Jusand Nominees Pty Ltd v Rattlejack Innovations Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Jusand Nominees Pty Ltd v Rattlejack Innovations Pty Ltd [2023] FCAFC 178

Appeal from: Jusand Nominees Pty Ltd v Rattlejack Innovations Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 540
File number: VID 328 of 2022
Judgment of: PERRAM, NICHOLAS AND MCELWAINE JJ
Date of judgment: 13 November 2023
Catchwords:

PATENTS – where invention claimed is a safety system for protection against falling drill rods in mining industry – construction – meaning of ‘anchor member’ – meaning of ‘configured to be fixed in a proximal end region of the bore’

PATENTS – infringement – whether First Respondent’s product included an anchor member – whether First Respondent’s product was configured to be fixed in a proximal end region of the bore adjacent to a rock face

PATENTS – validity – sufficiency and support – whether patent met requirements of ss 40(2)(a) and (3) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) – effect of Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act 2012 (Cth) – consideration of Regeneron Pharmaceuticals Inc v Kymab Ltd [2020] UKSC 27; RPC 22 and Illumina Cambridge Ltd v Latvia MGI Tech SIA [2021] EWHC 57 (Pat); RPC 12 – whether range of materials from which safety system could be made was a relevant range across which patent was required to enable performance

Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 15AB(1)(b)(i), 15AB(2)(e), 15AB(2)(f)

Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act 2012 (Cth)

Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Bill 2011 (Cth)

Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ss 7(2), 7(4), 18(1)(b)(ii), 18(1A)(b)(ii), 29(1), 29(4A)(c), 40(2), 40(3)

Patents Act 1977 (UK) ss 14(3), 14(5)

Convention on the Grant of European Patents, opened for signature 5 October 1973, 1065 UNTS 199 (entered into force 7 October 1977) Arts 83, 84

Cases cited:

Aldi Foods Pty Ltd v Moroccanoil Israel Ltd [2018] FCAFC 93; 261 FCR 301

Biogen Inc v Medeva Plc [1996] UKHL 18; [1997] RPC 1

CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384

Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1988) 13 IPR 385

Encompass Corporation Pty Ltd v InfoTrack Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 421; 130 IPR 387

GlaxoSmithKline Consumer Healthcare Investments (Ireland) (No.2) Limited v Apotex Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 608; 119 IPR 1

Illumina Cambridge Ltd v Latvia MGI Tech SIA [2021] EWHC 57 (Pat); RPC 12

Kimberly-Clark Australia Pty Ltd v Arico Trading International Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 8; 207 CLR 1

Kinabalu Investments Pty Ltd v Barron & Rawson Pty Ltd [2008] FCAFC 178

Lockwood Security Products Pty Ltd v Doric Products Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 58; 217 CLR 274

Merck Sharp & Dohme Corporation v Wyeth LLC (No 3) [2020] FCA 1477; 155 IPR 1

Pfizer Overseas Pharmaceuticals v Eli Lilly and Company [2005] FCAFC 224; 225 ALR 416

Product Management Group Pty Ltd v Blue-Gentian LLC [2015] FCAFC 179; 240 FCR 85

Regeneron Pharmaceuticals Inc v Kymab Ltd [2020] UKSC 27; RPC 22

Saeed v Minister…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCAFC 178
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Jusand Nominees Pty Ltd sought to appeal a decision of the Federal Court of Australia in which it was held that Rattlejack Innovations Pty Ltd had not infringed a patent and that the patent was invalid. The patent related to a safety system for protection against falling drill rods in the mining industry. The primary judge had found that Rattlejack’s product did not infringe the patent as it did not have an anchor member and was not configured to be fixed in the proximal end region of the bore. Jusand also argued that the patent was invalid as it was not sufficiently described and enabled. The court had to determine the meaning of certain terms in the patent claims, whether the patent was sufficiently described and enabled, and whether the patent was valid.

The court found that the trial judge's construction of the patent claims was correct and that the patent was sufficiently described and enabled. The court held that the term "anchor member" referred to a component that provided stability and support to the safety system. The term "configured to be fixed in a proximal end region of the bore" meant that the safety system had to be designed to be fixed in the end of the bore closest to the rock face. The court also held that the patent was sufficiently described and enabled as it enabled a person skilled in the art to make and use the invention.

Jusand's appeal was dismissed and it was ordered that Jusand pay the Respondents' costs of the appeal as taxed, assessed or agreed. The court held that the trial judge's findings were supported by the evidence and that there were no errors in law or fact that warranted interference with the primary judge's decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The Appellant pay the Respondents’ costs of the appeal as taxed, assessed or agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The trial judge concluded that the Appellant had not proven that the SafetySpear travelled by no more than 5 mm down the bore when struck by a falling drill rod section. The Appellant takes issue with three aspects of this conclusion.First issue: the adequacy of the trial judge’s treatment of Mr Spencer’s evidence The Appellant submitted that there was evidence that the SafetySpear did not move down the bore when struck by a falling drill bit. It consisted of the evidence about the August 2020 drop tests. The trial judge did not accept that this evidence showed that the SafetySpear did not move when struck by a falling drill bit: J [218]. The Appellant took issue with this conclusion. It submitted that the trial judge had decided not to accept this evidence because it was based solely on two blurry photographs. The Appellant submits that this was erroneous because there was evidence about the drop tests beyond the two blurry photographs. This was Mr Spencer’s evidence about what he observed during the drop tests. Relevantly, Mr Spencer had said in his report that the SafetySpear had not budged from its original position other than very marginally. He also explained that the photographs in his report did not show the position as clearly as he had observed it. There are two problems with this. First, it is not correct that the trial judge said that the test results were based solely on two blurry photos. In fact, the trial judge explicitly referred to Mr Spencer’s statements ‘to the effect that the SafetySpear had not moved during the trial’ at J [210] and to his statement that ‘the prototype had not moved substantially or budged during the drop test’ at J [215]. In the same passage the trial judge discounted this evidence because it was ‘only a rough estimation, made from where [Mr Spencer] stood below the bore hole watching the test without the benefit of any measurements other than comparing the approximate distance of a painted line on a stick from the shotcrete covered ceiling of the mine’. Secondly, the trial judge also brought to account her own examination of the two photographs and reported that ‘on close inspection of the blurry enlarged photographs taken of the August 2020 drop test, there appears to be movement of the SafetySpear of more than a few millimetres (ie there is a detectable difference in the position of the pink circle)’: J [216]. Having inspected the photographs myself, I agree with the trial judge’s observation. But regardless of my view, the trial judge’s observation makes it impossible to accept that her Honour’s rejection of the utility of the drop tests was based solely on two blurry photographs. The suggested error is therefore not demonstrated.Second issue: significance of the fact that Mr Spencer’s tests were done on a prototype of the SafetySpear which differed from the product alleged to infringe The Respondents rely upon proposition (vii). So far as is relevant to this case it would require this Court to ask whether the material from which the Safety System is made significantly affects its utility for the purpose for which it is to be made (or, one might add, used). Illumina

Decision

Reasons for decision

It is clear from Figure 1 and this passage that: first, the invention is intended to be used in bores between 20 m and 60 m long and with drill rod sections weighing up to 500 kg; and secondly, that the bore holes will be of varying angles from the horizontal. Thus it is not correct to say that by reasoning that the person skilled in the art would understand that the one Safety System had to work for all the potential forces up to the maximum impact force potentially experienced in the bore hole (as her Honour did in the last bullet point at J [98]) her Honour had thereby construed the patent as requiring that the Safety System be suitable for every conceivable use. Rather, the trial judge simply construed the patent as requiring that the Safety System be suitable for the purposes which the patent itself contemplated. The suggested error was not made by the trial judge.Conclusions on Grounds 1-3 All of the challenges to the trial judge’s reasoning on the meaning of ‘anchor member’ fail. Grounds 1-3 should be rejected.‘Configured to be fixed in a proximal end region of the bore’ (Grounds 4 and 5) There are two debates between the parties in relation to these grounds. First, how far into the bore does the ‘proximal end region of the bore’ extend? The trial judge concluded that this meant ‘at or near the rock-face’ and that it extended ‘a short distance into the bore’: J [181]. The Appellant takes issue with this and submits that the proximal end region of the bore merely means the end of the bore closest to the bore opening. The second debate concerns the word ‘configured’. The trial judge found that ‘configured’ meant that ‘the anchor member was ‘put together, arranged or constructed so it is suitable for the purpose of being fixed in the proximal end of the bore’: J [175]. The Appellant submits that this conclusion does not entail that the device had, in fact, to be fixed in that location and that the trial judge had erred in concluding otherwise. I deal with these two issues in turn.The meaning of ‘proximal end region of the bore’ According to Claim 1, the anchor member must be ‘configured to be’ fixed in ‘a proximal end region of the bore adjacent to a rock-face’. The Appellant and the Respondents agree that ‘proximal end region’ is not a term of art. There are four areas of debate between the parties as to the meaning of the phrase. First, the Appellant submits that the ‘proximal end region’ is the end of the bore closest to the bore opening. Mr Caine for the Appellant submitted that the ‘proximal end’ was to be contrasted with the ‘distal end’ which is the end furthest from the bore opening: T31.35. Thus, the work done by the words ‘adjacent to a rock-face’ is to confirm that the proximal end of the bore is being discussed. I did not apprehend the Appellant to submit that the bore was to be considered as consisting of two halves, one being the proximal half and the other being the distal half. Rather, the point was that the bore had two ends and that ‘adjacent to a rock-face’ reinforced which end Claim 1 was talking about.