Kaplan & Hankel (No 2)
[2025] FedCFamC1F 210
•4 April 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Kaplan & Hankel (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 210
File number: SYC 9434 of 2021 Judgment of: SCHONELL J Date of judgment: 4 April 2025 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – STAY – Where the wife sought a stay of orders that are the subject of appeal – Where the husband opposed the stay application – Where the Court is not satisfied that the wife has discharged the onus that there is a proper basis to stay the orders – Application dismissed.
FAMILY LAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – COSTS – Where the husband sought an order for costs on the basis that the wife failed to comply with orders and sold and disposed of assets without notice such that he incurred costs in excess of $80,000 – Where the wife opposed the costs application – Consideration of factors under s 117(2A) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) – Where the Court is not satisfied the circumstances justify the making of a costs order – No order for costs – Application dismissed.
Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Pt VIII ss 117(2), 117(2A)
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) r 13.12(2)
Cases cited: Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corporation Ltd (Receivers appointed) (1985) 2 NSWLR 685
Aldridge & Keaton (Stay Appeal) [2009] FamCAFC 106
Bant & Clayton (Costs) (2016) 56 Fam LR 31
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Kelly and Kelly (1981) FLC 91-007
Nada v Nettle (Costs) (2014) FLC 93-612
Penfold v Penfold (1980) 144 CLR 311
PBF as Child Representative for AF (Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania) & TRF & LKL (2005) 33 Fam LR 123
Samaras & Allen [2021] FedCFamC1F 20
Kaplan & Hankel [2025] FedCFamC1F 41
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 48 Date of hearing: 28 March 2025 Place: Sydney The Applicant: Litigant in person The First Respondent: Litigant in person The Second Respondent: Did not appear ORDERS
SYC 9434 of 2021 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MS HANKEL
Applicant
AND: MR KAPLAN
First Respondent
MS BRILEY
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
SCHONELL J
DATE OF ORDER:
4 APRIL 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicant’s Application in a Proceeding seeking a stay of orders made 30 January 2025 is dismissed.
2.The respondent’s application for costs is dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Kaplan & Hankel has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
SCHONELL J:
By Amended Notice of Appeal sealed 14 March 2025 the wife appeals final financial orders made 30 January 2025.
By Application in a Proceeding the wife seeks a stay of the final orders pending determination of her appeal. The wife’s application is opposed. The husband seeks an order the wife pay his costs of the proceedings fixed in the sum of $20,000. The husband’s application is opposed.
Both parties appeared unrepresented. As a consequence, particularly in relation to the stay but more generally apposite to both applications, the focus of the submissions was on matters not germane to the issue with frequent resort to irrelevancies, such as the best interests of the children.
BACKGROUND
The husband commenced proceedings pursuant to Part VIII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) on 17 December 2021. The final hearing took place over two days in early January 2025.
A significant issue at the hearing was whether a company which held two properties in New Zealand had been or was an asset of the parties. The shares in the company on incorporation had been issued to the wife and held by her until she transferred them to her mother following separation. The wife contended that the shares had been held by her beneficially for her parents at all times since incorporation or alternatively were transferred to her mother in repayment of a loan.
The wife’s mother was joined to the proceedings as the second respondent on 3 October 2024.
The husband contended that the wife was at all times the legal and beneficial owner of the shares and they were transferred to her mother to reduce the pool of assets for division. While there was no valuation of the company, the matter proceeded on the basis that the value to be ascribed to the company was the agreed value of the properties less the corresponding mortgage debt.
At hearing the wife sought the parties’ assets (excluding any value for the company) be divided as to 95 per cent to her and 5 per cent to the husband. The husband for his part contended that the parties’ assets (including a value for the company) should be divided 55 per cent to the wife and 45 per cent to him.
As to the wife’s contention that the company should be excluded from the pool of assets for division on the basis that the shares in the company were either always beneficially held for the wife’s parents or transferred in repayment of a loan, the Court in the reasons for judgment recorded as Kaplan & Hankel [2025] FedCFamC1F 41 (“the Reasons”) made the following findings:
113I am not so persuaded and am not satisfied that there existed a trust between the wife and her parents of the shares in the Company or that the wife at the time of incorporation or at any time thereafter until after separation regarded the Company as other than her own property. Nor am I satisfied that there was a loan to be repaid or repayment of a loan to her parents at any time by the transfer of shares.
114I am satisfied that the wife transferred the shares in the Company to her mother so as to reduce the pool of assets available for distribution as between her and the husband. Her conduct in doing so is entirety consistent with the unchallenged evidence of the husband as to what occurred on 1 November 2022. I propose to notionally add back the real estate owned by the Company to the pool of assets as a premature distribution (Townsend and Townsend (1995) FLC 92-569).
…
118I reach the conclusions referred to above in relation to these matters based on the following:
(a)There is no evidence of the creation of any declaration of trust in relation to the shares nor is there any document that indicates that the wife was at any time other than the beneficial owner of the shares.
(b)The Company acquired five pieces of real estate in New Zealand during the course of the parties’ relationship. The Company remains the owner of two pieces of real estate. In relation to the purchase of every piece of real estate, the wife, not her parents, provided a personal guarantee for borrowings by the Company. In respect of four of the pieces of real estate the husband provided personal guarantees for the purchase of the real estate. There is no evidence of the wife’s parents being a borrower, mortgagor or guarantor for the acquisition of any real estate. I find providing such a guarantee is inconsistent with the existence of a trust.
(c)It is the wife’s evidence that she met the shortfall if any in relation to any loans and/or expenses from her income. The evidence of the husband is that he contributed to the deposits and expenses by contributing his income to the wife’s bank accounts. I accept his evidence. There is no evidence that the wife’s parents or either of them made any payment towards any outgoings or shortfall. I find making such payments by the wife and indirectly the husband inconsistent with the existence of a trust.
(d)The wife declared in her income tax returns as a deduction the losses incurred by the Company on the rental income. I find the claiming of such a deduction inconsistent with the existence of a trust.
(e)During the course of the husband’s cross-examination, counsel for the wife put to the husband the proposition that the wife used the Company to buy property for herself. Such question being put to the husband, presumably upon instructions, is entirely inconsistent with the case now sought to be advanced by the wife.
(f)The wife agreed during cross-examination that of the $460,280 of the parties’ funds paid to the Company from the sale of the [S Street] property $275,000 was remitted to Australia and applied to the purchase of the [Suburb D] property. When asked as to what happened to the balance of the funds the wife said that they remained in the Company. It is but further evidence of the intermingling of the parties funds with those of the Company and is inconsistent with the notion that the wife was nothing other than a bare trustee of the shares in the Company. I find depositing the parties funds into the Company account and then using part of them to fund a purchase in the wife’s name and leaving the balance in the Company inconsistent with the existence of a trust.
(g)The only financial contribution made by the wife’s parents to any of the property acquired by the Company was $26,304 contributed to the purchase of the first property.
(h)At times when the wife clearly had funds available to repay her parents the alleged loan it is not repaid.
(i)The alleged conversations between the wife and her mother as to the repayment of the loan are inconsistent and irreconcilable. Their evidence is implausible and unconvincing, and I am not persuaded by it.
(j)The transfer of shares to the wife’s mother alone is inconsistent with a trust said to exist for both parents.
(k)The evidence that the husband provided guarantees for the purchase of real estate in the knowledge that the Company was owned by the wife’s parents not the wife is inconsistent with his evidence and inherently implausible and illogical. I do not accept the wife’s evidence that she told the husband the Company was her parents as irreconcilable with his financial contributions to a Company he believed was the wife’s.
(l)The husband and the wife prepared a separation agreement in 2013. The terms of that separation agreement record in part that the wife will retain as part of her property the Company and all of its property. One of the recitals to the agreement records that the parties have disclosed to each other all of their property a summary of which is in the Schedule. The Schedule refers to the Company and its property. The creation of such an agreement by the parties is inconsistent and irreconcilable with the wife’s case that she told the husband that the Company was her parents and is irreconcilable with the existence of a trust.
(m)I find the evidence of the wife and her mother as to the reasons for creation of the Company and repayment of the alleged loan as irreconcilable with the subsequent conduct of the wife and the husband, inconsistent internally and implausible.
119I am satisfied on the basis of the matters referred to above and given the little weight I place on the evidence of the wife and her mother, that there was not a legally enforceable obligation to repay her parents and that the wife was at all times the legal and beneficial owner of the shares in the Company and that the wife sought to reduce the pool of assets in these proceedings for division between her and the husband by transferring the shares to her mother.
The Court found the parties’ assets (including a value for the company) should be divided as to 70 per cent to the wife and 30 per cent to the husband and made orders for the wife to pay the husband $1,164,648 within three months and for her to discharge mortgages over two properties, failing which the properties were to be sold and payment made to the husband.
Relevantly, for the purposes of the application for a stay, the Reasons recorded as follows:
171I am satisfied that a 70/30 percentage division of the parties’ property in favour of the wife represents a just and equitable determination.
172The wife seeks by way of final orders a transfer to her of the [Suburb E] property. In circumstances where the husband does not seek to retain that property then I will accede to the wife’s request, subject to her causing the mortgage secured over that property to be discharged. As part of the husband’s contributions, the husband executed a mortgage in relation to the [Suburb D] property providing his guarantee. It is appropriate and clearly contemplated by the orders of all the parties that the husband should be released from his guarantee.
173In circumstances where the wife’s case was that the husband should only have a very modest payment as opposed to the husband’s case where he sought a payment to him of in excess of $1.3 million, I raised with counsel for the wife how an order should be framed in the event I did not accede to the magnitude of the relief sought by the wife.
174The wife’s counsel sought a period of three to four months in which to give the wife the opportunity to raise funds sufficient to pay out the husband. I also raised with the wife’s counsel that the Court would make orders for the husband to be paid from the proceeds of sale of the property in the event that the wife failed to raise the sum provided for. There was no demur to such eventuality.
175I have found that the pool of assets for division between the parties to be $4,093,943. The findings as to a 30 percent division in favour of the husband is in dollar terms $1,228,183. The husband currently has assets represented by superannuation having a value of $63,535. Thus, the wife is required to pay the husband $1,164,648. I propose to give the wife three months in which to pay that sum to the husband.
176Simultaneously with the payment to the husband, there will be a transfer to the wife of the [Suburb E] property.
177In the event that the wife has not paid that sum to the husband and/or caused the mortgages over [Suburb E] and [Suburb D] properties to be re-financed with the husband removed as a mortgagor and/or borrower and/or guarantor, then the properties will be sold and the husband will receive 67.5 percent of the net proceeds of sale of [Suburb D] being the sum required to be paid to him as a percentage of the current net equity in that property less any amount paid to him from the proceeds of sale of the [Suburb E] property.
APPLICATION FOR A STAY
The Court’s power to grant a stay pending an appeal is discretionary and is embodied in part in r 13.12(2) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (“the Rules”).
A stay is not ordered as a matter of right. The power to order a stay is incidental to the right of appeal.
In order to justify a stay, the party seeking the stay bears the onus to establish that the circumstances warrant a departure from the general rule that a judgment is presumed to be correct and liable to be enforced (Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corporation Ltd (Receivers appointed) (1985) 2 NSWLR 685 at 693–694) and a court should not deprive a successful litigant of the fruits of litigation without just cause (Kelly and Kelly (1981) FLC 91-007).
The principles applicable to a stay in financial proceedings are well settled and are conveniently set out by the Full Court in Aldridge & Keaton (Stay Appeal) [2009] FamCAFC 106 which records as follows:
18. The principles to be applied in determining an application for a stay of orders both in the general law and in respect of parenting proceedings are also well known (see The Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v Myer Emporium Limited [No.1] [1986] HCA 13; (1986) 160 CLR 220 at 222; Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corporation (1985) 2 NSW LR 685; Jennings Construction Limited v Burgundy Royale Investments Pty Limited [1986] HCA 84; (1986) 161 CLR 681; Clemett & Clemett [1980] FamCA 90; (1981) FLC 91-013; JRN & KEN v IEG & BLG [1998] HCATrans 263; (1998) 72 ALJR 1329 at 1332). The authorities stress the discretionary nature of the application which should be determined on its merits. Principles relevant to this matter include the following:
•the onus to establish a proper basis for the stay is on the applicant for the stay. However it is not necessary for the applicant to demonstrate any “special” or “exceptional” circumstances;
•a person who has obtained a judgment is entitled to the benefit of that judgment;
•a person who has obtained a judgment is entitled to presume the judgment is correct;
•the mere filing of an appeal is insufficient to grant a stay;
•the bona fides of the applicant;
•a stay may be granted on terms that are fair to all parties - this may involve a court weighing the balance of convenience and the competing rights of the parties;
•a weighing of the risk that an appeal may be rendered nugatory if a stay is not granted – this will be a substantial factor in determining whether it will be appropriate to grant a stay;
•some preliminary assessment of the strength of the proposed appeal – whether the appellant has an arguable case.
There are other relevant considerations which include whether the stay has been brought promptly and is not merely a delaying tactic as well as the period of time during which the stay will be in place.
The wife alludes, albeit not expressed in such terms, to a contention that her appeal would be rendered nugatory in the event a stay was not granted. Relevantly Harper J observed in Samaras & Allen [2021] FedCFamC1F 20:
39.… The High Court has several times indicated that the enjoyment of a right is rendered “nugatory” if it is rendered worthless or seriously undermined: Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410 at 450, referring to Nullagine Investments Pty Ltd v Western Australian Club Inc [1993] HCA 45; (1993) 177 CLR 635 at 647-648, 659.
DISCUSSION
As referred to earlier, the wife’s submissions, despite repeated attempts to ask her to identify error, were discursive, resorted to pleas that the result was unfair, that it was not in the interests of the children and, like her evidence at trial, focused on the shortcomings of the husband. Notwithstanding, indeed despite her submissions, a determination of the wife’s application begins with a consideration of the merits of the appeal as articulated in the grounds as cast in the Amended Notice of Appeal. Put simply, if the wife does not have an arguable case on appeal, then it is arguable that the other considerations are otiose.
The Amended Notice of Appeal contains six grounds. They are as follows:
1.The court ordered 1 that “The wife shall pay the husband within three months of the date of the making of these Orders the sum of $1,164,648 is not fair. Based on the evidence of her financial contribution that the wife should not pay that amount of money. In addition, the wife cannot get that amount fee within three months.
2.The court order 4, “the event that the wife fails to comply with Orders 1 and/or 2 then the husband and wife shall forthwith do all acts and things and sign all documents necessary to effect a sale of the [Suburb D] Properties.” [Suburb D] property is the only primary and stable residence for the wife and two young children. The wife also current do not have enough saving to buy a place and currently there is a big shortage in rental. Two children suffered domestic from the husband and they need a safe home. The children are also currently studying in the schools nearby [Suburb D] Property.
3.The court order 6 that “The proceeds of sale of the [Suburb E] Property shall be applied in discharge of the mortgage and costs of sale and thereafter paid to the husband.” [Suburb E] Property is a rental property, but the order 6 does not exclude the capital gain tax.
4.The court order 7 that “The proceeds of sale of the [Suburb D] Property shall be applied in discharge of the mortgage and costs of sale and thereafter shall be paid as to 67.5 percent to the husband less any amount paid pursuant to Ord r 6 and the balance to the wife.” Firstly, this is the only living home for the wife and two young children. Secondly, 67.5 percentage less proceeds from [Suburb E] Property is not correct and excessive share for the husband. Lastly, order 6 and order 7 creates contradictory and procedurally unfair outcome by forcing wife to sell both properties.
5.The judge admitted the husband's affidavit as evidence despite it not being signed, sworn, or affirmed. This is a clear error of law under the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth),
6.The court’s failure to ensure proper service and consideration of second respondent’s rights as a foreign citizen which affected the judgement and wrongly included [F Pty Ltd] into the total asset pool for division.
(As per original)
The affidavit in support merely re-states the various contentions in the Amended Notice of Appeal, amounts essentially to a series of complaints as to the outcome, and resorts to the best interests of the children and the loss of the wife’s home rather than engagement with the merits of the appeal.
The wife’s appeal is from the exercise of a wide discretion. Absent some exceptions for discrete legal error including jurisdictional error, she must bring her appeal within one or more of the recognised categories for appellate intervention identified by the High Court in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499. Making due allowance for the wife’s lack of legal training, none of the grounds as drawn invite appellate intervention.
Ground 1 contends that the order compelling the wife to pay the husband a sum of money within three months is not fair, that she should not have to pay it, and that she cannot get that amount within three months. The wife’s belief that it is not fair is irrelevant and not a recognised ground of appeal. At hearing, her counsel sought three to four months in which to make a payment and the Court determined the payment should be made within three months. The wife does not contend that she would be able to raise the monies within four months as her overarching complaint is that she should not have to pay the monies at all. Ground 1 as cast cannot succeed as a ground of appeal.
Ground 2 references the default provision that apply in the event the wife does not pay the monies the subject of the first ground. The ground does not identify appealable error but rather focusses on the consequence of the default. Ground 2 cannot succeed.
Ground 3 contends that a sale of the Suburb E property will attract capital gains tax, and that the orders make no provision for capital gains tax. The ground faces an inherent difficulty irrespective of its lack of merit. No evidence was adduced at hearing that there was capital gains tax payable. Assuming that capital gains tax was payable it would only become payable upon the wife’s default and even then, any capital gains tax would be apportioned in accordance with the parties’ legal ownership. Ground 3 is without merit.
Ground 4 is a contention that the order is contradictory and creates a procedurally unfair outcome by compelling the wife to sell both properties in the event of a default. The consequences of default are entirely avoidable in the event the wife complies with the order. The wife has not identified how the orders are contradictory. The resort to procedural unfairness does not assist the wife. Its’ success focusses on the process not the result. Ground 4 would fail.
Ground 5 contends that the Court made an error of law by the admission of the husband’s affidavit. The husband at hearing relied upon an unsworn affidavit. He subsequently swore to the truth of the contents of the affidavit in the witness box and it was thereafter tendered as an exhibit. No objection was raised to this course by the wife’s counsel. This ground is without merit.
Ground 6 contends that the court failed to ensure proper service and consideration of the second respondent’s rights as a foreign citizen and wrongly included the company in the parties’ assets for division. The Reasons in so far as they related to the second respondent record as follows:
1These are proceedings pursuant to Part VIII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (‘the Act’) for financial adjustment. Joined to the proceedings as the second respondent is the respondent’s mother. Her joinder follows the transfer to her after separation of all of the shares in [F Pty Ltd], a company owned and controlled by the wife (“the Company”).
2Each of the husband and the second respondent were not represented at the hearing. Consequently, the orders each sought were not refined with any precision. The matter was complicated by the fact that the second respondent does not speak English.
3As the hearing progressed, the husband indicated that all he sought from the joinder of the second respondent was the release from guarantees he had given for mortgages secured against assets of the Company. Each of the parties agreed to an order to that effect and upon the making of such order, the husband indicated that he no longer sought any orders against the second respondent.
4The second respondent, despite being given the opportunity to withdraw, sought to remain a party.
In circumstances where no orders were sought against her other than those ultimately made by consent the ground is without merit. The Reasons set out why the assets of the company were included in the pool of assets for division. The ground does not identify the error in adopting this approach.
DISPOSITION AS TO STAY
I am satisfied that the wife has brought her application promptly and that it is bona fide albeit misguided. The Reasons are presumed to be correct, absent an arguable case on appeal warranting a stay. In circumstances where the Amended Notice of Appeal, the affidavit in support of the application, and the submissions of the wife fail to demonstrate any arguable ground of appeal, then a stay serves no purpose other than to deny the husband the fruits of the litigation. A contention that a dismissal renders the appeal nugatory is the necessary consequence of an appeal that is without merit. The balance of convenience in view of all of the relevant considerations and the competing rights of the parties referred to above invites of only one conclusion.
The Application in a Proceeding for a stay will be dismissed.
APPLICATION FOR COSTS
The husband seeks that the wife pay the husband’s cost of the proceedings in the sum of $20,000. The husband’s application is based on failings by the wife to comply with orders, the sale and disposal of assets without notice and the incurring of costs in excess of $80,000 as a consequence. The husband’s application is opposed.
An application for costs is governed by the provisions of s 117 of the Act which provides a general rule that each party to the proceedings should bear their own costs.
Section 117(2) of the Act reposes in the Court a discretion to make a costs order if the Court determines there are circumstances that justify this and, if there are such circumstances, the Court may make such order as it considers just, having regard to the matters set out in s 117(2A) of the Act.
In Penfold v Penfold (1980) 144 CLR 311 at 315, the plurality in the High Court determined that to make an order under s 117(2) of the Act, the Court needs to make a finding of “justifying circumstances” as a preliminary prerequisite to the making of an order. Their Honours also observed that a term such as “a clear case” is not necessarily a determiner of whether an order for costs should be made. All that is required or necessary is that there are justifying circumstances.
It is well-settled law that no one factor in s 117(2A) is determinative, and the Court may give such weight as it considers relevant to any factor. In PBF as Child Representative for AF (Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania) & TRF & LKL (2005) 33 Fam LR 123 at 130, the Full Court observed:
41. … Nowhere in subsection 2(A) or elsewhere in section 117, is there any prescription that more than one factor must be present before an order for costs is made nor of comparative weight of the factors set out in subsection 2(A). As a consequence, there is nothing to prevent any factor being the sole foundation for an order for costs.
Addressing the matters under s 117(2A) I find as follows.
(a) The financial circumstances of each party to the proceedings
This is not applicable.
Even assuming what the wife says as to her straightened financial position, impecuniosity is not a bar to the making of a costs order (Nada v Nettle (Costs) (2014) FLC 93-612).
(b) Whether any party was in receipt of legal aid
This is not applicable as neither party was in receipt of a grant of aid.
(c) The conduct of the parties
The husband’s submissions rely on the wife’s conduct in the proceedings.
What is relevant is conduct of a party which in some way or other leads to an increase in costs by the other party. Such factors may include uncooperative behaviour, obstruction, prolonging litigation or the bringing of unreasonable or unmeritorious applications. It may include non‑disclosure or a failure to comply with the Rules in relation to disclosure.
While there are aspects of the wife’s conduct that call for criticism, particularly in relation to her dealing with assets that were clearly assets of the marriage, it is not conduct of itself that is sufficient to displace the general rule nor was it conduct that would defeat the husband’s claim or disadvantage the husband.
(d) Whether the proceedings were necessitated by the failure of a party to comply with a previous order
This is not applicable.
(e) Whether any party to the proceedings has been wholly unsuccessful in the proceedings
The term “wholly unsuccessful” refers to a situation in which proceedings as a whole have been unsuccessful, rather than necessarily an application or a form of relief (Bant & Clayton (Costs) (2016) 56 Fam LR 31).
This is not applicable.
(f) Whether either party to the proceedings has made an offer in writing to the other party to the proceedings to settle the proceedings and the terms of any such offer
This is not applicable. I was not taken to any offer of settlement that would call for consideration under this subsection.
(g) Any other matter the court considers relevant
There is no other matter that the Court considers relevant.
DISPOSITION
Having regard to all of the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the husband has established justifying circumstances to warrant departure from the usual order. The husband’s application for costs will be dismissed.
I certify that the preceding forty-eight (48) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Schonell. Associate:
Dated: 4 April 2025
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