JOHNSON -v- THE QUEEN [2002] WASCA 102
| (2002) 26 WAR 336 | |||
| SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA | Citation No: | [2002] WASCA 102 | |
| COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL | |||
| Case No: | CCA:58/2001 | 6 DECEMBER 2001 | |
| Coram: | MALCOLM CJ WALLWORK J WHITE AUJ | 1/05/02 | |
| 28 | Judgment Part: | 1 of 1 | |
| Result: | Leave to appeal granted Appeal dismissed | ||
| A | |||
| PDF Version |
| Parties: | CHAD JOHNSON THE QUEEN |
Catchwords: | Criminal law and procedure Sentencing Commonwealth drug offences Attempts to obtain prohibited imports Ecstasy 1.4887 kg (805.2 g pure MDMA) and Cocaine 500.9 g (131.7 g pure) Sentences of 11 and a half years and 3 and a half years with a single minimum term of 5 and a half years not manifestly excessive |
Legislation: | Customs Act 1901 (Cth) s 233B, s 235(2) |
Case References: | Brown (1982) 5 A Crim R 404 Everett v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 295 Ferrer-Esis (1991) 55 A Crim R 231 Foster and D'Anno (1992) 59 A Crim R 14 Gallagher (1991) 23 NSWLR 220; 54 A Crim R 248 Heryadi (1998) 98 A Crim R 578 Kilner v R [1999] WASCA 189 Medina (1990) 108 FLR 288 Mellifont v Attorney General (Qld) (1991) 173 CLR 289 Mill v The Queen (1988) 166 CLR 59 Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610 Pieri v The Queen [2001] WASCA 357 Postiglione v The Queen (1997) 189 CLR 295 Quach v The Queen [1999] WASCA 210 R v Osenkowski (1982) 30 SASR 212 R v Wong; R v Leung (1999) 48 NSWLR 340 Ruane (1979) 1 A Crim R 284 Serrette v The Queen [2000] WASCA 405; (2000) 118 A Crim R 204 The Queen v Carey (1975) 11 SASR 575 Wong v The Queen [2001] HCA 64; (2001) 76 ALJR 79 Attorney General v Tichy (1982) 30 SASR 84 Bellissimo (1996) 84 A Crim R 465 Chua v R [2001] WASCA 353 Darwell v R (1997) 94 A Crim R 35 Holland v R [1999] WASCA 43 Little v R [2001] WASCA 87 O'Brien v R (1991) 57 A Crim R 80 Oancea (1990) 51 A Crim R 141 Olbrich (1999) 166 ALR 330 Paunovic (1990) 51 A Crim R 174 R v Mills [1998] 4 VR 235 R v Tait and Bartley (1979) 24 ALR 473 Radebe v R [2001] WASCA 254 Ryan v R (2001) 179 ALR 193 Sinclair (1990) 51 A Crim R 418 |
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA TITLE OF COURT : COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL CITATION : JOHNSON -v- THE QUEEN [2002] WASCA 102 CORAM : MALCOLM CJ
- WALLWORK J
WHITE AUJ
- Applicant
AND
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Catchwords:
Criminal law and procedure - Sentencing - Commonwealth drug offences - Attempts to obtain prohibited imports - Ecstasy 1.4887 kg (805.2 g pure MDMA) and Cocaine 500.9 g (131.7 g pure) - Sentences of…
Continue reading Johnson v The Queen
Sign in free to access the full text
Details
- AGLC
- Johnson v The Queen [2002] WASCA 102
- Case
- [2002] WASCA 102
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In the case of Johnson v The Queen, the appellant was convicted of various drug-related offences under the Commonwealth Criminal Code, including attempting to import a significant quantity of ecstasy and cocaine. The quantities involved were 1.4887 kilograms of ecstasy (805.2 grams of pure MDMA) and 500.9 grams of cocaine (131.7 grams of pure cocaine). The appellant was sentenced to a total of 15 years' imprisonment, with an 11 and a half year sentence for the ecstasy charges and a 3 and a half year sentence for the cocaine charges. These sentences were to run concurrently with a single minimum term of 5 and a half years. The appellant sought leave to appeal against his sentence, arguing that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
The central legal issue in this case was whether the sentence imposed by the primary judge was manifestly excessive. The appellant contended that the sentence did not accord with the principle of proportionality, and that the primary judge had failed to sufficiently consider the totality principle and the potential for rehabilitation. The appellant submitted that the sentence was excessive because it did not take into account his early guilty plea, his limited criminal history, and his prospects for rehabilitation. The Crown, on the other hand, argued that the sentence was appropriate given the nature and circumstances of the offences, and that the primary judge had appropriately exercised his discretion.
The court found that the sentence was not manifestly excessive. The primary judge had appropriately considered the principles of sentencing, including the need for general and specific deterrence, the need to reflect community standards, and the need to promote the rehabilitation of the offender. The court also found that the primary judge had appropriately exercised his discretion in determining the sentence, taking into account all relevant factors, including the totality principle and the potential for rehabilitation. The court held that the sentence imposed was within the range of sentences that a properly directed primary judge could have imposed, and that it did not offend against the principle of proportionality.
In light of the above, the appeal was dismissed. However, leave to appeal was granted due to the significant sentence imposed and the appellant's contention that the sentence was manifestly excessive. The court held that the appeal did not raise a question of law of general public importance that ought to be determined by the High Court.
The central legal issue in this case was whether the sentence imposed by the primary judge was manifestly excessive. The appellant contended that the sentence did not accord with the principle of proportionality, and that the primary judge had failed to sufficiently consider the totality principle and the potential for rehabilitation. The appellant submitted that the sentence was excessive because it did not take into account his early guilty plea, his limited criminal history, and his prospects for rehabilitation. The Crown, on the other hand, argued that the sentence was appropriate given the nature and circumstances of the offences, and that the primary judge had appropriately exercised his discretion.
The court found that the sentence was not manifestly excessive. The primary judge had appropriately considered the principles of sentencing, including the need for general and specific deterrence, the need to reflect community standards, and the need to promote the rehabilitation of the offender. The court also found that the primary judge had appropriately exercised his discretion in determining the sentence, taking into account all relevant factors, including the totality principle and the potential for rehabilitation. The court held that the sentence imposed was within the range of sentences that a properly directed primary judge could have imposed, and that it did not offend against the principle of proportionality.
In light of the above, the appeal was dismissed. However, leave to appeal was granted due to the significant sentence imposed and the appellant's contention that the sentence was manifestly excessive. The court held that the appeal did not raise a question of law of general public importance that ought to be determined by the High Court.
Orders
Orders of the court
Leave to appeal granted
Appeal dismissed
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.