JG v Chief Executive, Department for Child Protection

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Appeal to a Single Judge)

JG v CHIEF EXECUTIVE, DEPARTMENT FOR CHILD PROTECTION & ORS

[2023] SASC 80

Judgment of the Honourable Justice Bampton  

18 May 2023

MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT

FAMILY LAW AND CHILD WELFARE - CHILD WELFARE UNDER STATE OR TERRITORY JURISDICTION AND LEGISLATION - CHILDREN IN NEED OF PROTECTION - GUARDIANSHIP OF CHILDREN

FAMILY LAW AND CHILD WELFARE - CHILD WELFARE UNDER STATE OR TERRITORY JURISDICTION AND LEGISLATION - CHILDREN IN NEED OF PROTECTION - PROCEEDINGS RELATING TO CARE AND PROTECTION

Appeal against a decision of a Youth Court Magistrate granting the Chief Executive of the Department for Child Protection’s application for long-term care and protection orders placing three children under its guardianship until they each attain 18 years of age – the application was opposed by the appellant, who is the children’s biological mother, and their biological father – the application was supported by the children’s legal representative – the appellant contends the Magistrate erred in failing to give due weight to the wishes of the children, by failing to consider that long-term care and protection were the least preferred option under the Children and Young People (Safety) Act 2017 (SA), by failing to take into account the irreversible harm suffered by the children while in State care, and by placing undue weight on past history and the Department for Child Protection’s misrepresented facts – whether there was an error in the exercise of the discretion to make the care and protection orders.

HELD:  Appeal dismissed – the appellant failed to demonstrate any error in the Magistrate’s decision.

Children and Young People (Safety) Act 2017 (SA) ss 7, 8, 11(3), 17, 41, 50, 50(3), 53, 53(1)(g), 55, 59, 62, 62(3), 63(1)(b); Youth Court Act 1993 (SA) ss 22, 22(3); Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 69ZK; Youth Court (Care and Protection) Rules 2018 (SA) r 11(2), referred to.
RS v Chief Executive of the Department for Child Protection [2022] SASCA 58; Lee v Lee (2019) 266 CLR 129; Minister for Child Protection v T, SJ & Ors [2018] SASCFC 46; M, L v Minister for Education and Child Development [2018] SASCFC 131; CDJ v VAJ (No 2) (1998) 197 CLR 172; House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; R v Lutze (2014) 121 SASR 144, considered.

JG v CHIEF EXECUTIVE, DEPARTMENT FOR CHILD PROTECTION & ORS

[2023] SASC 80

Appeal to a single Judge

  1. BAMPTON J: Ms G and Mr M are the biological parents of TM aged 15, TGM aged 13, and CGM aged 11 (“the family”). On 22 August 2022, a Magistrate in the Youth Court made care and protection orders pursuant to s 53(1)(g) of the Children and Young People (Safety) Act 2017 (SA) (“the Act”) in relation to TM, TGM, and CGM (“the children”), placing them under the guardianship of the Chief Executive of the Department for Child Protection (“the…

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Details
Case
[2023] SASC 80
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of JG v Chief Executive, Department for Child Protection, the court was tasked with deciding on a long-term guardianship application brought by the Chief Executive of the Department for Child Protection against the parents of three children. The case concerned the welfare and protection of the children, who had been under the guardianship of the Chief Executive following a care and protection order made by the Youth Court. The parents sought to have the children returned to their care, while the Chief Executive argued that it was not in the children’s best interests to be returned to their parents due to concerns about exposure to domestic violence and substance abuse.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the children should be returned to the care of their parents or remain under the guardianship of the Chief Executive. The court had to weigh the statutory requirements of the Children and Young People (Safety) Act 2017 (SA) against the evidence presented about the children's welfare and the parents' ability to provide a safe and nurturing environment. The court also had to consider the statutory principle that the needs of the children to be heard, have their views considered, and to achieve their full potential should be prioritised.

The court, after conducting a thorough review of the evidence, found no error in the Magistrate's decision to grant the long-term guardianship order to the Chief Executive. The court was satisfied that the evidence demonstrated that returning the children to their parents would expose them to significant risk of harm. The court found that the parents had not sufficiently addressed the underlying issues that led to the children being removed from their care, and that the children themselves expressed a desire not to be involved with their father. The court concluded that the order was in the best interests of the children, taking into account their safety, emotional well-being, and the need to protect them from further harm.

The final orders of the court were to dismiss the parents' appeal against the Youth Court's decision, thereby upholding the long-term guardianship order in favour of the Chief Executive.

Background

Background to the litigation

Facts are to be proved on the balance of probabilities in proceedings under the Act. As noted by the Magistrate in her judgment, whilst the Chief Executive bore the evidentiary onus, if that was met, then pursuant to s 59 of the Act the onus fell on Ms G and Mr M to persuade the Youth Court that the order should not be made. This was because the children were, pursuant to a care and protection order of the Youth Court, under the guardianship of the Chief Executive at the time the Chief Executive’s application was filed on 14 August 2020. Background to the application for the long-term guardianship orders Exhibit CE1 is the trial book filed by the Chief Executive in the Youth Court, comprising documents under the following headings:(1)The Chief Executive’s court documents-long term application(2)Birth Certificates of the Children(3)Mother’s court documents(4)Documents relating to children(5)Reunification Court documents(6)Department for Child Protection documents-short term application(7)Documents relating to mother(8)Documents relating to father(9)Additional documents 12 January 2022, which includes Ms G’s and Mr M’s response and a parenting capacity report prepared by Dr Don Tustin concerning Ms G dated 7 January 2022 Exhibit CE2 is a list of additional documents complied by the Chief Executive’s solicitors comprising a report dated 18 February 2022 prepared by Department for Child Protection social workers (“Departmental workers”) concerning the children, a CAMHS report concerning TGM dated 14 February 2022, a psychologist’s report concerning TM dated 14 February 2022, and a psychologist’s report concerning CGM dated 14 January 2022. The evidence tendered in the Youth Court trial revealed the following history. The Department for Child Protection (“the Department”) had received 10 notifications regarding the family over the period between 2018 to 2020 relating to the children’s exposure to domestic violence, lack of attendance at school, and their trauma-related behaviours at school. The Department’s involvement with the family commenced following reports from South Australia Police (“SAPOL”) that Ms G had contacted SAPOL and given a statement describing an incident in November 2019 where Mr M had pushed her, attempted to strangle her, verbally abused her and damaged property. During this incident, Ms G sustained injuries to her arm. Mr M was charged with two counts of aggravated assault, property damage, reckless driving, and resisting police. SAPOL raised concerns about domestic violence, having regard to their records concerning a domestic violence history dating back to 2006. On 28 November 2019, an interim intervention order was issued by SAPOL against Mr M naming Ms G as the protected person. The interim intervention order prohibited communication between Mr M and Ms G, prohibited Mr M from being within 100 m of Ms G, and prohibited him from entering or remaining within 100 m of Ms G’s place of residence or employment.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Mr Tonkin considered that the children will suffer further damage if they remain in State care and “to return them to their parents who can love them and nurture them appropriately will provide them with a future full of hope and potential”. Mr Tonkin referred to Ms G and Mr M having sent conflicting messages to the Department concerning their relationship. He said that they wanted to placate the Department and that they had not been truthful about their relationship for fear the children would not be returned to them. He also reported that Ms G and Mr M “clearly want their relationship to be successful and in turn want their children to witness what a successful relationship can look like … this is a worthy objective which needs to be supported”. Dr Don Tustin’s report and evidence Dr Don Tustin obtained a master’s degree in psychology in 1973 and has been a registered psychologist since 1977. Dr Tustin, who had been in private practice since 2007, stated he has “expertise in the assessment and treatment of mental health difficulties of parents and children, especially in families where parents are separated or there is a childhood disorder or a parental mental illness or a child protection issue”. Dr Tustin interviewed Ms G on two occasions in late 2021. He interviewed the children together on one occasion in December 2021 and did not speak to Mr M for the purposes of his assessment. Dr Tustin said in his report 7 January 2022 that this was a matter “where impressions gained from reading documents and from interviewing a parent are very different”. He stated there needed to be a judicial determination of how much credit to give the differing sources of information. Dr Tustin reported that he administered a checklist to Ms G for each child. The checklist is used by Dr Tustin to assess specific impacts on children who witness substance abuse. He also administered the checklist to the children during his interview with them. He said one of the reasons he administered the checklist to the children was to determine whether the children wanted to participate in joint therapy with Ms G. He stated all children expressed a desire to participate in healing therapy with their mother, but not their father. Mr Tustin reported that Ms G acknowledged the children had been traumatised by their exposure to domestic violence, and that this together with Mr M’s illicit substance use was why she ended the relationship with Mr M in August 2020. Dr Tustin stated it was clear that in the past Ms G had prioritised her own adult relationship over the wellbeing of her children. He stated that Ms G had told him that she recognised the adverse impact of allowing her children to be exposed to illicit substance use and to domestic violence. He suggested that the Youth Court might consider issuing a supervision order, the children be returned to Ms G’s care, and Ms G makes undertakings to continue to address topics identified in his report. Dr Tustin gave evidence that Ms G told him she would not involve Mr M in parenting the children. In response to the concern raised by the Department that Ms G encouraged the children to reconcile with Mr M, Ms G told Dr Tustin that the two older children were old enough to make their own decisions about seeing Mr M and that she would respect those decisions. Ms G told Dr Tustin in response to the Department’s further concern that she had been too tolerant of Mr M’s harsh parenting style, that she acknowledged that he had used excessively harsh methods of discipline, that she would no longer permit him to engage in discipline of the children and she will protect them from his anger.

Decision

Reasons for decision

For the following reasons, no error has been demonstrated in the Magistrate’s decision to make the order and I dismiss the appeal.Appeal against judgments given in the Youth Court Section 22 of the Youth Court Act 1993 (SA) (“the Youth Court Act”) provides that an appeal from any judgment given by a Magistrate in the Youth Court, other than an interlocutory decision, lies as of right to a single Judge of the Supreme Court. On appeal I am bound to conduct a real review of the evidence given in the Youth Court and of the Magistrate’s reasons for judgment to determine whether the Magistrate erred in fact or law.[1] As the Court of Appeal noted in RS v Chief Executive of the Department for Child Protection,[2] whilst appellate restraint must be exercised concerning the Magistrate’s factual findings, given the advantages enjoyed by the Magistrate, the appellate Court is otherwise in as good a position as the Magistrate to decide on the proper inferences to be drawn from the facts which are undisputed or which, having been disputed, are established by the findings of the Magistrate.[3][1] Lee v Lee (2019) 266 CLR 129, [55] (Bell, Gageler, Nettle and Edelman JJ).[2] [2022] SASCA 58, [10].[3] Lee v Lee (2019) 266 CLR 129, [55] (Bell, Gageler, Nettle and Edelman JJ). The Magistrate’s decision to make the order pursuant to s 53 of the Act involved the exercise of a discretion. As such, “apart from whether the Youth Court made any error of fact or law, the exercise of discretion can only be vitiated where it is demonstrated that the” Magistrate “took into account an irrelevant factor, or ignored a relevant factor, or proceeded on a wrong principle, or misunderstood the facts, or arrived at an unreasonable or plainly unjust result”.[4][4] RS v Chief Executive of the Department for Child Protection [2022] SASCA 58 at [11]; House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, 504-505 (Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ). On appeal I may confirm, vary, or set aside the judgment, or remit the matter for hearing or further hearing.[5][5] Youth Court Act1993 (SA) s 22(3).The Children and Young People (Safety) Act 2017 (SA) The paramount consideration in the administration, operation and enforcement of the Act is to ensure that children and young people are protected from harm.[6] In addition to the paramount consideration, the needs of the children:(1)to be heard and have their views considered; (2)for love and attachment;(3)for self-esteem; and (4)to achieve their full potential,are also to be considered. It is also desirable that the connection of children and young people with their biological family be maintained.[7] [6] Children and Young People (Safety) Act 2017 (SA) s 7.[7] Children and Young People (Safety) Act 2017 (SA) s 8. Part 3 of the Act relevantly prescribes the principles of intervention and of the placement principles. Section 11(1) requires that children and young people who have been removed from the care of a person should be placed in a safe, nurturing, stable and secure environment, preferably with a person with whom they have an existing relationship.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court first examined whether the Magistrate erred in fact or law in her review of the evidence and reasons for judgment of the Youth Court. The Supreme Court noted that it was bound to conduct a real review of the evidence given in the Youth Court and of the Magistrate's reasons for judgment to determine whether the Magistrate erred in fact or law. The court highlighted that while appellate restraint must be exercised concerning the Magistrate's factual findings, the appellate Court is otherwise in as good a position as the Magistrate to decide on the proper inferences to be drawn from the facts which are undisputed or established by the Magistrate. The court found no such error in the Magistrate's review of the evidence and reasons for judgment of the Youth Court.

Next, the court assessed whether the Magistrate correctly exercised her discretion in deciding to make the order under s 53 of the Children and Young People (Safety) Act 2017 (SA). The court reiterated that the exercise of discretion can only be vitiated where it is demonstrated that the Magistrate took into account an irrelevant factor, or ignored a relevant factor, or proceeded on a wrong principle, or misunderstood the facts, or arrived at an unreasonable or plainly unjust result. The court determined that the Magistrate's decision to make the order was correct, as it was made in accordance with the paramount consideration of protecting children and young people from harm, as well as the needs of the children to be heard, have their views considered, for love and attachment, self-esteem, and to achieve their full potential.

The court further considered whether the Magistrate took into account irrelevant factors, ignored relevant factors, proceeded on a wrong principle, misunderstood the facts, or arrived at an unreasonable or plainly unjust result in her decision-making. The court found that the Magistrate appropriately balanced the desirability of maintaining the children's connection with their biological family against their need for protection and nurturing. The Magistrate's decision was based on the best interests of the children, taking into account their exposure to domestic violence and their need for a safe, nurturing, stable, and secure environment.

In addition, the court examined whether the Magistrate's decision to make the order was in accordance with the paramount consideration of protecting children and young people from harm, as well as the needs of the children to be heard, have their views considered, for love and attachment, self-esteem, and to achieve their full potential. The court found that the Magistrate's decision was indeed in accordance with these principles, as it prioritised the children's safety and well-being over maintaining their connection with their biological family.

Finally, the court considered whether the Magistrate appropriately balanced the desirability of maintaining the children's connection with their biological family against their need for protection and nurturing. The court concluded that the Magistrate appropriately balanced these competing interests, taking into account the children's exposure to domestic violence and their need for a safe, nurturing, stable, and secure environment.

In summary, the Supreme Court found that the Magistrate did not err in fact or law in her review of the evidence and reasons for judgment of the Youth Court, correctly exercised her discretion in deciding to make the order under s 53 of the Children and Young People (Safety) Act 2017 (SA), and appropriately balanced the desirability of maintaining the children's connection with their biological family against their need for protection and nurturing. The ratio decidendi of this case is that a Magistrate's decision to make an order under s 53 of the Act must be based on the paramount consideration of protecting children and young people from harm, as well as the needs of the children to be heard, have their views considered, for love and attachment, self-esteem, and to achieve their full potential. The Magistrate must also appropriately balance the desirability of maintaining the children's connection with their biological family against their need for protection and nurturing.