Johnson Diversey Australia Pty Ltd v Ferenczfy

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Supreme Court of South Australia

(Full Court)

JOHNSON DIVERSEY AUSTRALIA PTY LTD v FERENCZFY

[2013] SASCFC 59

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Justice Gray, The Honourable Justice Sulan and The Honourable Justice White)

28 June 2013

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - INTERFERENCE WITH DISCRETION OF COURT BELOW - IN GENERAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - FUNCTIONS OF APPELLATE COURT - GENERALLY

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - INTERFERENCE WITH JUDGE'S FINDINGS OF FACT - FUNCTIONS OF APPELLATE COURT - FINDINGS ON ISSUE OF NEGLIGENCE

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - INTERFERENCE WITH JUDGE'S FINDINGS OF FACT - FUNCTIONS OF APPELLATE COURT - OTHER FINDINGS

Appeal by the defendant - where the plaintiff and respondent recovered damages in respect of the negligent conduct of the defendant and appellant following a trial in the District Court - the trial commenced on 3 May 2010, concluded on 10 December 2010 and judgment was delivered on 1 March 2012 - whether the trial Judge's finding that defendant was negligent should be set aside - whether the Judge's assessment of damages was erroneous - whether the case involved operative delay.

Held per Gray and Sulan JJ, White J agreeing: Appeal dismissed - the Judge’s findings of fact are supported by evidence, both on the questions of liability and of damages - there was no operative delay - the Judge followed the correct procedure and provided comprehensive and careful reasons - each of the separate awards made by the Judge was well within his discretion - the overall award of damages was open on the evidence and, in the circumstances, a reasonable award.

Held per White J: On the issue of breach of duty, the Judge adverted specifically to the dangers of hindsight reasoning, and correctly considered the response of a reasonable person looking forward - it is apparent that the Judge assessed the appellant’s breach by reference to a duty to exercise reasonable care - having made findings as to the extent of a plaintiff’s symptoms based on their assessment of the plaintiff’s credibility and other evidence, trial judges may give effect to that assessment, relying on the rationale given in Dibbins v Dibbins (1978) 80 LSJS 165.

Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531; Jones v Hyde (1989) 63 ALJR 349; Abalos v Australian Postal Commission (1990) 171 CLR 167; Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472; Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40; Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422; Terry v Leventeris (2011) 109 SASR 358; New South Wales v Fahy (2007) 232 CLR 486; Ferenczfy v Johnson Diversey Australia Pty Ltd [2012] SADC 22; McVicar v S & J White Pty Ltd (2007) 97 SASR 160; Dibbins v Dibbins (1978) 80 LSJS 165; Benham v Comcare [1990] FCA 190, considered.

JOHNSON…

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Details
Case
[2013] SASCFC 59
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned a decision of the District Court where the plaintiff, Mr Ferenczfy, recovered damages against the defendant, Johnson Diversey Australia Pty Ltd, for negligent conduct. The defendant appealed the trial judge's findings on liability and the assessment of damages, also raising the issue of operative delay.

The appellate court was required to determine whether the trial judge's finding of negligence against the defendant should be set aside, whether the assessment of damages was erroneous, and whether the case had suffered from operative delay.

The appeal was dismissed. The court found that the trial judge's findings of fact, both on liability and damages, were supported by the evidence. The judges agreed that there was no operative delay and that the trial judge had followed the correct procedure, providing comprehensive and careful reasons. Each award made by the trial judge was considered to be within his discretion, and the overall award of damages was deemed to be open on the evidence and reasonable in the circumstances. Specifically, on the issue of breach of duty, the court noted that the trial judge had correctly considered the dangers of hindsight reasoning and had assessed the defendant's breach by reference to a duty to exercise reasonable care, looking forward from the perspective of a reasonable person. The court also found that the trial judge's assessment of the plaintiff's symptoms and ongoing incapacity was a valid exercise of discretion, relying on established principles for giving effect to such assessments.

Orders

Orders of the court

Held per Gray and Sulan JJ, White J agreeing: Appeal dismissed - the Judge’s findings of fact are supported by evidence, both on the questions of liability and of damages - there was no operative delay - the Judge followed the correct procedure and provided comprehensive and careful reasons - each of the separate awards made by the Judge was well within his discretion - the overall award of damages was open on the evidence and, in the circumstances, a reasonable award.

Held per White J: On the issue of breach of duty, the Judge adverted specifically to the dangers of hindsight reasoning, and correctly considered the response of a reasonable person looking forward - it is apparent that the Judge assessed the appellant’s breach by reference to a duty to exercise reasonable care - having made findings as to the extent of a plaintiff’s symptoms based on their assessment of the plaintiff’s credibility and other evidence, trial judges may give effect to that assessment, relying on the rationale given in Dibbins v Dibbins (1978) 80 LSJS 165.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

WHITE J
Once the Judge’s primary findings in regard to injury and ongoing incapacity are accepted, each of the separate awards made by the Judge was well within his discretion. We consider that the overall award of damages was open on the evidence and, in the circumstances, a reasonable award. Conclusion We would dismiss the appeal. I agree that the appeal should be dismissed and agree with the reasons of Gray and Sulan JJ. I particularly associate myself with their reasons for rejecting the appellant’s submission that the reasons of the trial Judge were affected by the passage of time. The Judge’s careful and comprehensive consideration of the evidence, as revealed by his reasons, contradicts that submission. I add, briefly, the following reasons. A principal complaint of the appellant was that the Judge had erred in his consideration of the issue of breach of duty by focussing on what it could have done to avoid the known injury to the respondent, instead of considering the response of a reasonable person looking forward and without knowledge of that injury. The latter is the proper approach.[25] [25] New South Wales v Fahy [2007] HCA 20 at [57]-[58], (2007) 232 CLR 486 at 505-6; Vairy v Wyong Shire Council [2005] HCA 62 at [124]-[129], (2005) 223 CLR 422 at 461-3. In my opinion, consideration of the Judge’s reasons indicates that that criticism is not warranted. The Judge adverted specifically to the dangers of hindsight reasoning.[26] In the preface to his articulation of the appellant’s duty of care, the Judge was careful to consider the position as it was known, or ought to have been known, by the appellant before the occurrence of the respondent’s injury.[27] When considering the question of breach, the Judge referred specifically to the reasons of Hayne J in Vairy[28] and to the similar observations of Doyle CJ in McVicar v S & J White Pty Ltd[29] in which each warned against the use of hindsight reasoning.[30][26] Ferenczfy v Johnson Diversey Australia Pty Ltd [2012] SADC 22 at [9].[27] Ibid at [44] and [45].[28] Vairy v Wyong Shire Council [2005] HCA 62 at [126]-[128]; (2005) 223 CLR 422 at 461-2.[29] [2007] SASC 107 at [36]; (2007) 97 SASR 160 at 168.[30] Ferenczfy v Johnson Diversey Australia Pty Ltd [2012] SADC 22 at [49]-[50]. The appellant was critical of the Judge’s articulation of the duty of care by saying “the defendant owed a duty to exercise reasonable care to ensure that the equipment it supplied and maintained was safe for all reasonably foreseeable uses”.[31] It submitted that the word “ensure” put the duty too stringently. However, that submission overlooks the composite nature of this frequently used formulation of a duty of care and, in particular, fails to have regard to the effect of the words “exercise reasonable care”. Further, and in any event, the Judge later described the duty as one “to exercise reasonable care in its efforts to maintain the integrity of the various connections”.[32] It is apparent that the Judge assessed the appellant’s breach by reference to a duty in these terms.[31] Ibid at [45].[32] Ibid at [47].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: WHITE J