FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Wahab v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 421
MIGRATION – special need relative – no substantial and continuing assistance – no serious circumstances
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Regulation 1.03
Judiciary Act 1908 (Cth), s 39BHussein v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1621 referred to
Wu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 105 FCR 39 applied
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Cohen (2001) 177 ALR 473 referred to
Chow v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 88 referred toMOHAMED SHIRAZ WAHAB v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS AND MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
VID 1463 OF 2004
KENNY J
18 APRIL 2006
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 1463 OF 2004
BETWEEN:
MOHAMED SHIRAZ WAHAB
APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENTMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
SECOND RESPONDENTJUDGE:
KENNY J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 APRIL 2006
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Migration Review Tribunal be joined as a respondent to the appeal.
2.The appeal be dismissed.
3.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal fixed, by agreement, in the sum of $4,000.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 1463 OF 2004
BETWEEN:
MOHAMED SHIRAZ WAHAB
APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENTMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
SECOND RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
KENNY J
DATE:
18 APRIL 2006
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
The appellant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, entered Australia on 7 July 1996 holding a student visa. That visa was cancelled when the appellant did not commence the course in which he was enrolled. Subsequently, he was granted a Sri Lankan temporary visa (subclass 435) valid until 31 July 1997. He applied for a further Sri Lankan temporary visa but this application was rejected on 4 August 1997.
On 30 July 1998, the appellant applied for a Change in Circumstances (Residence) (Class AG) visa, subclass 806, on the basis that he was a ‘special need relative’ of the nominator, his uncle. ‘Special need relative’ was then defined in Regulation 1.03 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the “Regulations”). The criteria for the grant of the visa included a requirement that appellant satisfy the definition of ‘special need relative’ both at the time of the application and at the time of the decision: cll 806.213 and 806.221 of Sch 2 to the Regulations.
The definition of ‘special need relative’ at the relevant time was as follows:
“… ‘special need relative’ in relation to an Australian citizen usually resident in Australia … means a relative who is willing and able to provide substantial and continuing assistance to the citizen or resident if:
(a) the citizen … has a permanent or long-term need for assistance because of death, disability, prolonged illness or other serious circumstances affecting…
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- Case
- [2006] FCA 421
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was tasked with examining whether the MRT had erred in its interpretation of the term "serious circumstances" and whether such an error constituted a jurisdictional mistake. Furthermore, the court considered whether the MRT's decision, even if based on an incorrect legal precedent, was still valid. The appellant argued that the MRT's reliance on outdated or incorrect legal principles led to an erroneous conclusion that he did not meet the visa criteria.
The court concluded that the appellant had conceded that it was open to the MRT to find that the assistance he provided was not substantial, which alone was sufficient to uphold the MRT's decision. The court further reasoned that the MRT's interpretation of "serious circumstances" was consistent with relevant case law and did not lead to any jurisdictional error. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal, fixed at $4,000 by agreement.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Migration Review Tribunal be joined as a respondent to the appeal.
2. The appeal be dismissed.
3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal fixed, by agreement, in the sum of $4,000.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court as an appeal from the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal. The appellant had initially applied for a visa under the special needs relative category and his application was dismissed by the MRT. He subsequently appealed this decision to the court, arguing that the MRT erred in their interpretation of the term "serious circumstances" and in finding that he did not meet the necessary requirements for the visa.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the appellant met the requirement of providing substantial and continuing assistance to his wife as required for the special needs relative visa.
2. Whether the MRT erred in their interpretation of the term "serious circumstances" in the context of the visa application.
3. Whether any error in the interpretation of "serious circumstances" by the MRT constituted a jurisdictional error.
Held
1. The court concluded that the appellant met the requirement of providing substantial and continuing assistance to his wife as required for the special needs relative visa. However, this was effectively conceded by the appellant, and it was open to the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT) to find otherwise.
2. The court found that the MRT did not err in their interpretation of the term "serious circumstances" in the context of the visa application.
3. The court determined that even if there were an error in the MRT's interpretation of "serious circumstances", it did not constitute a jurisdictional error.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: KENNY J
Furthermore, in written submissions, citing Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Cohen (2001) 177 ALR 473 (“Cohen”) per McHugh J, the first respondent claimed that as “serious circumstances” is used in its ordinary, non-technical sense, its meaning is a question of fact. Accordingly, the first respondent submitted that, even if the MRT did apply erroneous precedent concerning the meaning of “serious circumstances”, this was not jurisdictional error.CONSIDERATION To be a special need relative, a visa applicant must be willing and able to provide substantial and continuing assistance: see, e.g., Chow v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 88 at [22] per Moore, Emmett and Bennett JJ. The language of regulation 1.03 makes this clear. Because of the appellant’s concession that it was open to the MRT to find that the assistance he provided to the nominator was not substantial, the appellant has also effectively conceded that it was open to the MRT to find that he did not satisfy a necessary requirement of the visa. The appeal must be dismissed if only for this reason. If it were necessary to do so, I would also reject the appellant’s argument that the MRT misapplied the definition of “serious circumstances”. Contrary to the appellant’s submission, Wu is consistent with the view that the terms “death, disability or prolonged illness” are relevant to the meaning of “other serious circumstances”. In fact, in Wu at [41], the Full Court held that a circumstance “is sufficiently serious [if], in relation to a citizen, it would require assistance of the same sort that would be required if the citizen was suffering from a disability or prolonged illness”. Thus, the Wu Court, like the MRT in this case, considered the meaning of “serious circumstances” in light of the nearby terms. It was clearly open to the MRT to decide that no “other serious circumstances” were present at the time of application. Even if Hussein no longer correctly states the law in all respects, the Tribunal’s reliance on this decision did not lead it into relevant error. As no error has been shown in the MRT’s decision, I need not consider the significance of Cohen and whether or not any error of interpretation would have been a jurisdictional error. I would order that the appeal be dismissed with costs.