SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Full Court: Case Stated)
MINISTER FOR CHILD PROTECTION v T, SJ & ORS
[2018] SASCFC 46
Judgment of The Full Court
(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, The Honourable Justice Vanstone and The Honourable Justice Nicholson)
7 June 2018
FAMILY LAW AND CHILD WELFARE - CHILD WELFARE UNDER STATE OR TERRITORY JURISDICTION AND LEGISLATION - CHILDREN IN NEED OF PROTECTION - PROCEEDINGS RELATING TO CARE AND PROTECTION - APPLICATIONS
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - OTHER MATTERS - CASE STATED AND RESERVATION OF QUESTION OF LAW
On 7 February 2018, the Minister made application for an order that a child, already subject to a short term order, be placed under the guardianship of the Minister until she attains 18 years of age. The application proceeded pursuant to s 38 of the Child Protection Act 1993 (SA).
On 26 February 2018, some sections of the Children and Young People (Safety Act) 2017 (SA), including s 59, commenced operation. The balance is to commence on 22 October 2018. Section 38 of the Child Protection Act remains in force until that date.
The Judge of the Youth Court reserved three questions of law. The first two questions concern whether section 59 of the new Act - which places the onus of proof onto a person objecting to the order sought - applies to the application. The third question is premised on s 59 applying.
Held, per Vanstone J (Kourakis CJ and Nicholson J agreeing): Section 59 of the Children and Young People (Safety) Act does not apply to an application for a guardianship order made under s 38 of the Child Protection Act.
Youth Court Act 1993 (SA) s 23; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 48(1); Children and Young People (Safety) Act 2017 (SA) s 45(2), s 50(3), s 59; Children's Protection Act 1993 (SA) s 37, s 38, s 38(a1)(a), s 38(2); The Children's Protection Law Reform (Transitional Arrangements and Related Amendments) Act 2018 (SA) s 34(1), s 24(2), referred to.
Thiess v Collector of Customs (2014) 250 CLR 644, applied.
MINISTER FOR CHILD PROTECTION v T, SJ & ORS
[2018] SASCFC 46Full Court: Kourakis CJ, Vanstone and Nicholson JJ
KOURAKIS CJ: I agree with the answers proposed by Vanstone J and with her Honour’s reasons.
VANSTONE J: Pursuant to s 23 of the Youth Court Act 1993 (SA) the Judge of the Youth Court has reserved questions of law arising in proceedings for determination by the Supreme Court.
Section 48(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) provides that the jurisdiction “vested in, or exercisable by the court, shall be exercisable either by the Full Court or by a single judge sitting in court”. On 14 May 2018 the Full Court ordered that this Court consider the three questions reserved.
The questions arise in the factual context provided in the document referring the matter. The facts are given as follows:
1.On 7 February 2018, the Minister for Child Protection (
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- Case
- [2018] SASCFC 46
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether section 59 of the Safety Act, which deals with the burden of proof in certain applications, applied to the Minister's application for a guardianship order under section 38 of the same Act. Specifically, the court had to determine if section 59 imposed an obligation on an objector to prove that a guardianship order should not be made, or if the existing burden on the Minister to satisfy the court of the grounds for the order remained.
The court reasoned that section 59 of the Safety Act had no application to the Minister's application for guardianship. The court found that the language of section 38, which refers to the court's satisfaction rather than an onus of proof, and the conflicting language in section 59(2) regarding whether an order "should not be made," made it unworkable and theoretically unappealing to apply section 59 in this context. Furthermore, once the applicant (the Minister) satisfied the court of the grounds for the application, the location of a burden of proof regarding whether the order should be made would be of little consequence.
Consequently, the court answered the reserved questions as follows: Question 1: No. Question 2: No. Question 3: Does not arise. Nicholson J agreed with the reasons provided by Vanstone J.
Background
Background to the litigation
T's parents contested the application, asserting that the Minister had not adequately demonstrated the necessity for a guardianship order. They argued that T's best interests would be served by remaining in their care, supported by various measures to address the issues that had led to T being in foster care. The parents emphasised their commitment to T's wellbeing and highlighted instances where they had shown care and support for T. They also pointed out that T had expressed a desire to return home, which they believed should be considered in the decision-making process.
The proceedings were marked by a dispute over the interpretation and application of specific statutory provisions, particularly sections 38(a1) and 59 of the Safety Act. The Minister's burden to establish the grounds for the guardianship application was central to the arguments presented by both parties. The parents contended that the language of the statute did not impose an onus of proof on them to demonstrate why the order should not be made, while the Minister argued that the statutory framework required such a burden to be placed on the objector. This disagreement led to the reservation of questions of law for determination by the court.
The case of Minister for Child Protection v T, SJ involves an appeal from a decision made by the Family Court of Australia in South Australia, where the Minister for Child Protection sought to have a child placed under the guardianship of the Minister until the child attained 18 years of age. The matter came before the court after the Family Court reserved questions of law for determination by the Supreme Court of South Australia. The appeal process followed the case stated procedure under the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), where the Family Court referred questions of law and statutory interpretation to the Supreme Court for its determination. This procedure is commonly used when a lower court needs clarification on a point of law to properly decide the case before it.
In this instance, the Family Court considered the application under the Guardianship and Administration Act 1993 (SA) and the Safety Act 2002 (SA), raising questions about the interplay between these statutes, particularly concerning the burden of proof and the application of section 59 of the Safety Act. The Supreme Court was tasked with answering these questions to assist the Family Court in finalising the guardianship application. Throughout the proceedings, key procedural steps included the lodging of the case stated by the Family Court, the consideration of written submissions from both parties, and the oral hearing where the questions were debated. The Supreme Court's decision focused on the interpretation of statutory provisions without delving into the substantive merits of the guardianship application itself.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by examining whether s 59 of the Safety Act applied to the proceedings arising from the Minister's application for the child to be placed under the guardianship of the Minister until the child attained 18 years of age. The court considered the implications of applying s 59 to these proceedings and found that it would be inappropriate to impose such a section on the existing guardianship and custody regime. The court reasoned that the burden of proof on the applicant, as outlined in s 38(a1)(a) of the Family Court Act, would remain the same, placing the burden on the Minister. However, the court found it unsatisfactory to interpret s 38(a1) in conjunction with s 59 of the Safety Act, as it would create conflicting burdens and directions in the proceedings. Consequently, the court concluded that s 59 of the Safety Act had no application in these proceedings.
Regarding the burden of proof in relation to the application and objection under the Safety Act and the Family Court Act, the court noted that even if s 59 applied, it would be unappealing to construe s 38(a1) together with s 59 of the Safety Act as casting burdens in two different directions. The court observed that the language of s 38 refers to the Court's satisfaction rather than an onus of proof. Moreover, the language of s 38(a1)(b) – "that an order should be made" – collides with the language in s 59(2): "that the order should not be made". Thus, the court found that once the applicant satisfies the Court that the grounds of the application have been made out, it is difficult to see that much will turn on the location of a burden with respect to whether an order should be made.
In interpreting s 38(a1) of the Family Court Act in conjunction with s 59 of the Safety Act when considering the Minister's application for guardianship and custody orders, the court found that such an interpretation would be unsatisfactory. The court reasoned that the language of the two sections conflicted, and it was difficult to see that much would turn on the location of a burden with respect to whether an order should be made once the applicant satisfied the Court that the grounds of the application have been made out. Consequently, the court concluded that the questions reserved should be answered as follows: Question 1: No; Question 2: No; and Question 3: Does not arise.
In summary, the court found that s 59 of the Safety Act had no application in the proceedings arising from the Minister's application for the child to be placed under the guardianship of the Minister until the child attained 18 years of age. The court also concluded that it would be unsatisfactory to interpret s 38(a1) of the Family Court Act in conjunction with s 59 of the Safety Act when considering the Minister's application for guardianship and custody orders, as it would create conflicting burdens and directions in the proceedings. The ratio decidendi of this case is that s 59 of the Safety Act has no application in proceedings for guardianship and custody orders, and the court should not interpret s 38(a1) of the Family Court Act in conjunction with s 59 of the Safety Act, as it would create conflicting burdens and directions in the proceedings.