even that assessment involves some evaluation of the nature and extent of the restriction. That evaluation was for the Tribunal member. I note again that the examples of the impairments in the Tables are not intended to be definitional, but are instead illustrative. Their application involves, almost inevitably, assessments on which reasonable minds may differ.