Kankanamage v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kankanamage v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 484

MIGRATION – special need relative – “willing and able” to provide assistance – “substantial assistance” – whether the Tribunal had directed its mind to “prolonged illness” – ability of the nominator to work – description of consulting psychiatrist as “medical practitioner”

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 23,24, 25, 32
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 471(1), 474(2), 474(3)(i)

Migration Regulations reg 1.03

Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission (1969) 2 AC 147
Chow v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 88
Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323
Narayan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1745
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Cohen (2001) 177 ALR 473
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 298
VAT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) FCAFC 255
Wahab v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 421
Wu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 105 FCR 39
Xiang v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 64

DAYARATHNA WICKRAMAPALA WANNIARACHCHI KANKANAMAGE v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS AND MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL

VID 945 OF 2005

COLLIER J
3 MAY 2006
BRISBANE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 945 OF 2005

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

DAYARATHNA WICKRAMAPALA WANNIARACHCHI KANKANAMAGE
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENT

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

COLLIER J

DATE OF ORDER:

3 MAY 2006

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 945 OF 2005

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

DAYARATHNA WICKRAMAPALA WANNIARACHCHI KANKANAMAGE
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENT

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

COLLIER J

DATE:

3 MAY 2006

PLACE:

BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application pursuant to s 39B Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and ss 23 and 32 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) by Notice of Appeal filed on 11 August 2005, for review of a decision of McInnis FM given on 25 July 2005. The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka who lodged an application for a change in circumstance (residence) (class AG) sub-class 806 family (special need relative) visa on 31 July 1998. He has claimed that he is a ‘special need relative’ in relation to his brother (‘the…

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Details
Case
[2006] FCA 484
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Kankanamage v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the appellant, a Sri Lankan citizen, sought to appeal against the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal affirming the delegate's refusal to grant a change in circumstance (residence) visa. The appellant, who entered Australia on a visitor visa, applied for a special need relative visa, citing his brother, an Australian permanent resident, as the nominator. The Tribunal rejected the application on the grounds that the nominator's illnesses did not meet the statutory definition of a special need relative, the assistance provided by the appellant was not substantial, and there were adequate alternative support arrangements. The Federal Magistrate upheld the Tribunal's decision, finding no jurisdictional error.

The central legal issue was whether the Tribunal's decision was subject to judicial review and whether it contained a jurisdictional error. The appellant argued that the Tribunal misinterpreted the medical evidence and failed to properly consider the nominator's narcolepsy. However, the court found that the Tribunal had correctly applied the statutory criteria and did not commit any jurisdictional error. The court noted that the appellant's submission amounted to a request for a different factual finding, which is not permissible in judicial review.

The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Tribunal's decision was final and conclusive unless it involved a jurisdictional error. Since the appellant failed to demonstrate any jurisdictional error, the decision was upheld. The court ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant pay the costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Court is hearing this application in its appellate jurisdiction: ss 24 and 25 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).BACKGROUND The appellant is a Sri Lankan citizen of Sinhalese ethnicity. He entered Australia in January 1996 as the holder of a short stay (visitor) (class TT) sub-classes 435 visa. This visa ceased on 12 February 1996. He has held a number of visas, including bridging visas, since then. On 31 July 1998 the appellant applied for a change in circumstance (residence) (class AG) sub-class 806 family (special need relative) visa, his brother being the nominator under the legislation. As already noted, the delegate of the Minister refused to grant the visa on 10 September 2003, and the Tribunal on 18 February 2004 affirmed the decision of the delegate. The relevant provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)(‘the Act’), including part 806 and the definition of ‘special need relative’ in reg 1.03, were repealed by statutory r 259 of 1999 reg 4 in Sch 2. However, the original visa application in the case before me pre-dates the repeal, and the legislation in force as at the date of the application continues to apply. This includes the definition of ‘special need relative’ as it stood before the repeal: McHugh J in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Cohen (2001) 177 ALR 473, cf for example Wahab v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 421. At the time of the application, the definition of ‘special need relative’ in reg 1.03 Migration Regulations read:‘“special need relative”, in relation to an Australian citizen usually resident in Australia, an Australian permanent resident usually resident in Australia or an eligible New Zealand citizen, means a relative who is willing and able to provide substantial and continuing assistance to the citizen or resident if:(a)the citizen or resident has a permanent or long-term need for assistance because of death, disability, prolonged illness or other serious circumstances affecting the citizen or resident personally, or a member of his or her family unit; and(b) the assistance cannot be reasonably obtained from(i)any other relative of the citizen or resident, being a relative who is an Australian citizen, an Australian permanent resident or an eligible New Zealand resident; or(ii) welfare, hospital, nursing or community services in Australia.’ The nominator in this case is an Australian permanent resident, ordinarily resident in Australia. Evidence has been submitted that the nominator has for varying periods of time suffered from a number of medical conditions, including·diabetes,·hypertension,·glaucoma,·narcolepsy,·recurrent Inguinal Hernia, and·anxiety and depression. I understand that the appellant is the nominator’s only sibling in Australia, that there is an age gap of one year and eight months between them, and that they are emotionally close.DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL Before the Tribunal, the applicant stated that he provided stable mental support to the nominator, as well as assistance with housework, child care and daily tasks in the house. The applicant ceased employment on the same day as the nominator, in order to be at home with the nominator. For the purposes of the application and current appeal, the applicant also relied upon medical reports concerning the nominator’s medical status from a general practitioner treating the nominator, Dr Kanapathipillai, and a consultant psychiatrist, Dr Nallaratnam.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Accordingly I reject the submission of the appellant in this respect.GROUND (b): MISINTERPRETATION OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE In summary, the appellant submitted that:(i) the Tribunal failed to properly identify a medical report in a way which prejudiced the appellant’s case and(ii) the Tribunal erroneously downplayed a medical condition – specifically, the narcolepsy from which the nominator suffered – without evidence. In relation to (i), the appellant argued that Tribunal did not properly consider that the appellant was being treated by a consulting psychiatrist, rather than ‘a medical practitioner’, and therefore approached the nominator’s medical condition incorrectly. However in my view the reference by the Tribunal to the report prepared by the nominator’s consulting psychiatrist as being a report prepared by a ‘medical practitioner’ is unobjectionable, and not indicative in any way of a misapplication of law in respect of this application. In relation to (ii), the view taken by the Tribunal of the appellant’s narcolepsy was in my opinion a finding of fact, and not properly an issue before this court. Accordingly I reject these submissions of the appellant. As no errors have been shown in the decision of the Tribunal, I order that the appeal be dismissed with costs.

Decision

Reasons for decision

COLLIER J
After considering the evidence the Tribunal rejected the application, in summary on the grounds that:·the illnesses of the nominator were not of nature contemplated by reg 1.03·the evidence did not support a claim that the assistance provided by the appellant was ‘substantial’·there appeared to be adequate alternative support arrangements for the nominator.DECISION OF THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE In reviewing the decision of the Tribunal, the learned Federal Magistrate considered that the Tribunal had not erred in considering the medical evidence before it. Further, his Honour was of the view that the Tribunal had applied the correct criteria in determining whether the applicant was a ‘special need relative’ of the nominator, and had embarked upon its fact-finding mission in a manner consistent with the law (decision of McInnis FM, par 25). The learned Magistrate, in reviewing the decision of the Tribunal, noted that the Tribunal had referred to the Full Court decision in Narayan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1745, which authority was, in his Honour’s view, applicable to this case. In his Honour’s view, the applicant (now the appellant) had ‘effectively sought to re-agitate the issues which were before the MRT and essentially…sought to argue that there should be a different finding of fact’, a submission incompatible with judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision.APPEALS UNDER THE MIGRATION ACT The scheme of the Act is such that ‘privative clause decisions’ are final and conclusive, and cannot be challenged or called into question in any court: s 474(1). ‘Privative clause decisions’ means decisions of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under the Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under the Act: s 474(2). Decisions of the Tribunal are ‘privative clause decisions’, and in the normal course appeals do not lie from Tribunal decisions: s 474(3)(i). However the High Court in Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 decided that decisions made under the Act for the purposes of s 474:‘must be read so as to refer to decisions which involve neither a failure to exercise jurisdiction nor an excess of the jurisdiction conferred by the Act.’ (at 506) Accordingly, an administrative decision which involves jurisdictional error is regarded, in law, as no decision at all: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597 at 614-615, 618, 646-647 and Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 at 506. It follows that, in order for the appellant to seek to overturn the decision of the Tribunal, and the learned Federal Magistrate who affirmed that decision, it is necessary for the appellant to establish that the Tribunal’s decision suffered from jurisdictional error as distinct from mistake of fact. The nature of a jurisdictional error by an administrative tribunal was explained by the High Court in Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179 where their Honours said:‘…. If such an administrative tribunal falls into an error of law which causes it to identify a wrong issue, to ask itself a wrong question, to ignore relevant material, to rely on irrelevant material or, at least in some circumstances, to make an erroneous finding or to reach a mistaken conclusion, and the tribunal’s exercise or purported exercise of power is thereby affected, it exceeds its authority or powers. Such an error of law is jurisdictional error which will invalidate any order or decision of the tribunal which reflects it.’

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: COLLIER J

In reviewing the decision of the Tribunal, the learned Federal Magistrate considered that the Tribunal had not erred in considering the medical evidence before it. Further, his Honour was of the view that the Tribunal had applied the correct criteria in determining whether the applicant was a ‘special need relative’ of the nominator, and had embarked upon its fact-finding mission in a manner consistent with the law (decision of McInnis FM, par 25). The learned Magistrate, in reviewing the decision of the Tribunal, noted that the Tribunal had referred to the Full Court decision in Narayan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1745, which authority was, in his Honour’s view, applicable to this case. In his Honour’s view, the applicant (now the appellant) had ‘effectively sought to re-agitate the issues which were before the MRT and essentially…sought to argue that there should be a different finding of fact’, a submission incompatible with judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision.APPEALS UNDER THE MIGRATION ACT The scheme of the Act is such that ‘privative clause decisions’ are final and conclusive, and cannot be challenged or called into question in any court: s 474(1). ‘Privative clause decisions’ means decisions of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under the Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under the Act: s 474(2). Decisions of the Tribunal are ‘privative clause decisions’, and in the normal course appeals do not lie from Tribunal decisions: s 474(3)(i). However the High Court in Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 decided that decisions made under the Act for the purposes of s 474:‘must be read so as to refer to decisions which involve neither a failure to exercise jurisdiction nor an excess of the jurisdiction conferred by the Act.’ (at 506) Accordingly, an administrative decision which involves jurisdictional error is regarded, in law, as no decision at all: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597 at 614-615, 618, 646-647 and Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 at 506. It follows that, in order for the appellant to seek to overturn the decision of the Tribunal, and the learned Federal Magistrate who affirmed that decision, it is necessary for the appellant to establish that the Tribunal’s decision suffered from jurisdictional error as distinct from mistake of fact. The nature of a jurisdictional error by an administrative tribunal was explained by the High Court in Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179 where their Honours said:‘…. If such an administrative tribunal falls into an error of law which causes it to identify a wrong issue, to ask itself a wrong question, to ignore relevant material, to rely on irrelevant material or, at least in some circumstances, to make an erroneous finding or to reach a mistaken conclusion, and the tribunal’s exercise or purported exercise of power is thereby affected, it exceeds its authority or powers. Such an error of law is jurisdictional error which will invalidate any order or decision of the tribunal which reflects it.’