Brantag Pty Ltd v Min for Mineral Resources

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S135 of 1997

B e t w e e n -

BRANTAG PTY LIMITED

Applicant

and

MINISTER FOR MINERAL RESOURCES

Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

GLEESON CJ
McHUGH  J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 7 AUGUST 1998, AT 11.49 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR D.L. WILLIAMS:   May it please the Court, I appear for the applicant.  (instructed by Bowen-Thomas & Barlow)

MR P.M. HALL, QC:   I appear for the respondent.  (instructed by D. Fearon, Director of Legal Services, Department of Mineral Resources)

MR WILLIAMS:   Your Honours, the reasonable man might find it remarkable that, if he obtained a Crown grant at any time from settlement up until 1955, any rutile, zircon or ilmenite on the land would belong to him because the Crown had not been interested in reserving that from the grant.  But if his grant happened to occur in a 23-year period between 1861 and 1884 the Crown would own those substances.  He might find that even more remarkable when the relevant statute under which the grant was made did not define “minerals” so as to expressly include those substances and, in addition, he might find that more remarkable when, within 5 years of one grant, 7 years of the other grant, the Crown in the 1884 Act is specifying those minerals which it is interested in reserving from Crown grants and defining and specifying them in a way which does not include the relevant substances.

He mind find that even the more remarkable if he knew that those substances with which he is concerned had not been commercially mined at that time, that those substances - - -

McHUGH J:   But they were known, were they not?

MR WILLIAMS:   They were known, yes.

GLEESON CJ:   And they were minerals.

MR WILLIAMS:   They were known to the scientific world as minerals but the question that is posed by the case law in this area is what is known as the “vernacular test” and that is where the Court of Appeal fell into error in this case because it equated dictionary definitions with the satisfaction of the vernacular test.  The vernacular test is quite different.  The vernacular test depends upon the vernacular of the mining world, the commercial world and the land owners at the relevant time.

It was recognised by the Court of Appeal that it was settled that in cases such as this the ultimate search is for the expressed intention of the parties. 

GLEESON CJ:   When you say it all turns on what you describe as the “vernacular test”, there was not any dispute in the courts below as to what were the relevant principles of construction to be applied, were there?  It was a question of the application of well-established principles of construction to the particular circumstances of the case.

MR WILLIAMS:   No, with respect.  At first instance Mr Justice Young - I…

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Details
Case
[1998] HCATrans 263
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Brantag Pty Ltd (the applicant) sought judicial review of a decision by the Minister for Mineral Resources (the respondent) to refuse its application for a mining tenement. The dispute concerned the interpretation and application of provisions within the *Mining Act 1992* (NSW) and the *Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979* (NSW) concerning the grant of mining tenements and the necessity of obtaining development consent. The matter was heard by the High Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Minister's refusal of the mining tenement application was lawful, specifically considering whether the applicant was required to obtain development consent under the *Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979* (NSW) prior to the Minister's determination. The court also had to consider the proper construction of section 115 of the *Mining Act 1992* (NSW) and its interaction with the planning legislation.

Gleeson CJ and McHugh J, in separate judgments, held that the Minister's decision was not vitiated by error. Their Honours reasoned that section 115 of the *Mining Act 1992* (NSW) conferred a discretion on the Minister to grant or refuse a mining tenement application, and this discretion was not contingent upon the applicant first obtaining development consent. The court clarified that while development consent might be a prerequisite for commencing mining operations, it was not a prerequisite for the Minister's decision to grant the tenement itself. The statutory scheme contemplated that the tenement could be granted subject to conditions, including the subsequent obtaining of necessary consents.

The High Court dismissed the application for judicial review.

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